



KREMLYOV
Sergey 10 myths about 1941

The design of the series by the artist S.
Kurbatov The cover design used the painting: Yuon K. F. "Parade. November
1941, 1949





Сергей КРЕМЛЁВ

10
мифов

о 1941 годе



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The tragedy of 1941 became the main trump card of the "liberal" revisionists, professional exposers and defilers of the Soviet past, who, in order to achieve their goals, do not disdain anything - neither juggling, nor distorting facts, nor outright lies: in their "sensational" writings, events are deliberately distorted, losses are overestimated repeatedly, rumors and gossip are presented as the ultimate truth, anti-Soviet myths breed like dung flies in a cesspool

pit...

This book is the best antidote to the "liberal" lies. The leading Russian historian, author of the bestsellers *Beria is the Best Manager of the 20th Century* and *Why Was Stalin Killed?* circumstances of the tragedy of 1941

of the year.

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Dedicated to the generation of my father and mother, Taras Konstantinovich and Ekaterina Ivanovna Brezkun (Kapustyan), the generation that met the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 and brought it to May 9, 1945...

FROM THE AUTHOR: "A FEW WORDS ABOUT MYTHS AND MYTH-CREATION"

My book is called "10 Myths About 1941"... Despite the fact that such a title was determined, in fact, by the order of the Yauza publishing house, I wrote the book myself. And since I took up writing it, it means - with the approach indicated in the title agree.

Yes, in recent years the word "myth" has become commonplace, as well as the word "myth-making". In 2004, the same publishing house "Yauza" published a book by A. Isaev with a very similar title: "Ten Myths of World War II" ... Enough on the shelves of bookstores and other "Myths ...".

But what does the word "myth" mean? How is it interpreted by such, for example, an authoritative expert as Vladimir Dal, the author of *The Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language*? He tells us: "A myth is an incident or a fabulous, unprecedented, fabulous person ..." A more modern Ushakov's dictionary expands this concept: "Myth ... 1. An ancient folk tale about gods or heroes ... 2. Something. legendary, fantastic, fabulous; invention, invention.

These are not heroic times. Perhaps that is why, when people talk about "myths" today, they do not mean stories about heroes, but fiction, fiction. And here in annotations, say, to the book by Mark Solonin "June 22, or When did the Great Patriotic War begin?" it is reported that "the author refutes the already established and new

myths about the causes of catastrophic defeats in the first months of the war, gives an objective, deeply reasoned interpretation of the course of hostilities ...".

Well, there are supposedly enough arguments and facts in Solonin's book ... Although his main conclusion for the "democratized" part of the population of the current "Russian" is not so sensational: the collapse of 1941 is, they say, a natural result of the policy of the "tyrant" Stalin.

They say that if the Nazi regime "rested on lies, demagoguery and terror", then "Stalin put only terror at the basis of his power." Stalin - according to Solonin - "was convinced that universal fear - this is the stone on which his unshakable power will rest", but "the people crushed by terror" could not be raised to the Great Patriotic War. And "the cattle raised to the heights of power - without honor, without faith, without shame and conscience" (this is Solonin about "for life," as he puts it, the generals of the Red Army frightened by 1937) turned out to be completely professionally unsuitable. It, this "cattle" in stripes, fled with the outbreak of the war, along with the civilian authorities, and "together with the escaped authorities, fear also left - and the Red Army, great and terrible, began to rapidly and uncontrollably fall apart" ...

And only, they say, Hitler's stupid policy towards the Russians he conquered, the policy of preserving collective farms in the occupied territories, but refusing to create an "anti-Bolshevik Russian volunteer army and an alternative Russian government", only the atrocities of the invaders raised the people to fight and saved Russia, and at the same time - and "the poorly educated son of a drunken shoemaker", as Mark Solonin certifies Stalin.

Well, the judgments and conclusions for the son of "Private Great War Semyon Markovich Solonin" are unexpected. However, they are generally quite worn out. since the school of propagandists of the "Russian" "liberation" "army" Vlasov in Dabendorf. And it is quite understandable why, before these "conclusions", another "son of a "front-line soldier" - "Victor" "Suvorov" - Rezun, takes off his hat with a bow to the ground.

But here's the thing! The prehistory and history of the Great Patriotic War, and especially the period from the beginning of June 1941 to approximately the end of November 1941, give us so many conflicting facts and information that, if desired and skillful, they can be pulled to "confirm" directly opposite statements. And due to the biased selection of certain documents and facts, many old myths, that is, fictions, about 1941 can be "confirmed", they can be expanded, or new ones can be invented, as Rezun and Solonin did.

However, regarding their "discoveries" it is quite appropriate to note that the new - this is a well-forgotten old one... Fables about the "tyrant" Stalin began to be composed not even in Dabendorf and not even at Trotsky's Mexican villa in Coyocan - there were enough of them already in the early 1920s in Moscow itself.

By the way, indisputable documents and facts can also confirm the basic scheme adopted in the official Soviet historiography, namely: in 1941 only Hitler planned a war against the USSR, and the USSR honestly fulfilled the terms of the 1939 Pact and was subjected to an unprovoked treacherous attack. It caused the loss of the border battle and a deep retreat of our troops. However, the heroic efforts of the entire people and their leadership, led by Stalin and the CPSU (b), during 1941 led to the failure of the German blitzkrieg and created the prerequisites for our future Victory.

But even this scheme, which on the whole is much more true than the schemes of the Rezunians, will, alas, be far from being objective and truly historical.

So is it possible to get not an "objective, deeply reasoned *interpretation* of the course of hostilities" at the beginning of 1941, but an objective *picture of them?*
"Interpretation" - according to the same Ushakov's dictionary - is "this or that understanding,

interpretation of ... something. But what we need is not *an interpretation* of the facts, but their **knowledge** - in full (which is very rare in reality) or at least in a representative (which is more real) volume!

And if we *know* these *representative* facts, then we will *understand* everything correctly!

But what kind of knowledge does such a "myth-fighter" provide us with, like, say, Mark Solonin?

But, for example, like this ... Declaring on pages 468 - 469 of his book that the only one "requiring neither acquaintance with subordinates, nor intelligence of the enemy, nor knowledge of military equipment," the universal rule for the Soviet command at all levels was "thundering" and "rumbled" "at all headquarters, trenches and dugouts" the rule "At any cost!", Mark Solonin cites as an example the battles on the famous "Nevsky Piglet" and further writes:

"In the autumn of 1941, after the blockade of Leningrad was established, a tiny bridgehead remained in our hands ... with an area of 2 by 3 km. On the "Nevsky Piglet" it was possible to deploy a rifle battalion, from strength - a regiment ... "Nevsky Piglet" could not have ... no significant role in breaking the blockade ... Nevertheless, this "bridgehead" was ordered to be held. At any cost. They kept him. 400 consecutive days. German artillery shot through every meter of this huge mass grave. The total number of exterminated (with this epithet Solonin lays in the subconscious of readers a hint that the blame for the "extermination" is not on the Germans, but on Stalin. - S.K.) in this damned place of soldiers is estimated by various researchers at 200 - 300 thousand people. Human. For reference: in the first six months of the war (by December 31, 1941), the Wehrmacht lost 209,595 soldiers and officers on the Eastern Front killed and missing [74. S. 97; 12, p. 161]..."

Further, I will have to dwell more than once on the "discoveries" of "researchers" such as Solonin or Rezun, but in order for the reader to understand whether it is worth trusting their data and conclusions recklessly, I will provide the following information ...

In 1993, the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published a statistical study "The classification has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and conflicts, edited by Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev. Not free from inaccuracies (inevitable in such a study), on the whole this edition should be regarded as a kind of normative and reliable source for any historian. And the source is quite accessible. In the list of "used" literature in the book of M. Solonin, he goes, by the way, for No. 35.

I don't know how and for what purposes the author of the book about June 22 used it, but page 167 of the Military Publishing House contains data on the Leningrad strategic defensive operation (it lasted 83 days, from July 10 to September 30, 1941). Irretrievable losses of the Northern (Leningrad), North-Western Fronts and the Baltic Fleet - 214 thousand 078 people. These are the losses of two **fronts** and one **fleet**. Generally!

Page 184 contains data on Operation Iskra to break the blockade of Leningrad (lasted 19 days, from January 12 to January 30, 1943). Irretrievable losses of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts - 33,940 people.

Page 199 contains data on the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic operation (lasted 48 days, from January 14 to March 1, 1944). Irretrievable losses of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, the 2nd Baltic Front and the Baltic Fleet - 76,686 people.

Page 247 contains data on the losses of personnel of the Leningrad Front for the entire period of hostilities - 1353 days. A total of 332,059 people were killed and died during the stages of medical evacuation (26,789 officers, 64,523 sergeants and 240,747

soldier). At the same time, losses in the dead and dead during the sanitary evacuation by war years: for 1941 - 62,187 people, for 1942 - 62,747 people, for 1943 - 74,473 people, for 1944 (the year of the active offensive) - 122,999 people, for 1945 - 3653 person.

Finally, page 301 provides data on the total losses of personnel of the Baltic Fleet for all 1418 days of the war. A total of 19,836 people (3,001 officers, 4,038 foremen and sergeants, and 12,797 sailors and soldiers) were killed and died during the stages of sanitary evacuation.

So where did Mark Solonin get the figure of 300 thousand "exterminated" defenders from just a "patch" near Neva Dubrovka? This is not a typo, not an involuntary mistake or inaccuracy. This is deliberate, malicious and malicious misinformation of the reader. In essence, this is a historical forgery.

Yes, "Nevsky Piglet" is a joint and important *for* the defense of Leningrad feat of the army and sailors. And our losses there were almost continuous, huge for a limited sector of the front ... I remember how a veteran in a shabby jacket heard two words from me, "Neva Dubrovka?" after his statement that he fought in a marine brigade near Leningrad, he could not hold back his tears ... Yes, it was a tragic and heroic episode, but - only an **episode** in the large-scale Leningrad epic! And the episode, maliciously distorted and slandered by Solonin.

The bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva near the village of Nevskaya Dubrovka was created on the night of September 20, 1941 by units of the 115th Infantry Division, Major General V.F. Konkov and the 4th Marine Brigade, Major General B.N. Nenasheva, and it had a frontal length of up to 4 km and a depth of up to 800 meters. The Germans launched violent counterattacks in order to eliminate this supposedly "worthless" - according to Solonin - bridgehead, and as a result, it was reduced to 2 km along the front. Up to 50,000 shells, mines and air bombs per day fell upon it - such efforts are not made in relation to unnecessary positions. In the spring of 1942, when the ice drift cut off a "patch" from the right bank of the Neva, the Germans liquidated the bridgehead on April 29, but on September 26, 1942, the troops of the Neva Operational Group again captured this bridgehead and held it (already in less difficult conditions) until the blockade was broken Leningrad in January 1943. Then the 45th Guards Rifle Division advanced from this bridgehead, pinning down significant parts of the enemy on the right flank of the front's strike force. By the way, this division, previously the 70th rifle division, on the Nevsky Piglet became the guards division - the first on the Leningrad front.

However, this is not all ... With regard to the number of German losses, Mark Solonin commits, in fact, no less malicious and malicious forgery, although not actual, but systemic. Citing data on the losses of the Wehrmacht for the first half of the war, he refers to two sources. Number 74 on his list of references is a book by T.G. Ibatullina "War and captivity" (St. Petersburg, 1999). Without having it at hand, I can not say anything about this source. But here is No. 12 in Solonin's exile - this is the famous "War Diary" of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder. His official diary, which he kept personally, - also a normative document for any researcher. Solonin, citing the number of losses of the Wehrmacht in Russia in 1941, refers to the 3rd volume of the "Diary ...", published by the Military Publishing House in 1971. Specifically, on page 161.

Actually, volume 3 is published in two books, and the exact reference should take this into account (pages numbered 161 are in both books). But it is clear that this refers to the entry dated January 5, 1942 - for the 198th day of the war, placed on page 161 of the second book of the 3rd volume:

"Losses from June 22 to December 31, 1941: Wounded - 19,016 officers, 602,292 non-commissioned officers and privates; killed - 7120 officers, 166,602 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing - 619 officers, 35,254 non-commissioned officers and privates.

In total, 26,755 officers and 804,148 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men were lost.

The total losses of ground forces on the Eastern Front amount to 830,903 people, that is, 25.96 percent of the strength of all ground forces in the East (3.2 million people) ...".

If we sum up Halder's data on the dead and missing, then we really get the figure given by Solonin of 209,595 German losses by the end of 1941.

But!

First ... Halder made all the entries in the diary exclusively for himself, transcribing them. By virtue of this alone, his loss data cannot be considered accurate. They are in Halder's diary of a purely operational nature and, of course, underestimated - not by Halder, of course. The reason is quite understandable: what kind of field commander, even at the divisional or corps level, will report "upstairs" complete data on ever-increasing losses in real time!

Second... Solonin summarizes Halder's data only on the combat losses of the Wehrmacht killed and missing. But there is also a category of losses at the stages of sanitary evacuation. The 1993 Military Publishing House's reference book on the Red Army and the RKKF provides data on irretrievable losses in precisely this formulation: "killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation," including our losses near Leningrad. And if Halder recorded the losses of the Wehrmacht, taking into account sanitary losses, then the result would, of course, be significantly higher.

Thirdly... Halder recorded only the losses of the Wehrmacht, but the Luftwaffe, say, also had its own ground forces already in 1941. Most importantly, Halder could not include and, of course, did not include the losses of the Waffen-SS in the Wehrmacht loss figure. And SS units were widely used on the Eastern Front from the very beginning of the war, they fought effectively and boldly, which is why they suffered very considerable losses.

Fourth ... On the Eastern Front in 1941, not only Germans fought and suffered losses, but also Italians, Hungarians, Romanians, Finns, Slovaks, Croats, Spaniards ... Only the armed forces of Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland during the war had irretrievable losses officially in 1.7258 million people. For comparison - Germany officially lost 6.9237 million people in battles on the Soviet-German front. That is, the losses of Germany's allies amounted to almost 25% of the losses of the Germans. Therefore, to the figure of 209,595 people, Solonin and his ilk can confidently add at least 50 thousand people. Plus the loss of SS units, plus the loss of the Luftwaffe and a number of specialized units (for example, battalions of state labor service) and plus those who died in hospitals. No, **the full** final figure, with **a full** calculation of the losses of the Nazi bloc, hardly looks very rosy for the Germans, their allies and Corned beef with Rezun ...

For comparison: according to the reference book of the Military Publishing House of 1993, our losses for 1941 amounted to 465.4 thousand people killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation and 101.5 thousand people who died from wounds in hospitals. But these are the results of the most difficult war year, when the heroism and devotion to the Motherland of some were mixed with cowardice and betrayal of others!

I took for analysis one of the passages of Mark Solonin almost "offhand", but almost any of his "discoveries" can be analyzed in the same detail and with the same final results. But if such an analysis is dealt with in detail, this lesson will hardly be entertaining for many. To understand what certain substances smell like, it is not at all necessary to delve into them for a long time. If, of course, everything is in order with the sense of smell.

In addition, my book is just a brief outline of the situation in 1941, and the number of "ten myths" selected by me for analysis does not even to a small extent exhaust the entire array of myths that have accumulated about 1941 - ingenuously sincere, oaky-official, frenziedly embittered, ordered as part of the psychological war against Russia, pompously ignorant, half-knowing, spiteful or simply intelligent "show off". Actually, the number "ten" was determined by the conditions of the publishing series. But I tried to form a representative set of these myths from the point of view of the overall picture, and the reader himself will appreciate how much I succeeded.

In this preface, it remains for me to say the following ... Having accepted this work about 1941 at the suggestion of the Yauza publishing house, I, already more thoroughly than before, getting acquainted with the problem and sources, was unpleasantly surprised by the fact that, for all seeming abundance of literature on the topic of June 22, 1941, I almost did not find anything adequate enough for this topic and considering it fully and

complex.

Even in books that impress me, quite convincing when read them objectively, behind the verbosity of sound arguments, conceptuality is often lost ... Sometimes the authors of honest and very necessary books today are let down by excessive emotionality and overlaps associated with it ...

In books like Rezunovsky-Soloninsky, a kaleidoscope of twitched facts, figures, unit numbers, descriptions of certain military operations are annoyingly flickering, but even if there are no direct forgeries and overexposures characteristic of books of the latter type, the facts and data given give only a fragmentary truthful representation about certain circumstances of the summer and autumn of the first war year and at the same time do not give a general truthful picture. Indeed, as I have already said, everything can be found in the events of those days - and numerous examples of not only competent, but simply brilliant actions of the commanders of many formations and units of the Red Army, and examples of not only mediocre, but simply idiotic actions of the Red Army command of all degrees.

How to be? What to rely on, what to take as a basis? After all, I had to write not a major comprehensive work, but a short essay. This form was dictated by the publishing task, the tight deadlines, and my personal attitude - I decided that I could say a lot in a small book.

That is why in the end I came to a certain thought that seemed to me fruitful and non-trivial. "And why," I thought, "not to use the testimonies and assessments of one of the leaders of that war from the German side as one of the main sources of reliable information about those days and events? Why not rely on the data of the very Colonel-General of the Wehrmacht Franz Halder, the meaning of the "War Diary" of which cannot be questioned even by "Victor" "Suvorov", even Mark Solonin, even any malicious anti-Stalinist?" The word "unique" is now often used incorrectly, but Halder's case is truly unique, that is, inimitable and incomparable. Halder turned out to be the only military commander of the highest rank in world military history who personally kept daily records of his daily service activities during the war (only from October 10 to November 4, 1941, records were not kept, since Halder, while riding horseback, fell from horse, received a severe dislocation of the right collarbone and could not write for almost a month).

I reasoned: "If I involve in my allies to expose the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian myths about 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (Des Generalstabes des Heeres) of the Wehrmacht General Halder, who kept daily records of the course of the war from June 22, 1941 to September 29, 1942, then his evidence will be more convincing than any of my own arguments!

I came to the idea of the expediency of such an approach when, having started work on the book and leafing through Halder's personal diary, I began to look for in it - it would seem that I was already well known - such data that ...

In short, the reader of this book will be able to form his own opinion about whether I did the right thing by asking General Halder for help, and whether the data in his Diary debunk the malicious myths about 1941.

I remind you that the author offers the reader only a brief essay, which, in principle, is not capable of giving **a detailed** picture of those events. But the **big** picture, I hope, he reflects. And looking at this picture with a look that is not clouded by malice towards the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, you see the historical correctness and greatness of that era, which has long been called the era of Stalin, and the historical correctness and greatness of not the creator of this era (any era is created by the active, best part of the people), and the first figure of this era was the Bolshevik-Leninist Joseph Stalin.

INTRODUCTORY EXPLICATION: "ON THE EUROPEAN SITUATION IN 1940-1941"

The word "explication" (from the Latin *explicatio* - deployment, explanation) is used, as a rule, in relation to the text explaining the meaning of symbols and symbols on plans and maps. However, it will probably be appropriate to define the essence of the introductory section to this book, because I really need to explain something to the reader about how I imagine the world, and above all the European, situation in 1940-1941.

On September 29-30, 1938, an agreement was signed in Munich on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, bordering the Reich, to Germany. Since out of the approximately fourteen million population of the Versailles "remake" - Czechoslovakia, the Germans were the second national minority after the "titular" nation, the Czechs - there were up to three and a half million of them, even slightly more than the Slovaks, then in Munich, in fact, the right of nations to self-determination triumphed.

As for the Schweik nation, by the thirties of the twentieth century it had neither the common sense of this main national hero, nor the former, long-lost ability for self-sacrifice and resistance, characteristic of its forgotten national heroes Jan Hus and Jan Zizka. And in March 1939, after the president of Czechoslovakia, Hach, legitimately elected by the Czechs themselves, "handed the fate of the Czech nation into the hands of the Fuhrer", the Germans entered Prague, and the Czech Republic was transformed into the imperial protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, whose president until 1945 remained *that* or Gakh.

One of the most amusing falsifications of history (amusing because it is easily exposed by any attentive schoolboy) is the assertion that Hitler "occupied *Czechoslovakia*." Firstly, in international legal terms, he did not occupy it, but took it under the imperial hand with the consent of the head of the Czech state himself and without the slightest armed opposition of the Czech people. Secondly, the protectorate was formed on the lands of the Czech Republic only, and *Slovakia*, through the mouth of the Slovak Sejm, proclaimed itself an independent state, headed by President Master Tiso. And the world fully recognized this act. The USSR also recognized it, because it established official diplomatic relations with Slovakia. Finally, let's not forget that a little over half a century after Munich, Czechoslovakia was dismembered not by the "totalitarian" Austrian German Hitler, but by the completely "democratic" Czech Czech Havel, thus confirming the artificiality of "Czechoslovakia".

Further, on the night of March 22-23, 1939, the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Urbshis signed an agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the German Empire on the transfer of the Klaipeda region to the Reich. This act is also presented as an act of Nazi violence against Lithuania. However, in reality this was just a restoration of justice, since the German Memel region, after the defeat of the Germans in the First World War, taken under the control of the Entente in 1920, was presented to the last Lithuania in 1923. But at the end of 1938, in the elections in Klaipeda-Memel, local Nazis received the votes of 90% of the voters. Taking into account the fact that the elections were held in the province, which still belongs to Lithuania, this figure does not need comments.

The last serious "sick" problem of Europe was Danzig and the Polish "corridor". The ancient Polish-German (and by the 20th century, almost without exception German) city of Gdansk-Danzig after the First World War was declared a "free city" - the "Republic of Danzig" under the mandate of the League of Nations. And the territory of Germany was cut by a narrow "corridor" that connected Poland with the sea, but separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Such a decision of the Entente and the United States was vile in relation not only to the Germans, but also in relation to the whole of Europe and the whole world, because in itself it programmed a future European conflict. All smart people understood this in real time, but I will note only Lloyd George's Fontainebleau memorandum of March 25, 1919, where he wrote:

"If in the end Germany feels that she was unfairly treated in the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1919, she will find means to obtain compensation from her conquerors ... The maintenance of peace will ... depend on the removal of all causes of irritation, which constantly raises the spirit patriotism; it will depend on justice, on the consciousness that people act honestly in their desire to compensate for losses ... The injustice and arrogance shown in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven."

*For these reasons, I strongly oppose the transfer of a large number of Germans from Germany to the rule of other states ... I cannot help but see the reason for a future war in the fact that the German people, who have sufficiently shown themselves to be one of the most energetic and small states. The peoples of many of them (Lloyd George could have said more specifically - Czech Republic and Poland. - **S.K.**) could never create stable governments for themselves before, and now a mass of Germans will fall into each of these states, demanding reunification with their homeland. The proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs to transfer 2,100 thousand Germans under the rule of a people of a different religion, a people that throughout its history has not been able to prove that it is capable of stable self-government, in my opinion, should sooner or later lead to a new war in Eastern Europe "*

In my opinion, this document alone is enough to justify Germany's position on the "Polish" question in 1939 and unequivocally condemn Poland's position. Not only did the Poles not want to hear about changing the bastard "status quo", they did not even want to have real guarantees of it, because the only real guarantee could be a tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet treaty guaranteeing Poland. The Poles not only did not agree to the entry of Soviet troops into Poland in the event of a German attack on it, they denied a potential Russian ally even airfields - even after the Germans invaded Poland. The position of Poland led to a deadlock in the military negotiations between the USSR and Britain and France, which began in Moscow on August 12, 1939. However, the position of the Anglo-French led the situation in the same direction - to a dead end. It was possible, however, from the point of view of the "allies", and another option - such a "general" war with Germany, when approximately 80-90% of the military efforts would fall on the USSR.

And the Reich strongly demanded from Poland a speedy solution to the problem of the "Corridor" through, for example, a referendum under international control. If the inhabitants of the "Corridor" spoke in favor of leaving it as part of Poland, Germany should have received the right either to dig an underground tunnel for communication with East Prussia, or to build an above-ground extraterritorial transport overpass through the "Corridor". If the population voted for Germany, Poland should have received the right to extraterritorial communication with the Polish port of Gdynia and Danzig, returned to the Reich.

The Poles refused, because the "leadership" of Poland was led from London and Paris, and ultimately from Washington. And *this* overseas leadership in Europe needed war, not peace. Moreover, the war between Germany and Poland, according to the plans of this leadership, was to develop into a war between Germany and Soviet Russia.

Since Stalin and Russia did not need war, on August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, which, by the way, was based (it is often forgotten) on the Soviet-German neutrality treaty of 1926, extended by Hitler in 1933 year and in force at the time of the signing of the 1939 Pact.

I will give only two real-time assessments of this Pact. The first belongs to 80-year-old Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov, a famous cadet, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government:

"Stalin's agreement with Hitler on the neutrality of Russia ...

Western democracies - if they decide to go to war with Germany, they will make such a decision voluntarily, after the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty on August 23 ...

Does any of the Russians really want the whole burden of the allied war against the mighty army of Hitler to fall on one still unarmed Russia? What was Stalin guilty of here? That he preferred neutrality and thereby gained time?

The pact is clearly not directed against democracies, and if the map of the world turns out to be different than what the democratic states expected, then the reasons for this must be sought in their own policy, and not in the policy of the USSR ... "

And here is a quote from the encryption of the Moscow Ambassador of France Nadzhari to Paris:

"The deal of 23 August is not the treacherous blow to Poland and us that Germany wanted."

It was true. At the same time, it was also true that the Pact excluded the perfidy of France and England in relation to Russia and objectively forced Poland to a realistic position. Alas, Poland and reality are incompatible things... Despite its obvious wrong, Poland did not agree to a peaceful compromise with the Reich.

Such was the prehistory of the German-Polish war that began on September 1, 1939. Through the efforts of England and France, under the backstage leadership of the United States, it immediately turned into a pan-European war with the prospects of it developing into a world war in the interests of the United States.

However, the Pan "arrogant" Poland collapsed so quickly that no one expected it, in the first place - Hitler himself. It would seem that the obligations of England and France to guarantee the "independence" of the completely rotten - as it turned out -

"states" could be considered exhausted. And it would be wise to start peaceful consultations with the aim of de-escalating the conflict. Nevertheless, England and France were more and more swaggering and, having declared war on Germany after September 1, 1939, they did not turn it off.

This state of affairs was planned in advance by the international Golden Elite, and therefore there could be no talk of any peace between England and France with Germany. However, until the spring of 1940, the Anglo-French war with the Reich was almost bloodless and rightly received the name "strange". At the same time, Hitler had nothing against ending this "war" ...

In early February 1940, Washington announced its intention to send its special representative, Sumner Welles, to Europe. The official statement on the purpose of the trip emphasized: *"Mr. Welles has not received the authority to make proposals or make commitments on behalf of the US government ... His trip is undertaken only for the purpose of informing the President and the US Secretary of State about the current situation in Europe."*

On February 12, 1940, General Halder wrote down information received from the German Foreign Ministry in his diary:

"Sumner Welles. His itinerary: Rome, Berlin, Paris, London. Tasks: a) collection of information; b) preparation of proposals for mediation on the following two conditions: restoration of the Polish state; restoration of Czechoslovakia in accordance with the Munich Agreement.

No interference in the internal affairs of Germany. No excessive reparations. American aid: money to support European currencies, to help get European trade on its feet..."

Alas, it was only a peaceful "packaging" of Welles' visit, inside of which was contained an ambulance *real* war.

On February 17, 1940, the Yankees sailed from the New to the Old World, on February 23 he was already there and began a series of soundings in the leading European capitals. Welles had his first meeting with Mussolini on February 26, departed Rome on February 29, and spoke with Hitler on March 2. Then followed Paris, London and again Rome. Welles, by the way, did not visit Moscow.

After conducting his soundings, Welles departed overseas, but in conversations in London and Paris, the American emissary firmly promised the allies participation in future military events of the United States. And in fact, by the mission of Welles, America, without yet getting involved in battles directly, ensured the future big war politically. This war was to exhaust and weaken Europe and enrich and strengthen the United States.

If peace came soon, then Germany would quickly become the economic (and then political) leader of some United States of Europe in line with the German ideas of Central Europe. England and Germany could restore and develop joint projects in the spirit of the Dusseldorf Agreement on Mutual Economic Cooperation concluded only in February 1939, but already half-forgotten.

The Soviet Union, friendly to Germany and becoming more and more economically strengthened, in the new situation would acquire more and more complex power and, accordingly, more and more influence on European and world affairs.

Italy would be drawn into new European orbits in a way that would benefit Italy and Europe, and not the United States.

France in such a Europe would also find a quite worthy place, as well as others European countries.

But America did not need *such* a Europe, and with the beginning of the spring of 1940, a new round of European confrontation began - "Norwegian". Moreover, the British themselves provoked the Germans into action, which is clearly seen from the conversation of the Soviet envoy Maysky with the Norwegian envoy in London Kolban. In response to Maisky's question whether the Norwegians were afraid of the German occupation, Kolban said that they were rather afraid of rash actions "on the part of our English friends."

There was reason for such fears. Say, on March 6, 1940, General Halder wrote in his diary:

"England, like France, demanded permission from Norway and Sweden to let their troops through. The Fuhrer intends to act. By 10.03 the preparation will be completed. March 15 - Operation Weserübung begins.

Formally, the Anglo-French demanded a passage of troops to ensure their military assistance to the Finns in their war with the USSR. But just on March 6, 1940, a Finnish delegation headed by Ryti left for Moscow to make peace. And London needed troops in Norway to block the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany through Norwegian ports. The British offered the Norwegians extensive military support in the event of providing ports, covering Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, Narvik ... The landing of the British in Norway was planned no later than March 20, 1940, and the first echelon was supposed to be transported by sea to Narvik on March 15. Even before that, Churchill - then the Minister of Marine - intended to mine the Norwegian **territorial** waters - without the consent of Norway, of course.

London both wanted and pricked.

Denmark, in the event of the occupation of Norwegian territory by English troops, would be an advantageous potential continental base for English troops oriented towards Germany itself, as well as an important naval base for the English fleet.

This is the state of affairs under which the German envoys in Copenhagen and Oslo on April 9, 1940 at 5 o'clock in the morning handed memorandums to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Norway stating that henceforth Germany would take over the military protection of Denmark and Norway from possible Anglo-French aggression and from for this purpose introduces its troops into their territory. At this time, the German ships had already been at sea for more than a day on their way to Norway.

The occupation of Norway was clearly a preventive measure - Hitler only slightly forestalled the British occupation of Norway. As for the "occupation" of Denmark, since it offered no resistance, Denmark actually retained its sovereignty at that time. In any case, even after its "occupation" by the Germans, Denmark and Germany retained their embassies in Copenhagen and Berlin. Denmark also maintained diplomatic relations with the outside world, including the Soviet Union. Back in 1941, the USSR and Denmark signed another trade agreement for 1942.

The "strange" war continued... The "moment of truth" came for France shortly after the start of the powerful German offensive in northern France. In the early morning of May 10, 1940, units of the Wehrmacht moved to France and at 5:35 without a declaration of war entered the territory of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.

As in the First World War, this was such a logical step for the Germans that it was foreseen in advance by the Anglo-French, and already at 0645 hours on May 10, the 1st French Army Group of General Billot and the English Expeditionary Force received an order to implement the plan "D", according to which the allied troops were to enter "neutral" Belgium with the left wing and take control of the border along the mouth of the Scheldt before the German troops approached it, and two mobile French formations - advance to the area of Tilburg, Breda and establish contact with the "neutral" Dutch!

Such plans are not drawn up in seventy minutes, and plan "D" was adopted on November 17, 1939. It provided for the immediate entry of allied troops into Belgium if the Germans entered there. After all, the Germans had one reasonable option: an attack on France through Belgium. The powerful Maginot Line covered the entire Franco-German border and stretched to Sedan along the border with Luxembourg and the southern section of the Franco-Belgian border. There she broke off, dictating to the Germans the only reasonable

strategic decision: break through to France, bypassing the Maginot line through Belgium and Luxembourg.

On May 15, 1940, the Dutch, who got involved in someone else's fight, capitulated, and on May 25, the Belgians. Soon the Gauls received their catastrophe. On June 14, the Germans occupied Paris without a fight, and on June 22, in Compiègne, the French representatives signed the terms of France's surrender.

On June 24, a truce was concluded between France and Italy, which declared war on France on June 10 - "under the curtain" of events.

England, having received its Dunkirk at the end of May 1940, was expelled from the continent, but not a single German bomb has yet fallen on its territory. More In addition, during the triumphal honoring of the winners in the Reichstag, Hitler in mid-July 1940 publicly offered peace to England.

However, the Golden Elite of the world needed a long and bloody war. Therefore, the confidant of this Elite, Churchill, rejected Hitler's peace proposals. And the Germans began to prepare the operation "Sea Lion" to invade the English Isle, simultaneously deploying aerial bombardments of the territory of England.

This is how the situation in Western Europe developed in 1940. Outwardly, everything was more than successful for the Reich, but in fact Hitler found himself in an increasingly difficult situation.
position.

Unlike Germany, the position of the Soviet Union by the autumn of 1940 improved dramatically, although there were some "pitfalls".

On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The current "democrats" like the "political scientist" Arbatov Jr. are trying to qualify this action as "participation in the division of Poland", but at the same time they only demonstrate an elementary ignorance of history, because there are already two words - "Curzon Line" - put everything in its place.

Curzon's line (named after British Foreign Minister J. Curzon) - this is the conditional name of the line passing through Grodno - Yalovka - Nemirov - Brest Litovsk - Dorogusk - Ustilug, east of Grubeshov (Khrubeshov), through Krylov and further, west of Rava-Russkaya, east of Przemyśl to the Carpathians. This line, corresponding to the ethnographic boundaries, was developed by the territorial commission of the Paris Peace Conference and adopted by the Supreme Council of the Entente on December 8, 1919 as the eastern border of Poland. On July 10, 1920, at a conference in Spa, the Poles agreed to recognize it, but after the failure of the RSFSR in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, these Russian lands were ceded to Poland under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921.

Now, in 1939, we returned them, and Western Ukraine was reunited with all of Ukraine, and Western Belarus with Belarus.

After the fall of Poland, the Soviet Union, in agreement with Germany and after the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders with it in September 1939, in October 1939 concluded mutual assistance pacts with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Soviet troops entered the territory of the Baltic States.

This was fully justified - the small nations of the Baltic never had a chance for genuine state independence, but only Russia, even the tsarist one, provided them with a national identity. Otherwise, the Lithuanians would have become Polonized long ago, the Latvians would have been Germanized, and the Estonians would have either been "finnized", or if Russia had not taken Finland under its hand at the beginning of the 19th century after the last Russo-Swedish war, they would have been "Swedish" together with the Finns.

By the end of the 30s of the 20th century, the three Baltic peoples had little choice - either to remain as peoples under the patronage of Russia, or gradually become Germanized under the patronage of Germany. At the same time, the masses preferred Russians, the ruling stratum -

the Germans, even better - the British, and even better - the Yankees. But the British were across the seas, the Yankees were across the ocean, and the Germans were right at hand.

Having solved the Baltic problem, Stalin set about solving the "Finnish" problem. In 1939, our border with the Finns was such that heavy artillery from Finnish positions could shell Leningrad. And in Finland itself, someone publicly talked about the great Finland to the Urals!

When the Finns refused Russia's generous offers to exchange territories, the cannons began to speak. The West responded to the start of the Soviet-Finnish war with the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, while Germany supported us politically (later all Soviet sources claimed the opposite).

Our military failures at the end of 1939 were replaced by powerful breakthroughs in the Finnish defense at the beginning of 1940. The Anglo-French were preparing expeditionary corps for the war in Finland. And on March 7, 1940, French Prime Minister Daladier told Finnish Ambassador Holman in Paris that the Allies were waiting for Finland to appeal to them in order to "rush to her aid by all means," and that he, Daladier, did not understand why such an appeal was being postponed. However, the Finns were exhausted and exhausted. And on March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was signed.

Our border with the Finns moved beyond Vyborg. In 1812, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian province of Vyborg to the newly acquired Grand Duchy of Finland. Now she was returning to Russia along with the second largest city in Finland, Viipuri-Vyborg.

We also received the Hanko Peninsula - on lease for our naval and air base. Murmansk and the Murmansk railway were now well covered by the new territories. Previously, Murmansk was easily vulnerable from the neighboring Finnish (and now our) islands, and the road was easily cut.

We have fully regained Lake Ladoga - previously cut in two by the border - with the town of Sortavala on its shore.

The English General Ironside, having learned about all this, did not hide his bitterness. "We suffered a second defeat," he said, referring to the first Poland.

The French were not limited to comments. On March 15, 1940, Paris refused to extend the Soviet-French trade agreement, and an arrest was made on the amounts that French firms were supposed to pay us. And on March 26, our envoy Surits was declared "persona non grata", and the French demanded his recall. On April 26, 1940, the French authorities seized the valuables of our trade mission.

In the distant Far Eastern waters, French and English cruisers began to threaten our merchant traffic. On March 28, 1940, the British and French detained two Soviet steamships Selenga and Vladimir Mayakovsky, arrested their crews and took the ships first to French Haiphong and Saigon, and then to English Hong Kong. And our ambassador Maisky spent weeks seeking the truth in the Foreign Office, and the British stubbornly sought an answer from him to the question - were the cargoes destined for Germany?

But on February 11, 1940, a new economic agreement was concluded with the Germans. From our side, it was signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Mikoyan and trade representative in Germany Babarin, from the German side by Dr.

Pravda published a joint communiqué about this, stating:

"The economic agreement provides for the export from the USSR to Germany of raw materials, offset by German supplies to the USSR of industrial products.

The trade turnover between Germany and the USSR in the first year of the agreement will reach a volume exceeding the highest levels ever achieved since the World War.

There is an intention to further increase mutual deliveries of goods in the future."

That's right! Germany in the thirties supplied us with almost the entire industrial base for the construction of the first five-year plans and even then was our largest trading partner. The USSR was quickly turning into an industrial power, our natural resources were enormous, and partnership with Germany opened up prospects, without exaggeration, grandiose.

The Anglo-French were planning bombing... Baku. In December 1939, Lord Chatfield, the British Minister for Defense Coordination, submitted a report "On the Vulnerability of the Oil-Producing Regions of Russia" to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. Then Generals Gamelin and Weigan flew to London from Paris with Admiral Darlan. Churchill, General Wavell, Admiral Cunningham were present at the meeting of the Union Council.

Weygand commanded the French troops in Syria and Lebanon, Wavell - English in the Middle East. Cunningham flew the flag of the Commander of His Royal Majesty's fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On January 19, 1940, the governments of England and France instructed the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in France, General Gamelin, and the commander-in-chief of the French fleet, Darlan, to finally determine the plan for a direct invasion of the Caucasus. In this campaign it was supposed to take Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey with them.

The invasion troops were to destroy the Soviet oil fields and move "to meet the armies advancing from Scandinavia and Finland to Moscow." However, in reality, by the middle of the summer of 1940, France could not even defend Paris.

And Soviet Russia further strengthened its positions, regaining in June 1940 Bessarabia, captured by Romania in 1918, and annexing the Ruthenian Northern Bukovina, which, it should be noted, had never belonged to Russia before.

In July 1940, Soviet power was established in the Baltic States, a movement began to join Russia, and in August 1940 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were admitted to the USSR.

So, in 1939 and 1940, as a result of territorial acquisitions, Germany received a protracted war with the West (and, in fact, with the United States) with uncertain prospects.

Russia, without a single, in fact, shot and profitably using the activity of Germany, regained Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, The Baltic States, Bessarabia, acquired Bukovina. In addition, at the cost of relatively little bloodshed, the border with Finland was pushed back.

And all this while maintaining peace with the outside world.

Germany, on the other hand, was at war with England, whose leaders, first of all, were Churchill, openly provoked Hitler, declaring that "the Eastern Front is still possible."

Question: "Is there much truth in such a statement?" - became Hitler's main source of headache.

Hitler could not but understand that if he did not defeat England in the near future, then not in 1942, then in 1943 he would also have to fight with America, acting on the side of England. And then the "Polish" situation could be repeated, but already in relation to the Reich. In 1939, Hitler, invading Poland, risked everything, and Stalin, without risk, took advantage of the fruits of the risk of the Germans and regained the original Russian lands. Russia struck Poland when its fall was sealed by a successful German invasion.

Will something similar happen if, in the not too distant future, the united Anglo-Saxons strike at the Reich? Won't Stalin hit the Germans in the back then,

when will their fall be inevitably sealed by the invasion of the continent by England and the USA? The possibility of such a prospect could not but excite Hitler for quite objective reasons.

Hitler really wanted to personally meet with Stalin, was ready to receive him with maximum pomp in Berlin, but, alas, only Molotov went to the capital of the Reich in November 1940.

In 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation officially published the last, XXIII volume of the multi-volume publication of the 1970s, Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. This volume was already called simply "Foreign Policy Documents. 1940 - June 22, 1941" (Book 2, parts 1 and 2) ... "USSR" dropped out of the name - apparently, this great abbreviation was very hated by the ranks from the "Russian" Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So, in the XXIII volume of "DVP" in book 2, part 1, there are official records of Molotov's Berlin conversations with Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering in November 1940 ... This is an interesting read, and from these transcripts one can see a completely different than they usually show us, Fuhrer. For example, on November 12, 1940, in the first conversation, he said surprisingly far-sighted and true things to Molotov! I will simply quote the Russian entry of the translators V. Pavlov and V. Bogdanov (p. 44):

"The US is pursuing a purely imperialist policy. The US is not fighting for England, but trying to seize her inheritance. In this war, the United States helps England only insofar as they create armaments for themselves and try to win the place in the world position to which they aspire. He (Hitler. - **S.K.**) thinks that it would be good to establish the solidarity of those countries that are connected by common interests. This is not a problem for 1940, but for 1970 or 2000."

There is also a German entry by the translator Hitler Schmidt, given in the collection of documents and materials "Subject to disclosure. USSR - Germany. 1939 - 1941", published in 2004 by the TERRA-Book Club publishing house (compiled by Y. Felshtinsky). There, on pages 268 - 269, the words of the Fuhrer are given somewhat differently:

"At present, the US is pursuing an imperialist policy. They are not fighting for England, but only trying to take over the British Empire. They help England, at best, in order to continue their own rearmament and, by acquiring bases, to strengthen their military power. In the distant future, the issue of close cooperation between those countries whose interests will be affected by the expansion of the sphere of influence of this Anglo-Saxon power, which stands on a foundation much stronger than England, will have to be resolved. However, this is not an issue to be resolved in the near future; not in 1945, but only in 1970 or 1980, the earliest (when. - **S.K.**) this Anglo-Saxon power will threaten the freedom of other peoples.

In order to fully restore Hitler's thought, it is obviously necessary to combine both entries, where there is some discrepancy in years and so on ... But any option is amazing! Today, in the 2000s of the new century, Hitler's prediction has fully come true, and the United States threatens the freedom of all the peoples of the world! In light of the bombings of Serbia and Iraq, the depth of Hitler's analysis is amazing!

How striking are his words, spoken to Molotov during their second meeting (DVP, v. 2, part 1, p. 65):

"I believe that our success will be greater if we stand back to back and fight against external forces than if we stand chest to shoulder and fight against each other."

But perhaps the Fuhrer was cunning, double-dealing? I still think no. When you read the records of his conversations with Western leaders, then yes, you often feel slyness, especially when Hitler slanders Russia ... Here he really "was serving a number" and got off with on-duty anti-Soviet phrases. And in a conversation with Molotov, the intonations are sincere ... "Back to back ..." - this is said strongly! I immediately recall the song from "Hearts of Four" by Jack London: "We are back to back at the mast, against a thousand - together!"

And then Hitler unequivocally offered the USSR to openly join the front against the Anglo-Saxons and the United States under the Pact of Three (Germany, Italy and Japan). The Soviet note says: "He, Hitler, invites the Soviet Union to participate as the fourth partner in this Pact."

By the way, at the same time, Hitler said: "Perhaps such forces will revive in Asia that will exclude the possibility of colonial possessions for European states" ... This generally somehow does not fit well with the image of a "maniac rushing to world domination."

Under the "new world order", Hitler understood such a world when the sun would shine without setting, not only Britain, but all the peoples of the world, when the Anglo-Saxons would have to make room and give a place at the world table to all countries.

But what order was announced to the world by the inscription on the US one-dollar bill, where under the pyramid of Masonic power there was a ribbon with the words: "Novus ordo seclorum" ("New order for the ages")?

Alas, Molotov - a typically performing figure of the second plan - did not catch the ideas of the Fuhrer, and Stalin did not have time to look him in the eye and answer with a look of understanding that excludes a future war between the Russians and the Germans, and therefore the current globalization and the world dictates of the Golden Elite to the beginning of the XXI century.

As a result, Hitler's distrust of Russia grew.

One of the reasons for Hitler's distrust was the figure of the Moscow ambassador of England, a staunch Germanophobic Cripps, who felt very comfortable in the Russian capital and provoked us with might and main against Germany. By the way, our plenipotentiary in London, Maisky (a long-standing "cadre" of such a sinister figure as the long-term People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR "Litvinov"-Ballah) behaved by no means like a friend of Germany, although she was a power officially friendly to Russia, and at the same time was in a state of difficult war with Maisky's host country, Russia was not at all friendly.

Not without reason, when the Rubicon was crossed, in his address to the Germans on June 22, 1941, regarding the outbreak of war, Hitler stated:

"Britain still hoped to form a European anti-German coalition, which was supposed to include the Balkans and Soviet Russia ... Therefore, in London they decided to send Mr. Cripps as an ambassador to Moscow. He received clear instructions to resume relations between England and Soviet Russia on any terms and to develop them in a pro-British direction...

In this speech, by the way, Hitler said this:

"The German people have never experienced hostile feelings towards the peoples of Russia..."

And even this:

"I ... fought ... for the establishment in Germany of a new National Socialist order, which allowed the worker to fully reap the fruits of his labor ... Success

this policy in the economic and social revival of our people, which, systematically eliminating class and social differences, becomes a truly people's commune - the final phase of world development ... "

Yes, there was also "work for the public", but I would like to see how they would react to the proposal, even if hypocritically, but publicly recognize *the commune* of the "democrats" Churchill and Roosevelt as the highest stage in the development of society!

From us, dear reader, this was hidden insofar as it was very difficult for the Soviet Union, which had lost so many and so many in that war, that Russia itself has a share of the blame for the fact that the war between Germany and Russia became a reality.

This is hidden from us to this day - but for a different reason. Knowing the truth, you begin to understand that it was not Hitler (and certainly not Stalin) who unleashed and fanned the Second World War. This was the work of the organic bearer of the ideas of World Evil - the supranational Golden Elite of the West, the Golden Cosmopolitans, and above all, the Yankees!

And the Yankees are the current true owner of the "Rossiyanin". And point your finger at Uncle Sam, the current "academic" "historians" are not happy.

Let's return, however, to the turn of 1940 - 1941 ...

October 28, 1940 Mussolini also decided to be noted in the big foreign policy, and Italy attacked Greece. Mussolini pursued an intelligent domestic policy (even in the sixties, for example, the famous Italian writer Alberto Moravia was not afraid to say this), but his foreign policy was always mediocre. As a result, Hitler had to help out the Duce and get involved in the war in the Balkans. On the other hand, he was forced to do so by the policy of England, which hoped to use Greece and Yugoslavia as bases for the bombing of the oil fields of Romania, which supplied the Reich with oil.

Hitler tried to neutralize the "Yugoslav" oil threat by connecting Yugoslavia to the Pact of Three, but immediately after that, the British organized an anti-German coup in Belgrade, and Germany was forced to enter the territory of Yugoslavia and Greece on April 6, 1941.

At that moment, an event occurred, a rational explanation for which I personally cannot give. April 5, 1941 - a day before the attack of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe on Yugoslavia, the USSR concluded a pact of friendship and non-aggression (!?) with the pro-British Simovic government.

General Simovic, by the way, as well as the Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow Gavrilovich, were members of the Black Hand secret society, which contributed to the outbreak of the First World War in the interests of the United States.

On April 28, 1941, Hitler, in a conversation with the Moscow ambassador of the Reich, Count von der Schulenburg, asked: "What the hell pulled the Russians to conclude a friendship pact with Yugoslavia"? If you know the whole situation in Europe at that time, then, alas, it is impossible to ask any other question about our hasty "friendship" with Belgrade.

Yes, we behaved stupidly that fateful spring, stupidly ... And such steps of the USSR, as a pact with Yugoslavia-Serbia, doomed to slaughter by the Britons, made the plan to end Russia even before the blow to England more and more attractive for the Fuhrer. And now he acted irrationally - to the point that *the devil already pulled* him to go to Moscow in the summer of 1941.

This is the European background against which the notorious Barbarossa plan began to acquire detailed features. And the fact that on April 13, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, nothing can be changed could.

What else needs to be said?

Of course, Stalin was not going to fight with Germany.

In 1941...

And in 1942, when would the rearmament of the Red Army be completed?

And in 1943 or 1944, when the United States would have attacked Germany, "having sewn the last button to the uniform of the last soldier," and England, constantly inciting the Yankees to continue the war with the Germans?

I think that in this case, too, Stalin, most likely, would have simply preferred to remain on the sidelines ... However, one cannot but admit that Hitler had, there were serious objective reasons to doubt the prospective loyalty of Russia and Stalin to his Germany.

And Hitler, I must say, spoke in detail and reasonably about his doubts even then - in real time. He reported both in a very narrow circle - for example, during a meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941, and publicly - in a note from the USSR about the declaration of war and in a radio address to the nation on June 22, 1941.

An illustrative detail is that the text of the note and the memorandum to it are not even in the above-mentioned XXIII volume of the DVP. The annotation to this volume says that the publication of documents of that time is "important for establishing the historical truth" ... However, in order to establish the truth, it is simply necessary to know those key documents that I mentioned. Alas, Volume XXIII ends with the text of a radio speech by V.M. Molotov on June 22, 1941.

And the text of Hitler's speech - no! The directive of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow and the memorandum on the reasons for declaring war can only be found on the Internet (http://publicist.n1.by/history/1941/history_I_941-06-21_-html). The text of Hitler's speech is in the same place (<http://militera.lib.ru/docs/ww2/chrono/1941/1941-06-22.html>).

Only in issue 6 of the Military Historical Journal for the fateful year 1991 was the text of a lengthy note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet government dated June 21, 1941, published. But it almost never reproduced again.

Why?

Yes, because there, in full accordance with historical truth, it is said that, despite the loyal steps on the part of Germany:

- the cession of Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence;
- support in the issue of the return of Bessarabia and the inclusion of Northern Bukovina (which never belonged to Russia) into the USSR;
- restraint in the return of the Baltic States to the USSR;
- support against the Finns during the Soviet-Finnish war,

The USSR unreasonably tried to expand its activity and influence in the Balkans (which created Hitler's concern about Romanian oil); together with England (although without coordination with it), he actually encouraged an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and immediately concluded a pact with the Yugoslavs, surprisingly unnecessary for Russia.

The main thing is that the USSR actually gave England reason to hope for some favorable (and unfavorable for the Reich) turn in Soviet-German relations. And these hopes supported England in her unwillingness to end the war in Europe with an honorable peace for both sides.

This is what Hitler accused us of in June 1941. And, sadly, it must be admitted that Hitler's claims to the Soviet Union were to a certain extent justified ... I emphasize - the claims, and not the method that he chose on June 22, 1941 to satisfy them.

Of course, Stalin, too, justifiably hesitated in assessing Hitler's true intentions and in the strength of his - a staunch anti-communist - new loyalty to the Soviet Union.

But Hitler, too, was then overwhelmed with cruel doubts ... And the fact that he hesitated is clearly seen from his little-known letter to Mussolini dated June 21, 1941. It was

published in the USSR in No. 5 of the small-circulation "Military History Journal" for 1965 and started like this:

"Duce! I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of hard thinking, as well as eternal nervous waiting, ended in the adoption of the most difficult decision in my life ... Further waiting will lead to disastrous consequences at the latest this or next year ...

After the destruction of France - in general after the liquidation of all their Western European positions - the British warmongers all the time direct their eyes to where they tried to start the war: at the Soviet Union.

Both states, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a disintegrated Europe, weakened by a long war. Behind these states stands the North American Union in a pose of instigator and expectant ...

If we continue to endure this danger, we will probably have to lose the whole of 1941, and at the same time the general situation will not change in the least. On the contrary, England will be even more opposed to the conclusion of peace, since she will still rely on a Russian partner. Moreover, this hope, of course, will grow as the combat readiness of the Russian armed forces increases. And behind all this, there are still American massive deliveries of military materials that have been expected since 1942 ... "

Mutual suspicions and anxieties could be removed only by looking into each other's eyes. Moreover, the topic of a personal meeting between Hitler and Stalin has arisen since the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact several times - including in conversations between Stalin and Ribbentrop, Molotov and Hitler ...

In my book The Fuhrer's Kremlin Visit, by the way, I put the two leaders face to face, forcing them to give their thoughts and doubts a new character.

But how could things develop further in this case?

If the USSR had accepted Hitler's proposal to join the Pact of three (Germany, Italy and Japan), then this would not have been so much a political departure from the pro-British line - Stalin pursued only one policy, pro-Russian, so to speak, but a departure from our slippery neutrality to the side long-term political friendliness to the "axis" countries.

The main thing here could be our refusal to support the anti-German circles in Serbia (as for the Croats and Slovenes, they were traditionally loyal to the Germans, and the rest of the South Balkan Slavic peoples did not go into a serious "disposition").

Political steps (including the renunciation of activity in the Balkans) could and should have been reinforced by increased supplies to Germany not only of oil and raw materials, but also, obviously, of the weapons it needed for landing in England by the end of 1941 or in 1942. Officially neutral America supplied weapons to England - allegedly on a commercial basis. So we could do something similar in relation to Germany.

Having avoided the war with Germany in 1941 due to this and increased the production of weapons at the factories of Kharkov and Zaporozhye, Nikolaev and Sevastopol, Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, not destroyed by bombing, not evacuated, we would not have received war with England in 1941 - with any of our policies .

To win in that situation one peaceful year for rearmament meant for Russia to win stable prospects for building developed socialism. And to ensure the indestructible socialist future of Russia meant everything for Russia! After all, everything that has happened and has been happening with us since 1991 is also one of the results of our Victory over Germany in 1945, which in the end turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. We lost too many convinced builders of the new world in that war.

She destroyed too much of what they managed to build in Russia - from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic to Kushka.

But what would peace with the USSR mean in 1941 for Germany - without real, convincing evidence on our part of Russia's stable loyalty to III Nationalist Reich?

Germany, having given us this peaceful year, on the contrary, risked losing everything. After all, time did not work for her, but for the Anglo-Saxons ... And it was not clear who Russia would be with in the future? Actually, Hitler wrote to Mussolini about this on June 21, 1941.

But not to give us a peaceful 1941 meant for Germany - as real history has shown - a military defeat by 1945 and a civilizational defeat of Germany and all of Europe by the end of the 20th century.

We, without supporting the Reich, eventually lost strategically, by the beginning of XXI century, finally giving the world geopolitical initiative to the Golden Elite. What are we paying for now?

Germany, having attacked us, lost both strategically, now also more and more falling under the influence of supranational forces alien to it, and tactically - unconditionally capitulating in a few years to both the West and the East.

That is, the only mutually reasonable - both tactically and strategically - the option for Russia and Germany was an increasingly close and indestructible alliance.

Up to the military.

Hitler had to understand that the future of his Reich was secured only under conditions peace and friendship with Russia.

Stalin had to understand that the future of Russia, which is impossible without a socialist system in it, is ensured only with a bloc with the Reich, which would exclude the defeat of Russia in its sole (without the Reich) confrontation with the West in the 20th century.

In 1992, ex-member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yegor Ligachev came to Europe. During his trip, he also met with the ideologist of European nationalism Jean Thiriart. This Belgian thought not only in terms of little Belgium, but also of the big world, and in response to Ligachev's statement that the USSR had saved the world from the brown plague, Thiriart told Yegor Kuzmich this:

"I believe that you, like Hitler in your time, are making a mistake, because I am convinced that the only and main enemy of Russia and Germany is American capitalism, and that in fact the war between Russia and Germany is a mistaken war. A truly just war must be directed against American capitalism. The most correct idea was that the Soviet Union and Germany should jointly oppose Anglo-Saxon imperialism. In this case, the power of the Anglo-Saxon civilization in the world today would be over, and Russia and Germany would only benefit from this ... "

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that Thiriart spoke about Hitler's mistake, not Stalin's, and he was right here. Indeed, in reality, it was Hitler who attacked Russia, and not Stalin attacked Germany; it was Hitler who authorized the development of the Barbarossa plan, and Stalin's USSR had no such plans - the internal initiative developments of the General Staff of the Red Army do not count, which I will say more about.

But, one way or another, a mistake was made and led to such disasters for Germany, which she did not experience either before or after that war.

As for Russia, our disasters and losses in the Great Patriotic War are gradually fading only against the backdrop of the current black streak of our recent history, which, starting in March 1985 with the drive to the pinnacle of power by Gorbachev, *continues* to this day.

We won *that* war against Russia.

Will we win **this one?**

It was not me who said: "He who does not know his past has no future." In order for us to have a future, I tried to make this book a feasible contribution to understanding the realities of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the myths that have accumulated around it.

Myth first and foremost
THE WAR BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE THIRD REICH WAS INEVITABLE
FROM ANY POINT OF VIEW: CIVILIZATIONAL, GEOPOLITICAL, POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC

For many years now, everyone has agreed on such a statement - both the "right" and the "left", and the supporters of Stalin, and his detractors, and the supporters of Hitler, and his detractors, and even the majority of "revisionist" historians.

However, the above statement by Jean Thiriart shows and proves that there may be a different view of this "indisputable" "truth". In my introductory explication, I hope I gave the reader enough documentary information to think about: "Is everything really so simple here?" And below the arguments and facts, I'll add more, leaving the reader the right to disagree with me or ...

Or, agree.

I must say that on the real scale of real history, the inevitability of the war between the Reich and the USSR was not so unambiguously obvious to everyone. For example, immediately after the Germans hit Poland, when the sirens of the German Stuka Ju-87 dive bombers howled over it, a telegram from the industrialist Fritz Thyssen came to the Fuhrer from abroad. He had known Hitler since January 1931 and actively contributed to his rise to power. With the outbreak of the war, Thyssen secretly emigrated and was now indignant, however, not with the war as such, but with the fact that Hitler had come into conflict with England and France.

In an open letter to the Fuhrer, the "Captain of Industry" wrote:

*"I remind you that you, of course, did not send your Goering to Rome to the Holy Father or to Doorn (the Dutch city where the ex-emperor Wilhelm II. - **S.K.**) to the Kaiser to prepare both for the upcoming alliance with communism. Nevertheless, you nevertheless suddenly entered into such an alliance with Russia, that is, you took a step that you yourself condemned more strongly than anyone else in your book Mein Kampf - old edition, pp. 740 - 750. Your new politics, Herr Hitler, is pushing Germany into the abyss and will lead the German people to disaster. Get back while you still can..."*

If then Thyssen had been asked whether he considered a war between Germany and Russia inevitable, he would hardly have answered in the affirmative. Nevertheless, an almost common place in the writings of Western, Soviet and post-Soviet authors was the opinion about the alleged duplicity of Hitler, who, by proposing to conclude a Pact, provided himself with "Russian" rear lines in a blitzkrieg against Poland in 1939, with an immediate expectation of a future blitzkrieg against Russia.

Well, I doubt it! I doubt it, despite how the day of June 22 of the real 1941 began for our Motherland. I believe that Hitler was in a hurry to resolve the "Polish" issue and did not want to conflict with Russia, which could ally itself with France, as it was before the First World War - I believe in this. But the fact that Hitler in 1939 only played with us - no, I do not believe.

Here is actually **the full** text of the memorandum presented by the German Ambassador Schulenburg to Molotov on August 15, 1939 - in preparation for the conclusion of the Pact:

"1. The contradictions between the worldview of National Socialist Germany and the worldview of the USSR were in the past years the only reason why Germany and the USSR stood on opposite and hostile positions. From the development of recent times, apparently, it is clear that different worldviews do not exclude reasonable relations between these two states and the possibility of restoring good mutual cooperation. Thus, the period of foreign policy contradictions could be put to an end forever and the road to a new future for both countries could be cleared.

2. There are no real contradictions in the interests of Germany and the Soviet Union exists. The living spaces of Germany and the USSR touch each other, but in terms of their natural needs they do not compete with each other. As a result, from the very beginning there is no reason for the aggressive tendencies of one state against another. Germany has no aggressive intentions against the USSR. The German Government is of the opinion that there is not a single question between the Baltic and Black Seas that cannot be resolved to the full satisfaction of both countries. This includes the issues of the Baltic Sea, the Baltic states, Poland, the South-East, etc. In addition, the political cooperation of both countries can only be beneficial. The same applies to the German and Soviet national economies, which complement each other in every direction.

3. There can be no doubt that German-Russian relations have now reached their historical turning point. The political decisions to be taken in the near future in Berlin and Moscow will be of decisive importance for shaping relations between the German and Russian peoples for many generations to come. It will depend on them whether both peoples cross arms again and without sufficient grounds or whether they will again come to friendly relations. Both peoples in the past were always happy when they were friends, and bad when they were enemies.

4. It is true that Germany and the USSR, as a result of the ideological enmity that has existed between them in recent years, are currently mistrusting each other. There is still a lot of accumulated garbage to be eliminated. However, it must be stated that even during this time the natural sympathy of the German people for the Russian never disappeared. On this basis, the policy of both states can begin new creative work.

5. Based on their experience, the German government and the government of the USSR must take into account the fact that the capitalist Western democracies are irreconcilable enemies of both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union. At the present time they are again trying, by concluding a military alliance, to drag the Soviet Union into a war with Germany. In 1914 this policy had bad consequences for Russia. The interests of both countries demand that the mutual tearing apart of Germany and the USSR for the sake of the Western democracies should be avoided forever.

6. The aggravation of German-Polish relations caused by British policy, as well as the military hype raised by England and the attempts to conclude alliances connected with it, make it necessary that German-Soviet relations soon

clarification has been made. Otherwise, things without German influence may take a turn that will cut off the opportunity for both governments to restore German-Soviet friendship and, if there is an appropriate situation, jointly clarify the territorial issues of Eastern Europe. In view of this, the leadership of both countries should not leave the development of things to chance, but take timely measures. It would be fatal if, due to mutual ignorance of the views and intentions of the other country, the two peoples finally took different paths.

According to the report made to us, the Soviet government also
there is a desire to bring clarity to German-Soviet relations.

In view of the fact that past experience has shown that such a clarification can only be achieved slowly by using the usual diplomatic route, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to come to Moscow for a short time in order to present the Fuehrer's point of view to Herr Stalin on behalf of the Fuehrer. In the opinion of Herr Ribbentrop, a change can be achieved through such a direct exchange of views, which does not exclude the possibility of laying the foundation for the final putting in order of German-Soviet relations.

This document is an example of a brilliant concise analysis of both the essence of past Russian-German relations and the essence of the current political realities of that time. And it is written, of course, from sincere positions.

However, the war has become a fact. Russia and Germany failed to jointly change the course of world history in the direction of cooperation between peoples in the name of counteracting Anglo-Saxon globalism and, therefore, for the benefit of a more reasonable and just world around the world.

Was this collaboration possible? They poke us in the nose with quotes taken out of context from Mein Kampf or from the Barbarossa plan and categorically declare: "No!"

But is everything so unambiguous even in this very plan of "Barbarossa"?

Well, for example...

How often do "historians"-academics cite the first lines of the famous "Barbarossa" plan, which begins like this:

"The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the war against England is over (Option "Barbarossa" ..."

But how many are fully familiar with this plan, approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940? But in this top secret directive No. 21 (plan "Barbarossa", machine number 33408/40, 9 copies printed) first paragraph of section IV clearly proves that the plan for the invasion of Russia, when it was approved, was only *conjectural*. I invite the dear reader to verify this for himself by reading the mentioned paragraph:

IV. All orders that will be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this directive must definitely proceed from the fact that we are talking about precautionary measures in case Russia changes its current position towards us (the emphasis here and below is mine. - **S.K. J**").

A month and a half passed, the operational department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces issues on January 31, 1941, the already revised "Directive on the concentration of troops" (Barbarossa plan, machine No. 050/41 - command document, Soviet secret, 30 copies printed).

And its first section again confirms the absence of Hitler's hard intention at that time to start a war with the USSR:

"1. General tasks. In the event that Russia changes her present attitude towards Germany, as a precautionary measure, extensive preparatory measures should be taken that would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England is over.

The ideas of "Suvorov"-Rezun are absolutely alien to me (this is just a cleverly composed mixture of plausibility and black lies). And I understand and know that by the beginning of the war, Russia had not changed its attitude towards Germany, but the "fast-moving campaign" nevertheless began. However, I cannot fail to notice that the above-cited documents date back to the time before the Soviet Union approved the anti-German coup in Yugoslavia on March 27, 1941, and before our conclusion on April 5, 1941, of a pact with the anti-German and pro-British Yugoslav government that came to power as a result of this coup.

After that, Hitler had reason to doubt our loyalty.

Let us return once again to the topic of the November negotiations between Hitler and Molotov. Already at their first meeting on November 12, Hitler declared (DVP, vol. XXIII, v. 2 (1), p. 42):

"The situation in which this conversation will take place is marked by the fact that Germany ... is at war, and the Soviet Union is not ... After this war, not only Germany will have great successes, but also Russia.

If now both states soberly check the results of joint work for this year, they will come to the conclusion that this was beneficial for both ... Maybe not every country has achieved 100% of what it hoped for, but in political life one has to be content with 25 %.

Perhaps in the future not all wishes will come true, but... I am convinced that... the two peoples, if they act together, will be able to achieve great success. If they work against each other, then only someone else will benefit from this."

Did our actions towards Yugoslavia fit into this reasonable scheme? Or our claims to influence in the Balkans? After all, Russia has never (I emphasize - never!) count on anything serious in the Balkans, because Russia has never had serious economic influence there.

At the same time, even before the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 14, 1939, Schulenburg stated in Moscow that England and France were "again trying to drag the USSR into a war with Germany," and continued: "In 1914, this policy had worse consequences for Russia. The interests of both sides demand that the mutual tearing apart of Germany and the USSR for the sake of the Western democracies should be avoided.

I will note - to the same "democracies" who were ready to strike the USSR together with the Finns in the winter of 1940 and to bombard Baku preemptively in the spring and summer of the same
of the year.

The tragedy was that Stalin knew about the provocations of the West, spoke about them (one conversation with Matsuoka in the spring of 1941 is worth something!). But now - doubting the sincerity of the Germans, hesitating between the prospect of playing his game on the weakening of the Reich by the Anglo-Saxons and the prospect of an alliance against them with the Reich, Stalin missed the moment to avoid a war with the Germans and form a coalition saving for Russia with them.

Alas, Stalin unwittingly gave reasons for doubt to Hitler. Attempted inappropriate activity in the Balkans; an unprecedented three-hour conversation with English

Ambassador Cripps in the summer of 1940 immediately after the latter's arrival in Moscow; claims for the whole, and not only Northern Bukovina - these are just a few examples in this regard.

But I would especially single out our non-aggression pact (?!) of 1941 with pro-British Yugoslavia, which is not rationally explicable. He played, in my opinion, a particularly fatal role in Hitler's decision to fight Russia.

As a result, as I said, the Germans lost in 1945, and the Russians in 1991, and we lost to a large extent because we were dragging chestnuts from the fire for the West as part of the "anti-Hitler" "coalition", and did not smash the West as part of the hypothetical Quadruple Pact of Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan.

Transcripts of the Berlin talks between Hitler and Molotov in the autumn of 1940 confirm that there was a fundamental possibility for the latter option! For example, Hitler then said (WWP, vol. XXIII, v. 2(1), p. 42) that:

"... wants to try, as far as it is possible and accessible to human understanding, to determine the future of nations for a long time, so that frictions and conflicts are eliminated ... We are talking about two large nations that by nature should not have contradictions if one nation understands that the other needs to ensure certain vital interests ... He is sure that in both countries today there is a regime that does not want to wage war and that needs peace for internal construction ... "

And so it was said to them (p. 43):

"If there is mutual recognition of future development, it will be in the interests of both peoples. This, perhaps, will require a lot of work and strain of nerves, but in the future both peoples will develop, however, without becoming one single world, since the German will never become Russian, and the Russian - German. Our task is to ensure this peaceful development."

In these words, by the way, shows genuine respect for the Russians.

At the same time, Hitler invited the Soviet Union to participate as the fourth partner in the Tripartite Pact (p. 46).

The reader may object - they say, you can say a lot of things, but in reality the Fuhrer aspired to world domination. However, here everything is far from being so clear-cut. if you examine that era carefully and without prejudice. But what kind of impartiality can we talk about, if even such a fairly easily accessible document as the memorandum of the authorized department of economic policy of the NSDAP imperial administration von Kersdorf dated June 1940, "historians" either hush up or extremely briefly annotate it with fundamental distortions of its completely constructive essence ?

Without being able to delve into this topic, but returning to Hitler's conversations with Molotov, I'll just say that I'm sure that it was not a bluff on Hitler's part at that time, but a sincere desire to avoid a dangerous conflict with Russia. Hitler was by no means
maniac.

And his long-term forecast turned out to be **the only** far-sighted of all long-term forecasts of that time. He was so accurate that I will quote him again. The November 12, 1940 transcript recorded (p. 44): "The next point is America's problem. He, Hitler, does not talk about this in connection with real events (by that time, the United States had actually already fought on the side of England, not only supplying and arming it, but also guarding British convoys with the US Navy. - S.K.) ... The United States **did** not fighting for England, but trying to seize her inheritance. In this war, the United States helps England only insofar as they create armaments for themselves and try to win the place in the world position to which they

strive. He thinks it would be good to establish the solidarity of those countries that are connected by common interests. This is not a problem for 1940, but for 1970 or 2000..."

It was said in 1940 - thirty years before Vietnam, fifty years before 1991, sixty years before Serbia and Iraq.

On November 13, 1940, Hitler asked Molotov the most important question for the future (p. 68): "Would Russia immediately declare war on America if it entered the war?"

Molotov stated that he "considers this issue irrelevant."

Hitler remarked: "When it is relevant, it will be too late."

And then he suggested (p. 69): "We need to ... create a world coalition of countries: Spain, France, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan." And, having drawn a picture of a quite reasonable world development, he stated (p. 69): "To implement all this, of course, a long time is required, 50-100 years." It was said sixty-eight years ago.

Hitler persistently sought to meet with Stalin, in the spring of 1940 he took official steps for this, and in the autumn of 1940 he painfully wanted to understand what he should expect from Russia: a stab in the back with the "Russian sword of England" when the United States came to Europe for the second *time* year that way in the 43rd; dubious neutrality or a strong handshake not of an opportunistic, but of a strategic partner, ready to support an ally with political, material, and, if necessary, even military force.

Not resolving his doubts (but, on the contrary, having received reinforcement by him in the form of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact of 1941), Hitler, as I understand it, decided on the adventure of a "preventive" war. In some way, the situation with Napoleon was repeated, who, after all, also did not want a conflict with Russia. After all, Russia and France were also *pitted then!* And - the same forces!

The above does not mean, of course, that the author is pro-German. I have only one object of unchanging sympathy, or rather, love and devotion, my Motherland, the Soviet Union, which I served and serve to this day. However, that is precisely why, as a result of long reflections, I came to the following conclusion: Russia many times "were intertwined" in "coalitions" that were detrimental to her, but failed to rise to the understanding of the salvation for her of the global coalition that was offered to her by Germany in the fall of 1940.

The result is known: Germany lost in 1945, and Russia in 1991.

In the long run, "someone else" won. Although, I will note in brackets, it is unlikely - irrevocably.

But anyway, the war started. And a lot of myths have also formed around its beginning.

About some of them further and our conversation will go ...

Myth two

**THE CAUSE OF THE DEFEATS OF 1941 IS STALIN... THE PROXIMITY OF WAR
EVERYONE SEEN EXCEPT THIS "FOOL" AND "PARANOID" WHO
KEEPT THE GENERALITY, IGNORED INTELLIGENCE
DATA AND BELIEVE "PROVOKATOR" BERIA. THEREFORE, IN 1941, IN THE
COUNTRY AND IN THE ARMY, EVERYONE WAS PREPARING FOR WAR, EXCEPT
STALIN. THANKS TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF THE NAVY KUZNETSOV, WHO DECLARED
"READINESS No. 1", THE RED FLEET, WHICH STARTED THE WAR SUCCESSFULLY**

To this day, this myth is the most stable and most vile in relation to Stalin, to those hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers who met the war not in their beds, but in combat positions, and to the commanders of these soldiers. And therefore, despite the small volume of this book and the inability to consider the issue comprehensively, I will pay special attention to the analysis of the second myth.

So...

When the falsifiers of history begin to talk about the beginning of the war and about the allegedly "talentless" Stalin, who supposedly missed the war, then the standard starting premise is the famous telegram of Richard Sorge dated June 15, 1941:

"An attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a broad front."

And although I am not striving to obfuscate, but to clarify the truth, I will also begin the analysis of the second myth with the "Sorge telegram", noting, firstly, that the "construction" of this alleged encryption differs sharply from real ciphergrams, and secondly, that no responsible leader of the state will take any serious action on the basis of such a report alone, even if it comes from a hundred times verified and reliable informant.

However, this is not the point! The fact is that Sorge did not report anything of the kind at all. On June 16, 2001, the Krasnaya Zvezda organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published the materials of the Round Table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, with the recognition of Colonel Karpov of the SVR:

"Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in the Khrushchev era. Such "fools" are launched simply: one of the authors of publications about Sorge came up with these radiograms for a red word, and the rest picked it up with reference to it - and the province went to write ... Then they added psychologism, came up with a vengeful Stalin ... "

And here is another "fool" that flew out from under someone's lively pen - perhaps the writer Ovid Gorchakov, who, in any case, reproduced it:

"From the memorandum of L.P. Beria I.V. Stalin:

"June 21, 1941 ... *I again insist* (this is allegedly Beria allegedly writes to Stalin in similar terms! - **S.K.**) *on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov, who continues to bombard me with "disinformation" about the allegedly impending attack on THE USSR. He said that this "attack" would begin tomorrow. The same was radioed by Major General V.I. Tupikov, military attache in Berlin. This stupid general claims that three Wehrmacht army groups will attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev ... <...> But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise destiny: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us! ... "*

These lines have also been walking on the printed pages for many years, and any advanced "historian" will rattle off to you: "The NKVD intelligence missed the war, because Beria destroyed all the smart intelligence officers before the war."

But from February 3, 1941 to July 20, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two separate people's commissariats - the NKVD under the leadership of Beria and the NKGB under the leadership of Merkulov. Therefore, from February 3, 1941, the **NKVD did not have foreign intelligence!** Moreover, no one destroyed the scouts in 1940 - 1941, just as they were not very "destroyed" - innocently - before. But how many people know about it?

As for the "memorandum of Beria", this rollicking fake does not even have the appearance of an official document. Business papers of a certain era have their own, well-defined vocabulary, phrases are also built in a certain way, and so on.

And the mere use of the slang expression "disinformation" in this supposedly document of national importance betrays a forgery. In addition, the real Beria was not so stupid as to use the flat pun "stupid general Tupikov" in a report to Stalin ...

In this anti-Beria "fool", the Berlin ambassador Dekanozov is credited with hypervigilance. And in the biographical directory of K. Zalesky "Stalin's Empire" Dekanozov is charged with the fact that he "could not assess the situation and remained in the dark about the aggressive plans of A. Hitler."

However, both statements are false. In reality, Dekanozov was inclined to agree with his longtime colleague, NKGB intelligence resident Amayak Kobulov, to whom the Germans, for the purpose of strategic disinformation, set up a double agent Berlinks, who had the code name Lyceist in the NKGB. So Dekanozov could not "bombard" anyone with any "misinformation" about the imminent offensive of the Germans - he succumbed to the "misinformation" of the Lyceum student, who assured the opposite. In addition, on the direct instructions of Beria, intelligence officer Alexander Korotkov, from March 1941, intensified work in Berlin with Harro Schulze-Boysen - Sergeant, who gave fairly accurate information. And this information arrived on time to the right place - to the tables of the country's leaders.

By the way, in A. Sukhomlinov's book "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria", the following allegedly Stalinist visa is given on the pre-war report of the Sergeant Major, presented to Stalin by Commissar GB Merkulov: "To Comrade Merkulov. You can send your source from the headquarters of the German aviation to e ... mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformer ... "

Further, A. Sukhomlinov writes: "Stalin not only wrote obscene words, but also underlined them twice. All this is in the archives..." Well, after Khrushchev and Gorbachev, you can really find a lot of things in the archives that never existed on a real scale of the Stalin era.

Interestingly! Honored Prosecutor Sukhomlinov is a figure of a certain importance. In any case, no one will be allowed to enter Beria's investigative case: God forbid it turns out that it is a complete falsification. I mean that Sukhomlinov, judging by his statement, saw the "visa of Stalin", where obscene words *are underlined twice*, with his own eyes.

But here in front of me is a special message from V.N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941 in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade Stalin with intelligence data of the Sergeant and Corsican (Arvid Harnak) dated June 16, 1941. This special message was published in the collection of documents "Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 "(M.: MFD, Materik, 2006) on pages 286 - 287 indicating the location, etc.:" Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, fund 3, inventory 50, file 415, sheet 50. Original. Typescript".

And here "Stalin's resolution" looks a little different: "T-schu Merkulov. *Maybe send your "source" from the headquarters of the german aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformer. I. St.*

The collection published by Materik is a scientific publication, and all the features of the published documents, including underlining, marginal notes, ticks, etc., are indicated specifically. So, not only is obscene words not underlined in the "Mainland" "Stalin's visa" - at least one line, but the addressing to Merkulov (and not "comrade", like Sukhomlinov's, but "t-shchu") is emphasized, right? and the "visa" itself has a fundamentally different meaning! At Sukhomlinov, Stalin actually orders: "You can send ...", and in the collection "Lubyanka. Stalin..." Stalin just thinks: "Maybe send..." But more than that! In this last visa, Stalin separates the informants and expresses distrust only to the informant from the Luftwaffe headquarters (Sergeant Major - Schulze Boysen), but not to the informant from the Ministry of Economy (Corsican - Harnack).

And this visa already looks more reliable, because, although Schulze-Boysen was an honest informant, his message of June 16 really looks frivolous, just because it confused the date of the TASS message (not June 14, but June 6), but the priority objects of *the* raids German aviation named the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories "producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops." So Stalin had every reason to doubt the accuracy of such "information".

However, despite all the archival data of Merkulov's special message and the undoubted authenticity of this message, the authenticity of the "*resolution*" itself is more than doubtful for me personally for one, but weighty reason ...

Here is what is reported about *the real* Stalinist reaction to this note by Merkulov in the collection of documents "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table" published in 1995 jointly by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and the Moscow City Association of Archives on pages 232 - 233:

"Having familiarized himself with the undercover message, Stalin on the same day (June 17. - **S.K.**) summoned the People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov and head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitin. The conversation was conducted mainly with Fitin. Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the sources. It seemed to Fitin that he had fully and accurately told about the Corsican and the Petty Officer and explained why intelligence trusted them. Stalin remarked: "Go, clarify everything, double-check this information and report back to me." The result of Stalin's order was a document prepared on June 20, 1941 by foreign intelligence and known as the "Calendar of messages from Corsican and Starshina from September 6, 1940 to June 16, 1941." It collected all the main reports that warned of the upcoming war, indicating from whom and when the informants received this information ... "

However, by June 20, 1941, Stalin, presumably, did not need this "Calendar", and why this is so, the reader will understand later, having become acquainted with my reconstruction of the events of the last pre-war week.

Insolently, boldly, but clumsily concocted such a "fool" as Beria's alleged resolution of June 21, 1941: "Recently, many workers succumb to brazen provocations and sow panic. The secret collaborators of Yastreba, Carmen, Almaz, Verny, for systematic disinformation, should be erased into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany. Others must be given a strict warning."

Beria could not write anything like this on June 21, 1941, because by that day it was clear not only to him, but also to Stalin: the counting of peacetime goes, if not by hours, then by a few days!

I analyzed these "fools" in detail in my book "Beria: the best manager XX century", so here I will confine myself to what has already been said and quote only two authentic notes by Beria himself (the first - almost completely!), Recalling that since February 3, 1941, he did not lead the intelligence of the NKGB, but as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs he was the supreme leader of the border troops USSR and thanks to its efforts, by 1941, *its own* border intelligence was created in the border troops. She did not have the "cream of society" as agents, but she was helped by simple train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest villagers and residents of border towns. They collected information like ants, and, collected together, it gave the most objective picture of what was happening. The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was reflected in the notes of the NKVD to the country's leadership, for example, in the note of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria No. 1196 / B dated April 21, 1941 on the transfer of German troops to the Soviet

border and violation of the airspace of the USSR, directed by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko:

"Top secret

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the general government.

In the border zone of Klaipeda region:

two infantry divisions arrived, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion and a company of scooters.

To Suwalki Lykk area:

arrived up to two mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, tank and engineer battalions.

To Myshinets-Ostrolenka area:

up to four infantry and one artillery regiments, a tank battalion and a motorcycle battalion arrived.

To the Ostrov-Mazowiecki-Malkinya-Gurna area:

one infantry and one cavalry regiment arrived, up to two artillery divisions and a company of tanks.

To the area of Biala Podlaska:

one infantry regiment, two sapper battalions, a cavalry squadron, a company of scooters and an artillery battery arrived.

To the Vlodava-Otkhovok area:

arrived up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery regiments.

To the Holm area:

arrived up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, cavalry regiment and sapper battalion. Over five hundred cars are also concentrated there.

To the Hrubieszow area:

arrived up to four infantry, one artillery and one motorized regiments and cavescadron.

To the Tomasov area:

the headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred tanks.

To the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav area:

arrived up to an infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments.

<...>

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, squadron, battery, and often at night.

In the same areas where the troops arrived, a large number of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles.

In April, work on the construction of fortifications intensified.

<...>

During the period from April 1 to April 19, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 km.

Most of the planes were fixed over the areas: Riga, Kretinga, Taurogen, Lomzha, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl, Rivne.

Application: scheme.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Beria"

On June 2, 1941, Beria sends note No. 1798 / B personally to Stalin:

"... Border detachments of the NKVD of the Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR obtained the following information about the military activities of the Germans near the border with the USSR.

Two army groups concentrated in the areas of Tomasov and Lezhaysk. In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were identified: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanov ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierzhan manor ... the commander of which is General Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. Troop movements occurs mostly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and at the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) one hundred aircraft were delivered.

<...>

Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border: May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of the town of Ulguvek ... May 18 - a general with a group of officers - in the Belzhets region ... May 23, a general with a group of officers ... in the Radymno region.

At many points near the border, pontoons, canvas and inflatable boat. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov.

<...>

In addition, information was received about the transfer of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest in the direction of the borders with the USSR ...

<...>

Reason: telegraphic reports of districts.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Beria"

Three days later, on June 5, 1941, in a note No. 1868 / B, Beria reports to Stalin, in particular, about the arrival in Byala Podlaska of the headquarters of an infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the headquarters of a tank formation, about the concentration of pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges in the Yanov-Podlyasky area northwest of Brest, about the arrival of an echelon with tanks at the Sanok station, about the presence of up to a hundred aircraft at the Modlin airfield, and up to 250 German aircraft at the airfield in the Buzeu region, about proceeding to the Soviet-Romanian border through the Pashkany station of twelve echelons of German infantry with tanks; via Craiova station two echelons with tanks; about the arrival of three echelons of infantry at the Dormenesti station and two echelons with heavy tanks and vehicles at the Borshchov station.

And so - until June 22, 1941 ...

It gradually became clear that the German measures were not a cover for an impending attack on England (wooden bridges were needed to cross the Bug, not the English Channel), not a show of force, but preparations for an imminent and finally decided by Hitler war.

But how did the Red Army prepare for this war?

Well, for example, so...

On December 21, 1940, the new people's commissar for defense, Marshal Timoshenko, who replaced Marshal Voroshilov, issued Order No. 0367, which read:

"Order NPO 1939 No. 0145 required mandatory camouflage of all newly built operational airfields. The Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army was to carry out these activities not only on the operational, but also on the entire airfield network of the Air Force. However, none of the districts paid due attention to this order and did not fulfill.

It must be realized that without careful camouflage of all airfields, the creation of false airfields and the camouflage of all materiel in modern warfare, the combat work of aviation is inconceivable.

I order:

<...>

3. All airfields ... must be sown taking into account camouflage and in relation to the surrounding area by selecting the appropriate herbs. At airfields, simulate fields, meadows, gardens, pits, ditches, ditches, roads, in order to completely merge the background of the airfield with the background of the surrounding area.

By July 1, 1941, complete the camouflage of all airfields located in 500-km strip from the border.

<...>

9. Inspector General of the Air Force to establish control and report on the progress of work monthly.

People's Commissar Marshal of the Soviet Union for Defense of the USSR

S. Timoshenko.

Alas, the order of People's Commissar Timoshenko No. 0367 of December 27, 1940 was not carried out in the same way as the order of People's Commissar Voroshilov No. 0145 of September 9, 1939 (thirty-ninth!) was not carried out.

The main blame for this lies, of course, with the Inspector General of the Air Force, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation Yakov Smushkevich and Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General of Aviation Pavel Rychagov. However, is it permissible - from the point of view of the "democrats" - to put the question in this way, if these two leaders of the pre-war Air Force were "innocently" shot after the start of the war by order of the "bloody executioner" Beria, and only the "whistleblower" of this "executioner" Nikita Khrushchev them in 1954 rehabilitated?

Actually, the people's commissar Tymoshenko is not without fault here - he forgot to control the execution of his own order, the proof of which is already his order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941. In it, People's Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Zhukov stated:

"... There is still nothing to mask airfields and the most important military installations significant has not been done.

The airfield fields are not sown, the runways are not painted to match the color of the terrain, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply with bright colors, attract the attention of the observer for tens of kilometers.

The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft at airfields with the complete absence of their camouflage and the poor organization of airfield services with the use of unmasking signs completely unmask the airfield ... "

As follows from the same order, the leadership of the Air Force did not bother to arrange false airfields by June 19, 1941. And the crowding of equipment can be judged from the photographs of our aircraft destroyed on the ground, taken by the Germans in 1941. Burnt, destroyed aircraft in these photos stand wing to wing, and even in two rows.

So, after *such a thing*, should one be surprised that the war began the way it began? And is Stalin guilty of the fact that it started like that?

But many ground generals, in terms of criminal neglect of the affairs of service, did not go far from aviation generals. And this was mentioned in the same order No. 0042 of June 19, 1941:

"... Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air.

tanks, armored vehicles, other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection, and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground.

Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military facilities ... "

This is how the generals prepared. Not all, of course, but many, especially the highest generals.

Was Stalin preparing for war? Did he foresee it?

There is such a book - "I am a fighter", written by Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Nefyodovich Zakharov. Before the war, he commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District. Being then in the rank of colonel, Zakharov already had experience of fighting in Spain (6 planes personally shot down and 4 in the group) and in China (3 personally shot down).

The quote from his book will be extensive, but I could not significantly reduce it - every phrase is important here:

"... Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew out on the U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Drifted along the roads motorcycles, cars - apparently, staff - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting against it ... and ready to overflow over it.

The number of troops recorded by our eye, at a glance, did not leave
I have no other options for reflection, except for the only one: the war is coming.

Everything that I saw during the flight was superimposed on my previous military experience, and the conclusion that I made for myself can be formulated in four words: "from the day to day".

We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed a plane on *any suitable* (emphasis hereinafter mine. - S.K.) site, which could seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (that is, he knew in advance that our plane with urgent information would land soon! - S.K.) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. In the evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok and landed at the location of the division of Sergei Chernykh "...

The border guards are Beria's service! Therefore, there is no doubt: from the border "secret" Zakharov's report went to the frontier post, from there to the headquarters of the border detachment, from there to the headquarters of the border (not military!) District, he telegraphed to

The main directorate of the border troops of the NKVD, and the general summary of the flight was put on the table of the people's commissar, that is, Beria.

The case with Zakharov is not just special! He - in the exact sense of the word - unique. ***And in the true history of the war, it should be written in bold and capital letters!***

And why so - a little later.

Now let's note this... The task of flying Zakharov was set by the army authorities, and after landing in Bialystok, the colonel reported to him. So what was the reaction of this boss?

Zakharov writes:

"In Bialystok, Deputy Commander of the Western Special Military District, General I.V. Boldin conducted an analysis of the recently completed exercises. I briefly reported to him on the results of the flight, and on the same evening, on a fighter provided to me by Chernykh, I returned to Minsk ... "

Strange!

"Advanced" "historians" accuse Stalin of forbidding any movement of troops near the border. But in fact, in the ZapOVO in June 1941, even exercises were carried out! "Historians" claim that Stalin demanded from the military that they sit in their places quietly, like mice, why, they say, the troops in underpants met the war ...

Further ... Ivan Vasilievich Boldin, presumably, took into account Zakharov's information. With the outbreak of war, he, commanding the operational group of troops, cut off from the main forces of the Western Front in the area of the Bialystok ledge, fought successfully and led the group out of encirclement. And although Boldin was the first deputy of the executed commander of the ZAPOVO General of the Army Pavlov, no one accused Boldin, did not arrest him, in October 1941 he took command of the 19th Army, and from November 1941 to February 1945 he commanded the 50th Army, ending the war Deputy Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

As for the commander of the ZAPOVO Pavlov, he reacted differently to the direct evidence of a military commander of an aviation division with rich military experience, as Zakharov himself reports:

"Commander of the Air Force of the district, General I.I. Kopets listened to my report with the attention that testified to his long-standing and complete confidence in me. Therefore, we immediately went with him to report to the commander of the district (front). Listening, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The commander's intonation frankly replaced the word "exaggerate" with "panic" - he clearly did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.

The attention of General Kopts to Zakharov's report was, alas, belated. Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov reported an interesting detail in his memoirs. On the last Sunday before the war, that is, June 15, 1941, he - then the Deputy People's Commissar for Combat Training - was in the Western Special Military District and watched the exercise in the aviation unit. Suddenly, in the midst of the exercise, a German plane landed at the airfield.

Further - a direct quote from the fifth, 1988, "politizdat" edition of Meretskov's memoirs (p. 197):

"... Everything that happened at the airfield became a field of observation for him (the German aircraft. - **S.K.**) of the crew.

Not believing my eyes, I turned with a question to the commander of the district, D.G. Pavlov. He replied that, by order of the head of the Civil Aviation of the USSR, German passenger planes were ordered to be received at this airfield. This angered me. I ordered the preparation of a telegram addressed to I. V. Stalin about the wrong actions of the civilian authorities and strongly scolded Pavlov for not informing the People's Commissar of Defense about such orders. Then I turned to the chief of aviation of the district, Hero of the Soviet Union I.I. Koptsu:

— What is it you have going on? If a war starts (it turns out that such public assumptions before the war were not criminal, as we are now being assured! - **S.K.**) and the aviation of the district fails to get out of the enemy's attack, what will you do then?

Kopets calmly replied:
"Then I'll shoot!"

Exactly a week later, thirty-two-year-old Kopets shot himself. But to be honest, I don't feel sorry for him. Moreover, he deserved not so much an honorable death from gunpowder and lead as a rope ...

Like his boss Pavlov.

Two weeks before the start of the war, the future Air Chief Marshal, and then - the commander of the 212th separate long-range bomber aviation regiment, lieutenant colonel Alexander Evgenyevich Golovanov, witnessed a conversation between the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov and Stalin via high-frequency communications. So, Pavlov convincingly proved to Stalin that the alarming news from the border was not true, that he had just returned from there and reported that there was no concentration of Germans, and the intelligence of the district was working well.

Pavlov said that he considered the alarm a provocation, and when he hung up, he told Golovanov that some bastard was trying to prove to Stalin that the Germans were concentrating troops on our border.

Wasn't Beria this "bastard"? However, to this day we are told that Stalin "did not believe Pavlov's warnings."

By the way, Meretskov ended up in the border zone of the Western Special Military District a week before the war on the direct orders of Stalin! Stalin sent him there with an inspection after a report about the alarming situation on the borders in the area of the Kyiv Special and Odessa military districts.

The testimony of NKVD General Sudoplatov is also interesting ... On June 20, 1941, his old ally, General Eitingon, told Sudoplatov that he was unpleasantly impressed by a conversation with the commander of the Western Special Military District, General Pavlov, Eitingon's old acquaintance back in Spain. Eitingon, calling Pavlov, in a friendly way asked the commander which border regions should be paid special attention in the event of a war, but Pavlov in response "said something ... unintelligible." He believed that "no special problems will arise even if the enemy manages to seize the initiative at the very beginning on the border, since he has enough forces in reserve to withstand any major breakthrough" ...

You read all this and think: "Isn't it too "stupid" misunderstanding of the situation discovered the "innocent victim of Stalin and Beria" - General Pavlov?

And was it "stupid", and was it "misunderstanding"? Are we not dealing here with the eruption of the Tukhachevsky-Uborevich conspiracy? At one time, Pavlov was "quietly" promoted by them. And, after all, why did Hitler strike through Belarus when he - by all accounts - needed Ukraine? Occupied by a huge mass

troops from the very beginning, depriving the USSR of a powerful production and raw material base in Ukraine, Hitler could count on a lot. And Hitler struck through the Pinsk marshes... Was it not because he knew that it was here that traitors would disorganize resistance to him?

Stalin or...

From about June 18, 1941, Stalin no longer needed anyone's warnings. He knew for sure that the war would begin very soon. And "informed" him about it himself ... Hitler!

I invite the reader to return to the flight of Colonel Zakharov and think: "Why, if Zakharov's task was given by the commander of the ZapOVO aviation, General Kopets, that is, a person from the department of People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, then reports from Zakharov were everywhere accepted by border guards from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, headed by People's Commissar Beria? And they accepted silently, without asking questions: who, they say, are you and what do you need?"

Why were there no questions? How so?! In a tense border atmosphere near the border, an unknown plane lands, and the border patrol is not interested: what, in fact, does the pilot need here?

This could happen in one case: when at the border under each, figuratively speaking, this plane **was waiting for this plane.**

Why were they waiting for him? Who needed, and even in real time, Zakharov's information? There can be only one explanation: **no later than June 18, 1941, Stalin conducted a personal strategic sounding of Hitler's intentions and double-checked his results with the information of Colonel Zakharov.**

Imagine again the situation of that summer ...

Stalin receives messages about the impending war from illegal immigrants and legal out-of-cord residencies of Merkulov from the NKGB, from illegal immigrants of General Golikov from the GRU of the General Staff, from military attachés and through diplomatic channels. But all this may be a strategic provocation of the West, which sees its own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.

However, there is intelligence of the border troops created by Beria, and it is not only possible, but necessary, to believe her information. This is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it can only be reliable.

And this information proves the proximity of the war.

Similar (and independent!) information also comes from the intelligence departments of the border army districts. And she, too, can and should be trusted. But how to check everything finally?

The ideal option is to ask Hitler himself about his true intentions. Not the Fuhrer's entourage, but his own, because the Fuhrer more than once, unexpectedly even for the environment, changed the deadlines for the implementation of his own orders! The timing of the offensive on the Western Front in 1940 was changed by Hitler more than twenty times!

And on June 18, 1941, Stalin turned to Hitler about urgently sending Molotov to Berlin for mutual consultations. This is not a hypothesis, but a fact! Information about Stalin's proposal to Hitler is found in the diary of Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. This standard source for any serious historian of the war was published by the Order of the Red Banner of Labor by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1968-1971, and on page 579 of volume 2, among other entries on June 20, 1941, there is the following:

"Molotov wanted to speak with the Fuhrer on 18.6."

One phrase...

But this phrase, which authentically fixes the fact of Stalin's proposal to Hitler about Molotov's urgent visit to Berlin, completely turns the whole picture of the last pre-war days!

Fully!

Stalin suggested...

Hitler refused.

Even if he began to delay with an answer, this would be proof for Stalin that the war was near. But Hitler generally refused. Straightaway!

And Stalin understood: this is war. Actually, after Hitler's refusal, one did not have to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov did and which can be formulated in four words: "from day to day."

And Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Defense to ensure urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border zone from the German side. And he emphasizes that reconnaissance should be carried out by an experienced high-level aviation commander. Perhaps he gave such a task to the commander of the Air Force of the Red Army Zhigarev, who visited Stalin's office from 0.45 to 1.50 on June 17 (actually, already on 18) June 1941, and he called Kopts in Minsk.

Could Kopets have chosen a better candidate than Colonel Zakharov?

On the other hand, Stalin instructs Beria to ensure the immediate and unhindered transmission of the information collected by this experienced aviator to Moscow. That is why Zakharov, along the entire route of his flight, in the zones of several border detachments, under each bush, was waiting for a border detachment, without even asking what kind of plane it landed in the border zone. After all, Zakharov landed on "suitable sites" not on his own initiative. He was told in advance that he must periodically transmit all information in real time through the border guards, making landings every 30-50 kilometers.

And be sure to periodically, and not once at the end of the flight! Because, first of all, there was no time to wait! In real time, Stalin himself *was waiting* for information from Beria. At a speed of U-2 (later renamed Po-2) of about 120 - 150 kilometers per hour, the time factor on a 400-kilometer route was already significant.

And secondly ... Secondly, at some point the Germans could have shot down Zakharov. And then at least part of the operational information would have reached Stalin through Beria anyway.

She has come to a full extent. And by the evening of June 18, 1941, Stalin knew exactly and finally: the war was on the nose.

It is possible, however, that the reconstruction of events I have given needs to be changed in some ways (especially if Zakharov did not fly on the 18th, but on the 17th), that is, perhaps at first there was Zakharov's flight, and only after him - Stalin's appeal to Hitler. A parallel combination of these events is also possible. But their interrelation and mutual conditionality in the real, I emphasize, time scale are undoubted.

Realizing that Hitler did decide to go to war with Russia, Stalin immediately (that is, no later than the evening of June 18) began to issue appropriate orders to the NGOs, the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the NKVD.

This could not but be noticed in one way or another by another's eye, which is also confirmed in the note to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, sent by the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov on June 21, 1941.

The note contained the text of a conversation between two Moscow foreign diplomats that took place on June 20. Exact data regarding their citizenship in the text of a note published in the collection of documents "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table" was confiscated by the Foreign Intelligence Service even in 1995! However, the conversation itself is important for us now, part of which I give below:

_____: When did your lieutenant general arrive?

_____: Yesterday. He saw Timoshenko and Zhukov.

_____: <...> Were you with him?

_____: I was with him.

<...>

_____: But he didn't ask anything? Tymoshenko knew that he was from your the general will not receive a suitable answer ... And here everyone is worried - war, war.

_____: Yes, yes. The Russians have found out.

Yes, the Russians did!

And we learned in advance because the efforts of many large and small spies, undertaken in recent months, crowned Stalin's personal probing!

In the light of this sounding, the TASS statement of June 14, 1941 that "according to the USSR, Germany is just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, therefore, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground ...".

Stalin's TASS statement of June 14, as it were, preceded his subsequent proposal to Hitler for the immediate dispatch of Molotov to Berlin.

That is, it was the first phase of sounding.

The proposal for an urgent visit by Molotov was the second phase.

Hitler's refusal became a "litmus test".

The flight of Zakharov and information from him, taken by the border guards of Beria and immediately transferred by the latter to Stalin, put the last point.

Now it was necessary to immediately instruct Timoshenko, Zhukov and Navy People's Commissar Kuznetsov to urgently put border troops and fleets on alert without much noise and wait for developments.

As they mounted, on June 21 Stalin authorized a second directive. The very first directive on readiness for an attack was sanctioned by Stalin on the evening of June 18 - immediately after Zakharov's flight. The directive itself was probably destroyed long ago - most likely, back in Khrushchev's times. But a number of details of the last pre-war week convincingly prove its existence.

So, Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs "On the Eve" writes:

"... The TASS report of June 14 sounds especially illogical now that we know how Hitler reacted to it. On June 17, that is, literally three days later, he gave the order to begin the implementation of the Barbarossa plan at dawn on June 22. Looking through the reports from the fleets, one can be convinced of the increased activity of the Germans at sea from this fateful date - June 17 ..."

However, everything is just logical! If the TASS report was probing (and it was), and on June 17 the second phase of Stalin's probing was carried out with a proposal for a visit by Molotov, then Hitler, after his refusal, should have immediately authorized the start of Barbarossa. He wasn't stupid either. Reich troops are made. The Führer may still have hesitated, but when he saw that Stalin was putting him in a "moment of truth" situation, he immediately realized that immediately after his refusal, Stalin would have to take urgent measures in the border military districts. And this means that the factor of surprise attack is under threat.

And Hitler gave the final order.

Moreover, there is very interesting evidence from the other side, for example - memoirs of Luitpold Steidle, former commander of the 767th Grenadier Regiment of the 376th

Infantry Division of the 6th Paulus Army. On the eve of the war, Steidle commanded a battalion of a regiment stationed in the area of the Bialystok ledge, and reports this:

"On June 18, my regiment was ordered to requisition 600 horses and carts in a precisely marked area within 24 hours. The action was sudden and at first it was presented as a police and veterinary event ... Now each company received an additional horse-drawn transport. The goal was to guarantee the highest degree of mobility... away from the main roads...

However, almost no one believed that the situation was so serious. And in the past, it happened more than once that Hitler achieved his goal through military demonstrations (as we see, before his direct sounding, Stalin had objective reasons to hesitate in assessing Hitler's plans. - S.K.) ... The division headquarters knew almost nothing about the enemy, not about how our command assesses the situation as a whole ... "

That is, here, as a certain milestone, it is called approximately the same (June 17 - 18) pre-war day. I think this is no coincidence.

No, Stalin did not "miss the war". And the intelligence "Calendar of messages of the Sergeant and the Corsican", prepared by the NKGB intelligence by June 20, remained unclaimed, not because Stalin did not trust these messages, but because after June 18, 1941, Stalin personally did not need additional information - "informant » Stalin personally became the Fuhrer.

And the generals...

Well, sometimes it is difficult to get rid of the idea that at the beginning of the war we in a number of cases dealt not only with the bungling of military leaders, but also with their direct, pre-planned betrayal! In any case, the way that many commanders and commanders met the war can only be called a crime.

References to the "degaussing" effect of the TASS statement of June 14 can only convince simpletons! Any political public statements and to a small extent cannot be a guide to action for the military. For a competent, real military man, **only** an order is such a guide! And the generals of the Red Army could not (?) even fulfill the orders of the NPO to disguise ...

From the beginning of May 1941, every senior commander and general in the western military districts had to be like a tight string. And, in any case, this was the responsibility of the personal "teams" of Timoshenko and Zhukov in Moscow, Pavlov in Minsk and Kirponos in Kyiv.

How did they "prepare" for war? Here is the chief of staff of the KOVO, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev reports on January 2, 1941 from Kyiv to the General Staff:

The "mobilization" supply of ammunition in KOVO is extremely insignificant. It does not provide for the troops of the district even for the period of the first operation. <...> The main [main] A[rtilery] Directorate] does not fulfill its plans. Instead of the 3684 wagons planned for the second half of the year according to the directive of the People's Commissar of September 20, 1940 No. 371649, only 1355 wagons were delivered to the district, and without the district's needs for types of ammunition, " etc.

The "clerk" generals from the General Staff, in the best clerical traditions, forward Purkaev's report to the GAU, and from there, in the best clerical traditions, in February 1941, a reply comes (the emphasis is mine everywhere):

"... The amount of ammunition supply to the district according to the plan for the 2nd half of the year [19]40, based on the directive of the General Staff, was **calculated only for partial** satisfaction of the district's needs in [19]40. <...> The delivery **plan** was completed by 34%",

etc. with a reassuring notice that, they say, during 1941 we will ship everything.
Shipped!

But how did the General Staff prepare the People's Commissar's directive, **planning** in advance to satisfy the district's needs only **partially**? Moreover, this **planned** need was satisfied by only **a third**! And they didn't worry, they didn't tease People's Commissar Timoshenko, industry, the Central Committee, personally Comrade Stalin, but they cheerfully reported: "The armor is strong, and our tanks are fast ..."

Yes, I know that Marshal Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that at the beginning of 1941, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, N.A. Voznesensky (the same one who was shot for the cause in 1950) considered the applications of the People's Commissariat of Defense "too exaggerated" and told Stalin that they "should be satisfied by a maximum of 20%". What Stalin first convinced, but ...

But, firstly, Stalin soon, on sound reflection, ordered the issuance of a special decree on a significantly larger production of ammunition, starting from the second half of 1941 (how it helped us out with the outbreak of war!).

Secondly, Zhukov's testimony reveals another direct culprit of our first military failures - Voznesensky. This "statesman" before the war did not look, it turns out, beyond his own arrogant nose.

Thirdly, the blame is still not removed from the General Staff and GAU, because, as we see, they planned in advance exaggerated, "paper" planned figures and thus criminally misled the border districts.

Fourthly, the command of the districts, especially the ZAPOVO, is criminally guilty of the fact that the existing warehouses of ammunition and weapons already produced and delivered to the districts were placed mediocre and did not provide operational supplies to the troops in the conditions of the fleeting start of hostilities.

The country really gave the army, say, strong armor of the latest fast T-34 tanks, but many generals in the pre-storm time planned combat training in such a way that ordinary tankers did not have the opportunity to master this technique as soon as possible. And they formed new mechanized and tank corps almost on the border, supplying them with new equipment in small batches and not providing proper combat readiness.

And the same, if not worse, we had in the Air Force, led by the "victims of Beria" Smushkevich and Rychagov.

Later, Marshal Zhukov justified himself by the fact that, due to Stalin's hesitation (well, how could it be without it!) They began to form tank and mechanized corps belatedly only in March 1941 and did not have time to complete them. But the way out was obvious - not to multiply the management of 20 (twenty) mechanized corps, which do not have equipment, but stationed in the border zone, but to create them in half, say, less, but fully equipped. And the second turn to cook in the depths of the country.

Yes, we have much, much obscurity in our coverage of the pre-war half of 1941, and especially the last pre-war and first war weeks. For example, the famous "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in the timely bringing of the fleets to "readiness No. 1" ... Is it really so great, and was it, this initiative allegedly taken by Nikolai Gerasimovich without Stalin's sanction?

Even the fact that the fleets were more or less ready for the German attack is far from a fact. And even more so, it is not a fact that the People's Commissar of the Navy issued an order to put the Navy on alert!

There are "Notes of a Participant in the Defense of Sevastopol" classified since 1943 by Captain 1st Rank A.K. Evseev, which are still kept in the Central Naval Archive (fund 2, inventory 1, file 315, sheets 6 - 126). And from them it follows that the full combat readiness of No. 1 in the Black Sea Fleet was announced *after* the first German bombs exploded on the Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol. And this despite the fact that 21

On June 1941, the Black Sea Fleet, without any directives from Moscow, was, in fact, on full alert due to the last day of major maneuvers, which should have ended on June 22.

Here is what the former commander of the training detachment of the Black Sea Fleet Evseev wrote in December 1942:

"... A wonderful Crimean evening has come. The dismissal of personnel ashore began. Life in Sevastopol went on as usual. Brightly lit streets and boulevards gleamed. White houses, theaters and clubs flooded with fire beckoned sailors who had retired to the city to rest. Crowds of sailors and townspeople dressed in white filled the streets and gardens. The well-known Primorsky Boulevard was, as always, crowded with walkers. Music played. Funny jokes and laughter were heard on this pre-holiday (the end of the exercises is always a holiday for military people. - **S.K.**) evening everywhere.

The senior and senior commanders of the fleet - participants in the maneuvers - were invited command of the fleet to a banquet on the occasion of the successful completion of the maneuvers ... "

Need comments?

Let me just remind you that General Pavlov also enjoyed the operetta at the Minsk Theater on the last pre-war evening, although at that moment he should have been in a completely different place, which I will say more about.

And even when German planes flew over the bays of Sevastopol, many answered the question "What kind of planes are these?" they answered: "Yes, this is probably Ivan Stepanovich decided to check the readiness of the air defense of Sevastopol ..."

Admiral Ivan Stepanovich Isakov then supervised the maneuvers of the Black Sea Fleet. It was he who classified Yevseyev's notes on December 28, 1943, ordering them to be classified as secret "with the right to use by all those working in Sevastopol." Note: he did not give the order to punish Evseev for slander, but "only" classified the truth, which in itself crosses out the "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy for bringing the fleets to "Readiness No. ...".

What was the most important thing for him?

Well, actually! How could the people's commissar take such a step *before the outbreak of hostilities* without a direct order from Stalin? After all, what is readiness number 1? This is the "Big Gathering" signal in the bases of the fleet, the combat alarm on the ships, the brave Red Navy men and lieutenants in white tunics, white trousers and white shoes fleeing from dismissal! In Sevastopol, in Odessa, in Tallinn...

And this commotion is being watched by agents of the Abwehr ... Or even just citizens of the still friendly Third Reich, who, by chance or on official business, ended up in, say, Tallinn. And suddenly take the war and do not start on June 22.

Let's say Hitler would have postponed the blow for another week! He was not going to tinker with us until the autumn thaw, he expected to complete everything before the fall and could donate another week for one reason or another.

And what would we have then? At least - a note from the Reich Ausamt to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. What's the maximum? As a maximum - the very reason for the attack, which Stalin was so afraid of.

That's it!

No, this kind of action in the country can go sideways! How can they go sideways and unauthorized initiators of such actions. Therefore, it is unlikely that Kuznetsov acted on the eve of the war *at his own peril and risk*.

By the way, in 1961, Krymizdat published notes by Yevgenia Melnik, the wife of an artilleryman from the 35th heavy coastal battery, with a circulation of 30,000 copies, located near the Cape of Chersonesos in Sevastopol, "The Way to the Underground". Unpretentious but very informative, these notes begin with a description of the night with

21 on June 22, 1941, and from them it can also be concluded that in Sevastopol they did not know about any "Readiness No. 1" on the eve of the war. The blackout for the last two pre-war weeks was observed insofar as those very large naval exercises were going on, which ended by June 22 ... For what reason the famous Primball was brightly illuminated on the evening of June 21, and the admirals gathered for a banquet.

Well, Sevastopol was far from the borders of the USSR. But in the border military districts, if their command had taken their duties responsibly, it was clearly not up to banquets. And it, this command, by the evening of June 21, 1941, was obliged to be not in theater boxes, but at front-line command posts.

It was the front-line, and not the district, because no later than June 19, 1941, relevant orders were received from Moscow to Minsk and Kyiv. We will see this now, but for now I will say that interesting data on the beginning of the war can sometimes be found even in such a source, seemingly far from military-political issues, as the monograph "Domestic horse breeding: history, modernity and problems" by E.V. Kozhevnikova and D.Ya. Gurevich.

Although why - "distant"? .. The masses of armed horsemen for a long time played the role of a strategic factor in world history, so the story about the actions of the Soviet cavalry in the first hours of the war was by no means redundant in a smart book about a horse ... Especially since our cavalymen in these the terrible hours did not twist the tails of the horses, but fought bravely, and often skillfully. Here is how it is written about this in the monograph "Domestic horse breeding" of 1990 with reference to the 1984 edition of the year "Soviet Cavalry. Military history essay. AND I. Soshnikov and others:

"The cavalry entered the battle with the Nazis from the first minutes of the war. In the Western (Special. - **S.K.**) military district, together with the border guards, two squadrons of the 6th Chongar Cavalry Division, sent to help the 87th mu border detachment **on June 19** (my emphasis. - **S.K.**). Following them, all units of this division entered the battle, pulled up to the border an hour before the start of hostilities - at 3 am on June 22, 1941. The cavalry steadfastly repulsed the attacks of superior enemy forces. They suffered heavy losses, but held back the aggressors striving deep into Soviet territory ..."

Wounded in battle, the commander of the Chongar division, General M.P. Konstantinov got to the partisans, after recovering for a year and a half he commanded a large partisan formation in Belarus, and after returning to the mainland, he continued to fight, from October 1943 until the end of the war he commanded the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps. In April 1945 he became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

However, in the above quote, we should now be most interested in the message that parts of the 6th Chongar Cavalry Division were put on alert as early as June 19, 1941! After all, this could not have been the initiative of General Konstantinov! But the merits of the commander of the troops of the Pavlov district are not in that either - otherwise the entire district would be on alert.

Who gave the smart order, today one can only guess. But it was given. And, knowing already what we know, we should rather be surprised not at the fact that a number of units and formations met the war in combat readiness, but at why *not everyone was like that!*

And I haven't even said everything yet!

Here, for example, is also an interesting fact, suggestive - from the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev, who, just before the war, was appointed from the post of artillery commander of the Kyiv Regional Military District to the head of the GAU:

"By June 19 (1941. - **S.K.**) I had already finished handing over to my successor and almost on the go said goodbye to my now former colleagues. On the go because

The headquarters of the district and its administration these days just received an order to relocate to Ternopil and hastily curtailed work in Kyiv.

What is written does not differ from the book by G. Andreev and I. Vakurov "General Kirponos", published by Politizdat of Ukraine in 1976:

"... in the afternoon of June 19, an order was received from the People's Commissar of Defense to the field administration of the district headquarters to be relocated to the city of Ternopil.

But why did this **district** administration suddenly rush to Ternopil, where **the front** command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44th Infantry Division and "everything was ready for the work of the field administration"? We are told that the "tyrant" and "fool" Stalin did not allow the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov to withdraw troops to summer camps, although there was no crime in that - planned combat training. And here the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District is removed from its place! Who could give instructions about this except Stalin?

And what - the KOVO was given the order to deploy the field administration of the district (that is, already, in fact, the front), but there is no ZapOVO? Urgent instructions reached Kirponos in Kyiv by the second half of June 19, but did they not manage to reach Pavlov in Minsk by June 21?

Success, it turns out! And near Baranovichi, in the area of the Obuz-Lesnaya station, a front-line command post was also deployed a few days before the invasion. Only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war!

But in the Odessa military district, General M.V. Zakharov arrived at his field command post in the Tiraspol region on June 21, 1941, on time and took command. And Zakharov arrived there not on his own initiative - on June 14 he received an order from Moscow to separate the army command (9th Army) and on June 21 to withdraw him to Tiraspol, carefully organizing the command and control of the troops from there. Rear Admiral Konstantin Illarionovich Derevyanko, former deputy chief of staff of the Odessa Naval Base, writes about this in his memoirs (published in 1985). He also directly writes about two directives from People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov dated June 14 and 18 and reports that the commanders of other western districts received them on June 18!

That's right! The Odessa military district is the "Romanian" theater of secondary military operations. There is no need to worry about secrecy and the absence of a reason for provocations. And with *special* districts it was necessary to deal with it *separately*, and give them *special directives*. And just on June 18-19 they were given away - formally to Timoshenko and Zhukov. But could they do it without Stalin's sanction? Of course not!

However, in the classic (in the sense - the first and lifetime, in 1971) edition of "Memoirs and Reflections" by Marshal Zhukov, not a word is said about these directives. In Chapter 9 "On the Eve of the Great Patriotic War", starting from page 213 to page 232, which refers to the draft directive of the General Staff, which began to be prepared on June 21, 1941, only the directives of April 14 and May 13, 1941 are mentioned. But after all, Admiral Derevyanko did not invent anything when he wrote about the hushed directive of June 18! And not only in Derevyanko we find the "traces" left by this directive.

More ... In 1995, the book of retired colonel-general Yu.A. Gorkov, consultant of the Historical-archival and military-memorial center of the General Staff, under the name "Kremlin. Bid. General Staff. On page 79 we we read:

"In the context of the impending war, on June 13, S.K. Timoshenko asked I.V. Stalin's permission to put on alert and deploy the first echelons according to cover plans. But permission has not been received."

I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a single reason for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked. Yu. Gorkov himself writes about this - on page 78. Therefore, on June 13, 1941, Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible measures to deploy troops. That is why he began his own soundings, starting with the TASS statement of June 13-14, which, most likely, he wrote after a conversation with Tymoshenko.

It must be said that in the records of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office (I will later tell about the source of this information) there are no days of June 12, 13, 15 and 19. Without trying to explain this fact in any way (although there are deaf mentions that Stalin fell ill before the war), I simply draw attention to it, expressing only the assumption that Stalin was just dealing with some urgent and delicate issues these days connected with the assessment of the current situation and the development of the nearest line of conduct for one's own, the Armed Forces of the USSR and the whole country.

Interestingly! In his memoirs, Zhukov wrote: "After the death of I.V. Stalin, there were versions that some commanders and their headquarters on the night of June 22, suspecting nothing, slept peacefully or had fun without a care. This is not true. The last peaceful night was completely different ... "

Alas, here one can clearly see the desire to maintain both honor and acquire capital ... If on the last peaceful night the commanders and their headquarters were in place and in combat readiness, then why were the troops sleeping? Moreover, some were sleeping, while others were already moving towards the border ... How is this to be understood?

By the way, how did Beria's border guards meet the war? Well, I will simply quote the monograph "The Border is Fighting" by A.I. Chugunov:

"The last night before the invasion for the border troops of the western and northwestern sections was actually no longer peaceful. On the evening of June 21, many outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments, by order of their chiefs, left the barracks and occupied defensive structures prepared in case of hostilities.

But who gave orders to the chiefs? And what does "...many" mean? What, at some outposts, the chiefs said to their subordinates: "What, guys, the night is warm, starry, can we sit this night in the trenches? Of them, the stars are better visible, and the German - if something starts there! And at some outposts the night was cloudy, and there in the trenches - to admire the stars, they did not sit down ...

No, such a responsible order as the order to take combat positions in the evening could come to the outposts only from Moscow, from the people's commissariat. And only the Commissar himself could give such an order. That is, Beria. And, of course, for the entire western strip of the border.

True, there are reports that the border guards were not at all forbidden to occupy defensive structures. Well, so be it, although such a statement does not stand up to any logical analysis! But who was the initiator of this state of affairs (in fact, permission to act according to the situation), if not People's Commissar Beria? And could he give such a "carte blanche" to the border guards without the knowledge and consent of Stalin? And could Stalin limit himself to the NKVD border troops and forget about the Red Army and the Red Army? After all, the actions and everyday life of the frontier troops are visible to the opposite side.

So the information of A. Chugunov proves once again: Stalin knew about the war, and the rest knew.

But someone took action, and someone *for some reason* - no!
Marshal Meretskov later recalled:

"M.P. Kirponos, taking the matter very seriously, ordered the occupation of field positions in the border fortifications of the Kyiv Special Military District. Moscow received a message about this. The movement of formations from the second echelon was allowed, but at the direction of the General Staff, the troops of the KOVO had to leave the foreground and retreat. Things did not come to the consideration of a similar initiative (? - **S.K.**) of the Odessa Military District (? - **S.K.**). As a result, in practice, the troops of this district were on the eve of the war, it can be considered, in combat readiness, which cannot be said about the troops of the Kyiv and Western Special Military Districts.

Here, every phrase is a question, because we are dealing here with a confusion of truth, omissions, omissions and outright lies.

Marshal Zhukov wrote about the last pre-war days in the same style:

"We (Zhukov and Timoshenko. - **S.K.**) were strictly forbidden to make any advances of troops to the front lines according to the cover plan without the personal permission of I.V. Stalin.

People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko recommended that the commanders of the district troops conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to bring troops closer to the deployment areas ... "

So, it was possible to move troops. However, Zhukov is completely silent about actions of Kirponos described by Meretskov and blocked by Zhukov.

Do I need to explain why he is silent about them? After all, back on June 18, 1941, the military received Stalin's sanction to issue directives to the troops to bring them on high alert. Another thing is that she turned out to be "lowered on the brakes" by negligent sloths, bunglers and traitors.

But then the war began...

How and when did it begin for Stalin?

After the XX Congress, held at the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites tried to present Stalin as a scoundrel who left the country on June 22, 1941 to the mercy of fate and went to drink at a dacha in Kuntsevo, allegedly saying - they say, prosr ... the country, so now figure it out yourself. This vile gossip was widely circulated, reproduced by Valentin Pikul in the unfinished epic "Stalingrad". And this "fact" was considered "reliable" for decades. Still - it was announced by the head of state and the party! And after all, Pikul himself (!) painted "Stalin's insanity" in his "Stalingrad" with such relish! So there are many of our fellow citizens who believe in this vile lie to this day.

For the first time, it was refuted by the retired Colonel-General Yu.A., already known to the reader. Gorkov, who published in his book "Kremlin. Bid. General Staff" extensive extracts from the "Journal of Visits by I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office"... Today, however, in a meager circulation of 350 copies, this entire "Journal ..." has also been published.

General Gorkov assessed the "Journal ..." as follows: "A unique, invaluable source is of particular importance - the register of persons who visited it (Stalin. - **S.K.**) in the Kremlin office, now stored in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation (former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU).

Indeed, the data of this "Journal ..." exposes many lies about Stalin, and even General Gorkov writes:

"Let's go back ... to the first days of the Great Patriotic War. It was around them that the most dense atmosphere of gossip and rumors concentrated. Unfortunately, it has already become a textbook opinion that these days I.V. Stalin, deeply depressed by the collapse of his offensive doctrine (God forbid, where could he have had it in 1941? - **S.K.**), deceived and humiliated (wow! - **S.K.**) by Hitler, fell into deep apathy, and 22 and on June 23, he generally drank soundly, not taking any part in the affairs of government.

So, the analysis of the journal of visits by I.V. Stalin shows that I.V. Stalin was in his Kremlin office from the early morning of June 22, 1941 ... "

It really is. And on June 22, 1941, Stalin, having started the reception at 5.45, finished it at 16.45, taking people for eleven hours in a row! June 23, 1941, starting at 3.20, he finished at 0.55 on June 24. And on this day, after Stalin's rest, the flow of people flowed through his office for "only" 5 hours and 10 minutes. However, it was necessary to understand the situation in more detail, to think ...

But on June 25, 1941, Stalin's working day was all 24 hours! On this day, he received 29 people! On June 26, 24 people were received in 10 hours and 35 minutes, and on June 27, in 10 hours 05 minutes - again 29!

Like this!

And on June 21, 1941, after 10:20 p.m., only three people remained in Stalin's office besides his master: Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria. Soon, Beria went away for a short while and at 22.40 came again.

At 11 p.m., Beria, Molotov and Voroshilov left, and Stalin was left alone. It seems that he already understood that his directives of the last days were executed very badly by the army team. But at the moment he could not change anything, and he needed to rest - The next day promised to be difficult.

The day of the twenty-second of June 1941 began with the fact that at 5.45 in the office Stalin included Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, Zhukov.

At 7.30 Malenkov came and left with Beria at 9.20.

But at half past twelve, when only Molotov remained in Stalin's office, they again appeared together for half an hour. And before that, often associated with common tasks, Malenkov and Beria will now interact more and more closely for all twelve subsequent years - until the day of Beria's arrest on June 26, 1953.

On the first day of the war, Stalin was also visited by Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Vyshinsky, Shaposhnikov, Vatutin, Navy People's Commissar Kuznetsov, Kulik, Manuilsky and Georgy Dimitrov.

On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed.

As you can see, a simple acquaintance with the document brings down a huge layer of lies about Stalin's "binge drinking" and so on. Although, to be honest, it would not be surprising to drink with grief, having discovered how Russia and its leader were let down by those on whom there was the most hope - military! After all, for them, Stalin and the country gave weapons, personnel, funds. Constantly delving into *general* defense problems, Stalin left *purely military* problems to the military, to professionals.

And they...

Yes, much becomes clear when analyzing documents.

And then the lie collapses.

But in 1956, she brazenly triumphed! After all, not one of those who were in good health in 1956, in the 60s, in the 70s and even in the 80s and knew **exactly** how Stalin spent the first day of the war, raised his voice in defense of Stalin and historical truth!

After all, Molotov did not stand up in the hall of the 20th Congress and did not say in response to Khrushchev's insinuations: "Yes, how dare you lie so vilely, citizen Khrushchev, because after such

lie, you are not my friend! I left Comrade Stalin's office an hour before June 22, 1941, and re-entered his office the next morning at fifteen minutes to six. And then I was day after day in this office several times a day!"

And Malenkov didn't get up...

And Kaganovich...

The marshals and generals did not stand up when Khrushchev, scoffing at our history from the rostrum of the 20th Congress, signed himself up as a strategist and denied military leadership talent to their Supreme Commander. But all of them were then sitting in the hall - except for Marshal Rokossovsky, who was then the Minister of Defense of Poland.

Marshals Voroshilov and Zhukov did not get up.

They didn't get up after Khrushchev declared that Stalin knew nothing about military affairs, that he was informed of the situation on the globe, that he pulled out a map almost from the top of his boot, on which almost the whole world was placed ...

But Marshal Timoshenko, Marshal Vasilevsky, and Admiral Kuznetsov could tell the truth. But the latter somehow mentioned that he saw Stalin almost a week after the start of the war. But he was summoned to Stalin's office at 15:20 Moscow time on June 22, 1941.

And others - either those who passed through this office in the first days of the war, or those who received orders and instructions directly from his master did not get up either.

They all then remained silent.

Why?

I hope the reader already understands why. However, let us return once again to the days on the eve of the war and see what is written about them in those memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, which are called "On the Eve". Their supplemented edition Voenizdat released in 1990 ...

Page 285:

"Even in the afternoon of June 21, it became known: the next night you can expect the Germans to attack..."

Page 299:

"At about 11 pm (June 21. - **S.K.**) the phone rang. I heard a voice Marshal Timoshenko: - There is very important information. Come to me..."

The question immediately arises: "So when it became known:" in ***the second half the afternoon of June 21***" or ***"about 11 pm"***?

Reading page 299 further:

"... A few minutes later, we (with Rear Admiral Alafuzov. - **S.K.**) were already going up to the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K.'s office was temporarily located. Timoshenko.

Marshal, walking around the room, dictated ... General of the Army G.K. Zhukov was sitting table and wrote something ...

Semyon Konstantinovich ... without naming sources, he said that a German attack on our country is considered possible ...

Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts (the chronology of Admiral Kuznetsov does not agree well with other data, but... —

S.K.). I remember that it was lengthy - on three sheets (and the "Directive No. 1" now exhibited to the public is very short. - **S.K.**). It set out in detail what the troops should do in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany.<...>

I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:

- Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the full actual readiness number one..."

Admiral Kuznetsov, reporting this, did not seem to understand that he was actually debunking his "merit" - after all, he gave the notorious order when delaying its return would be tantamount to treason. Moreover, Rear Admiral Derevyanko, with reference to the story of his old colleague Captain 3rd Rank V.A. Ershchenko, who on the night of the attack was an operator at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, reports that People's Commissar Kuznetsov (not Alafuzov) called the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet via HF at one o'clock in the morning and, having ordered the **fleet** to be put on operational readiness number one, added that a telegram about this had begun to transmit from Moscow at 23.50 June 21.

But that's not all! Reading page 300:

"Later, I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 at about 5 p.m. (Zhukov himself vaguely indicates "on the evening of June 21." - S.K.) to I.V. Stalin. Consequently, already at that time ... it was decided to bring the troops to full combat readiness and, in the event of an attack, repel it. This means that all this happened about eleven hours before the actual invasion of the enemy on our land.

And again the question arises: "What does Kuznetsov mean by writing" this happened"?"

Eleven hours **before** the attack "occurred", as I understand it, the last (but - if I was right in the previous reconstruction of events - not the first) Stalin's sanction to put the troops on alert. And even by 11 p.m. on June 21, "there was no" sending of a directive about this to the troops.

Why?

What - Stalin is to blame for this?

Much later than Stalin's death, Marshal Vasilevsky declared that it was necessary to "boldly step over the threshold", but Stalin "did not dare to do this" ...

However, Stalin, if we use figurative comparisons in the spirit of Vasilevsky, opened the "door" in front of the military in time, and boldly walked through the "threshold", naturally without starting hostilities, but, putting the troops on alert, they not only could, but also were obliged.

Could Stalin have assumed that the top generals would almost completely neglect their duties?

But that's not all! We read page 300 of N.G. Kuznetsova further:

"Not so long ago I happened to hear from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he commanded the Moscow Military District - that on June 21 **at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon** (emphasis mine. - **S.K.**) I.V. called him. Stalin demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense.

It turns out that not at "17 o'clock", but at "2 o'clock in the afternoon" on June 21, 1941, Stalin was ready to "step over the threshold"? If he demanded to increase combat readiness from the commander of the internal military district Tyulenev (note - over the head Timoshenko and Zhukov), then the commanders of the border special military districts could not be forgotten by him!

But all accurately informed persons were silent about this for the rest of their lives.

Why? Why did practically everyone lie or "sanctify" other people's lies with their silence, including lies about how Stalin started the war? And not only Stalin ... In 1963, the "Khrushchev" year, the memoirs of the Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronova. On the one hand, the marshal clearly did not lie when he conveyed his conversation with Pavlov, the commander of the ZapOVO, whom he knew from Spain.

The conversation took place a few days before the war in Moscow. Pavlov, having visited the People's Commissariat "on some trifles", accidentally ran into Voronov and in response to his question - how, they say, are you doing there? - cheerfully answered that, they say, everything is calm, everything is in order, the troops are "stomping" with might and main in tactical exercises.

In terms of Pavlov's criminal vigor, the marshal's testimony is probably true. But on the other hand, Marshal Voronov describes a clearly impossible situation ... They say that, while commanding the country's air defense at that time, in the middle of the night from June 21 to June 22, 1941, he received messages from the VNOS (air surveillance, warning and communications) posts about the bombing of Libau and etc. And allegedly he immediately hurried to the People's Commissar Timoshenko, who allegedly had the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Red Army Mekhlis, but allegedly there was no chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Zhukov. Voronov allegedly began to tell the people's commissar the terrible news, but he allegedly did not believe it, ordered to sit down and write everything down on paper, and Mekhlis allegedly also stood behind Voronov's back and looked to see if Voronov was writing what he was saying. Voronov claims that he finished his writing at four in the morning on June 22, 1941, but supposedly even at four o'clock the People's Commissar of Defense did not believe that hostilities had begun.

Well, for 1963, this tale could pass for truth. But why **Voronov personally** lied so obviously, and even at the address not of Stalin, but of Timoshenko, I cannot say even in 2008.

Nevertheless, I am now personally convinced that practically the entire then party state and military elite, who had the opportunity to see the big picture, being in Moscow, in the center of events, later conspired to remain silent about Stalin's first war days because it was important for her to distort the picture of **the last pre-war** days of Stalin, and even present him before the war itself, either a fool or a coward.

For the sake of objectivity, I must admit that at least in 1971, at the age of 75 and three years before his death, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, in his memoirs, published by the Novosti Press Agency in 1971, had the courage to declare:

"I.V. Stalin was a strong-willed man and, as they say, not from a cowardly dozen. **Somewhat** depressed, I saw him **only once** (the emphasis is mine everywhere. - **S.K.**). It was at dawn on June 22, 1941: his conviction that war could be avoided collapsed.

But this short and incomplete admission was made during the Brezhnev era, which some people sometimes define - albeit without serious grounds for this - as a "return to mild Stalinism." And to say loudly to the same Zhukov, or Timoshenko, or Vasilevsky, or Meretskov in the fifties, in the sixties, that Stalin not only *knew*, but also **sanctioned** bringing the troops on combat readiness in time, this or...

That meant committing civil suicide! Or - if you choose a more sublime comparison - lie with your chest on the embrasure. And for self-sacrifice none of them dared.

And how could, say, Molotov dare to do this? He also lied **outright**. even in 1984. And this lie was then recorded by Felix Chuev, although he considered it to be the holy truth. In his book One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov, there is an entry dated January 13, 1984:

"I am reading to Molotov excerpts from Avtorkhanov's book on June 22, 1941: "We came to his dacha and offered to make an appeal to the people. Stalin flatly refused. Then they instructed Molotov ... "

"Yes, that's right, something like this..."

But that's not even close to true! This is absolutely not true! On June 22, 1941, Stalin was not at the dacha, but received Molotov in his Kremlin office at 5.45 and was in the Kremlin all day, starting the war.

But Molotov could not tell the truth. She was very unattractive to him, too. By the way, if **this** truth came out, then, you see, the truth about Lavrenty Beria would also come out ... And instead of the "dusty camp" monster, a brilliant statesman-universal would appear before the eyes of astonished descendants, not only not threatening anyone with erasure in the "camp dust" for warnings about the imminent war, but, on the contrary, by his organizational work and his personal actions, he ensured that Stalin was informed about it **in a timely manner !**

Alas, none of the first persons of the state either in real time or later stood up for the desecrated honor and good name of the leader, for the truth about Comrade Stalin. But it was the one who raised them, gave them gold epaulettes and stars, gave them high government posts ... It was the one who clearly - both formally and informally - towered over them by virtue of the obvious genius and greatness of personality and destiny.

Alas, the "darkness of low truths" was dearer to them than their "elevating" deceit...

Myth three

IN 1941, STALIN HIMSELF PLANNED A PREVENTIVE STRIKE ON GERMANY, AND HITLER ONLY PREVENTED HIM (OPTION: STALIN AND HITLER AGREED ON A JOINT STRIKE ON ENGLAND, BUT HITLER DECEIVED STALIN AND STRIKED ON RUSSIA)

This myth was born on the very first day of the start of the war between Germany and the USSR by the efforts of a team of anonymous authors led by the Reich Chancellor of Germany Hitler and Reich Minister Ribbentrop. This myth was detailed and "substantiated" in a note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet government dated June 21, 1941. In the final part of the note, it was said (I quote from the text published in the Military History Journal, 1991, No. 6, pp. 32-40):

"... If there was the slightest doubt about the aggressiveness of the strategic concentration and deployment of Russian troops, then it was completely dispelled by reports received by the Wehrmacht High Command in recent days. After the general mobilization in Russia, at least 160 divisions were deployed against Germany.

<...>

BASED ON THE FACTS PRESENT, THE REICH GOVERNMENT
FORCED TO STATE:

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, AGAINST ITS OBLIGATIONS, IN CLEAR
CONTRADICTION TO ITS SOLEMN STATEMENTS, ACTED AGAINST GERMANY, AS WELL AS:

1. THE SUBVERTIBLE WORK AGAINST GERMANY AND EUROPE WAS NOT JUST
CONTINUED, BUT WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR (after September 1, 1939. - **S.K.**) IT WAS
ALSO STRENGTHENED.

2. FOREIGN POLICY BECAME MORE AND MORE HOSTILE TO GERMANY.

3. ALL ARMED FORCES ON THE GERMAN BORDER WAS
FOCUSED AND DEPARTED IN READY TO ATTACK.

THEREFORE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BETRAYED AND VIOLATED TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH GERMANY. THE HATE OF BOLSHEVIST MOSCOW TO NATIONAL SOCIALISM TURNED OUT STRONGER THAN POLITICAL REASON. BOLSHEVISM IS THE DEATH ENEMY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM.

BOLSHEVIST MOSCOW IS READY TO STRIKE IN THE BACK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY WHICH IS WHICH IS FIGHTING FOR EXISTENCE..."

I have already said that many of the claims of the Reich against the USSR were justified. However, at the same time, we need to understand that these claims were just as justified as the statement that Moscow was allegedly ready to stab Germany in the back, all the more prepared for this blow in 1941, was unfounded. Paul Karel, the author of the famous book "Hitler Goes East", published in Germany in 1963, admitted that "... whatever opinion anyone might be inclined to, Stalin clearly had no intention of attacking Germany in 1941." And further Karel wrote: "The process of complete rearmament of the Red Army, especially with regard to tank units, was in the middle. The troops received new tanks and aircraft. It is very possible that it was for this reason that Stalin tried not to provoke Hitler to undesirable actions.

Even Field Marshal von Manstein and Colonel General Goth, when asked about the nature of the grouping of Soviet troops by June 22, 1941 - defensive or offensive, after the war it was expressed in the sense that the nature of the deployment and deployment of Soviet units would most accurately be defined as "deployment just in case", and the depth of the location of Soviet troops was such that they could only be used in defensive operations. And this is an absolutely accurate assessment. True, both German commanders stipulated, as, for example, Manstein, that "for a very short period of time, the Red Army had the opportunity to regroup to go on the offensive" ...

Actually, juggling the numbers of the concentrating Soviet units and the cheating use of cards indicating their concentration just allows "researchers" like "Suvorov"-Rezun to declare Stalin's intention to strike in July 1941 ... But in the Red Army by June 1941 in areas where on the maps there were symbols, for example, formidable mechanized corps, only "embryos", the embryos of these corps, were actually deployed - we will see this a little later. And already this circumstance refutes the Rezun schemes.

I repeat: Hitler had logical and political grounds to fear such an option *in principle* - in the foreseeable political future. The same Paul Karel (under this pseudonym, perhaps, Hitler's former personal translator Paul Schmidt was hiding) reports that shortly after the end of Molotov's fruitless visit to Berlin in November 1940, Hitler wrote: "Now I am sure that the Russians will not wait until I will destroy Britain.

Yes, Hitler hesitated and doubted ... But such doubts are either strengthened or dispelled as a result of unequivocal preliminary diplomatic steps. Stalin, reasonably fearful of a German strike *in the chest* of Russia in the summer of 1941, took such a direct diplomatic step - on June 14, the TASS report of June 13 was published in Izvestia.

At the risk of increasing and increasing the volume of the book, I will still give this message in its main system blocks, starting from the first lines:

"Even before the arrival of the British ambassador to the USSR, Mr. Cripps, in London (Cripps arrived in London on June 11, 1941 - **S.K.**), especially after his arrival, in the English and

in general, rumors began to be circulated in the foreign press about "the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany" about ...

Despite the obvious senselessness of these rumors, responsible circles in Moscow nevertheless considered it necessary ... to authorize TASS to declare that these rumors are clumsily concocted propaganda of forces hostile to the USSR and Germany, interested in further expanding and unleashing the war.

TASS declares that: 1) Germany did not present any claims to the USSR...; 2) according to the USSR, Germany is just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground, and what is happening in recently, the transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany (that is, to the Polish "governor general" and East Prussia. - S.K.)

connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with Soviet-German relations (this is how Stalin delicately hinted at the "English" plans of the Reich. - **S.K.**) 3) the USSR ... observed and intends to comply with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which is why the rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocative ... "

Stalin undertook this sounding, knowing full well that a reassuring official reaction from Berlin to the TASS report would not mean, of course, that Moscow could sleep peacefully, but that the absence of an official reaction from Berlin would definitely become a combat alarm signal for us.

Hitler was silent. He already had the "fish" of the Ausamt note of June 21, 1941, at hand, and his public reassuring reply to Stalin a week before the fully prepared German attack on Russia would have made even the smallest diplomatic and political justification for German aggression impossible from the very beginning.

Hitler understood this, and therefore kept silent, although he could not help but realize that his silence for Stalin will be more eloquent than any verbal outpourings.

Hitler understood.

And Rezun-Suvorov?

I think he understood this when he began to fulfill *an order* for his Icebreaker, and he. Not without reason, in the preface to his book, he wrote: "I swung at the most sacred thing that our people have ... For this it was necessary to become a traitor. I became it... My father was my first victim. I asked him for forgiveness. He didn't forgive me...

And then Rezun himself admits: "I am a traitor, a traitor ... They don't forgive such people," and exclaims exaltedly: "Swear at the book, scold me. Curse"...

In fact, this smacks of either paranoia or schizophrenia ... But one must live by betraying the Motherland ... And English pounds, although they are not Swiss francs, - the currency is secure. In addition, the political situation in Russia was also favorable - not individual renegades began to betray the Motherland, but almost the entire Politburo, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and so on, and so on, and so on ... As they say - the shell of lawlessness floats in an ocean of stupidity. And since in the vastness of Russia since the late 80s this ocean has been spreading wider and wider, Viktor Suvorov could launch his Icebreaker into it without fear that he would run aground.

Yes, the myth of Stalin's preventive strike against Hitler was born on the same day as Hitler's strike against Russia, since then it has experienced a series of ups and downs, but it has found a full-blooded second life only in the "perestroika" Soviet Union, idiotized by its own "elite". It was then, at the time of the "widespread perestroika", in all the intelligentsia smoking rooms they excitedly began to discuss and exalt the "Icebreaker" Rezun-"Suvorov".

More than once reflecting on the Icebreaker phenomenon, I thought: "Why is historical unambiguity not always achieved? Due to lack of information? But they are still arguing about the causes of even the First World War - an event that seemed to be more than documented "... Obviously, the fact is that an objective picture can be recreated only with the extremely clean hands of an unbiased historian who respects the totality of historical **facts**. And if the author begins not to analyze the past, but **to select** in it what fits into his "concept", then instead of the truth, even in the best case, society will receive plausibility. At worst, that deliberate monstrous lie that some gullible people so much want to believe.

In fact, Suvorov made no discoveries, claiming that both the Soviet Union and its leader Stalin were intensively preparing for a difficult war with Nazi Germany. Of course, we prepared, and how! And they would be the last fools if they did not prepare. And fight - if the need arises -

they were going to "with little blood, with a mighty blow" ... But what kind of fool is that right away, you live well, is preparing to fight with big blood?

But "Suvorov" declares otherwise: the Red Army, fully prepared for the aggression that Stalin had long conceived, was about to start first! Thus, in pulling up new troops to the western borders immediately before the war, he sees them preparing for aggression. Although it is easier to see here what it was: hasty measures in a situation where Germany's behavior on the borders with the USSR was becoming more and more provocative, and there were not enough troops on the border for defense.

Or here is what "Suvorov" writes, referring to a certain "pilot" Price: "The Russian I-16 had the most powerful weapons among the serial fighters of the world in September 1939 ... The firepower of the I-16 was twice that of the Messerschmitt-109E and three times "Spit-fire-1".

Such a statement is already superficial. Each mass aircraft has many modifications. And the most characteristic data of the I-16 are as follows: 2 - 4 ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber. On some modifications, yes, two more ShVAK guns of 20 mm caliber were installed. But this type (17th) was supposed to be used as an attack aircraft. How frequent cannon I-16s were can be judged by the fact that even the pilot of the Moscow air defense zone, Viktor Talalikhin, went to ram, because the weak machine-gun armament of his "donkey" did not allow him to shoot down the enemy with weapons. The famous Mark Lazarevich Gallay wrote about this.

The Messerschmitt, on the other hand, the 109E (like the I-16) had variant armament: 4 MG-17 machine guns of 7.92 mm caliber, and two MG-17s with a 20-mm MG-FF Oerlikon gun, and two guns MG-FF.

The Spitfire was armed with eight 7.69 mm Vickers machine guns and two cannons "Hispano" caliber 20 mm, and four machine guns and two cannons.

The English Hurricane had up to a dozen 7.69 mm machine guns.

The Airacobra of the United States carried two 12.7 mm machine guns and a 37 (!) mm. This is before the war!

That is, it is not necessary to talk about two- or even three-fold (!) even fire superiority of the I-16 over other fighters, if you remain on the basis of professional analysis. Moreover, the combat capabilities of the armed forces (and, of course, the Air Force) are determined by a set of qualities: the tactical and technical characteristics of equipment, its resource, plus the combat skills of personnel, which the Luftwaffe was then on the whole, of course, higher ...

Proving the alleged super-armament of the Soviet Air Force, Suvorov reports that back in 1939, for the first time in the world, our aircraft used missiles in a combat situation. Yes, this is true - they were used for the first time at Khalkhin Gol. But this does not mean anything from the point of view of the combat perfection of aviation! Rockets (such as Katyusha shells) at that time, before the war and at the beginning of the war, were not of serious combat value **for aviation**

represented. Their use was episodic, although sometimes, as Alexander Pokryshkin testifies, for example, it was extremely effective.

Not the best acquaintance reveals "Suvorov" and the history of Soviet weapons and the Armed Forces in general, illiterately setting out the significance for our tank building of the ideas of the American Christie, the domestic airborne epic, etc.

But the "analyst"-defector knows just the story not so hot ... He writes: "Stalin sold on the foreign market titanic (Rezun's favorite "quantitative" measure. - S.K.) **reserves** of gold, platinum, diamonds." A little lower, we are talking about "collections of diamonds", that is, by "diamonds" we mean, presumably, not they, but industrial diamonds. Where Stalin got diamonds for export before the war in the USSR, if the first diamond "pipe" was found in Yakutia in the sixties, probably only our "professional", as he is certified by "Dee Welt", a scout, knows. But Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments Novikov writes that imported diamond "pencils" for sharpening tools were handed out to plant directors in the people's commissariat in person. And it looks more like the truth.

"Suvorov" writes about the disbandment of the Dnieper military flotilla in 1940 and the creation of the Danube and Pinsk flotillas on its basis, and for him this is preparation for a campaign against Romania, which is presented as the "oil heart" of Germany, and against Germany itself. About the Pinsk flotilla, for example, it is written as follows: "It is impossible to use the Pinsk military flotilla in defense." And hence the "conclusion": she is de - an instrument of aggression.

But here is what the Great Soviet Encyclopedia says (ed. 3, vol. 8): "At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War ... the Pinsk military flotilla took an active part in the hostilities in Polesie, near Bobruisk, Gomel, Kremenchug and in the defense of Kiev. Most of the ships in the flotilla were killed in action.

Defensive...

And here is absolutely "indisputable" - for the ex-Rezun - "proof" that in 1941 it was not Hitler who was going to attack (and attacked!) Us, but Stalin almost managed to get ahead of him. With reference to some "memoirs of the composer A. Alexandrov", "Suvorov" reports that the "dictator" allegedly ordered Aleksandrov the song "Get up, the country is huge!" Back in February 1941.

What is it?

Alexandrov is a composer, so how could Stalin order him something specific in terms of textual content? It was already then that Vasily Lebedev-Kumach, the author of not the melody, but the text, had to order. But Kumach (as an inveterate "Stalinist", presumably) has no evidence of this.

As another example of Rezun's "conscientiousness", I will give, and then comment on a quote from one of the last books of Viktor Suvorov - "I take my words back", where he, having "r-r-annoyed" Marshal Zhukov, reports:

"The result of the discussion about the role of Zhukov near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge was summed up by Air Chief Marshal Golovanov: "Zhukov **is not directly related** (allocation my. - **S.K.**) to the Battle of Stalingrad, and to the Battle of Kursk, and to many other operations "(F. Chuev. Soldiers of the Empire, p. 314)".

I don't know what is written there in the book of Felix Chu-ev, but it would not hurt Rezun to consult the primary source, for example, in the publication of A.E. Golovanov "Long-range bomber..." (M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007). And then Rezun could find out the true opinion of Marshal Golovanov and not mislead his readers so brazenly and vile.

Alexander Evgenyevich Golovanov had, as he himself admits, "not the best relationship" with Zhukov. And yet, on pages 579-580 of his memoirs, he writes that when Zhukov became Deputy Supreme Commander, he (Zhukov)

abilities in military affairs were further developed. Further, Golovanov writes that he does not have the opportunity to list everything done by Zhukov in this field, but remarks:

"However, it must be said that he (G.K. Zhukov. - **S.K.**) *has a direct relationship* (emphasis mine. - S.K.) and to the Battle of Stalingrad, and to the Battle of Kursk, and to many other operations "...

At the same time, Golovanov reports that he was, perhaps, the only one of the marshals who visited Georgy Konstantinovich after he was removed from the post of Minister of Defense to show that Golovanov's respect for Zhukov's talent as a commander remains unchanged regardless of whether Zhukov is a minister or just a citizen Soviet Union.

This is how our Rezun *cuts* the truth-womb - cuts without a knife.

Further, I am not inclined to dwell on the analysis of the specifics of Rezun's myths, but I will offer the reader two comments on the topic.

First ... Stalin, planning - according to Rezun - a preventive strike on the Reich, for some reason, until the last day, sent echelons and ships to the Reich as part of the fulfillment of contractual supplies of raw materials and food, and Hitler, not planning - according to Rezun - attack on Russia, by June 22, 1941, he did not have a single German merchant ship in Soviet ports.

Secondly ... Stalin, planning - according to Rezun - a preventive strike on the Reich, for some reason did not order to destroy the documentation of the Soviet embassy in Berlin in advance, and in order, for example, so that after the start of the war the cryptanalyst of the legal NKGB residency had time to burn the code books, the residency officer Gukasov had to start a brutal fight with the Gestapo and be beaten by them. At the same time, the families of Soviet diplomats remained in Berlin until the start of the war, and as a result, they were recruited for a whole train, which, with ordeals, reached the USSR very slowly.

And Hitler, not planning - according to Rezun - an attack on Russia, authorized the early destruction of the papers of the German embassy in Moscow, and smoke curled over the embassy building *for the entire* last pre-war *week* - documents were burned with might and main. At the same time, the minimum staff remained in the embassy itself, and the families of the embassy employees were already in Germany - supposedly on vacation.

Alas, the myth of the aggressive Stalin did not end on Rezun-Suvorov. Rezun attributed Stalin's blow to July 1941. And Mark Solonin, already mentioned by me, made a more sensational "discovery" in recent years! He claims that in June 1941, Hitler, "without expecting it himself" (!), "Preempted Stalin's strike by exactly one day." Accordingly, the book where Solonin "substantiates" this "his" "discovery", he called "June 23: 'Day M'". Thus, the myth of Stalin's preventive strike against Hitler thwarted by Hitler received new confirmation. Not so very weighty - about 600 kilograms (~ 0.6 kg times 10,000 copies of the circulation), but still ...

The set of "arguments" and facts here is used quite "gentlemanly", but after all, there are cheaters among gentlemen ... They also come across among historians, and Solonin's book, like Rezun's books, in its basic concepts, of course, is cheating, but detailed, a page-by-page analysis of its half a thousand pages would result in at least a thousand pages of text, and I do not intend to perform such a feat. Therefore, let us take only one, quite characteristic, passage of the author of "June 23" and briefly analyze it.

On page 28, Solonin reports that in 1989 the press organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense "Military Historical Journal" in No. 4 published data on mechanized corps deployed before the war in the western border districts, and further writes:

"... But as soon as several "amateur historians" drew the attention of the educated public to the fact that, it turns out, there were more mechanized corps in the Red Army than the Germans had tank divisions, it was enough for these "amateurs" to pick up a working calculator and report to readers, that, for example, the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts (it is not very clear why the "fronts" and not the Kiev Special and other military districts? - S.K.) were armed with 5826 tanks, **and** the German Army Group "South" - only 728, it was enough for some, especially unbridled "falsifiers of history" to declare aloud that 5826 is more than 728 ... What started here ... How much screaming, how many claims ... "etc.

Irony is not a bad thing, but in this case it is out of place already because when assessing the ratio of armaments of the parties, in addition to the ability to manipulate the calculator, some technical knowledge and consideration of such, for example, technical concepts as "time to failure", "warranty service life", "technical reliability", "physical wear", "motor resource".

After all, all this must be taken into account, as well as such factors as combat training, possession of equipment by personnel, the availability of radio communications, real combat experience ...

5826 is indeed more than 728, and in terms of quality, *the new* Soviet T-34 and KB tanks were unmatched not only in the tank forces of the Reich, but throughout the world. And by the beginning of the war, about one and a half thousand of the first and more than half a thousand of the second were produced. However, the TTX (tactical and technical characteristics) of these tanks, which look great today in the tables of the latest monographs, and impressive digital data on their presence in the USSR by June 22, 1941 in real time, that is, in the summer of 1941, somewhat spoiled the presence of such an unremovable before some moment of the detail, as the "time to failure" already mentioned by me, and other similar details.

It is easier to pour out the accumulated anger at Stalin than to master at least the basics of the theory of reliability, but without knowing and understanding some points, it is impossible to talk about some things. More precisely, it is possible, but - illiterate, ignorant and superficial. So a little theory...

In accordance with the interstate GOST (State Standard) 27.002-89 "Reliability in engineering. Basic concepts. Terms and definitions" reliability is "the property of an object to maintain in time within the established limits the values of all parameters characterizing the ability to perform the required functions in given modes and conditions of use, maintenance, storage and transportation".

Simply put, reliability is ensured when something works flawlessly and does not present any surprises in the form of, say, a tank track that is torn not in battle or after tens of hours of operation, but at the very first departure for exercises.

Failure, in accordance with GOST 27.002-89, is an event consisting in a violation of the working state. In this case, a sudden failure is "a failure characterized by an abrupt change in the values of one or more object parameters".

And the time to failure is (I quote hereinafter the same GOST) "the duration of the operation of the facility from the start of operation to the occurrence of the first refusal."

There are also failure rates. For example, there is the mean time to failure - "the mathematical expectation of the object's time to the first failure", and there is the mean time to failure - "the ratio of the total time of the restored object to the mathematical expectation of the number of its failures during this time".

So, with these very developments, the newest Soviet tanks by the middle of 1941 were not doing well. Although at that time the theory of reliability was not yet

existed even in its most rudimentary form, the technique broke down. And often broke completely unexpectedly, and not always explainable. After all, this technique was not even new, but *the latest!* That is, still poorly studied even by its creators, insufficiently mastered in mass production and little studied in terms of its real operational characteristics.

I understand that I have embarked on a discussion of issues that are boring for lovers of hasty and reckless reading like Rezun's Icebreaker or June 23 by Solonin. But what to do - the Second World War was a war of motors, and when analyzing its events, at least a little in the theory of technical reliability should be guided. And one must understand that the T-34s and KBs became truly formidable for the enemy a little later, when the real war and real exploitation revealed many of their shortcomings and these shortcomings were corrected.

So, by June 22, 1941, our newest tanks were still, alas, not very good. reliable. After all, they began to enter service only in 1940, or even in 1941.

"However, in the Red Army there were thousands of not so bad - compared to the German T-I, T-II and even T-III - older tanks: BT-7, T-26, etc.," say Rezun and corned beef .

Yes, there were ... Up to 11 thousand units. But for them, by June 22, 1941, other concepts of the theory of reliability became relevant. And above all, the concept of "assigned resource", that is, "total operating time, upon reaching which the operation of the facility must be **terminated** (allocation is mine everywhere. - **S.K.**) regardless of its technical condition", and the concept of "assigned service life". Old light tanks - due to their long production, for the most part were already not only morally, but also physically worn out. They have almost exhausted their resource and were subject to decommissioning and replacement. More and more often, already in peacetime, they passed from a good state - "the state of an object in which it meets all the requirements of regulatory and technical and (or) design (design) documentation", to a faulty state, that is, to "a state of an object, with which it does not comply with **at least one** of the requirements of the regulatory and technical and (or) design (project) documentation.

And many Soviet "bateshki" and their other relatives and cousins, produced during the first Soviet five-year plan, by June 22, 1941, did not meet not only one of the requirements of regulatory and technical and design documentation, but several at **once** . That is, to put it simply, they broke down more and more often due to the development of a resource, physical wear and tear.

But the resources of military equipment, even *assigned*, "regular", are never large. Especially for tanks and fighters, whose real combat life is often calculated in just hours. This is not a "Lada", which in capable hands lives almost forever ...

In addition, the problem of spare parts was acute. On the one hand, they didn't pay much attention to it during production - socialist Russia, which until recently was the bastard "Race", simply did not have the necessary experience. On the other hand, in the early years of the mass development of tank building, there was no particular need for spare parts - tanks in the USSR developed rapidly, and instead of conserving the technical "status quo" by replacing worn parts, it was at some point more reasonable to switch to the production of new models .

"So," the Rezuns will ask, "we made tanks that couldn't drive, but just broke?"

We drove, our tanks drove! But until the resource was exhausted, and thousands of tanks ended just in 1941. By the way, even modern tanks are often carried on special trailers in order to save the life of the engine and chassis.

As for the thousands of aging tanks in the Red Army, this dubious "power" was not least due to the incompetence of two successive chiefs of armaments of the Red Army - Tukhachevsky and Uborevich, who ordered these many thousands of industry, not caring about promising schemes. The designer of the T-34 medium tank, Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin, literally overstrained himself defending his offspring, and died before the war, on September 26, 1940, very young - at forty-two years old. The Stalin Prize was awarded to him posthumously in 1942.

In addition, old tanks, as a rule, did not have a walkie-talkie (the same on old fighters), for which we must also "thank" these two high-ranking conspirators and traitors.

Finally, the new technology was not properly mastered, and by the middle of 1941, its shortage was great. Here, the memoirs of twice Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko, are indicative and typical. In the spring of 1941, he was appointed commander of the 21st mechanized corps, but the corps had yet to be formed as part of two tank and one motorized rifle divisions. According to the state, the corps, stationed in the south-west of the Pskov region in the Daugavpils direction, was supposed to have 1031 tanks of various brands, and 98 BT-7 and T 26 were available. Powerful KB and T-34 were just starting to arrive.

In an effort to complete the formation as soon as possible, Lelyushenko hurried the command with sending equipment and weapons, but in response he heard: "Do not rush, you are not the only one in this situation." A month before the start of the war, Lelyushenko was at the GABTU - the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army and asked his chief, Lieutenant General Fedorenko: "When will the tanks arrive? After all, we feel that the Germans are preparing ..." Fedorenko reassured: "Do not worry! According to the plan, your corps should be fully completed in 1942.

By the way, things were about the same in the Soviet Air Force. I will not dwell on this side of the issue here, saying only that our new Yak-1 and LaGT-3 cannon fighters were not so good compared to the new German fighters, and the MiG-3 had only machine gun armament. At the same time, many pilots had less than 10 hours flight time on aircraft of the new Yak-1, Mig-3, LaGG-3, Il-2, Pe-2 brands. In other words, nothing! And the old planes were far from all combat-ready.

To make it clear what I mean, I will give a fragment of a diary entry General Halder dated September 12, 1941:

"Enemy aviation as of September 11, 1941, has 670 fighters, 600 bombers, 1230 training aircraft and 440 other aircraft. Total - 2940 aircraft.

If we assume that only 40 percent of the aircraft are combat-ready, then he has 270 combat-ready fighters and 240 bombers.

With tanks ready for battle, the situation, as a rule, was even more difficult. At the same time, on June 22, 1941, the German Army Group South, mentioned by Solonin, had all 728 tanks, of course, combat-ready, but the 5826 Soviet tanks mentioned by Solonin were combat-ready only in some of their parts, and it is unlikely that their combat-ready percentage was really more than 30 percent.

And the reliability of our combat-ready tanks was, as already mentioned, by June 22 insufficient for new tanks. For old tanks there was a resource problem, that is wear.

A few words about the ratio given by Solonin: 5826 of our tanks South-Western and Southern fronts against 728 German in the Army Group "South" ...

The Southwestern Front is until June 22, 1941 the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), and the Southern Front is basically the Moscow Military District. The latter had few tanks (on June 1, 1941, 4 KB and 5 T-34s, and in total by June 22, 1941 - just over a thousand, mostly obsolete tanks).

In one of the editions of M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Missed Chance" (M.: Veche, 2002) provides data on the presence of armored vehicles in the Red Army on June 1, 1941 (Table 24 B of Appendix B), from which it follows that there were 5836 tanks in KOVO, of which: KB — 278; T-34 - 496 (total modern tanks 774 units). From table 7 B of Appendix B - data on the staffing of the mechanized corps of the western border districts on June 22, 1941 - it follows that there were 4793 tanks in the KOVO. That is, even in one book by one author, we have a discrepancy of more than a thousand units. The last figure for KOVO roughly agrees with the total (on two fronts) figure of M. Solonin, but in general - the exact calculations of combat-ready equipment, and even sixty years after its operation, are a thing in itself.

And now I turn to pages 18 - 19 of the most interesting, richly illustrated with photographs book by the French historian Francois de Lannoy "German tanks in Ukraine. 1941" (M.: Yauza, 2006), which reflects the fighting of the 1st Panzer Group from the Army Group "South", and I read:

"The troops of the 1st Panzer Group (commanded by Colonel General Ewald von Kleist. - **S.K.**) were opposed by the 5th and 6th armies, which, together with the 26th and 12th armies, were part of the Kiev Special Military District. The latter, which was under the command of Colonel General Kirponos, was renamed the Southwestern Front after the outbreak of hostilities ...

... The 5th and 6th armies, which opposed the 1st tank group, were a powerful force. The four mechanized corps of these armies had at least 2590 tanks against only 880 tanks (M. Solonin had 778. - **S.K.**) of the 1st Panzer Group! However, out of these 2590 tanks, only 596 (according to M. Meltyukhov - 774. - **S.K.**) were equivalent to 615 Pz. III and IV.

Comments required?

Where is the supposedly overwhelming superiority of the Red Army in tanks, about which corned beef, "Suvorovs", etc. are telling us? and so on.? Moreover, I remind you once again that the Germans' tanks, which were prepared for an attack on the USSR, were, firstly, quite new in terms of wear and tear and quite reliable in terms of their running in and identifying manufacturing defects during operation. Secondly, they were carefully checked and prepared for the upcoming close combat operations with all German thoroughness. And the personnel of the tank troops of the Reich had real combat experience of modern maneuver warfare in Poland and Northern France. Sometimes it is pointed out that the duration of hostilities was short here and there, but even one real battle enriches a person with such experience - both military and psychological - that is not given by any teachings.

The Soviet tankers, in fact, did not have such experience - neither Spain, nor Khalkhin Gol, nor even the Finnish war, looked like what was to unfold in the open spaces of Russia on the morning of June 22, 1941.

That is, the year 1941 was for the Red Army a year of active rearmament and combat training, and therefore there could be no question of any preventive strikes by the USSR against Germany. In any case, in 1941. Yes, the General Staff of the Red Army carried out appropriate staff developments in this direction, and it is from similar documents published in the 90s and later that Rezun, Solonin and others like them tear out quotes and, waving them, bring down exaggerated "sensations" on the heads of the educated public about preventive Stalin's plans. But the General Staff, not considering various options

actions of the Armed Forces - from defensive to offensive - eat for nothing the bread of the country that feeds its General Staff officers.

But from what do the authors of the "sensations" pull quotes about the alleged preparation of a preventive strike by the Red Army in 1941? Well, let's say, here's what ...

In 1991, the year of the 50th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, the "Military Historical Journal" of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, edited then by Major General V.I. Filatov, published a number of interesting documents and analytical materials refuting statements about the preparation of the USSR for a preventive strike (see, in particular, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 of 1991).

However, already in No. 12 for 1991 - the year of a successful anti-Soviet counter-revolution - the same VIZH, still an organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but already edited by VS Yeshchenko, took dubious positions ... In No. 1 for our first anti-Soviet, 1992, year "VIZH" was presented to the reader as the "organ of the Ministry of Defense" of an unknown country. In this "organ", in its No. 1, on page 7, the question was again raised: "Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike?"

Further, up to page 30, there was some archival "information for reflection", and the answer to the question, although it was not formulated very intelligibly, was still negative.

From VIZH No. 2 for the same 1992, the reader could for the first time learn that the magazine was "established by the General Staff of the Armed Forces," and this was somewhat unexpected, since VIZH was founded in 1939 as an organ of the NPO of the USSR.

In the second issue of VIZH, the publication "The Stubborn Facts of the Beginning of the War" appeared, in which the texts of "Considerations on the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" dated May 15, 1941 and a draft note by Timoshenko and Zhukov addressed to Stalin and Molotov were given according to strategic deployment plans in 1941. Both documents, handwritten by AM Vasilevsky, were neither signed nor approved by anyone.

The beginning of the first document looked especially impressive from Rezun's point of view:

"Given that Germany currently keeps her army mobilized with rears deployed, she has the opportunity to warn us in the deployment and launch a surprise strike. In order to prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give the German command the initiative of action and to attack the German army at the moment when it is in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize the front and the interaction of troops.

The first strategic goal of the Red Army's actions was to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Brest-Demblin, and to reach the north of the Ostrolenka line, the river, by the 30th day. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Opeln, Olomouc.

The subsequent strategic goal is to advance from the Katowice region in a northern or northwestern direction, defeat the large enemy forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.

The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula..."
etc.

The second issue of "VIZH" for 1992, as I understand it, opened the "green light" for any fabrications, "sensations", "interpretations" and other "revelations" such as Rezunov's.

I do not really believe in the authenticity of this document, including because just at the end of the 80s - the beginning of the 90s, the activity of renegades such as General Volkogonov to falsify non-existent "documents" and destroy genuine archival documents falls. However, even in "Vasilevsky's considerations" there is no

a hint at the aggressive war of the USSR with the aim of defeating Germany. We are talking about pre-emptive actions in the conditions of Germany's clearly impending aggression against the USSR.

The myth of the readiness of the USSR for a preventive strike is also refuted by Halder's War Diary. On June 24, 1941, an entry appeared there:

"The complete absence of large operational reserves completely deprives the enemy command of the opportunity to effectively influence the course of events. However, the presence of numerous reserves in the border zone indicates that the Russians planned from the very beginning to conduct a stubborn defense and for this they created supply bases here.

Such a "strategist" as "Viktor" "Suvorov" sees evidence of preparations for a preventive strike by the USSR in the presence of Soviet supply bases in the border zone, but, as we see, such an "amateur" in strategy as the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces sees in the same evidence of the purely defensive intentions of the USSR.

That is, it is not me, Sergey Kremlev, who refutes Rezun, but Franz Halder! Rezun, however, can cite, in turn, quite a few contrary statements by Halder, whom the military historian from the GDR, Johannes Zukertort, referred to as "rabid peddlers" of statements about the presence of aggressive intentions in the USSR in the spring of 1941. But these statements by Halder date back to the times of the Cold War! And on the eve of the "hottest" war in the history of the world, Halder wrote in his diary on March 22, 1941:

"... Defense in the East. The question of defensive measures in the East in the event of a Russian preventive offensive comes to the fore. However, we must not allow any too hasty measures to be taken. I do not think that the Russians will take the initiative ... "

Yes, the USSR not only did not prepare a preventive strike, but also did not have either a special need or, most importantly, a real opportunity for it in 1941. The situation in 1941 was different for the Germans, for Hitler. I already spoke about this in the introductory Explication, but I repeat - by the summer of 1941, Hitler was in an extremely difficult position.

The West, deftly drawing it into a war with itself, did not want peace and was preparing to join the United States in the world war, which, as in the First World War, had to come to war-weary Europe in order to defeat Germany and remain in Europe as the supreme arbiter and the owner.

Russia, on the other hand, took an evasive position and sometimes gave - at least in Hitler's view - grounds for the West to count on itself as "England's last hope." In addition, in the event of a Western strike against Germany somewhere in 1942-1943, it was impossible to exclude a Russian strike against Germany from the rear - just as it happened in the autumn of 1939 in Poland.

To understand Hitler's mindset, an entry in the diary of General Halder dated March 17, 1941 is indicative:

"The Führer's demand: The defense of Norway must be ensured so that no sudden enemy raid is possible ... If the British gain a foothold in Norway, they will be able to organize interaction with Russia ..."

Therefore, it was very tempting for Hitler, and even logical, to try to solve the "Russian problem" in 1941 before the total "moment of truth" in

circa 1943, while the army is mobilized, ready to fight and full of high morale after impressive victories in the spring and summer of 1940.

A preemptive strike was logical for Hitler and necessary for Hitler.

One has only to wonder how stubbornly in recent years they have been trying to prove the opposite to us - for example, Mikhail Meltyukhov in his sensational book "Stalin's Lost Chance". A very thorough study, "impregnated" with considerable factual (and almost always quite accurate) information, for which the author used more than a thousand sources, is conceptually not worth a penny, since built on the following theses (p. 412 of the 2002 edition):

"... for the Soviet Union there was a favorable opportunity to deliver a surprise blow to Germany, which was fettered by the war with England (in 1941, only the Reich Navy was more or less fettered by this war. - S.K.) ... As the Red Army advanced deep into Europe ... Germany would be on the eve of defeat...

...Unfortunately, Stalin, fearing an Anglo-German compromise, postponed for at least a month (n-yes. - **S.K.**) the attack on Germany, which, as we now know (? - **S.K.**), was the only chance to disrupt the German invasion ... "

At the same time, on page 304, M. Meltyukhov claims that the main argument of the supporters of the "traditional version (? - **S.K.**) about the defensive intentions of the USSR" was "materials of G.K. Zhukov with some military historians in the 1960s"...

However, those "supporters" of the "traditional version" who draw all their arguments from such a source are not worth much. Not "arguments", but direct evidence of the exclusively defensive capabilities of the USSR in 1941, and even then, provided that the troops were put on alert in a timely manner, etc., are found in abundance in the statistics of those years, in the realities of 1941 - economic, foreign policy, military -technical and military, recorded both by Soviet and Western documents.

In fact, Rezun, Solonin, Meltyukhov can only be successful with those who are not familiar with at least General Halder's "Military Diary" in detail. Without tiring the reader with copious citations of the corresponding passages, I will simply say that it is enough to read thoughtfully at least his 2nd volume (from 1.7.1940 to 21.6.1941) or at least Halder's notes to Hitler's report of March 17, 1941 (p. 405 - 406 edition of 1969) and a diary entry from the same March 17, 1941 (pp. 409 - 410), to make sure that Hitler's strike by the summer of 1941 was actually a foregone conclusion without any fear of a preemptive strike from Stalin.

As for Stalin's hypothetical strike, in 1941 Stalin could weigh these or those options only for a forced strike against Hitler in response to his direct aggression. Stalin had no idea how poorly prepared his generals were for war, but he knew enough to understand the adventurism of any of our initiative military actions in 1941.

And nothing changes in what has been said above by the fact that at the meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, Lieutenant General V.N. Kurdyumov, head of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army, when discussing the report of the Inspector General of the Infantry, Lieutenant General A.K. Smirnov about the battle of the rifle division in the offensive and defense stated:

"... When attacking a defending German division, our corps, while overcoming the entire depth of defense, will have no less than a triple superiority in manpower and firepower and can defeat a German infantry division with great success ..."

Yes, the military at the end of 1940 said so. But what are the generals worth who are not ready for any variant of hostilities - both on the defensive and on the offensive ?! Another thing is that many of the highest Soviet generals of the 1941 model turned out to be skillful commanders only at meetings, and not in the real situation of June 1941.

This concludes my brief analysis of the myth of "Stalin's preemptive strike", but at least a little more attention needs to be paid to another version of this myth: "Stalin and Hitler agreed on a joint attack on England, but Hitler deceived Stalin and hit Russia."

This, absolutely absurd, "sensation" was born not so long ago, as far as I understand. And for some reason, it did not arouse laughter among the "educated public", but a stormy and passionate interest - like Rezun's "Icebreaker" in the late 80s.

It would seem that it's not for me, who has written more than one book on the strategic expediency of precisely Soviet-German cooperation, including a study with elements of virtual history "The Fuhrer's Kremlin Visit", to refute this version right off the bat. But just because I gave not so little effort to the study of that era, I can only shrug my shoulders about the "new versions" of June 22, 1941, sustained in a similar spirit.

Yes, the option of joint actions of the USSR and Germany against the Anglo-Saxons and specifically against England, in my opinion, was not only geopolitically and historically expedient (as Jean Thiriart explained to Yegor Ligachev), but also really possible with the rational policy of both Hitler and before all of Stalin. Personally, I am so convinced of this that a few years ago I wrote the study "Russia and the Reich - Forward Together!", which is still waiting for its publisher.

However, one thing is a possibility, and another thing is a reality.

A joint Soviet-German attack on England was reasonable and possible for Russia, although not in 1941, but in 1942. Nevertheless, the realities of 1940 and 1941, for a number of reasons, which I have no opportunity to analyze in detail here, turned out to be such that this potency could not be transformed into actions in any way.

The author of the "new version of the beginning of the war" A. Osokin claims that Stalin allegedly promised Hitler to wage war against England jointly - to which Hitler already urged him. And supposedly convinced of the seductiveness of this proposal for Hitler, Stalin de was calm and confident that Hitler would not hit Russia. According to A. Osokin, Stalin knew that "this option cannot be realized as long as Hitler needs the USSR as an ally to defeat England ...".

The concentration of Soviet troops on the border is explained by A. Osokin allegedly by the fact that they were soon in echelons, together with the German troops stationed in Poland - away from British air strikes - were to head across Europe to the English Channel in order to participate in a joint landing operation in England.

But Hitler finally decided to deceive Stalin and put an end to Russia, and only then - independently - with England.

This is - extremely briefly - the scheme of Alexander Osokin ...

The funny thing is that in the virtual study mentioned above (this is not a novel, but a study with elements of a partially fictionalized virtual history), "Russia and the Reich - forward together!" described, among other things, and the preparation for a joint landing operation, and even the operation itself, which I called "Luftlev" - "Air a lion".

However, I repeat, this was given as an unrealized possibility, and not as a description of unrealized, but actually planned events! To put it simply, I described as purely virtual the situation that Osokin presents as real.

Acquaintance with the circumstances preceding Molotov's visit to Berlin in the autumn of 1940, with the course of this visit itself and with the real ones that followed it

and by reliable actions of the parties, he unequivocally convinces of the complete absurdity of the hypothesis of A. Osokin and other similar hypotheses, if they are expressed not as a geopolitical possibility, but as an allegedly real joint plan of Stalin and Hitler, thwarted by Hitler's treachery.

In confirmation of his "new version", A. Osokin, among other things, reports that our newest MiG-3 fighters had a "ceiling" of 7 kilometers, but not German, but English bombers flew at such an altitude. However, such characteristics of the MiG-3 were laid down in the government assignment even at the time when the future chief designer Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich was working on a high-altitude fighter at the Polikarpov Design Bureau. At first, Artyom Ivanovich Mikoyan also worked for Polikarpov. A separate design bureau of Mikoyan and Gurevich was created on December 8, 1939 and immediately began to develop the I-200 high-altitude fighter. Soon he received the designation MiG-1, and his development - MiG-3. The high "ceiling" (it even reached 12 km!) The MiG-3 was due not to the planned - in the ideas of A. Osokin - "military commonwealth" of Hitler and Stalin, but to the then views on the nature of air combat "theorists" of the Red Army Air Force. By the way, during the war they did not come true - the battles took place at medium and low altitudes, where the MiG-3 was inferior to both yaks, laggas, and Messerschmitts both in speed and in maneuverability and armament, although before the war the troops received most of all just moments. But the moment came in handy in the air defense of Moscow and Leningrad.

However, supposedly ready to shoot down the Anglo-Saxon Lancasters and Boeings, the MiG 3 is not the only "aviation" detail of Osokin's "new version" ...) A. Osokin gives the "key" and "secrets" of the unimpeded flight of the German Junkers-52 transport aircraft from the western borders of the USSR to Moscow and its landing at the Tushino airfield on May 15, 1941. Like, this was how some urgent personal letter from Hitler was delivered to Stalin ...

Let's leave aside the question - did the Fuhrer himself go crazy at the same time as his deputy in the party, Rudolf Hess, who flew to England on May 11, 1941, choosing a similar method for the "most secret" delivery of the "top-secret" letter?

The simplest option: the plane crashes on the route, the pilot dies, the plane is broken, and the letter is saved. And Hitler's top secret becomes an open secret.

However, let's wait for a while with a detailed analysis of A. Osokin's "discovery" and turn to reliable and accurate documents first.

June 10, 1941 People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov issued order No. 0035, which began like this:

"On May 15, 1941, the German Yu-52 non-scheduled aircraft was allowed to cross the state border without any hindrance and flew across Soviet territory via Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk to Moscow. No measures were taken to stop its flight by the air defense authorities ...

<...>

... The Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Space Agency, Major General of Aviation Volodin and the Deputy Chief of the 1st Department of the Headquarters of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation Grendal, knowing that the Yu-52 aircraft arbitrarily flew over the border, not only did not take measures to detain him, but also contributed ego flight to Moscow with permission to land at the Moscow airfield and instructing the air defense service to ensure the flight ... "

By the way, I'll let you know that at that time Volodin was only reprimanded, but on June 27, 1941 he was arrested - after all, the situation on June 10 and June 27 differed like the sky and Earth.

In October 1941, by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which after the outbreak of the war received the right to sentence Volodin to capital punishment as an emergency measure, as well as Colonel General A.D. Loktionova and G.M. Stern, Lieutenant General of Aviation F.K. Arzhenukhin, Heroes of the Soviet Union I.I. Proskurov and P.V. Rychagov (former Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ya.V. Smushkevich, division engineer I.F. Sacriera, Major General M.M. Kayukova, G.M. Savchenko and brigengineer SO. Sklizkov was shot.

But this is by the way. Returning to the flight on May 15, it must be said that this case was ugly from all points of view. Today, it is sometimes argued that the same Volodin was punished so mildly because the flight was agreed in advance between Hitler and Stalin, that all our VNOS (Aerial Surveillance, Alert and Communications) services calmly watched the Yu-52, and the Air Force units were ordered do not plant him, etc.

We are doing well on a secret flight, about the strange nature of which and the special attention paid to it by the Moscow authorities, dozens, if not hundreds of people are aware. Hitler couldn't send a package from Berlin to Moscow by an absolutely reliable Feldsvyaz by train? Day with a little - and all the cases!

Besides, if Volodin and Grendal were then punished "for appearances," then why was Volodin later shot? And for what, even before the war, the head of the Air Defense Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union Stern, was arrested? And not just him...

I do not know the background of the flight on May 15, but I have some thoughts about it, but I will not express them yet.

As for Alexander Osokin, he "exactly" knows what was behind this flight, and talks about it like this:

"... What this flight meant was never explained. However, in recent years, the text of Hitler's letter to Stalin dated May 14, 1941 has been published (highlights everywhere by A. Osokin. - S.K.). It begins like this: "Dear Mr. Stalin, I am writing this letter to you at the moment when I finally came to the conclusion that it is impossible to achieve a lasting peace either for us or for future generations without the final crushing of England ...

<...>

Around **June 15-20, I plan to start** a massive transfer of troops to the west from your border ... **I ask you not to succumb to any provocations.** (And how is that? Let's send our echelons across German territory to the sea, and let's go! What do we care? - S.K.) ... If provocations ... cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, **do not take retaliatory actions and immediately inform me about what happened** through the communication channel known to you ... "

Here A. Osokin makes a thoughtful remark: "Here is the answer to the question: "What did Stalin do on June 22, 1941?" Yes, he acted on the instructions of his "sincere" colleague Adolf, not listening to anyone "...

I think that the author of this "sensation" himself is well acquainted with the genuine "photo of a working day" of Stalin on June 22, 1941, however, by launching another historical "fool", he clearly counts on the fact that to this day with the Stalinist work schedule 22 June 1941, not so many are familiar from the general public ...

However, let's continue quoting A. Osokin, quoting the "letter of the Fuhrer":

"... Only in this way will we be able **to achieve our common goals**, which, it seems to me, **we have clearly agreed with you ...** I thank you for meeting me halfway in the matter known to you (most likely, this means consent to participate in the operation "Sea Lion" - **ed.**) and please excuse me for the way I

chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, ADOLF HITLER. May 14, 1941."

This "letter" lacks only a postscript like: "I'm waiting for an answer, like Guderian of the summer" ... And any competent expert, reading this "letter", will most likely get real pleasure from identifying the factual, logical and historical absurdities with which the "Führer's letter" » filled like a Filippovskaya bun with raisins. Alas, this fake was made with the expectation that "for the general public", unaware of either the true scale that the preparation of an attack on the USSR acquired in the Reich by mid-May 1941, or the nature of this preparation, or the situation with the planning of the landing operation "Sea Lion", nor about what Stalin was doing in the last pre-war weeks and on the day of June 22, 1941 ...

Yes, and a general idea of how serious state (and even more so interstate) events are provided - materially, politically, economically and militarily, one must have more than a weak one in order to believe in this "letter".

I will give only one "inconsistency" - a logical one ... If - according to Osokin - Hitler and Stalin had already "clearly agreed" on some "common goals", then why the hell did Hitler only inform his "ally" on May 14, 1941 that he "finally came to the conclusion" that it was necessary to "crush England" as soon as possible? After all, everything is already - according to Osokin - decided! Soviet ammunition is already being stockpiled on the western border of the USSR, which will soon be transported across Europe to the English Channel ... Already dismantled - along Osokin as part of the "union" - the old URs (fortified areas) ... And most importantly - on the other side of the Soviet border they are already concentrated huge masses of German troops. And Hitler, it turns out, had just dawned on May 14 that England should be "crushed" ...

N-yes.

This is where I also finish my brief review of the "new version" of Osokin, noting that he explains the appearance of the "Hitler letter" by the appearance of Hess in England, which the "letter" could not keep silent about - the event was fresh. Hitler allegedly wrote to Stalin: "... Mr. Hess, I believe, in a fit of insanity or overwork, flew to London in order, as far as I know, to induce the British to common sense" ...

Well, it really does not bother us to remember Hess here. The visible outline of events was as follows ... On May 11, 1941, Rudolf Hess left a letter to Hitler (oh, those letters!), He flew to Scotland on a Messerschmitt-110 plane, jumped out with a parachute near the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, landed unsuccessfully, broke ankle, was discovered by a farmer, taken to a military base and...

And since the fact of Hess's arrival became public - say, the Daily Record newspaper devoted the entire front page of the issue of May 14 to the arrival of Hess with photographs of the wreckage of the aircraft, etc. - the scandal turned out to be worldwide. "Nazi No. 2 is in London!" It was truly a super sensation...

On May 14, Berlin Radio made a lengthy official announcement, where, in particular, it said:

"... Hess went on his flight with the intention of proceeding to the estate of the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon in Lancashire ... He believed that the Duke belonged to a British group in opposition to Churchill, representing the interests of a clique of warmongers ... Hess believed that the Duke had sufficient influence, in order to unleash an effective struggle against the Churchill clique ... Rudolf Hess perceived the German-British war as a war of two Nordic peoples, which, if continued, would lead to only one result - the complete destruction of Great Britain ... "etc.

Hess was declared insane, but what really happened to him is most likely known to this day only to those who have access to the completely classified English archives on Hess. And they are closed under the "rule of a hundred years" (a ban on the publication of information that offends the reputation of living people) until 2041. At the same time, the case of Hess was clearly "multilayered", and there is a serious secret here ...

Which?

At the Nuremberg trials, Hess was sentenced to life imprisonment, served time in Spandau prison, where since 1966 he was the only prisoner guarded in shifts by Americans, Russians, British and French. And as soon as the Gorbachev USSR in 1987 expressed its readiness to release the 93-year-old Hess, he immediately, while guarding the Andean shift, "committed suicide." Without a doubt - with the "help" of the British special services.

What did Hess know? Mountains of literature have been written on this subject, but the light on the truth is in my opinion - sheds a reprint in the "Military Historical Journal" (No. 5, 1991, pp. 37 - 42) of an old article by the former editor of the international affairs department of the Parisian anti-Nazi weekly "Das Neue Tagebuch" Leopold Schwarzschild, published on August 4, 1941 in the Canadian the Gazette Montreal...

However, first let's finish with the Yu-52 flight ... It could have - like the Hess flight - also several "layers". Hitler could solve a number of problems in this way and "kill" many "hares" at once.

Flight cover - the pilot lost his bearings and "got lost." Is it the true goal? There could have been at least three.

The first is to check the state of the air defense of the USSR, the level of efficiency in making decisions in an extraordinary situation and the reaction of the Russians to it. Indeed, in a month with a little, the border of the USSR had to be crossed by an armada of aircraft. At the same time, Hitler could not be particularly afraid that the flight of the Yu-52 would increase the vigilance of the Russians - German planes by May 15, 1941 violated the airspace of the USSR, allegedly getting lost or without explanation, at least dozens of times. Although only one flew to Moscow in May 1941 - if we mean not scheduled passenger flights, but an off-schedule flight.

The second reason is to carry out, under a plausible pretext, the final deep aerial reconnaissance of the USSR in the territory to Moscow, not at maximum altitudes, but at combat flight altitude and along a route that deviates from passenger routes.

And the third is Hess. Since Hess's flight became known to the whole world and could not but arouse Stalin's suspicions, then why not take an "incomprehensible" flight of a German aircraft to Moscow, so that Churchill in London would break his head - who and why so unexpectedly and "abnormally" flew to Russian? At the same time, the objective puzzling nature of the situation - since Hitler created it - suited Stalin too! She worked on his desire to show Britain that her calculations that Russia would become the "sword" of the Britons were groundless and that relations between the USSR and the Reich were strong and even confidential. Therefore, the perpetrators of the rotozey were not severely punished at the beginning. And only later, when the essence of such rotozey began to come to light, drastic measures followed.

And now about Hesse.

Article in the Gazette Montreal, August 4, 1941, reprinted by VIZH via
half a century, began like this:

"From reliable sources, which I can characterize as authoritative and impeccable, but which I do not yet have the right to name, I have received information that enables me to present for the first time a reliable history of the strange and

a rarity of the sensational event of the current war - the flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland ... "

And further, Leopold Schwarzschild reported that the backstory of Hess's flight began in the first weeks of World War II, when the German official news agency DNB reported that the German police had arrested two very dangerous English spies, one of whom, Major Best, was presented as the head of the European *department* " Intelligence Service, "the second - *Captain* Stevens was his closest employee.

"The Germans claimed," Schwarzschild wrote, "that two Englishmen were involved in the explosion in the beer hall (Munich beer hall Burgerbraukeller. - **S.K.**) 9 (in fact - 8-go. - **S.K.**) November 1939, where Hitler gave a speech ... It was recalled that the mine exploded on the balcony (in fact, the mine was built into the column of the hall. - **S.K.**) a few minutes after Hitler left beer..."

Further, the author of an article in the Gazette Montreal described - very inaccurately - the history of the capture of the British on *Danish* territory, stated that the incident was quickly forgotten even by *the Danish* side, and "meanwhile," he concluded, "it was the incident with Best and Stevens that was the starting point of history with Hess.

Then there was a war in Europe, events - and even delicate ones - were described by Schwarzschild almost in real time, and he messed up a lot, starting with the fact that the incident with the seizure took place on Dutch territory *in* the *Dutch* border town of Venlo.

Here is a summary of the exact details of this incident...

Captain Payne Sigismund Best , 54, was indeed in charge of the Central European Sector of the British Secret Intelligence Service and was also an employee of the Z branch, an independent organization within CIC (MI6). A career intelligence officer since the First World War, he moved to The Hague after it, was well known at the court of Queen Wilhelmina, often visited northern Germany, rotated in the circles of the German nobility and was known as the "man with a monocle". In appearance, a typical Englishman, but in fact half-Indian, Best was fluent in four European languages, loved music, played the violin ... Best's wife, the daughter of the Dutch general Van Rees, gained fame as a good portrait painter.

In 1938, Best arranged for the future chief of MI6 military intelligence, Sir Stuart Menzies, to meet with an emissary from General Ludwig Beck, then Chief of the Army General Staff. Beck was already planning a conspiracy of the military-political leadership of Germany against Hitler.

But in 1939, the captain fell into the trap of the head of the IVE group of the 4th Directorate of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), 29-year-old Walter Schellenberg. Best knew him as "Captain Schemmel", a member of the officer's anti-Hitler resistance group (as Schemmel Best was represented by Best's trusted agent, but in reality - a secret agent of the SD).

On October 21, 1939, "Schemmel" met with Best in the Dutch town of Zutphen, and in Arnhem, *Major* Stevens and the Dutch intelligence officer Captain Klop (the latter, however, called himself by the fictitious English name Coppens, which was for a citizen of a neutral country quite prudent precaution).

Richard Stevens worked in The Hague under the traditional MI6 guise of a British passport control officer. He had already been in contact with representatives of General Beck (the real conspirator) and, in order to convince *these* Germans of their high authority, MI6 even asked the BBC to slightly change the traditional headline of the radio newscast to Germany in a prearranged way.

"Schemmel" reported that the goal of *his* influential group was the violent overthrow of Hitler and the establishment of a new regime, and was interested in the attitude of the British government to this development of events. Stephens replied evasively that His Majesty's Government would welcome the removal of Hitler, but they were not personally authorized to make political commitments, although they were in direct contact with the Foreign Office and Downing Street.

Contacts continued, on November 7 and 8 meetings were held in a cafe in the town of Venlo near the German-Dutch border, a trip to London was supposed.

An unexpected denouement occurred immediately after the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler by 36-year-old carpenter Georg Elser. On the night of November 8-9, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler informed Schellenberg about the assassination by phone and ordered the immediate capture of the British and their removal to the territory of the Reich, which was done by Schellenberg with the help of the SS detachment.

There was shooting, "Coppens" was seriously wounded (already in Düsseldorf he died, and from the documents it became known that he was not the English "Lieutenant Coppens", but the Dutch captain Klop) ...

Best and Stevens were interrogated, and they told a lot ... But they had nothing to do with the assassination attempt, in which Elser was the only participant. Which, by the way, did not rule out the organization of an assassination attempt from outside.

So, British intelligence suffered a major and sensitive defeat for its pride, got angry and decided - according to Schwarzschild's informants - to take revenge. She set herself the goal of capturing some important person from the Nazi elite who could be exchanged for Best and Stevens, and in doing so ... did not inform the government about the development of the operation. After all, no one thought that Hess himself would fall on the already "English" hook! The essence of the operation was to create a kind of "mirror" situation in relation to Schellenberg's provocation, namely, it was decided to make the Germans believe that there was a "Scottish independence movement" and that the Scottish revolution against England was just around the corner.

It looked real! At one time, the Scottish Jacobites were asleep and saw something similar, but with the support of France. Therefore, in Berlin (according to Schwarzschild - at the level up to the Fuhrer, but this is unlikely) they believed in the provocation of the British. At the same time, the Secret Service represented the leader of a potential uprising - without his knowledge - just the Duke of Hamilton. The "Scottish revolutionaries" offered the Germans to send a high-ranking emissary to them, who was supposed to fly to Scotland by plane, jump out with a parachute, get to Hamilton's castle, hold secret negotiations, after which the conspirators had to send him back with the help of the Irish, who still love the British

less than the Scots.

The result of this combination was the arrival of Hess - he was a combat pilot, knew English very well, was familiar with Hamilton ... But since the secrecy of the action was violated, Churchill learned about the arrival of Hess, rashly publicly declaring that he would interrogate Hess and report to the House of Commons.

And then the "Secret Service" had to confess everything. And in the unauthorized organization of an unauthorized combination, and in the fact that during the "negotiations" with Berlin, the "Scottish revolution" was associated with ... the beginning of the Reich's war against the USSR.

This is how the journalist Schwarzschild described the background of Hess's flight, and this version seems to me very close to the truth. Indeed, if the situation was approximately the same as it was presented by the Gazette Montreal informants, then Churchill had something to think about ...

If Berlin realizes that no "Scottish conspiracy" actually exists, then Hitler may beware of attacking Russia.

If Moscow finds out about the combination, then it will regard the behavior of the British as extremely provocative and it will be possible to forget about any trust of the Russians in London, but it was not very great anyway.

Finally, if the "hook" *on which* Hess was caught by British intelligence would become known in England - from the same Hess, then a grandiose internal scandal would inevitably erupt, and this, in the conditions of the ongoing war, would be the most terrible. Separatist anti-English sentiment has always been strong in Scotland. And then suddenly it would become known that it is with these sentiments that a powerful British state organization provokes a foreign power! What kind of internal stability on the English island could we talk about after that? But there was a war...

Moreover, the secret of Hess's provocation was objectively permanent, it was explosive for the internal political stability of Great Britain both after the war and at the end of the 80s of the XX century ... If Hess had spoken even in 1987, then, you see, Glasgow could have been added to Ulster. That is why it was important for London to keep Hess silent by any means - up to a noose.

Winston Churchill later wrote: "I never attached too much importance to this escapade" ... However, it would be better if Churchill was silent. A good "escapade" is applied to which the "rule of a hundred years" is applied and, in order to preserve its secret, the main figure of this "escapade" is strangled six years after the event!

Actually, even today this "Secret of Hess", if Schwarzschild wrote the truth, is still extremely dangerous for the internal stability of Great Britain, which can explain its classification according to the "rule of a hundred years", although all participants in those events have already gone to another world.

Returning to 1941, we can say that even in the light of the conflict with Hess, A. Osokin's version looks ridiculously absurd.

Then here's what ... Analyzing the third myth about "Stalin's preventive strike", we should also touch on the topic of his speech to graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, which today is often considered as proof of Stalin's offensive plans. A. Osokin, for example, directly states that in his speech, Stalin, "without naming the enemy, unexpectedly announced that the USSR would not wage a defensive war, but an offensive war, for which the country was ready" ...

But what did the General Secretary of the Central Committee actually say on May 5, 1941? VKP(b) Stalin to graduates of the military academies of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army?

And here's what (I quote from the collection Documents of Foreign Policy, vol. XXIII, Kn, 2 (2), M.: Intern. Relations, 1998, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 648-651):

"...Comrades! you left the army three or four years ago, now you will return to it ranks and do not recognize the army. The Red Army is no longer the same as it was a few years ago ...
...What is our army like now?"

Stalin gave a description of the new army, talked about new divisions, new tanks, aircraft and guns, about shortcomings in academic studies, and then moved on to Germany:

"You will be asked, where are the reasons why Europe turned upside down, why Germany is winning? Why did Germany have a better army? It is a fact that Germany turned out to have a better army both in terms of technology and organization. How can this be explained?

Lenin said that defeated armies learn well. This thought of Lenin applies to nations as well. Broken nations learn well. The German army, being defeated in 1918, studied well ... The military thought of the German army moved forward. The army was armed with the latest technology, trained in new methods of warfare.

In general, there are two sides to this issue ... It is not enough to have good equipment, organization, you need to have more allies. Precisely because defeated armies learn well, Germany took into account the experience of the past.

In 1870 the Germans defeated the French. Why? Because they fought on the same front.

The Germans were defeated in 1916-1917. Why? Because they fought on two fronts.

In fact, Stalin directly carried out the idea that Germany won when it had neutral Russia behind it, and lost when fighting with it. And he further developed this idea:

"In order to prepare well for war, it is not only necessary to have a modern army, but it is necessary to prepare the war politically.

What does it mean to prepare for war politically? Politically preparing for war means having a sufficient number of reliable allies from neutral countries. Germany, starting the war, coped with this task, but England and France did not cope with this task ...

These are the political and military reasons for the defeat of France and the victories of Germany ... "

By "neutral countries" Stalin meant, of course, the USSR. And upon acquaintance with Stalin's speech, any smart German would have been delighted with her - she was completely loyal to Germany and was not oriented against the Germans. Stalin only quite reasonably stated:

"There are no and never were invincible armies in the world... Germany started the war... under the slogan of liberation from the yoke of the Treaty of Versailles. This slogan was popular, met with the support and sympathy of all those offended by Versailles. Now the situation has changed. Now the German army ... has changed the slogans of liberation from Versailles to predatory.

The German army will not be successful under the slogans of an aggressive conquest war. These are dangerous slogans..."

The last words of Stalin's speech were as follows:

"The army needs to be improved day by day. Any politician, any action figure who allows himself to feel complacent, may find himself in front of a surprise, as France was in front of a catastrophe. Once again, I congratulate you and wish you success."

The words about the readiness of the country for war, cited by Osokin, in Stalin's speech **simply no.**

No!

And I don't know why A. Osokin had to mislead his readers.

I, finishing with the third myth, will acquaint the reader with the content of the telegram of the Moscow ambassador of Germany, Count von der Schulenburg, to the ausamt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) dated May 24, 1941. Assessing the situation, he wrote:

"... These gestures of the Stalin government are aimed primarily at, observing their own interests, to defuse relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and create a better atmosphere for the future. In particular, one should take into account

that Stalin personally always advocated friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union ... In my opinion, it can be safely assumed that Stalin set himself an extremely important goal from the point of view of interests, which he hopes to achieve by using his prestige and efforts. This goal, as I am deeply convinced, is that Stalin wants in a serious, in his opinion, international situation to protect the USSR from a conflict with Germany ... "

As an illustration of Schulenburg's assessment, I will inform you that Ribbentrop, when on June 22, 1941, handed over a note declaring war to the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov in Berlin, there were tears in his eyes.

I heard about it by chance - in a long-standing conversation at the Beijing airport with a retired GRU officer while waiting for a flight to Moscow. And when I jumped up and asked:

— How do you know this? The interlocutor replied:

"My father told me about it...

- How does he know this?

—From Dekanozov himself...

The father of my interlocutor at one time in the rank of general was an analyst of the General Staff (I later learned this not from words, but from documents). And although the above just oral information, I am convinced that it is accurate.

On June 22, 1941, Ribbentrop experienced not the anger of the deceived, but bitterness, knowing in advance *that* the German strike on Russia was something more than a crime. This is a fatal mistake, with an inevitable tragic ending for the Reich.

Myth four
IF IN 1941 THE RED ARMY WERE TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH
AND COMMANDERS REPRESSED IN 1937-1938, THE WAR WOULD BE FOR THE
USSR IMMEDIATELY
SUCCESSFUL

This myth has already been worn out, like all the "cards" of "Stalinist repressions" in general. Over the past two decades, they have already been greasy to the max, but even today any "democrat" knows his favorite "prayer" better than the village deacon "Our Father": "Of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union, Stalin destroyed three ...", "the regiments were commanded by captains ..." etc. This refrain, which first arose in Khrushchev's times, sounded again in the era of the "catastrophe" and - more and more strongly. And in Yeltsin's "Rossiyanin" he gained just the same tocsin strength!

And on the eve of the emergence of "Yeltsiya" a certain colonel N.M. Ramanichev, in the Military History Journal, which was already acquiring an anti-Soviet and anti-communist character, in issue 12 for 1991, broadcast:

"... On the eve of the war, the Soviet armed forces (the last two words of the "colonel" with a small letter, instead of "Armed Forces." - **S.K.**) were actually beheaded ... In total, the Ground Forces, Navy and Aviation were repressed for 1937 - 1938 44 thousand people ... All commanders of the troops of military districts, 90% of deputies, heads of military branches and services were replaced, etc.

The inconsistency of such statements has been shown more than once before me, moreover, in my previous books, I myself have spoken out more than once on this topic. However, here I will

new data, and this will be only a small part of what can be said in refutation of the fourth myth ...

And what's interesting! If you carefully analyze the books of various modern exposers of the "tyrant" Stalin, who allegedly "decapitated" the Red Army and the Red Army, for example, Nikolai Cherushev, then an amazing thing is revealed! This military "historian", as well as a number of his fellow "denunciators" (for example, Colonel Suvenirov), provide a lot of factual information, but its thoughtful analysis completely refutes the conclusions made by the "denunciators". I repeat: the conclusions of the "accusers" are refuted by the data of the "accusers" themselves! Surprising, but true.

An illustrative example ... Here is a book by N.S. Cherushev "1937. Was there a military conspiracy? (M.: Veche, 2007). Page 310 contains an extensive fragment of the well-known article "The New Face of the Red Army", published in the German magazine "Verfront" in the second half of 1937. It praises the executed Tukhachevsky and other "victims of Stalin", pejoratively assesses the Red Army, "decapitated by repression", and states, for example, the following:

"In the spring of 1937 (before the repressions. - **S.K.**), virtually all the highest command positions of the Red Army (with the exception of the People's Commissar of Defense [i.e. - Voroshilov. - **S.K.**]) were occupied by specialists and the level of education of officers was significantly raised. Only Voroshilov remained at the head of the army as a parade general ...

After the trial on June 11, Stalin ordered the execution of the eight best commanders the next day... Military qualifications were sacrificed for the politics and security of the Bolshevik system...

Especially catastrophic was the appointment of new commanders of the military districts.

etc.

It was an article "to the public", including a certain readership in the USSR. Its conclusion is obvious: here, they say, how the mediocre Bolsheviks beat that highly professional army, which the "clever ones" like Yakir and Uborevich just reorganized according to the European model under the leadership of the "clever one" Tukhachevsky ...

However, the "anxiety" of one of the then most likely potential opponents of the USSR about the weakening of the personnel power of the Red Army looked strange! When an enemy praises you or someone close to you, think about it - why would it be? However, perhaps the Wehrmacht organ in such a cunning way - "on the contrary", additionally pushed Stalin to new repressions?

Perhaps ... But here is the fragment cited by Cherushev himself on page 313 from the secret review of foreign policy events prepared at the Wehrmacht headquarters from April 23 to May 12, 1937:

"The real reasons for the fall of Marshal Tukhachevsky are still unclear: it should be assumed that his great ambition led to contradictions between him and the calm, **reasonable and clearly thinking** (my emphasis. - **S.K.**)

Voroshilov, who is completely devoted to Stalin. The fall of Tukhachevsky is of decisive importance. It shows with all certainty that Stalin firmly holds the Red Army in his hands.

That is, in the internal, "without fools" document, the Germans fully understood that repressions in the "top" of the Red Army would not only strengthen Stalin's position, but would not affect

decisively on the combat capability of the army. And Voroshilov in a secret, *for himself*, review is by no means a "wedding" general.

And here is a kind of illustration for the article "Werfront" ... In 1927, Yakir was sent to study at the German Academy of the General Staff. And after graduating from Yakir in 1928, Field Marshal Hindenburg, then President of Germany, presented the new "academician" with the famous "Cannes" of General Schlieffen with the inscription "Mr. Yakir - one of the talented military leaders of our time."

What does it mean? Paul von Hindenburg began the First World War as the commander of the 8th Army, continued it as the commander of the Eastern Front, and ended in de facto commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Germany. And Iona Yakir began his "military" career in 1918 as the commander of the consolidated Tiraspol detachment, finished his civilian career as the head of the 45th rifle division, and then, without much brilliance, commanded the 14th army in the Soviet-Polish war. That is, the flattering "attestation" of Yakir by Hindenburg was not so much an act of politeness as, perhaps, a prelude to the undercover development of Yakir by the Germans. Which, it should be noted, soon followed ...

Let's return to the book of N. Cherushev. There, on pages 315 - 325, an interesting report is given in fragments by the former assistant to the Japanese military attaché in Moscow, infantry captain Kootani, "The Internal Situation of the USSR (Analysis of the Tukhachevsky Case)". A report with an introductory speech by the Chief of the Soviet Section of the 2nd Division of the Japanese General Staff, Colonel of the Kasahara Cavalry, was made at the 199th meeting of the Japanese Diplomatic Association in July 1937. On December 10, 1937, this report, obtained by Soviet intelligence through undercover means, was presented to Stalin by Yezhov (special message No. 62672).

Yezhov's full special report with Kootani's report was published in the collection of documents "Lubyanka: Stalin and the GUGB 1937-1938" and occupies more than 13 pages of small text there. I studied it carefully, but I will give only a few assessments of Kootani:

"... There is no doubt that thanks to the current incident (the Tukhachevsky trial. - **S.K.**) the spiritual cohesion of the Red Army has weakened, that this incident is fraught with great dangers in the future ... But if, on the basis of this incident alone, they conclude that the state the power of the USSR has greatly decreased or that the combat effectiveness of the Red Army has fallen to a greater extent, then I want to make adjustments to this look...

You have probably already heard more than once about how much the Red Army has recently strengthened ... an increase in the personnel military forces has been carried out ... the strengthening of aviation, the restoration of the Cossacks, and so on ... Now a two-year plan for the expansion of armaments is being carried out in the USSR ... "

In some ways Kootani was amusingly naive, but not always. Here is another one of his grade:

"... Here the question arises, are there people who can replace intelligent commanders, like Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich or Kork? I want to answer this: if you look, there will be ... <...> "

And such people were found - contrary to the statements of Cherushev and others. But enough alas, and "ballast". People's Commissar of Defense Klim Voroshilov said:

"Unfortunately, it never occurred to any of us, it didn't occur that this abomination, this rot, this betrayal is so widely and deeply entrenched in the ranks of our army. You know what the purge of the ranks of the Red Army was like. Cleaning has been done

radical and comprehensive - from the very top to the bottom. Therefore, the number of those cleaned out turned out to be very, very impressive. ”

And what was it like?

Voroshilov called "four tens of thousands" - why the "democrats" operate with a similar figure. But it would be more accurate to say - 35 thousand (data here and below - according to VIZH, 1992, No. 8, p. 16). And the "cleaned" are not necessarily those arrested. Then the term "clean" had a very definite meaning. Berlag's accountant, as the reader may remember, was precisely "cleaned" from Hercules, which did not prevent Ostap Bender from seeing him freely.

The officers of the old tsarist army who served in the Red Army had by this time approached a critical age, like some of those poorly educated commanders who advanced from the people's environment in the Civil War or in the early years of the construction of the Red Army, but did not go far. In addition, in these two groups there were enough dishonest people and those who were prone to alcohol. That is, it was the ballast that was often removed from the army and at the same time - politically dubious, for example - according to the Trotskyist past, command staff.

In 1937-1938, 9.5 thousand people were arrested (not shot!) in the Red Army, and another 14.6 thousand were fired on the grounds of "discrediting ties with enemies of the people." At the same time, more than 30 (!) Thousand commanders protested their dismissal, and a special commission of the NPO of the USSR, created in August 1938, on May 1, 1939, decided to return 12,461 commanders to the Red Army. This is quite understandable - after the Trotskyist and anti-Soviet element in the Red Army was basically destroyed, the army problem moved from the category of political to the category of personnel.

But even then, around the repressions in the army, including the efforts of the Trotskyists, lies began to accumulate. What is worth one fable that, they say, in December 1940, out of 225 regiment commanders, only 25 graduated from military schools, and the rest were junior lieutenants who came from the reserve. I will focus on this fable below. In fact, already in 1936, more than sixty thousand commanders were being trained in schools. In 1938, fifteen thousand people graduated from the school. Eleven thousand in 1936 studied at military academies.

I am somehow even embarrassed in front of a qualified reader for these *elementary* for an honest researcher data. But how many people are familiar with them today?

In 1939 and 1940 alone, four hundred senior and senior officers completed courses at the Academy of the General Staff. This is not counting the fact that the graduation from the Academy itself was up to a hundred people a year. But each of them is at least a ready-made regiment commander or regimental chief of staff. And the "junior lieutenants" from the reserve in such a company would obviously be uncomfortable.

Let us recall the words of Captain Kootani: "If you look, there will be..." And there was where and who to look for! At the end of the thirties, many of the truly talented military leaders of our time served in the Red Army in quite prominent positions: Antonov, Bagramyan, Vasilevsky, Vatutin, Voronov, Govorov, Zhukov, Zakharov, Katukov. Konev, Krylov, Lelyushenko, Moskalenko, Petrov, Rokossovsky, Rotmistrov, Rybalko, Russiyanov, Tolbukhin, Chernyakhovsky, Chuikov ... And only one of the major military leaders of the Great Patriotic War was temporarily hooked by injustice - Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky ...

Perhaps someone will notice: "And Meretskova ..." However, the matter is not very clear with the latter, and I will dwell on this a little. In his memoirs "In the Service of the People", published in 1988, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov writes:

"Unforgettable is June 1937, when, after a nine-month absence, I set foot on my native land (on my return from Spain. - **S.K.**). Then the joy of returning was

overshadowed by the sadness and horror of the news that Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir and other prominent military leaders were exposed as traitors and enemies ... "

And then he tells the following about the expanded meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, which took place on June 1-4, 1937, shortly after Tukhachevsky's arrest:

"When I was given the floor at the conference, I ... answered that I did not understand the speeches of the comrades who spoke here about their suspicions and distrust. It looks strange: if they suspected, then why have they been silent until now? But I didn't suspect Uborevich of anything, I believed him unconditionally and never noticed anything bad ... "

etc.

I will say right away: without analyzing the materials of the June and another, November, meeting of the Military Council in 1937, understanding the essence of repression in the Red Army in 1937 and 1938 years is simply impossible. But in their entirety, these materials became available (although not easily accessible) for research only recently ... Kirill Afanasyevich did not know, did not know that in 2008 the ROSSPEN publishing house, although with a circulation of one thousand copies, would nevertheless publish a complete transcript of the meetings of the Military Council 1 - 4 June 1937, where there is also the text of Meretskov's speech.

Here is part of the transcript of the evening meeting of June 3, 1937:

Meretskov. ... I was chief of staff with Uborevich for two years.

Stalin. What?

Meretskov. I believe that I was close to him, and in this respect my fault was the most, because I slept peacefully next to the enemy. And I must say: not only overslept, but there were a lot of cases when I blindly worked for his authority.

Voice. Engaged in politics.

Meretskov. Wait, I'll tell you about you too in due time..."

And Meretskov really "said" about many already arrested or future "victims of Stalin and Yezhov" - about Kork (reproaching a certain Comrade Isaenko for "not seeing an enemy in Kork"), about Veklichev, Smirnov, Kutyaikov and Sedyakin, about Sangursky and many others, urging: "Let Comrade Yezhov sort it out and find out who introduced this matter ..."

Meretskov also said about Uborevich...

Like this:

Meretskov. ... I saw the whole personal life of Uborevich. I know a lot, I could tell a lot about him.

Voroshilov. Bastard life.

Meretskov. Schemer.

Voroshilov. Why were you silent?

Meretskov (ignoring the question of the people's commissar. - **S.K.**). Two-faced person. Dirty man. In my opinion, all this was known, a coward and a gentleman in relation to the commanding staff. He called the commanders fools, and they all endured it ...

... In vain did some people think and think that there was only one Uborevich in the Belorussian district. Excellent Red Army soldiers, commanders, Bolsheviks worked and are working there ... "

Enough, dear reader? And the question is whether the former Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army Meretskov, from the beginning of the war to September 1941, was not deservedly under investigation himself?

Uborevich, of course, is a conspirator... He should have been shot! He was shot... But why put on clean robes for dirty deeds? After all, when you compare Meretskov's memoirs and the transcript, the conclusion suggests itself: Meretskov was also "taken" hurt, but due to circumstances *they were spared*.

Perhaps I'll add something else about Uborevich ... In the transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) published in 2007 in a circulation of 1 thousand copies by the ROSSPEN publishing house. 1928 - 1938", in Volume III, on page 283, in a statement to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the oppositionist I. Nusinov dated October 30, 1930, it is reported that during the XVI Congress, during the discussion of Uborevich's candidacy to the Central Committee at a meeting of the Siberian delegation, who tossed a note to Nusinov about Uborevich, "the meaning of which as Nusinov wrote, "he was something like this": *"A man, they say, capable, but little tested in terms of the party. That and look, imagines himself Napoleon "...*

Comments here are generally unnecessary, but I can say that at that time Stalin completely trusted Uborevich (Voroshilov in those turbulent times concentrated more on political work) and did not believe in his accusations of "Bonapartism" and "Thermidorianism". In general, Stalin was inclined to believe people to the last, until the moment when their negative image was finally and irrevocably manifested. However, Stalin, as more than once before, had to make sure that he trusted Uborevich, like Tukhachevsky, in vain.

If we return to the transcripts of the meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937, which were held with the participation of Stalin, and to the transcripts of another Military Council in November 1937, then a careful study of them alone is enough to understand: if in 1941, the Tukhachevskys were still in command of the Red Army, then everything would really end for Russia and Germany in 1941. But it would have ended not with a red banner over the Reichstag, but with a Wehrmacht victory parade hosted by Hitler on Red Square in Moscow.

And I don't even mean the betrayal of Tukhachevsky and other conspirators, but the "quality" of troop training that these "geniuses" would provide
military business.

In speeches at two Military Councils in 1937, so much unsightly, but, alas, accurate information about the situation in the Red Army spilled out that your hair stood on end! A lot of old "pustules" were opened ... Someone was exposed out of fright so that they would not expose him himself, although this did not help most of the "whistleblowers involuntarily" ... Someone was sincerely indignant ... Someone - reluctantly and forcedly ...

Alas, I cannot cite even a hundredth of those "pearls" that are generously scattered according to the transcripts of the two Military Councils of the NPOs of the USSR in 1937 and which make it possible to understand a lot in 1937-1938 ... If not all.

Here are just a few quotes...

On the evening of June 2, 1937, Commander Nikolai Krivoruchko, a Ukrainian, from peasants, graduated from the school of cavalry ensigns in 1914, Kotovets:

"... I declare to you, comrade. Stalin, and you, people's commissar, that on your first order, if necessary, I will not create glory for Yakir ... In the corps I will find people who did not work for Yakir's authority. Yakir was, Yakir is not here today - he is dead for us. Yakir is a son of a bitch, and if necessary, despite the fact that I worked with him for 16 years, I myself will take him by the throat and strangle him like a toad ...

I declare that there is no fraud in the corps and the corps in any
the moment is ready for war ... "

On February 21, 1938, Krivoruchko will be arrested as deputy commander of the Kyiv military district for cavalry and shot on August 9, 1938

of the year.

Innocent? According to Khrushchev, yes, because Krivoruchko was rehabilitated on April 11, 1956.

But here is a fragment of the speech of the commander of the 2nd (since 1938 - 1st) rank Ivan Fedorovich Fedko, a Ukrainian, from peasants, graduated from the Kiev school of ensigns in 1917. From May 1937 - commander of the troops and member of the Military Council of the Kyiv Military District, from January 1938 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

Speaking at a meeting on November 21, 1937, four months after speeches Krivoruchko, Fedko reported:

"... I will move on to the state of combat and political training of the troops of the district (Kiev. - **S.K.**) The state of combat and political training of the troops of the district ... was characterized by the presence in the work of the commanding staff of elements of fraud, which took on a very wide scale in the district. It must be said frankly that the habit of lying, the habit of telling lies, the desire to rub points, has come down to the level of junior commanders ... "

But after all, Krivoruchko "rubbed his glasses ...".

Fedko cited striking examples - obviously not sucked from the finger, but in at the end - the reader believes or does not believe, reported:

"To prepare for the new academic year at the end of October (1937 - **S.K.**) a ten-day gathering of commanders and commissars of corps and divisions was held, at which two training tasks were set ... "

Here, however, I will interrupt the quotation and invite the reader to guess what was the first task? For corps and division commanders? And here's what:

"The first task is to master the corps commanders and commissars with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and grenade launchers.

Why was this task set? - Fedko asked and answered: - Because it was discovered in the units that the commanders of squads, platoons and companies do not know how to load rifles. When the senior command staff was checked, we got the same picture. Hence, as Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny correctly noted, the command staff teaches not by showing, but by telling ... "

These are the "Tukhachevsky shooters" who commanded large formations of the Red Army in 1937. This is the situation in October 1937, and from May 1935 until May 1937, the Kyiv district was commanded by "one of the talented military leaders of our time" Iona Yakir. So, the commanders of the Kyiv military district, already under Fedko, four months after Yakir, forgot - from which end should one take up a rifle? Or is it still with the "intelligent" Yakir?

Fedko also spoke about the origins of Yakir's "successes":

"The former chief of staff of the Kyiv military district ... Podchufarov in his testimony says: "... In order to show the excellent preparation of the district, a competition of battalions was introduced. Thus, out of 9 divisions, one battalion is studying ... and the condition of the divisions and the district is assessed from it.

And so it was. Together with Shchadenko, we examined the units and witnessed such a situation when the battalions that were included in the All-Army competition were

staffed with the best command and Red Army staff, provided with all the necessary benefits even better than the regimental schools. We had to cash out these rigged battalions ... "

Alas, Fedko was soon arrested - on July 7, 1938. Shot on February 26, 1939. What is it - Stalin and Voroshilov amused themselves like this: in January, they appoint a person as the first deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR Voroshilov, give him the rank of commander of the 1st rank, and arrest him six months later?

Alas, quite real sins were revealed for Fedko, which were "released" he only Khrushchevites, having rehabilitated Fedko on May 26, 1956.

But on the evening of June 3, 1937, the army commissar of the 2nd rank, 37-year-old Grigory Okunev from the Pacific Fleet, a member of the RSDLP (b) since 1917, and talks about the undoubted sabotage in the Pacific Fleet and in the Office of Naval Forces - there, they say, "there are bison sitting in this part, whom we need to pick out" ... Okunev is indignant and the fact that he fruitlessly wrote to the enemy of the people, Gamarnik, about the "vile breakthrough" with the training of pilots on the I-16 (raid instead of 240 hours a year - 50-55 hours), etc. Okunev believes that "someone needs to be hanged for this case in order to correct this matter as soon as possible."

What an energetic exposé of the enemies of the people! That's who, it would seem, is suitable for "Stalin's satraps" ... However, on December 1, 1937, Okunev was also arrested, and on July 28, 1938 - after an eight-month investigation, we note - are shot. And only on May 19, 1956, he was rehabilitated - the Khrushchevites.

And now about the regiments that were "commanded by captains" ... Such fabrications can often be found, for example, in the book of the former Major General of the Border Troops Georgy Sechkin "Border and War", published in 1993 (reviewer Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor General Major V.N. Andrianov).

There, on page 26, Sechkin, with reference to the "democratic" "historian" V. Anfilov, stated that "the head of the combat training department, Lieutenant-General V. Kurdyumov" "at a meeting in December of the fortieth year" allegedly said the following:

"The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that out of 225 regimental commanders involved in the muster, only 25 people turned out to have graduated from military schools. The remaining 200 people are people who completed junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserve.

Comments on such a sensational fact were not required, the conclusion suggested itself: here they are, the results of the "defeat of the Red Army" by Stalin, Yezhov and Beria. However, I suggest not jumping to conclusions, because below I will give the reader additional "information for thought."

Anfilov published his "sensation" in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper on June 22, 1988

of the year.

Sechkin gave it a second wind in 1993 in a book signed for publication on October 20, 1992.

And therefore, neither one nor the other could assume that on April 14, 1993, the TERRA publishing house would sign volume 12 (1) of the Russian Archive, which opens the multi-volume edition of documents of the Great Patriotic War. The volume is completely devoted to the materials of the Conference of the top management of the Red Army 21 - December 23, 1940 and contains both the speeches of the head of the Combat Training Department of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikolayevich Kurdyumov, and the General Inspector of the Red Army Infantry Andrei Kirillovich Smirnov.

Kurdyumov fought, died in 1970. Smirnov, commanding the 18th Army of the Southern Front after the start of the war, died in battle near the village of Popovka (later the village of Smirnov) in the Zaporozhye region.

First, about the report of General Smirnov ... There is not a single figure at all, but the following was said about the fees (p. 30):

"We are now holding training camps for infantry commanders. It should be noted that almost all the districts took the training camp of the command staff of the infantry quite seriously. If the first gathering was still poorly organized, now the main link, which should resolve all issues of combat training - the link of the command staff, has taken its appropriate place in the understanding of the leaders of the districts, corps and divisions.

General Kurdyumov devoted the fourth section of his speech to the training of the commanding staff, and there are numbers in his speech. In particular, reporting that the deployment of new units causes a shortage of senior and middle commanding staff, especially in the internal military districts, he said:

"So, in the PriVO, 70 percent of the middle command staff and battalion commanders have practical command experience from 5 months to 1 year (it was clear to Kurdyumov's listeners, and I will remind the reader that this is not a command length of service in general, but length of service in the positions currently occupied. - **S.K.**). In the same district, all the commanders of rifle regiments, except for one, command units of the first year".

General Kurdyumov cited this example as the most alarming, but it must be taken into account that the PriVO is not PribOVO ... The second is the border *Baltic* Special Military District, and the first, where the situation with the regiment commanders was not the best, is the deeply internal *Volga* Military District, whose combat capability was not decisive.

But where did the military historian Anfilov get his data from? The speech of General Kurdyumov in a joint publication of the TERRA publishing house and the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is given according to the Russian State Military Archive (fund 4, inventory 18, file 55, sheets 54-63). The transcript of General Smirnov's speech is kept in the same place and in the same file (sheets 46-53).

However, the same false "data" as Anfilov's in 1988 was reproduced by the candidate of historical sciences, Colonel N.M. Ramanichev (this is the one who writes the words "Soviet Armed Forces" with a small letter) in the article "The Red Army is the strongest of all?" (VIZH, 1991, No. 12, p. 4). And they are given with reference to the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (fund 4, inventory 14, file 2742, sheet 62). At the same time, if the volume of documents published by the TERRA publishing house contains the full texts of the speeches of Kurdyumov and Smirnov, then Ramanichev's VIZH gives only a similar Anfilov "quote" - I think that the quotation marks are quite appropriate here.

What does it mean? Isn't it the fact that the original transcripts of the Meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army were published in 1993 in a circulation of 10 thousand copies and finding them is not always easy even for a specialist? And Anfilov's "revelations" were distributed throughout the country in 1988 in the volume of the then huge circulation of the main press organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And even the supposedly archival data of Colonel Ramanichev were published in the Military Historical Journal in December 1991 in a considerable circulation of 115,273 copies.

Then these supposedly fried facts could very seriously shift the brains of a significant part of the readership in uniform. And these brains in December 1991 were already melting for many, and not only for the military ... For the subordinates of the "perestroika" head of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "general against falsification" Volkogonov, it was important to throw into this "furnace" at that *time* also

such a "poly".

They say that Volkogonov destroyed the archives with wagons, so it was a trifle for him to make a "small cart" of counterfeit in return. Especially - in the presence of such outstanding employees of the then Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense as *Colonel of the US Army Villahermosa* (I will say something about him at the very end of the book).

But no captains and "junior lieutenants from the reserve" in 1940 commanded any regiments! Despite the constant command shortage due to the formation of new formations, more experienced candidates were also on the shelves in the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army.

By the way, about "marshals" and "lieutenants" from a somewhat unexpected side. It has long been a bitter joke in military circles that a successful enemy bombing attack on the highest headquarters dramatically increases the combat effectiveness of the army. As you know, in every joke there is a share of a joke, and this army tale is convincingly illustrated by how the situation in pre-war Soviet aviation changed after the arrest of the main ideological figure in the then Soviet aircraft industry, the design "marshal", the "legendary" Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev.

Here are his positions from 1930 to 1937...

Chief Designer of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI),
Head of the Department of Aviation, Hydroaviation, Pilot Construction (AGOS) of TsAGI ...

Deputy Head of the Central Design Bureau (TsKB) TsAGI ...

Deputy Head of TsAGI, Head of the Design Department of the Sector
experimental construction (KOSOS) of TsAGI...

And, finally, the last position before the arrest was the chief engineer and deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry of the USSR People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry.

And what were the results of his activities in these "marshal" positions?

In the autumn of 1937, Tupolev and a group of his employees were arrested, and for several years he worked in "special conditions", that is, in isolation under the control of the NKVD. But after all, they were arrested not from scratch, because Tupolev's activity was unequivocally wrecking, already because he actually stifled new ideas even in the business closest to him - the development of heavy aircraft. The Germans already in 1935 had the projects of the Junkers-88, Heinkel-111, the British - the Lancaster ... The Americans in the same years developed the first "flying fortress" Boeing-17. And Tupolev criminally slowed down new work and kept "improving" his low-speed TB-3, which by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was not only outdated, but *criminally* outdated. Thanks to Tupolev, we had a lot of records set on his aircraft in the 30s, but by 1941 - only a long-range bomber - DB-Zf Ilyushin (IL-4) and a less successful, but not bad bomber Yer-2 Ermolaev. They bombed Berlin in August 1941.

And here is the assessment of the aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev:

"If we compare the main types of Soviet aircraft that were in mass production ... in 1939 with the same German ones, then this comparison will not be in our favor.

MiG, Yak, LaGG fighters ... appeared in prototypes only in 1940.

Comparison of SB bombers (Tupolev's. - **S.K.**) with Yu-88 is also not in our favor ...

The Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber appeared with us ... only in 1940
year.

An aircraft for interaction with the ground forces, similar to the German Junkers-87 dive bomber ... did not exist at all ... "

All this is the result of not only the long-term monopoly of Tupolev, but also, by the way, the criminal military-technical policy of the chiefs of armaments of the Red Army Tukhachevsky and Uborevich. On the other hand, they favorably treated the Tupolev utter project of a multi-seat (!?) fighter armed with 7 (seven) 20-mm ShVAK aviation cannons ... The idea was so awkward that it was not reflected in the history of aviation, but I found "Tukhachevsky" praises for it in the materials Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, held in December 1935.

As for Tupolev himself, he was a pronounced egocentrist and crushed entire original design teams under him, although it looked decent: the patriarch is bringing up a galaxy of successors.

But before they had time to arrest the "master", independent design bureaus of his "chicks" appeared, and new planes "shaft" went! In 1938, a separate design bureau of Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi was organized. And immediately gives an excellent short-range bomber "Ivanov", Su-2 and Su-6 attack aircraft. For the last Sukhoi aircraft in 1943 he received the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree.

Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov only in "imprisonment" got the opportunity to work independently and also headed the new design bureau. And he immediately gave the outstanding Pe-2 bomber, which at the end of 1940 had already begun to be mass-produced.

The full namesake of Petlyakov - Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev in 1938 also became the chief designer of an independent design bureau and gave the project of the world's first long-range high-altitude bomber DVB-102 with a pressurized cabin and remotely controlled weapons, for the creation of which in 1942 he received gratitude from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, and the design bureau - Stalin Prize.

To overcome the consequences of the "activity" in aviation of Tupolev, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and other similar "marshals", urgent organizational efforts were needed by many, and above all by Stalin. In 1940, more than 300 decisions and resolutions were adopted on aviation issues. In 1941 - 488.

However, the rapid rise of Soviet aviation began already in 1938. It is significant that the first book of Shavrov, a classic of the history of aviation, is called "The History of Aircraft Designs in the USSR **until 1938**", and the second is "The History of Aircraft Designs in the USSR. **1938** - 1950". For the "democrats" 1938 is the year of repressions. For Soviet aviation - the year of the beginning of its renewal. The same as for the Red Army and the RKKF.

In fact, the repressions in the Red Army gave a chance for accelerated growth to a whole layer of quite young, but experienced commanders with great military experience. It was not for nothing that Hitler, after the conspiracy of the generals in 1944, admired Stalin for the fact that he decisively got rid of the ossified "marshall" and brought up a cohort of young commanders. Here it is only necessary to clarify that the essence of the repressions was still not a bloody "rotation" of personnel, but the liquidation of the multi-layered and multi-factorial military opposition of the Bonapartist, right and left-Trotskyist persuasion.

Sometimes, however, even such serious experts as, for example, Sergei Pereslegin, believe that the repressions of 1937 sharply reduced the intellectual level of the leadership of the Red Army. Well, if we keep in mind the nomination after 1937 of such an "intellectual" as Marshal Kulik, then one could agree with such a statement ... However, it is enough to compare the transcripts of the speeches of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, etc. at a meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in 1935 and the transcripts of the above-mentioned December meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in 1940, in order to understand that the repressions of 1937 raised the intellectual level of the leadership of the Red Army - not at the level of marshals, unfortunately, but at the level of top generals - without doubt.

Oddly enough, in assessing the "military" "talents" of the repressed Blucher, Yegorov, Tukhachevsky, Fedko and others, I found, it would seem, an "ally" in

the face of Mark Solonin. In his book about 1941, he recalls that those shot in 1937 are "people of the same generation, of the same political and life "school" as Marshals Timoshenko, Budyonny and Kulik who failed in the Great Patriotic War, General army Tyulenev, commander-in-chief of the cavalry Gorodovikov, whom, after six months or a year, Stalin had to send out of harm's way to the rear. Like, "at the final stage of the war, these unfortunate commanders in the army are few

and remembered...

"Why, knowing how the survivors showed themselves, do we continue to build illusions about the executed?" Solonin asks.

However, I will not take Mark Solonin as an ally even here! He very much slanders the commanders of the Red Army, taken as a professional corps as a whole, stating, for example, that "to the Military Academy. Frunze received commanders with two classes of the parochial school "and falsely enrolling Marshals Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, General of the Army Kirponos among the graduates of the TsPSH. The latter, by the way, thanks to his abilities, received a good primary education for the son of a poor man in a zemstvo school, where most of the students were children of rural rich people and employees from the landowner's economy. Kirponos could not continue his studies only because of poverty.

But more than that, Solonin also claims that "attracting semi-literate, but "socially close" personnel was the basis of personnel policy (there is a whole personnel policy, not only in the Red Army. - S.K.) both in the 20s and in **the** 30s x, and in the 40s. And hence the conclusion of Solonin - the level of the command staff of the Red Army was generally extremely low.

Well, what can I say?

To put personnel policy on one level in any sphere of life of Soviet society in the 20s and even in the 30s (not to mention the 40s!) Can only be a person who angrily bleeds the blackest saliva in relation to the past Motherland! Yes, and it is bad knowing the past. In fact, it is impossible to equate even the cadres characteristic of 1935 and 1941 with the same brush - the growth of the professional level in just six years was qualitative, striking - in industry, in science, in the defense sphere! There was enough mediocrity and "ballast", but there is always enough of it everywhere, in all societies, otherwise only outwardly playful laws of Parkinson and Murphy and the famous "hierarchology" with its "Peter principle" would not have been developed in the "enlightened West".

The question is which dominates!

In Stalin's Soviet Union, the dominant was such that, first of all, the personnel policy ensured the success of the Red Army, the Soviet economy and culture in the Great Patriotic War! Much later, I will cite the testimony of the German Panzer General von Mellenthin in this regard.

And even with regard to the old command cadres spat upon by Solonin, one can say kind, or rather, fair words.

So, the 62-year-old Colonel General Oka Ivanovich Gorodovikov, the hero of the Civil War, was, of course, outdated by the beginning of the new war. However, no one put him in the "first line". Since June 1941, he was the inspector general and commander of the cavalry of the Red Army, but the last post was, in fact, nominal in any kind of troops. During the war, Gorodovikov led the formation of cavalry units, was the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the use of cavalry. And he did his job well. Yes, and he was not such a retrograde equestrian. For example, his speech at a meeting of the highest commanding staff in December 1940, although it did not betray the new Schlieffen in the old cavalryman, was quite intelligent, realistic, contained sound thoughts with a sound statement that in a modern war, and even in the presence of enemy air superiority, "large forces of the cavalry, with all their desire, even seven stars in their foreheads, will not be able to do anything."

But Marshal Voroshilov ... Konstantin Zalessky in his biographical guide "Stalin's Empire" claims that he "showed complete inability to lead troops in a modern war" and "personally tried to lead the troops on the attack", which was one of the reasons for Voroshilov's immediate recall from Leningrad and its replacement by Zhukov.

The handbook by K. Zalessky, for all its shortcomings, is a valuable publication... However, the obvious anti-communism and anti-Sovietism clearly let the author of this handbook down, perhaps not knowing that Thomas Mann long ago called anti-communism the greatest stupidity of the 20th century... But if K. Zalessky wishes to compose his reference publications to use the "details" of the biographies of a number of figures of the Stalin era sucked from the finger, then I can recommend him to refer, for example, to the book by the American "historian" Harrison Salisbury (1908 - 1993) "900 days. Leningrad blockade". There you can find the following passage: "... Stalin was not joking. Three days later he sent a special commission to Meretskov's headquarters. It was headed by the most terrible bandit from the NKVD, Beria's assistant G.I. Sandpiper".

This is followed by a footnote: "Kulik served in Spain, his name was General" no no," because he knew only one Spanish word "no" and used it on every occasion. On returning to Moscow, he received a rank equal to (? - **S.K.**) marshal.

Grigory Ivanovich Kulik, Stalin's comrade-in-arms in the defense of Tsaritsyn, had many sins for his turbulent and far from always worthy life, and in 1950, "totally" "offended" by Stalin, was shot for "merit". The latter circumstance was once again indirectly confirmed by Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, who fully justified and rehabilitated Kulik in 1957, posthumously reinstating him even in the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

However, Grigory Ivanovich did not serve in the Soviet special services for a single day and, accordingly, was never an assistant to L.P. Beria. And being an adviser to the republican government during the Spanish Civil War, he could hardly have stayed in this post for a long time if he had said "no" every now and then. The title in 1940, he received not equal to the marshal (in the USSR there were only two titles equal to the marshal - the General Commissar of State Security and the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union), but "just" marshal.

But the publication of Salisbury's book was undertaken in "Rossiyanin" in 1996 under the "scientific (! - **S.K.**) edition" of Professor O.A. Rzheshesky! But how can one not risk even a professorial reputation, if the "prominent American historian" kicks Kulik's "Beria bandit" for nothing. After all, kicking dead lions for the current "democratic" "Russian" donkeys is always a tempting thing ...

Speaking of "lions", I mean, of course, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, and not Grigory Ivanovich ... The last in the history of the Stalin era turned out to be nothing more than - given his last name - a "sandpiper" who praised only that "swamp", which

praised him.

Here Kulik, with his fanaticism, unwillingness to listen to the opinion of professionals, unwillingness and inability to learn from his own and other people's mistakes, bears a considerable part of the blame for the failures of the Western Front. The main culprit here is Army General Pavlov, but also Kulik, who was sent to the Western Front to study the situation and coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops as a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command, did not show proper organizational skills and could not positively influence the situation.

Kulik turned out to be the only one of the four Marshals of the Soviet Union that existed in the USSR at the beginning of the war, who really failed completely, failed mediocly and, taking into account his nature, it is logical ... Obviously, that is why Khrushchev rehabilitated him - after all, he himself was mediocre, but ambitious beyond measure. But

even Kulik cannot be smeared only with black paint, and even more so, one cannot only blacken General of the Army Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev.

49-year-old Tyulenev was not an ignoramus in military affairs. Having joined the army in 1913, he fought bravely, received a full "bow" of St. George's crosses, in 1917 he graduated from the school of ensigns, and after the Civil War - the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1922 and advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1929. Starting the war as commander of the Southern Front (its basis was the Moscow Military District, which Tyulenev commanded from 1940), he fought really unsuccessfully and in 1941 was appointed commander of the "non-belligerent" Transcaucasian Military District. However, since May 1942, the district became very belligerent and was transformed into the Transcaucasian Front, which Tyulenev commanded, if only poorly, but until the end of the war.

Let us return, however, to Voroshilov, in the representation of the "democrats" with a sword at the ready, opposing the grenadiers of Ritter von Leeb ... In 1982, in the series "Military Memoirs", the Military Publishing House published the memoirs of Mikhail Ivanovich Petrov. Working since 1937 in the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the author held the position of adjutant and communications officer under the commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction K.E. Voroshilov.

M.I. Petrov explained what and why, starting with the refutation of lies about Voroshilov in A. Chakovsky's novel "Blockade" (incompetent, as it is clearly seen today) and in the film of the same name. And since this lie has long been rooted, I will give below two extensive quotes from the memoirs of the front-line assistant marshal:

"... In the film "Blockade" ... K.E. Voroshilov is shown in a peacetime marshal uniform (which, according to M.I. Petrov, he never had at the front, like a pistol or a saber. - **S.K.**) and with a pistol in his hand, holding a lengthy speech in front of a line of sailors. Well, then ... then, having given the command "Let's go", he allegedly goes on the attack ahead of the chain. I affirm with all responsibility: this is pure fiction, there was nothing like it and could not be!

Unfortunately, this far-fetched fact is also mentioned in some other publications...

As examples, M.I. Petrov mentions the tale of the Englishman Werth about Voroshilov "seeking death on the front line" "about September 10," 1941; the description of the front commander "youngly walking towards the roaring battle" no longer with a pistol, but with a cap in his hand in the book "Front City"; a scene from the novel "Baptism", where the marshal storms Krasnoye Selo at the head of a marine brigade "with a saber drawn" ... And then M.I. Petrov writes:

"Now about how it really happened. On the morning of September 11, 1941, the enemy, with forces of up to four divisions, supported by more than two hundred tanks, continued the offensive in the defense zone of the 42nd Army in the general direction of Krasnoye Selo. At 14 o'clock K.E. Voroshilov and I with L.A. Shcherbakov, then still a colonel, left Smolny for Pulkovo at the command post of this army. They did not stay there for long, they went to inspect the Krasnogvardeisky UR. Finally, they arrived in the area of the village of Kempelevo. Here the commander of the 42nd Army, General F.S. Ivanov reported to the marshal that the naval brigade with six KB tanks had already gone on the attack with the task of cutting the Ropsha highway - Red Village.

K.E. Voroshilov from a small hill began to observe the actions of this brigade. He drew the attention of the army commander to the crowding of the battle formations of the sailors, as well as to the fact that the second echelon of the brigade was located too close, within the reach of enemy artillery fire.

These remarks of the marshal were immediately taken into account, which played a positive role. The brigade completed the combat mission without unjustified losses. This is how it really happened..."

As for the general assessment of Voroshilov's actions, so much dirt was poured on him after his death that even Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. was offended. Moskalenko and in one of the issues of Pravda for 1981 wrote:

"Kliment Efremovich ... was one of the organizers of the defense of Leningrad, Murmansk, Karelia, the Baltic states. As commander in chief of the direction, and then commander of the Leningrad Front, he, together with A.A. Zhdanov led the defense of Leningrad. And it seems to me unfair the assessment that is given in some literary works to this period of his activity ... "

Voroshilov was really good where he was good. He was primarily a politician, but he also understood military affairs, although he did not have a bright military leadership talent. One way or another, in the first period of the war, he stubbornly held back von Leeb, commanding the troops of the North-Western direction, and then the Leningrad Front, and, despite the slander raised against him, in August-September 1941 he did a lot for the defense of Leningrad.

However, since July 10, 1941, General Halder's diary has been characterized by such entries for Army Group North: "The enemy's resistance ... has intensified" (July 10); "... strong enemy rearguards, supported by tanks and aircraft, stubbornly resist Göpner's tank group" (July 11), etc.

And just on July 10, three Main Directions were created, including - North-Western (Northern and North-Western Fronts, Northern and Baltic Fleets). Moreover, Voroshilov got a difficult direction (although which one was easy then?) After the first failures of the North-Western Front ...

In general, the replacement of Voroshilov by Zhukov was nevertheless justified. However, you need to know that Zhukov was very lucky, although neither he, nor Stalin, nor Voroshilov knew about it then ... It was lucky that Zhukov's appointment coincided with Hitler's decision in early October 1941 to stop the assault on the Russian northern capital and proceed to its blockade . That is, the troops exhausted the Germans under the leadership - whatever one may say - Voroshilov. And Zhukov in many ways only reaped the fruits of the collective efforts of two months.

This circumstance is indicated in his book "I take my words back (yeah, how! - **S.K.**)" even "Suvorov"-Rezun. True, at the same time he smears G.K. Zhukov, but even Rezun could not keep silent about the fact that Zhukov was also offended by Voroshilov.

Yes, it was. And in the collection of documents "Georgy Zhukov" of the 2001 edition, there is a letter from Georgy Konstantinovich to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Demichev dated July 27, 1971, where the marshal wrote:

"... In Chakovsky's novel, dedicated (so in the text. - **S.K.**) to the Leningrad blockade, there are a number of direct violations in the description of reality, distortions of facts and overexposures that can create a false idea in the reader about this most important stage of the Great Patriotic War. Carelessly operating on factual material, A. Chakovsky, for example, paints a picture of a meeting of the Front's Military Council. Only for the sake of a cheap sensation, the desire to produce an external effect, can I explain this fictitious, untrue description of the scene of the removal from office of Marshal K.E. Voroshilov and my entry into office

Commander of the Leningrad Front. In fact, there was nothing similar and similar! This transmission took place in person, face to face. At a meeting of the military

Council secretaries of district committees were not present. Marshal K.E. Voroshilov left Leningrad two days later, bringing me up to date in detail. There were no negotiations with the Headquarters, because there was no wire connection. Everything that A. Chakovsky writes about this is his harmful fiction ... "

Alas, even this authoritative statement could not rule out the cinematic slander of Voroshilov in the "epic film" Blockade, from which, perhaps, Mark Solonin drew his "own" understanding of the role of Marshal Voroshilov in the Great Patriotic War.

But that's not all! The main reason for Voroshilov's recall was by no means in his general mediocrity, but, on the contrary, in his undoubted diplomatic talent, which surpassed the more modest military talents. Already known to us M.I. Petrov testifies: "Upon returning (from Leningrad. - S.K.)

Kliment Efremovich took part in the conference of representatives of the USSR, England and the USA, which discussed the issue of mutual military and economic assistance in the system of the anti-fascist coalition.

Then it was the most important event for the USSR! The Soviet delegation was led by Stalin and Voroshilov, the British by Lord Beaverbrook, the American by Averell Harriman. Voroshilov was more than needed and useful here - he had been to England and had experience in negotiations with Western negotiators. For example, in August 1939, he brilliantly conducted military Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, cheerfully and accurately revealing the inconsistency of the position of Western "colleagues".

So the main reason for Voroshilov's recall from Leningrad is not the mythical saber-wielding on the front line and not his complete failure as a commander! On the contrary, to contain the onslaught of Army Group North, the marshal did, I repeat, a lot. The main reason is the need for Voroshilov on another, diplomatic, "front". But since the replacement of Voroshilov by Zhukov took place in dramatic circumstances, and objectively it was expedient due to Zhukov's really better preparedness for modern warfare and his qualitatively greater rigidity and cruelty than Voroshilov's, all the main "actors", including Voroshilov, understood that in the interests of the cause, it is better to give this change the character of removing Voroshilov. In this case, Zhukov's hands were completely untied for the most severe actions.

However, the people of Voroshilov in Leningrad had a good opinion. I unexpectedly found confirmation of this, getting acquainted with the memorandum of the deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the South-Western Front, senior major of state security V.M. Kosolapov dated August 6, 1942 "On the anti-Soviet and defeatist statements of individual servicemen of the 21st Army" addressed to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Abakumov. Among other things, there

there was this place:

"Among the personnel of the units of the 21st army, several facts of statements were noted with an assessment of the activities of the army command and the front of the following content.

Lieutenant of the 278th SD Legkodymov, 27.7.42, among the Red Army said:

"... When Budyonny was in command of the Southwestern Front, we fought near Odessa, the front was along the Dniester and the Bug, when Tymoshenko began to command, they began to retreat and retreat ...

Tov. Voroshilov saved and defended Leningrad, which was in the gravest situation. All the people are talking about Voroshilov, and if he had been instructed to command the Southern Front, he would have defeated the enemy's southern grouping and would have thrown the enemy back.

The commander of the 855 joint venture, 278 SD, Major Fedorov, among the command staff of the regiment, spoke out that Timoshenko was a bad warrior and he was ruining the army ... " etc.

In the above-mentioned note by senior major of the GB Kosolapov addressed to Deputy People's Commissar Abakumov, the following assessment of the actions of the command of the Stalingrad Front by the chief of staff of artillery of the 76th Infantry Division, Captain Svechkor on July 26, 1942, is given:

"We have been betrayed. Five armies were thrown to the Germans to be devoured. Someone is currying favor with Hitler. The front is open, and the situation is hopeless, but we have been marinated here since July 6 and have not been identified in any way. They scattered the division and deliberately made it unfit for combat, while it was possible to equip it and throw it into battle ... "

Lieutenant Legkodymov, Captain Svechkor, and Major Fedorov, of course, were not strategists, but their opinions are interesting because they were the opinions of ordinary Soviet people, besides, military people, front-line soldiers.

As for their assessment of the role of Marshal Timoshenko (at that time he was the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front), then, say, General Halder did not evaluate Tymoshenko and his colleagues so low. So, on July 11, 1941, General Halder wrote in his diary:

"... The Russian command put at the head of the fronts (in reality - strategic directions. - **S.K.**) of his best people: the North-Western Front is headed by Voroshilov, the Western Front - Timoshenko, the South-Western Front - Budyonny.

And two days later, on July 13, 1941, he added:

"...Now, after the command has passed into the hands of new people, the enemy probably does not think about retreating..."

In March 1964, G.K. Zhukov, obviously in the spirit of playing along with the anti-Stalinist policy of Khrushchev, in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov spoke negatively about the creation of strategic directions, but in real time they, apparently, played a positive - for that period of the war - role, and the three Commanders-in-Chief of directions managed the war not so mediocre. And their failures then were almost inevitable at any level of military leadership talent. There were too many previous failures at the lower levels of the war - with all the numerous reverse situations at the same lower levels.

Finishing the conversation about Tymoshenko, without deciphering anything specific here, I will say that it is in the activities of Semyon Konstantinovich that there are several dark moments for me. However, he also had a number of successes in the Great Patriotic War - the same defeat of the Germans near Rostov-on-Don in November 1941.

Now - a few words about Timoshenko's namesake - the famous commander The first cavalry army in the civil war Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny.

For a long time now, the following assessment has become the standard "cliché" of his appearance: "an opponent of tanks and an apologist for cavalry." But here is what Budyonny said in December 1940 at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army:

"Debates from the point of view of the use of mobile branches of the armed forces both in tactics and in the operational art of the new and already massed branches of the armed forces - tanks, aviation and motorized infantry - have always rested on one-sidedness. Thinking abstractly...

Marshal Budyonny was, of course, right... The "great" "military theorists" like Tukhachevsky in the 1930s put forward a variety of "brilliant" general doctrines in all areas of military affairs, "understanding" even aviation - I will later cite this as an interesting example. And Budyonny, on the contrary, defended tanks very consistently and very specifically, stating:

"The operational idea of using tanks nestled in the army at one time in such a way that tanks could operate on an operational scale without any support from cavalry, motorized infantry and infantry in general.

Then they again came to a different conclusion that the tanks cannot act independently... And then Khasan followed (unsuccessful battles near the Far Eastern Lake Khasan with the Japanese. - **S.K.**). We in the tanks there suffered unnecessary losses, and therefore some concluded that the tanks have now outlived their lives. Tanks, of course, cannot operate successfully in the mountains.

At the Finnish theater (there, by the way, I "caught" not so much Finnish snipers - "Cuckoos", how many "crows" the future Chief of the General Staff Meretskov. - **S.K.**) also, not knowing the conditions of the theater, they used tanks unsuccessfully.

After that, voices are again heard that the tanks did not live up to expectations. So sweeping it would be wrong to approach the assessment of the types of troops and their use ...

The solution now of issues related to the organization of an offensive operation ... the use of tank formations plays an exceptionally huge role for our army "...

Here's how to evaluate the value of the marshal-"cavalry" tanks on the eve of the Great War. And the "theorists" shied away either to them, or, as we see, from them, so that later - after Stalin's death - they would blame everything on him, and even on Budyonny, who "slowed down" the development of the tank business.

And here's another thing ... The same Budyonny and Kirponos in Ukraine found themselves in a difficult situation due to the failures in Belarus of the commander of the Western Special Military District, and with the outbreak of war - the commander of the Western Front, Pavlov. Try to hold the front when an enemy breakthrough of hundreds of kilometers has formed on your western flank, and mechanized formations of the Wehrmacht are pouring into this strategic "hole" ...

However, the question is legitimate: "Wasn't Pavlov's "failure" a kind of "burp" of Tukhachevsky's conspiracy?" I think this is very possible, and even - most likely it was so ... But what would the situation be like in 1941 if Tukhachevsky himself and his direct accomplices commanded the Red Army?

But even if they had not "surrendered" Russia to their colleagues - the German generals consciously, they would have "surrendered" it due to obvious military projection (Tukhachevsky at one time demanded one hundred thousand light tanks for the Red Army!), And also - due to a tendency to doctrinal "games of soldiers" instead of serious practical work.

For example, according to the charters developed by the "military geniuses" Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and Yakir, from a division of 17 (seventeen) thousand people, 640 (six hundred and forty) fighters were to attack the front line in the first echelon, and another 2740 (two thousand seven hundred and forty) fighters were waiting for a breakthrough in defense in order to "develop success".

I'm not inventing anything here - these are data from the main report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Meretskov, at the same famous December meeting of the highest commanding staff at the end of 1940.

That is why Lieutenant General P.G., Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, who spoke at the end of the meeting. Ponedelin (at the beginning of the war, commanding the 12th Army, he was taken prisoner) complained that "in a division of bayonets 3000 with a little" with a total strength of "about 17 thousand people" and that "it is enough to lose 1500 - 2000 bayonets, like any the offensive ability of the division disappears, dries up ... the division can only defend itself ...".

There is a Russian proverb "One with a bipod, seven with a spoon." In the Red Army of the Tukhachevsky-Yakir model, it must be admitted, a less impressive version was implemented - in the "Tukhachevsky" infantry, there were "only" 5,666 (6) "spoons" per bayonet.

And here are the samples of "aviation" "thinking" of the "destroyed" "geniuses" recorded in the transcripts of the meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in December 1935.

Head of the Air Force Directorate of the Red Army Ya.I. Alksnis (Astrov):

"I am convinced that in actions in the air there will be much similar to the actions on the water of the navy and on land of the earthly (so in the transcript, - **S.K.**) troops, with the only difference that the air forces have a third dimension in which you can also maneuver, and this somewhat complicates the matter ...".

On November 23, 1937, Alksnis-Astrov was arrested, on July 28, 1938, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was sentenced to death, and in 1956 he was rehabilitated by the Khrushchevites.

Deputy Alksnis V.V. Khripin (also repressed three years later):

"It turned out that fighters should not attack from above, but attack in a horizontal plane or being below it."

It is a pity that the author of the famous formula from the time of the war "Height - speed - maneuver - fire! three times Hero of the Soviet Union Pokryshkin ... Now he would have laughed, listening to Khripin broadcast:

"... I believe that recently ... the value of air combat has been falling somewhat, and it will fall even more, since meeting with an air enemy will be even more difficult (due to the increase in flight speeds. - S.K.) ..".

Khripin, on the other hand, intended to demand from the bombers that they maneuver "in a zigzag manner", and "if necessary", turn around on command "all of a sudden", as in naval tactics, they say.

No less ridiculous and self-confident, but at length they talked about tactics, techniques and distances of air combat "know-it-alls" Tukhachevsky and Yakir.

But what about the mass command structure?

Anyone who accuses Stalin of "beheading" the Red Army before the war claims that as a result of repressions, the professional level and experience of not only higher, but also senior, and middle, and almost junior officers have fallen sharply! And the catastrophic decline in their qualifications led to the mediocre start of the war.

A variant of this "theory" is a statement like Solonin's: they say, regardless of the repressions, the level of commanders of the Red Army in all command levels was initially low. And the mediocre start of the war is explained by this fact.

When analyzing the myths of the sixth and seventh, I will touch on these points, but already Now, finishing the analysis of the fourth myth, it is necessary to speak out on this score.

Today, thanks to the efforts of an impressive team of authors under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, two major biographical reference books have been published by the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (the latter in two volumes).

The first directory contains official biographies of the commanders of all Soviet armies - combined arms, tank, sapper, air - during the war, as well as the commanders of the Leningrad People's Militia Army, the Separate Guards Airborne Army, the armies of the Polish Army, the air defense armies, the air defense air fighter army and air defense zones - about three hundred and thirty names ...

The second reference book contains about eight hundred biographies of corps commanders and their equals, who commanded rifle, mountain rifle, cavalry, airborne, mechanized, corps, as well as air defense corps, artillery, defense fighter aviation corps, air defense corps districts and the Stalingrad People's Corps. militia.

I note that for the sake of completeness, it would be useful to create and publish the reference book "Combat Commanders", but these are already thousands of biographies, and at least two to three thousand rubles for several volumes of such a hypothetical reference book.

I don't know if "researchers" like Mark Solonin and he personally are familiar with these publications. But, I think, it's unlikely ... Because even the most unscrupulous liars are unlikely to turn their tongues about the incompetence of the officer corps of the Red Army before the war and at the beginning of the war as a whole **after** studying only these three strictly published books, where the Red Star and Title embossed in silver...

At first, I wanted to give, for example, ten biographies of "combined-arms" commanders - the first four with the letter "A", the first four with the letter "Peace", beloved by Russians, "P", and two with the letter "I". But this would make the text too heavy, and I will simply inform the reader that already at the beginning of the war, the country had thousands of generals and colonels, most of whom could fight quite skillfully.

And they fought from the first days of the war quite skillfully.

Many of them, by June 22, 1941, who had lived for thirty-five, and some for fifty years, started back in the First World War as privates, non-commissioned officers, ensigns, and even lieutenants ... Then, in the Civil, they were platoon, company, battalion commanders, and even regimental commanders ... Then - schools and military schools, advanced training courses for command personnel, including the famous Shot courses, service in ever-increasing middle positions of assistant chief of staff of a regiment, division, commanders of battalions, regiments, chiefs of operational departments of corps and armies, study - for many - at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze or in other academies... For some, before the war, subsequent teaching in academies or schools...

Not everyone started the war with dignity, some started it mediocre or even criminally. But in general, from the very first days, they shouldered it - this unprecedented scale of the war on their shoulders and took on the burden of real command of their subordinates in real combat operations. And from, say, the commanders who commanded the 481 corps, which was part of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 208 became Heroes of the Soviet Union, and 21 people - twice Heroes.

I will give - in a brief extract - the biography of only one commander. I will cite it both because his fate has always interested me in particular, and because he bore the most Russian name Ivan and a sonorous Russian surname, and because from the first day of the war he fought simply brilliantly and became the first commander of the 1st Guards

rifle division, transformed from the 100th rifle division with which Ivan Nikitich Russiyanov started the war on June 22, 1941 in Belarus.

And I will give information about Lieutenant General Russiyanov not from the Komcours reference book, but from his autobiography dated August 18, 1947, published in No. 12 of the Military History Journal for 1991 (pp. 28 - 30):

"Born on August 28, according to the old style of 1890, in the village of Shchuply, Koshchinskaya volost, Smolensk district, now the Pobeda collective farm, Smolensk district, Smolensk region.

He began to live and work independently in 1916. Since 1916, he worked as a day laborer at the Smolensk railway junction and the Smolensk city tram. <...>

Until 1916 he lived and worked with his father in the village. In the winter he studied, in the summer, in addition to helping his father, he was hired as a day laborer and shepherd of cattle in the village. He studied at the Khlenovsky zemstvo school from 7 - 11 years old and from 11 - 16 years old at the Koshinsky 2-class school, successfully graduated from them.

He entered as a candidate member of the CPSU (b) in 1921, was accepted by the party organization of the 3rd Infantry Western School of Command and the Smolensk City Committee of the CPSU (b) ... <...>

He entered the Soviet Army on conscription in November 1919 ... Participated in the civil war. <...> In November 1921, at the end of the civil war ... voluntarily entered the 3rd infantry school of the commanders ... In 1924, after graduating from school, he was appointed commander of a platoon of the 9th rifle company of the 81st rifle regiment of the 27th Omsk rifle division..."

And Ivan Russiyanov began a long army life: commander and political instructor of the company, deputy battalion commander, battalion commander, student of the Shooting and tactical advanced training courses for command personnel "Shot" named after. Comintern in 1931 - 1932, regiment commander, and so on - until August 1940, when he was transferred from the post of commander of the 52nd rifle division to the same position in the 100th rifle division of the Order of Lenin, which he commanded until September 1941 as the 100th, and from September 1941 to November 1942 - as the 1st Guards.

Moreover, in 1940, the commander of the 100th SD Russiyanov was temporarily seconded to study at KUVNAS (Advanced Courses for Senior Commanders) at the Academy of the General Staff, and from May 1941 he returned to his native division.

From November 1942 to June 1946, Russiyanov continuously commanded the 1st Guards Mechanized Vienna Orders of Lenin and Kutuzov Corps.

"I can't list all the operations," I.N. wrote in his autobiography. Russiyanov, - since the 100th Rifle Division, and then the 1st Guards and 1st MMC - were formations of the Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and, depending on the situation on the fronts, they were used. The most characteristic [were]:

1. Minsk defensive operation of the first days of the war in 1941.
SD acted independently as part of the BVO. Experience:
 - a) perseverance in the defense of rifle units with large tank-mechanized troops of the German-Hitler army;
 - b) maneuver on the flanks;
 - c) the adoption of flasks-bottles with fuels and lubricants to fight enemy tanks, due to which about 300 enemy tanks and armored units were destroyed;
 - d) planned withdrawal, combat in encirclement and combat with enemy airborne assault forces.

2. The Yelninskaya defensive-offensive operation of 1941 as part of the Western Front - the 24th Army.

Experience:

- a) perseverance in defense;
 - b) interaction both within and with neighbors;
 - c) the use of guards mortars - PC;
 - d) organizing a counteroffensive and pursuing the enemy.
3. Yelets-Livenskaya operation of 1942 on the Bryansk front..."

And so - until the last Vienna operation of 1945 with its experience of swiftness, fighting in the city, forcing the river and the Danube Canal, night battles and the maneuver of the mechanized corps in a limited time ...

Since 1953, Russiyanov, who was awarded three Orders of Lenin for the war, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree and Suvorov 2nd degree, resigned.

February 21, 1978 to him - for personal courage and heroism shown in the fight against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War - was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He died on March 21, 1984 and was buried in Moscow.

Marshal Zhukov wrote about Russiyanov in his memoirs:

"The 100th Order of Lenin Division was commanded by Major General I.N. Russiyanov. When I was commander of the 4th cavalry division in the city of Slutsk, he brilliantly commanded the rifle regiment of the 4th rifle division named after the German proletariat. At all field exercises and maneuvers, the regiment I.N. Russiyanov was exemplary in tactics, discipline and order. Now these formations fought heroically on the outskirts of Minsk with units of the 3rd tank group of the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on it.

The fate of Ivan Nikitich Russiyanov, with all its undoubted brilliance, talent and originality, is still quite typical for his time and for the top commanders of the Red Army of the 1941 model. This was the generation that became the flesh of the flesh of the Soviet government, brought up by it, educated and raised to commanding heights.

Not the impulsive Tukhachevsky, not the self-confident Uborevich and Yakir, but the Soviet The era brought up Russiyanov and his comrades-in-arms as personalities and military leaders.

They defended this era and the Russia it created.

Then - in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the German fascist invaders.

Myth five

STALIN WAS WISE AND CLEAR IN EVERYTHING, DEVELOPED A WAR PLAN IN ADVANCE, PREVIOUSLY CREATED A LOSING SITUATION FOR HITLER AND CALMLY LEAD THE WAR

This myth, as well as the sixth myth that follows it, can be qualified not as evil, but as naive-oak", trying to portray Stalin as almost an angel without wings, or even someone like the omniscient Lord God.

Faced with such a "defense" of Stalin, I involuntarily recall the catchphrase, famous since the times of Ancient Rome: "Deliver me, gods, from friends, and I myself will get rid of enemies" ...

Yes, with the exception of Lenin, Stalin had an almost unique effect on the course of world history in terms of depth and creative power. One of the modern books about Stalin is aptly named "The Most Humane Man"... This was said about Lenin, but it can be applied without exaggeration to Stalin, who, based on the results of his activities, can be assessed as the greatest practical humanist in world *history* .

Stalin is also one of the most distinctive and, so to speak, "effective" politicians of all times and all peoples. However, Stalin was a man, not a god, and therefore he was not so rarely mistaken, right up to his main and fatal mistake - refusing to meet Hitler personally and attempt to form a stable anti-Anglo-Saxon bloc.

I know that in the well-known "Hitler's Table Talk" - the first published in 1951 recordings of Hitler's intimate conversations with the closest official circle at his headquarters - published for the first time in 1951 by Henry Picker, one can read in the entry dated May 18, 1942:

"He (Hitler. - **S.K.**) is glad that he managed to drive until the very beginning of the war Tips for the nose and constantly negotiate with them on the division of areas of interest ... "

But the point is not even that Picker's notes are not always authentic - in this particular case, I believe Picker, Hitler must have said something similar. But this was said in the euphoria of victories, already poisoned by the bitterness of the first defeats, and besides, there was clearly not without the "but the grapes are green" syndrome. In real time, in 1939-1940, Hitler could well go for a sincere partnership between the Reich and Russia, and what he said to Molotov in Berlin was by no means just a bluff and a game. Stalin, alas, did not believe in the sincerity of the Fuhrer's position.

However, other opinions were also expressed on this subject, reproaching Stalin, on the contrary, with excessive gullibility.

For example:

"Having concluded a non-aggression pact with the Hitler government, STALIN, MOLOTOV and other members of the Politburo failed to deeply understand the class essence of German fascism, its Jesuit policy in order to achieve their goals, for the sake of which HITLER went to deceit, lies and any meanness, just to break through road to world domination.

What brilliant politician, social thinker and expert in class analysis owns such an unflattering assessment of Stalin's "short-sightedness"? After all, in order to judge the outstanding Marxist Stalin so harshly, one must be at least Friedrich Engels, if not Karl Marx himself!

However, above I quoted a letter written on March 2, 1964 (still under Khrushchev) to the writer V.D. Sokolov ... Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

So, it turns out, the marshal is right? So Henry Picker confirms that Hitler only led Stalin by the nose, and Stalin, therefore, willingly substituted this nose for Hitler?

But is it?

Of course not! Rather, Stalin can be reproached, as I have said more than once, with the opposite - fatally excessive suspicion of Hitler. And let's not forget - the "dodger" Hitler by the beginning of May 1945 had turned into a black, burnt corpse, and the "simpleton" Stalin by that time was trying on the new snow-white uniform of the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, in which he appeared in the summer of 1945 at the Potsdam conference.

But before the war, Stalin did not, and indeed could not, assume much of what he had to face after June 22, 1941. He was a man, after all. not a god. Yes, besides, and - after all, everyone judges by himself - a person who assumed in all his closest employees not only workers imbued with a sense of the highest responsibility for the task assigned, but also comrades-in-arms in spirit. However, was it really so - if we mean very, very many of those who were in the pre-war USSR at commanding heights?

In the same letter quoted above, in which Marshal Zhukov answered a number of questions from Sokolov, he wrote:

"The Headquarters of the High Command was created on June 23, 1941 ...

On July 10, by decision of the GO KO (formed on June 30), the main commands of the northwestern, western and southwestern directions.

On July 10 (by the same decision), the Headquarters of the Civil Code was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. STALIN became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, People's Commissar of Defense, Chairman of the GOKO (State Defense Committee. - **S.K.**) .

And further:

"You, apparently, have already paid attention to the non-simultaneous formation of all the highest state and strategic bodies for the leadership of the war and the life of the country during the war.

This happened because in the pre-war period these issues were not resolved by the Government and the Politburo.

Before the war, the People's Commissar of Defense (that is, Timoshenko. - **S.K.**) and the General Staff (that is, Zhukov. - **S.K.**) repeatedly asked STALIN, MOLOTOV and VOROSHILOV to consider draft documents on the organization of the Supreme Command, as well as issues of building command posts of the Supreme command and control organizations of the fronts and internal districts, but each time we were told: "to wait with these questions", and K.E. VOROSHILOV was generally opposed to any (so in the text. - **S. K.**) whatever plans for the war, fearing that they might become known to the intelligence of the enemy, and he could not be persuaded of this absurdity ... "

First, regarding the "absurdity" ...

We are assured that a lot of de Soviet intelligence officers warned in advance the "stupid" Stalin about the upcoming war. However, this automatically means that Stalin learned about the German and Japanese war plans precisely because of the "absurdity" that the "stupid" Voroshilov feared, but which the "prudent" Zhukov completely ruled out. We, who are aware of the plans of a potential adversary -

This, according to Zhukov, is the norm. And the enemy, who knows about our plans, is, according to Zhukov, absurdity. W-well...

And, of course, Voroshilov was not against "war plans", but against dubious paperwork about new control schemes and other things, including the construction of command posts, etc. This fuss may indeed have given impetus to the kind of leak that Hitler had been waiting for with hope throughout the first half of 1941, and was angry that the Russians did not give a convincing reason for a preventive war.

Further...

If People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, heads of departments of types and branches of troops of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the leadership of border military districts from the spring of 1941 really lived in the proximity of war - as Georgy Konstantinovich assures of this - then the beginning of the war would be completely different!

We know enough to agree with such a statement. It was possible to disguise the field airfields, and disperse the equipment, and solve the issues of communications and supplies in advance, and the formation of new formations should be carried out more responsibly, and the deployment of troops according to the cover plan should be built smarter ...

And at the same time, it was necessary to constantly monitor the situation on the ground in real time. And not only by reports, but **necessarily** - in the mode of operational active feedback and personally.

This is what the military department should have been doing, and not bothering the top political leadership with projects for restructuring the state administration in case of war. After all, if the war had started "normally", then nothing much would have to be rebuilt! There were well-established bodies of political administration: the Politburo, the apparatus of the Central Committee, the apparatus of the Supreme Council; economic management bodies -

The Council of People's Commissars and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, as well as the bodies of military control - NPOs, the NK Navy and the General Staff.

If everything went "normally", then bomb shelters for the capital's headquarters would not be required ... Did Stalin think that Pavlov would surrender Minsk a week after the start of the war!

It is possible and necessary to create *emergency* governing bodies only in *emergency* circumstances! And since the irresponsibility, indiscretion - with all the external workload before the war - of the apparatus of Timoshenko and Zhukov and themselves with the outbreak of the war created these most extraordinary circumstances, an emergency governing body had to be created - the State Defense Committee, which concentrated in itself the full control of the country.

Stalin could not foresee in advance that his alleged associates and employees, as well as the subordinates of these employees, would be brought to extraordinary measures. He himself was duty incarnate and assumed it in others. When, in December 1944, General de Gaulle asked Stalin why he worked so hard, Stalin, in accordance with the official record of the conversation, replied that "this is, firstly, a bad Russian habit, and secondly, due to the large scale of work and the responsibility that is assigned to him by such a scope of work ...".

Alas, many of Stalin's employees in the military and other "departments" had scope, but responsibility ... What was Stalin to do? Looking for new ones? Where? There is either an apocryphal, or a true story about how Stalin, in response to a certain remark, said: "I have no other members of the Union of Soviet Writers." This is how it was with military personnel - it was necessary to start a war with its strict "qualification" requirements, so that major generals unknown to Stalin personally began to ascend to marshal stars and places at meetings held personally by Stalin.

Yes, many worked hard before the war, including Timoshenko and Zhukov. But what was the effect of the results of this work immediately after June 22, 1941? The results of Stalin's work by June 22, 1941 were evident: a powerful industrial and defense potential of Russia, providing prospects for its development, as well as a powerful - in principle - and well-equipped, with excellent development prospects, the Red Army ...

Finally, the result of the activities of the Bolshevik Stalin was not less than thirty to forty million new citizens devoted to Russia and Soviet power, who, with the outbreak of the war, quickly and consciously switched to a military regime of life.

And what are the results of the work of NGOs and the General Staff? Standing wing to wing - as in a parade - hundreds of combat aircraft, bombed on the ground in the very first hours of the war? Connections deprived of combat control? The lack of stable radio communications even in the "front-army" link, not to mention the "corps-division" link, and even more so the "division-regiment"?

Couldn't the army leadership in the last pre-war years - if it were aware of the importance of the task - to provide the troops with a couple of thousand reliable radio stations with a sufficient range? But it was Stalin who, back in 1934, could worry about installing radios on combat aircraft, and, say, Tukhachevsky even in 1937 saw a promising option for communication on the battlefield in ... messenger dogs.

A part of the Red Army leadership, cut off from the real needs of the day, suffered from a part of the leadership of the Red Army not only in 1941, but even in 1942. And with the outbreak of the war, Stalin suddenly faced the need to more and more transfer the lines and purely military control *to himself* ...

And here, of course, it was not without overlays ... But was it Stalin's fault? At the beginning of the "Khrushchev" March 1964, Marshal Zhukov stated exactly this, writing in a letter to V.D. Sokolov:

"Until July 10, TIMOSHENKO was the Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Headquarters, but this was the legal Commander-in-Chief. And the actual Civil Code was STALIN. Without the approval of STALIN, TIMOSHENKO had no opportunity to give the troops any principled order. STALIN *hourly* (the allocation is mine everywhere. - **S.K.**) interfered in the course of events, in the work of the Commander-in-Chief, *several times a day* called the Commander-in-Chief TIMOSHENKO and me *to the Kremlin*, was terribly nervous, scolded, and with all this only disorganized the already insufficiently organized work High command in a complicated situation ...

Dear Georgy Konstantinovich could not have known in 1964 that in 2008 the publishing house "New Chronograph" with a circulation of 350 (three hundred and fifty) copies will publish "Notebooks (journals) of records of persons accepted by I.V. Stalin (in the Kremlin. - **S.K.**) " in 1924—1953", extracts from which General Gorkov published in 1995.

Even five-minute visits were recorded in the "Kremlin journal", and here is a summary of the data on the stay of Timoshenko and (or) Zhukov in the Kremlin with Stalin from June 22 to July 10, 1941:

June 22: Timoshenko, Zhukov - entry at 5.45, exit at 8.30.

June 23: Timoshenko - entrance at 3.30, exit at 6.10; entrance at 18.59, exit at 20.45; entry at 23.55, exit at 0.55.

June 24: Timoshenko - entry at 17.30, exit at 20.55

June 25: Timoshenko - entrance at 1.40, exit at 5.50; entry at 20.20, exit at 24.00

June 26: Timoshenko - entry at 13.00, exit at 16.10 and entry at 21.00, exit at 22.00; Zhukov - entrance at 15.00, exit at 16.10 and entrance at 21.00, exit at 22.00.

June 27: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - entry at 21.30, exit at 23.00.

June 28: Timoshenko, Zhukov - entrance at 21.30, exit at 23.10.

There was no reception on June 29 and June 30.

July 01: Timoshenko, Zhukov - entrance at 16.50, exit at 19.00.

July 02: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - were not.

July 03: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - were not

July 04: Zhukov - entrance at 18.55, exit at 20.10.

July 05: Zhukov - entrance at 14.30, exit at 15.30.

July 06: Zhukov - entrance at 22.35, exit at 01.40.

July 07: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - were not.

July 08: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - were not.

July 9 was not accepted

July 10: Tymoshenko, Zhukov - were not.

And again, Zhukov appears in Stalin's Kremlin office only on July 17, and Timoshenko (together with Zhukov) on July 18, which, of course, does not mean that the new Supreme Commander-in-Chief has not met with his deputies for a whole week - it's just that Stalin himself spends a lot of time these days spent in Headquarters.

This outwardly mean chronology is actually very eloquent and dramatic. In the very first days, Stalin, together with a number of members of the political leadership (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and others), received reports from two of his then closest military collaborators, Timoshenko and Zhukov, and sometimes discussed the situation with them for a long time. At the same time, Stalin "pulls" two at once, Timoshenko and Zhukov, *more than once a day* only on June 26, which is understandable - by that day the scale of the disaster had become clear, but it was still unclear how to counteract it. Here you yourself twitch, and others "twitch" ...

By the beginning of July 1941, management began to improve, and Stalin - temporarily leaving the war mainly to Tymoshenko and Zhukov, somehow "embroidering" foreign policy problems, receiving the British ambassador Cripps on July 8 and 10 (Stalin will also receive him on July 12, and then there will be a break until July 21) ...

However, as we can see, there were no "... several times a day", not to mention "hourly...". So a *few lines* from the written testimony of such a seemingly authoritative participant in the events as Marshal Zhukov **completely** distort the picture of the essence and nature of Stalin's activities in the initial period of the war.

Moreover, from the evening of June 22, 1941 to the afternoon of June 26, 1941, Zhukov did not have the opportunity to directly observe Stalin's work at all, because no later than 16.00 on June 22 he received Stalin's order to fly to Kiev and from there with Khrushchev to go to the headquarters of the South-Western Front to clarify the situation, leaving Vatutin in the General Staff for himself. In his memoirs, Georgy Konstantinovich also describes this moment distortedly - they say that Stalin gave him instructions by phone "approximately" at 13 o'clock, and "after 40 minutes" Zhukov was already in the air. In fact, at 14.00 on June 22, 1941, Zhukov entered Stalin's office with Timoshenko and left only at 16.00 - presumably, in order to immediately go to the airfield.

The revealing conversation of G.K. Zhukov by telegraph "Bodo" with the commander of the 5th Army M.I. Potapov, which took place at 5 pm on June 24, 1941, from which I will give only one fragment:

"Zhukov. <...>

With regard to aviation, measures will be taken.

Nothing has been received or decoded from you on the radio.

It will be necessary to send a specialist on an airplane to clarify technical differences in the radio transmission and in the transcript. (It is necessary, but it had to be worked out *before* June 22. - **S.K.**)

<...>

How are your KBs and others doing? Do they penetrate the armor of German tanks and approximately how many tanks did the enemy lose on your front?

Potapov. The 14th air division is subordinate to me, which by the morning of today had 41 aircraft. The order from the front states that the 62nd and 18th bomber divisions are covering us. Where they are - I do not know, I have no connection with them.

There are 30 large KB tanks. All of them without shells to 152-millimeter guns.

I have T-26 and BT tanks, mostly old brands, including two-tower (hopeless junk. - **S.K.**)

About a hundred enemy tanks were destroyed.

Zhukov. 152 mm KB guns fire shells from 09-30, so order concrete-piercing shells from 09-30 to be issued immediately. and put them into action. You will beat enemy tanks with might and main ... "

It is sometimes argued that Stalin pre-arranged the deployment of troops in such a way as to lure the Wehrmacht to the Russian expanses. But I don't think that Stalin consciously "lured" Hitler deep into Russia, like Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov - Napoleon ... In fact, at the beginning of the war, alas, every now and then had to improvise. And not only to Stalin, but also to Zhukov, as we see ...

Stalin's "improvisations" were not always successful, especially his instructions about the need to set fire to the forests when retreating ... "Researchers" like "Suvorov" today scoff at this Stalinist mistake, but this mistake had no real negative meaning - they did not burn the forests.

On June 26, 1941, Zhukov was already in Moscow, but he also recalled this later inaccurately, claiming in his memoirs that he allegedly flew to Moscow "late in the evening" and went straight from the airfield to Stalin, in whose office Timoshenko and Vatutin were already "standing at attention" .

Zhukov, as I understand it, indeed, upon arrival in Moscow, immediately left for the Kremlin, but the first time he visited Stalin was not "late in the evening", but at three o'clock in the afternoon. Timoshenko and Vatutin were there from 13.00, and Beria, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Budyonny, Zhigarev, Voroshilov, Molotov, Fedorenko, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov were also in the office ... So it is unlikely that Timoshenko and Vatutin stood at attention in front of Stalin and others from 13.00 to 15.00 .

And my clarifications are not nit-picking. After all, from such small, albeit involuntary, distortions of certain facts *by the participants* in the events, then *by others*, major conscious and malicious juggling of historical events and lampoons of Stalin and his era are made up. The same writer Sokolov described events from the words of "Zhukov himself!" ... However, he described something that **did not exist!**

In some justification of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, I will say, however, that in his memoirs of 1971 ("Brezhnev's"), he wrote about Stalin in the main impressively and convincingly, especially on pages 278-284. And this despite the fact that in the letter, for example, to the writer Sokolov in March 1964 ("Khrushchev's") year, Zhukov - regrettably - actually slandered Stalin, writing as follows:

"... The headquarters was conceived as a collective body of the Supreme High Command, in fact, STALIN almost never convened the Headquarters in its entirety ...

At the beginning of the war, it was very, very difficult to work with STALIN. First of all, he was then poorly versed in the methods, methods and forms of waging a modern war ...

All his knowledge was purely amateurish, and we needed great endurance and the ability to briefly and clearly report the situation and our proposals (it is not clear why this required some kind of special endurance? - S.K.). We must pay tribute to STALIN, he worked hard on himself in order to master military affairs ...

... STALIN underestimated the importance and role of the General Staff in modern warfare, this single and most important working body of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Headquarters of the Supreme Civil Code ...

A particularly negative side of STALIN throughout the war was that, having little knowledge of the practical side of preparing the operation of the front, army, troops, he set completely unrealistic dates for the start of the operation ...

VASILEVSKY and I often had to ... listen to insulting words from STALIN ... "

etc.

I invite the reader to compare the above lines, relating to the Khrushchev era that blackened Stalin, with the lines given below and taken from the lifetime edition of G.K. Zhukov's "Memoirs and Reflections" in 1971:

"Here it seems to me appropriate to say a few words about the work of the Stavka itself and I.V. Stalin...

The Headquarters did not have any other administrative apparatus besides the General Staff. Orders and orders of the Supreme High Command, as a rule, went through the General Staff. They were usually developed and adopted in the Kremlin, in the office of I.V. Stalin...

The discussion at the Headquarters of important strategic decisions took place, as a rule, with the participation of members of the State Defense Committee. Usually the heads of the General Staff, the commanders of the air force, artillery, the head of the Main Armored Directorate, the head of the rear of the Red Army, and the heads of other main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were invited. The front commanders were called to the Headquarters when considering issues within their competence ... Sometimes there were designers of aircraft, tanks, artillery ... "

Is this evidence of a lack of collegiality in the work of the Stavka and Stalin's underestimation of the role of the General Staff?

I continue quoting the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov of the 1971 model:

"The Stavka's work style was ... businesslike, without nervousness, everyone could express their opinion. I.V. Stalin addressed everyone equally strictly and quite formally. He knew how to listen when they reported to him competently.

By the way, as I was convinced over the long years of the war, I.V. Stalin was by no means the type of person to whom one could not put sharp questions and with whom it was impossible to argue and even firmly defend one's point of view. If anyone claims otherwise, I will say bluntly: their claims are wrong.

The working body of the Headquarters was the General Staff ...

Go to the Headquarters for a report, to I.V. Stalin ... with maps that had at least some "blank spots", it was impossible to tell him ... exaggerated data. I.V. Stalin did not tolerate answers at random, he demanded exhaustive completeness and clarity.

I.V. Stalin had some special flair for weaknesses in reports or documents, he immediately discovered and severely punished those responsible for unclear information. Possessing a tenacious memory, he remembered well what was said, he did not miss the opportunity to scold rather sharply for what he had forgotten. Therefore, we tried to prepare staff documents with all care ...

However, with all the severity of the situation on the fronts ... in general, a businesslike and creative atmosphere was immediately established in the General Staff ... "

But excuse me, but who, if not the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was the initial impulse for such work? And the documents in which he found the slightest inaccuracy, were they not related to purely military, strategic and operational issues?

And here is an objective portrait of Stalin, given by Georgy Konstantinovich already at the end of life, in the same "Memoirs and Reflections":

"... Not tall (actually, G.K. Zhukov himself was not one of the giants, and Stalin was about 170 cm tall. - **S.K.**) and unremarkable in appearance, I.V. Stalin produced

strong impression. Deprived of posturing, he bribed his interlocutor with the simplicity of communication. The free manner of conversation, the ability to clearly formulate a thought, a natural analytical mind, great erudition and a rare memory of even very sophisticated and significant people forced, during a conversation with I.V. Stalin, to internally gather and be on the alert ...

I.V. Stalin rarely laughed ... but he understood humor and knew how to appreciate wit and a joke ... He read a lot and was a well-informed person in the most diverse fields. His amazing capacity for work, the ability to quickly grasp the material allowed him to examine and assimilate in a day such a quantity of the most diverse factual material that only an outstanding person could do ... "

And, finally, given by Zhukov at the "moment of truth", three years before his death, Stalin's assessment from the positions of the commander:

"...I.V. Stalin always dealt a lot with issues of weapons and military equipment ... We must give him his due, he was well versed in the qualities of the main weapons ...

<...>

As a military leader I.V. I studied Stalin thoroughly, since I went through the whole war with him.

I.V. Stalin mastered the organization of front-line operations and operations of groups of fronts and led them with complete knowledge of the matter, well versed in major strategic issues. These abilities I.V. Stalin as the Commander-in-Chief especially manifested itself, starting with Stalingrad.

In the leadership of the armed struggle in general, I.V. Stalin was helped by his natural mind, rich intuition (quality, for a commander, one of the main ones, by the way. - **S.K.**). He knew how to find the main link in a strategic situation and, seizing on it, to counteract the enemy, to carry out one or another offensive operation. Undoubtedly, he was a worthy Supreme Commander."

The modern reader may, however, say: "And who are the judges?" After all, Rezun, Solonin, and Yuri Mukhin opened our eyes to Zhukov himself - mediocre, cruel, rude ... This bloody "soldafon" praised the "bloody tyrant", in which he grabbed three Heroic Stars ...

Well, let's try to figure this out a bit ...

What is the true scale of a person can be well understood if we study the public assessments given to him when this person falls into disgrace ... Let's see what his military colleagues said about the newly removed Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal Zhukov at the October (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I will quote their statements from the collection "Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other documents", noting that the marshals who spoke then said a lot of harsh words against Zhukov (typically the statement of the Chief of the General Staff Sokolovsky: "an unusually vain person") and did not spare the former minister ...

Nevertheless, no one questioned the scale of Zhukov as a commander and did not reject his wartime merits.

Let's say the same Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky said: "... You remember, when in 1946 Zhukov fell into disgrace (without going into the essence here, I will only note - for the cause. - **S.K.**), then in essence only two people spoke out in defense of Zhukov - Konev and I (Rokossovsky also, in fact, spoke objectively then. - **S.K.**) ... "

But Marshal I.S. Konev: "... I have known Comrade Zhukov for a long time and I must say that I have always ... seen him as a strong and capable military leader ..."

Marshal M.I. Kazakov: "During the Great Patriotic War, we highly valued the talent of Comrade Zhukov as a commander and even personal insults, when we had to get very hard from him, we did not take into account for the sake of business ..."

Marshal R.I. Malinovsky: "Zhukov, of course, is a very strong person, a very gifted person ... He is a strong character ... He did a great job in the war, and I respect him for this and will respect him for what he did for the Motherland ... "

And this despite the fact that Malinovsky began his speech with a confession: "... I always went to work with him, frankly, with very aggressive intentions. Knowing him... I went with the intentions: I will be rude, I will be rude... if God forbid, *he will hit me*, so I surrender ladies..."

Marshal A.I. Eremenko was violently (and actually not without reason) offended for Zhukov's exaggeration of his own merits in the battle of Stalingrad, but Eremenko also admitted that "comrade Zhukov is a respected comrade ...".

And here is the ever-maneuvering Mikoyan: "Comrades, the merit of comrade. Zhukov, of course, there is, and no one wants to challenge them..."

And even Khrushchev himself said this: "... There is no need to belittle his role ... He, like a soldier, intervened and helped well, otherwise it turns out that we will belittle Zhukov as a military man, and he showed himself well as a military man ... "

As you can see, Zhukov's military merits were recognized even when he (again, for the cause) was removed from the post of Minister of Defense. And the above quotes already remove, in my opinion, all the insinuations against Zhukov, especially since Georgy Konstantinovich always had enough real sins - since the time of command of the regiment, as Marshal Timoshenko recalled.

But if Zhukov was wealthy as a commander and military leader, then, therefore, his judgments about Stalin's military professionalism cannot be called incompetent.

I will give one more fragment of the transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the Central Committee ... Returning from Poland, where he was Minister of Defense, Marshal Rokossovsky, speaking at the plenum, also spoke about the positive qualities of Zhukov, but noted that "the main drawback of Comrade. Zhukov during the war ... there was rudeness ... he could insult a person, humiliate ... ". The most humanly attractive and most talented and brilliant of the Soviet commanders, Konstantin Konstantinovich

recalled:

"Such an episode was near Moscow, when I was directly at the front, where bullets whistled and shells exploded. At this time, Zhukov called me to VC and began to scold me with the most selective abuse, why the troops retreated one kilometer, threatened me with execution ... "

And immediately - which was then an act of high civic courage - Rokossovsky remembered his Supreme Commander-in-Chief:

"... I had a completely different conversation with Comrade Stalin. A difficult moment near Moscow, I was called to the HF to talk with Stalin. I assumed that I, as the commander of the 16th Army, would be scolded, and I believed that there would be the same abuse from Stalin, that they would immediately be removed from work and shot. But I still have a warm, good memory of that conversation. Comrade Stalin calmly, without haste, asked to report the situation. I started to tell in detail, but he cut me off and said - no need, you are the commander ... and I believe you. It's hard for you, we will help. It was a conversation of the commander, a man who himself takes into account the situation in which we were "...

In addition to memoirs, I can cite a fragment of a document - a record of negotiations on a direct wire to I.V. Stalin with the commander of the Kalinin Front I.S. Konev on December 12, 1941. It was a period of successful development of our counter-offensive near Moscow, the most difficult days of the war were after all behind, and Stalin could afford greater psychological pressure on the commander than during the German offensive in October 1941. But here's how he did it:

Kalinin front. At the Konev apparatus.

Moscow. At the apparatus STALIN, SHAPOSHNIKOV, VASILEVSKY. The actions of your left group do not satisfy us. Instead of attacking the enemy with all your strength and creating a decisive advantage for yourself, you, like a miner and a handicraftsman, bring individual units into action, allowing the enemy to wear them out. We demand from you that you replace the Krokhor tactics with the tactics of a real offensive.

*KONEV. I report that everything that I had collected was thrown into battle ... **The matter was complicated by the thaw, across the river. The Volga of heavy tanks cannot be transported** (emphasis mine. - **S.K.**). Personally, I am not satisfied with the army commander 31 Yushkevich, I have to push and press all the time, in some cases force division commanders under threat ... "*

Commenting on this entry, one should perhaps note the following ... In terms of its maneuverability and dynamism, in terms of the territorial scope and scope of hostilities, the Great Patriotic War, that is, that part of the Second World War that was fought on the Eastern Front, was unprecedented. And sometimes military leaders in the course of this war in relation to their superiors involuntarily behaved in a sense like children, because they often had to make excuses. And they had to make excuses so often because, **objectively**, they often did not keep up with the situation. And sometimes, like children, they tried to shift the blame on others - like Konev on Yushkevich. But Stalin also behaved like a commander, with an understanding of this difficult psychological circumstance. Therefore, having deliberately offended the vanity of the front commander with an insulting assessment of him as a "crumbler", then, without interrupting, calmly listened to Konev's report and ended the conversation also calmly:

"STALIN. There are no more questions. I think you understood the settings given to you. Act boldly and energetically. All. Goodbye.

KONEV. Understood, everything is clear, accepted for execution, I press with might and main.

STALIN. All. Goodbye"...

And after all, in addition to military leadership concerns, every day economic, domestic and foreign policy, personnel, and even problems piled up on Stalin. cultural.

By the way, about personnel problems, or rather, about Stalin's personnel, and even more specifically, about Commander-31 Yushkevich, mentioned by Konev. 44-year-old - in 1941 - commander of the 31st Army of the Kalinin Front Vasily Alexandrovich Yushkevich was a cultured, skillful and courageous military leader. After graduating from the Vilna Military School in 1915, he managed to command a platoon and a company in the First World War, in the Civil War he commanded a company, battalion, regiment on the Wrangel front, then twice studied at academic courses ... Since 1930 - the commander of the glorious 100th Infantry Division (before the war, it was commanded by Russiyanov), since 1936 - commander of the 13th Rifle Corps. He fought in Spain, and began the Great Patriotic War as the commander of the 44th Rifle Corps of the ZapOVO, retreated with battles, in August 1941

was appointed commander of the 22nd Army of the Western Front, from October 1941 - commander of the 31st Army of the Kalinin Front, which liberated Kalinin ...

Yushkevich fought quite successfully until August 1944, when he was relieved of his post as commander of the 3rd Shock Army and took over the Odessa Military District. He died in 1951, at the age of fifty-four. He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star. A typical general from the second circle of Stalin's military employees during the war.

But how did Stalin manage the war itself? Where is the truth here? Who was he as a commander - an amateur who more or less mastered the craft by the middle of the war with the help of Zhukov and Vasilevsky, or was he immediately an original commander who accurately saw the situation from the very first days of his command?

I think that for an objective researcher of the era, the answer is obvious - before the war, Stalin did not assume that with the outbreak of the war, he would have, in addition to general government, to engage in military activities directly. And when the professionals failed and did not justify his calculations, he began to phenomenally quickly educate himself as a commander. To educate both independently and with the help of the Headquarters apparatus (that is, the General Staff) and their military assistants.

And by virtue of his undoubted complex genius, Stalin in the shortest possible time became an outstanding commander in a purely professional sense, although in the first period of the war he naturally did not avoid mistakes. However, Stalin knew how to learn quickly, because he studied and educated himself all his life. Therefore, he, albeit not immediately, developed a victorious plan for the war, and *gradually* created a losing situation for Hitler.

But before that, he seemed to have experienced a moment of weakness ...

From the first minutes of the war, Stalin knew that he, as the head of state, did everything right: he was careful in time, and he threw aside his hesitation in time, allowing the army and navy to put the troops on alert in time.

But the army team let him down ...

And how let down! A week of war passed, and on June 28 Minsk already fell, the German tank wedges tore and tore our defenses, which were not very strong without it.

On June 28, 1941, they were the first to enter Stalin's office at 7:35 p.m.

Molotov, Malenkov and Budyonny, who, however, left fifteen minutes later.

The office soon became crowded - Timoshenko, Zhukov, Bulganin, Air Force Commander Zhigarev and others appeared. At 21.30, the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Golikov, was called. Stalin listened, spoke, approved orders and instructions dated June 29. Twice - from 19.45 to 20.05 and from 24.00 to 00.15 - People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov was in the office. It is unlikely that his information pleased Stalin.

At 22.00, test pilots Suprun and Stefanovsky appeared for ten minutes.

- commanders of test regiments formed on the initiative of Suprun.

The time of stay in the Stalinist office of the most interesting visitors for us was distributed on June 28 as follows:

Molotov	19.35 - 00.50
Malenkov	19.35 - 23.10
Beria	22.40 - 00.50
Mikoyan	23.30 - 00.50

As you can see, all the time - from 19 hours 35 minutes on June 28, 1941 to almost one in the morning on June 29, 1941 - only Molotov sat with Stalin, but half an hour before midnight

Mikoyan entered the office, where Beria was then, and remained there with Molotov and Beria until the end. Malenkov left that night for an hour and a half (to be exact - one hundred minutes) before the last visitors to Stalin's office...

What happened there in those last hundred minutes?

Of all those who passed through Stalin's office on June 28, 1941, only Molotov and Mikoyan were professional revolutionaries and knew the owner of the office even before the revolution. And they didn't just know each other, but together with him they prepared this revolution ... So the conversation at the end of the working night was probably *all kinds* - not only business.

But the fact that young - in comparison with Stalin, Molotov and Mikoyan - Bolshevik Beria was not asked from the cabinet, which speaks of Stalin's special confidence in Beria. Yes, they were countrymen...

What happened next?

Then Stalin left for a nearby dacha. Perhaps he went there with Molotov, Mikoyan and Beria, but, one way or another, from some point on, Stalin was left alone in the dacha. Firstly, he was wildly tired during the first week of the war, he was in public all the time, and he, presumably, wanted to be alone with himself.

Secondly...

Secondly, depression could well fall on him.

And it looks like it fell off.

In the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office, as we already know, there is a two-day break - there are no entries for June 29 and 30. But in a letter from Beria, written in 1953 after his arrest addressed to Malenkov, but addressed to all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, there is the following passage where Lavrenty Pavlovich addressed Molotov:

"... You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with Comrade Stalin at his nearby dacha, you put the question point-blank in your office in the Council of Ministers that we need to save the situation, we must immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, I then fully supported you and suggested that you immediately call Comrade Malenkov to a meeting ... After ... we all went to Comrade Stalin and convinced him [about] the immediate organization of the Committee for the Defense of the Country ... "

There are similar references in the recordings of conversations with Molotov of the poet Felix Chuev, and in other memoirs, including Khrushchev's "memoirs", which are false in a number of key points, but allow us to make correct judgments even when we are dealing with an obvious lie. Khrushchev was a front row figure, and although he was not in Moscow in those days, he clearly heard stories about those days from other front row figures - Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich.

That is, there was a certain initiative trip of Molotov and Beria to Stalin's dacha. And it most likely could not have happened before the evening of June 29th. At the same time, it must be assumed that they took with them not only Malenkov, but also Kaganovich, Mikoyan ... And there were, presumably, sad conversations with Stalin ...

And Stalin's harsh words were certainly there, and Stalin could even be confused at that moment, because just about a week after the start of the war, after the surrender of Minsk, he almost inevitably had to experience a deep mental crisis.

Temporary...

However, he quickly, in a matter of two dozen hours, overcame it, and this crisis did not affect the general situation. Already on June 30, 1941, Stalin was at his post and appointed Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin as Chief of Staff of the Northwestern Front. The main event of the day on June 30 was the formation of the State

Defense Committee. And the decision on this, very likely, was made at Stalin's dacha, and not in the Kremlin.

In terms of the direct conduct of the war, the Headquarters of the High Command received power from June 23, 1941 (on July 10, 1941 it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command headed by Stalin).

As for the rest, according to the Constitution, power belonged to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. But now it was necessary to bring everything into one fist, and on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR formed the State Defense Committee, which assumed full power in the USSR.

So, from July 1, 1941, Stalin was again in his Kremlin office and, until the end of the war, harnessed himself to the daily military webbing. Already on July 1, starting at 4:40 p.m., he received eighteen people until half past one on July 2.

From the very beginning of the reception, in addition to Stalin, there were only three people in the office - Molotov, Beria and Malenkov. Ten minutes later, Shcherbakov, Timoshenko and Zhukov entered, and in this composition the conversation went on until 17.10, when Kaganovich joined those present.

At 19.00 Timoshenko and Zhukov left, and I do not rule out that in the first minutes of their conversation with Stalin, he told them everything that he thinks about them and about the top generals of the Red Army as a whole.

And perhaps he, with all the harshness of his tone, spoke only about the matter, having first familiarized himself with the current situation in detail. After all, he already understood that soon he himself would have to take charge of not only the rear, but also the front.

But even at the end of 1940, Stalin did not take a direct part in the games of the military. I put a literal meaning into the last message, referring to those two operational-strategic games that the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent January 2 - 6 and 8 - 11, 1941 after the December (1940) meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army.

The content and circumstances of these games themselves have long been the subject of malicious myth-making in the "research" of "historians", in fiction and cinema.

At the same time, Stalin is made a participant in both the December meeting and these games, and General of the Army Zhukov (in the movie - played by the actor Ulyanov) is a misunderstood prophet who supposedly foresaw the right directions of German strikes in early January 1941 ...

Well, we need to dwell on these games separately.

I repeat: Stalin was neither at the games nor at the meeting. In fact, Zhdanov and Malenkov took part in the meeting from the top leadership, while Stalin and other members of the Politburo were present only at the analysis of games in the Kremlin on January 12, 1941

of the year.

At the October (1957) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Marshal Eremenko, misinterpreting something over the years, recalled:

"Then there was a meeting in December 1940 with Stalin. There are many comrades who were there. How did we look at this meeting? Stalin gave instructions, sensible instructions; what divisions should be in terms of mobility, what is the ratio of military branches. There were a number of instructions, but nothing was carried out. Everyone was present, they know that these instructions are recorded in history. So now it's wrong to whitewash yourself ... "

Stalin gave instructions, but not in December 1940, but on January 12, 1941. However, that is not even the point of the question!

Today, these games of early 1941 are presented as some outstanding example of Zhukov's supposedly strategic foresight, playing for the Germans. Like, Zhukov completely anticipated the plans of the Wehrmacht and defeated Pavlov on the maps in the same manner in which Pavlov was actually defeated six months later by the commander of the Army Group Center, von Bock, with the help of the tank groups of Guderian and Goth.

But, firstly, Zhukov played for the Germans (the "Blue" side) against the "Red" side, for which Pavlov played, only in the first game. In the second game, Pavlov played for the former Blues, now the Westerns, and for the former Reds, now "Eastern", played by Zhukov.

Secondly, this is what is said in the "Information on operational-strategic games held with the participants of the December (1940) meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army" (see Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. Vol. 12 (1). - M.: TERRA, 1993.", pp. 388-390):

"Under the terms of the games, the "Western" carried out an attack on the "Eastern". It would have looked natural to consider in the games the options for repelling such an attack, but the most significant drawback of the games was that ***the operations of the initial period of the war were completely excluded from the draw*** (allocations are mine everywhere. - **S.K.**). From the tasks for the parties for the first game, it can be seen that the "Western", having carried out an attack on the "Eastern" on July 15, 1941, by July 23-25 reached the line of Siauliai, Kaunas, Lida, Skidel, Osovets (70 - 120 km from the state border), but then, under the blows of the "Eastern" by August 1, they were thrown back from the indicated line to their original position ... and ***from this position further actions of the parties were played out***. According to the same scenario, the war began in the second game ... Neither at the meeting nor at the games, their participants did ***not even try to consider the situation that could develop in the first operations in the event of an enemy attack ...*** "

So, this "Help ..." alone, combined with the historical specifics of the games it reports on, for fabrications such as "sensations" by Rezun, Corned beef, etc. just killer! How, say, they will explain the fact that Stalin, planning - according to them - by the summer of 1941 a preventive strike against the Germans, did not bother to sanction at least one operational-strategic game in the format of the Red Army offensive, but authorized two whole staff games in the format of repelling the German strike?

In the "Help ..." it is rightly stated that the statements of Marshal M.V. Zakharov that the games were allegedly held "to work out some issues related to the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war" are groundless. These questions were not included in the educational purposes of the games and therefore were not considered. At the same time, in both games, the actions of the parties in the directions to Brest, Baranovichi were not played out, although it was precisely such strikes by the Nazis at the beginning of the war that led to the encirclement of Soviet troops in the "Bialystok ledge".

I have no doubt that it was precisely for this reason that Marshal Zhukov in his memoirs wrote sparingly and indistinctly about this game.

"Help ..g" in the dispassionate language of the document testifies:

"... in January 1941, the operational-strategic link of the command staff of the Red Army played on the cards such a variant of military operations that the real "Western", i.e. Germany, ***was not planned***.

That is, Army General Ulya ..., sorry, Zhukov did not win any triumphant paper victories over Army General Pavlov! And in the first game "Reds" -

The "Eastern" (Pavlov) just did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them to encircle and defeat the "Blue" - "Western" (Zhukov) in East Prussia.

Actually, this is quite strange. In modern terms, the "format" of the staff games at the beginning of January 1941 simply had to provide for such a training task, which at its starting point would have exactly the initial period of the war. The very presence of the "Bialystok ledge" gave the Germans the temptation to create a "boiler" here with converging tank strikes. But for some reason this option was not considered by the organizers of the games. By the way, Zhukov's fault is not here - during the preparation of the plan for the January headquarters games, he was still in the position of commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District, transferring his duties to Kirponos and replacing Meretskov as chief of the General Staff only in January 1941, after the games. So the strange idea of the games is on People's Commissar Tymoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Meretskov and Deputy Meretskov Vatutin ...

It is necessary to point out one more, more than strange circumstance noted in the "Help ...". For some reason, the vast majority of the participants in the games led the associations in them, regardless of which associations they actually headed at the beginning of 1941. And almost none of them, since the beginning of the war, had to act where they acted in the games.

So, in the second game of the seven armies of the Southwestern Front of the "Eastern" only one was commanded (on the map) by the real commander of the 6th Army I.N. Muzychenko and - in the direction where the army subordinate to him was actually stationed at the beginning of the war. Basically, in January 1941, the commanders of the Arkhangelsk, Transbaikal, Transcaucasian, Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Volga, North Caucasian, Central Asian and Ural military districts.

This "personnel" approach can, perhaps, be compared with the replacement of skiers preparing for serious winter competitions, also skiers, but accustomed to ... water skiing. Such is the composition of the participants in the "war" on the maps prepared six months before the real war, the then Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Meretskov, and People's Commissar Timoshenko approved it.

And I think, what if the "non-professional" Stalin had earlier seriously interfered in such "games" of the professional military - not after June 22, 1941, but at least a year before that day? Would the war have started the way it started?

I don't think it's likely...

However, Stalin was, alas, not omniscient. And he had to become a commander out of necessity - after the failures of a number of "professionals".

Myth six

FROM THE FIRST DAY OF THE WAR, THE WHOLE COUNTRY STANDED UP TO THE GERMAN INVASION AS ONE PERSON, AND THE RKKA FROM THE VERY BEGINNING FIGHTED SKILLY AND COURAGELY UNDER THE LEAD OF PROVEN COMMANDERS, AND ONLY THE SUDDENNESS OF THE ATTACK DID NOT MAKE VALUES TO REFLECT AGGRESSION

October 16, 1952 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, held immediately after the XIX congress, which began as a congress of the CPSU (b), and ended as a congress of the CPSU, Stalin said:

"We old people will die, but we need to think about who, in what hands we will hand over the baton of our great cause. Who will carry it forward? This requires younger, more dedicated people, politicians. And what does it mean to grow a political,

statesman? This requires great effort. It will take ten years, no, all fifteen years, to educate a statesman ...

Perhaps, considering what he would say to the participants of this last plenum of the Central Committee, which took place during Stalin's lifetime, Stalin recalled his former deputy for the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers, the former chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Voznesensky and the former secretary of the Central Committee Kuznetsov, who were shot in 1950 in the "Leningrad" case. Voznesensky was then forty-seven years old, and Kuznetsov was forty-five at all.

Stalin really counted on them as a replacement, but it turned out that instead of preparing to receive the baton of a great cause, they were only secretly wondering how they would indulge their pride, satisfy their ambitions and rule, and not lead the state after Stalin's **death**. Natural death, or even ...

And even - deliberately accelerated.

Yes, cadres really did decide everything, if they were healthy cadres of politicians. But the cadres could not decide anything if they were rotten "cadres" of businessmen, ordinary people or simply mediocrity who imagined themselves. And already the first week of the war sharply divided Stalin's pre-war cadres into two unequal parts.

One, the dominant one, although not overwhelmingly dominant, did not turn its eyes away from the danger with the outbreak of the war, looked it straight in the face and moved towards it to block its path. Even being in the deep rear, she rushed to the front.

Another, smaller, although it cannot be said that it was insignificant, after the first serious setbacks, after the surrender of Minsk, fell into a panic and rushed to escape from danger deep into the country - if these "cadres" were in the frontline zone, or - if they were already in deep rear - hid like a gopher, afraid of one thing - the front.

The first part, living on the worries of work, looked in those days to the west, because there was an enemy.

The second part, who lived with concern for their own skin and selfish well-being, looked to the east - because there was, after all, not the front, but the rear.

It was true that the country met the "thunderstorm of 1941" heroically. But even that that a considerable part of the country met the war cowardly and basely, was also true.

In 1992, the Moscow publishing house "Russian Book" published a collection of archival documents, which was called: "The Hidden Truth of War: 1941". In the preface to it, the compilers appropriately quoted Cicero: "The first law of history is not to dare any lie, then not to be afraid of any truth" ...

The truth of the documents published then was bitter, but they were documents. Yes, the compilers' comments on them were often sustained in the spirit of 1992, that is, in the anti-Soviet and anti-communist spirit, and objectively the presentation of the documentary material was calculated - contrary to the compilers' assurances - to excite the minds of people, counting on an unhealthy sensation. However, the documentary evidence itself about the unsightly, anti-heroic side of the war was quite reliable.

Here, for example, is an extract from an extensive memorandum dated July 5, 1941, by the military prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison, a military lawyer of the 3rd rank Glinka to the military prosecutor of the Western Front, military jurist Rumyantsev. This note is not only informative, but also good in a purely professional sense, as the reader can see for himself:

"Local regional authorities are dissatisfied with the work of the head of the garrison, Colonel Redchenkov, saying that he does not provide work and can fail. In my opinion, he is simply not able to cover the whole huge mass of issues and needs concrete business help. I suggested to the secretaries of the regional committee and its first secretary comrade. STULOV to send party workers to help him, of whom there are a lot of people in Vitebsk, but they all go around idle. These are the secretaries of regional committees and district committees of other regions,

members of the Central Committee, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. However, the regional committee did not accept my proposal, saying that he, the head of the garrison, could find people for himself ...

Regional bodies, including the regional committee and the regional executive committee (comrade STULOV, comrade RYABTSEV) ... were late with many measures, as a result of which an anxious mood, panic, flight, confusion and disorganization appeared in the city, i.e. something appeared that Comrade warned against. STALIN in his speech.

The picture is ugly, and although the Germans occupied Minsk on the sixth day of the war, it is difficult to justify the Belarusian Central Committee. A huge war has begun, and many professional representatives of the political *vanguard* of society cannot find themselves affairs...

In Belarus, however, everything was complicated by military time pressure.

And in Ukraine? On July 6, 1941, the head of the Political Propaganda Directorate of the Southwestern Front, Brigadier Commissar Mikhailov, reported to the Chief of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis:

"In some areas, the Party and Soviet organizations are showing exceptional absent-mindedness and panic. Some district leaders left with their families long before the districts were evacuated.

Leading officials ... Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Tarnopolsky districts fled in a panic long before the withdrawal of our units, and instead of taking out state material values, they took out personal belongings with the transport at their disposal ... "

After all, this is not the western part of Belarus, rapidly occupied by the Germans and criminally lost by Pavlov. This is Ukraine, where the advance of the Wehrmacht was slowed down from the very beginning, where the invasion was more extended in time, and therefore it was easier for the political vanguard of society to organize popular opposition to this invasion.

On July 11, 1941, the same Mikhailov reported on the flight of the secretaries of the district committees of the Communist Party (b) of the Khmel'nitsky, Yanushpolsky, Ulanovsky districts ... This is Vinnytsia, it is already close to Kiev. And that's all - Khrushchev's footage. But he did not put them against the wall. And why? They will still be useful to him after the murder of Stalin and Beria, after 1953 ...

Perhaps that is why Khrushchev lied so vilely after 1953 about Stalin that, having blamed everything on Stalin, it was easier to "wind up" the question of the extent of his own guilt. After all, Khrushchev in Ukraine had enough time to turn the republic into a fortress. In addition, only Khrushchev in Ukraine was a member of the country's top leadership, was a member of the Politburo.

But then the war began, and Khrushchev, instead of promptly "embroidering" the emerging problems of civil and economic life, began to pose as a strategist, misinforming Stalin and complicating the position of Kirponos.

Let's get back to the topic though...

There are more than enough very ugly facts in the 1992 collection mentioned above. Actually, the collection consists of some of them, and for the general concept of the collection - to show the previously hidden truth - this is quite justified. However, when comprehending this truth, it is necessary not to lose sight of one subtle circumstance, to which Mikhail Meltyukhov rightly drew the attention of readers in his essay "The initial period of the war in the documents of military counterintelligence (June 22 - July 9, 1941)", published in the collective military historical collection of 2008 "The Tragedy of 1941. Causes of the catastrophe" by Yauza publishing house.

M. Meltyukhov's remark is so good that I will quote it directly. Anticipating the reader's acquaintance with no less stunning than in the 1992 collection, examples of striking, rationally inexplicable (if not assuming direct betrayal!) slovenliness, irresponsibility and indiscretion, M. Meltyukhov writes:

"Of course, the materials of military counterintelligence as a historical source have a number of features ... Aimed at identifying and summarizing negative facts and phenomena, the military counterintelligence agencies performed the function of a supervisory control apparatus in the army. Naturally, these documents reflect the negative phenomena to the greatest extent..."

An absolutely accurate and systemically necessary statement, which does honor to its author! The still "democratized" part of our society still enthusiastically perceives any "negative" about the Stalin era, although all the "negativity" of that time was not the essence of the era, but its costs, many of which, moreover, should be attributed not to Stalin's USSR, but at the expense of the former "Raseya", "headed" by a whole series of supposedly "Russian" tsars, starting with Alexander I ...

But the "negative" was enough. Here, for example, are data on the provision of the western border districts with the means of refueling and transporting fuel as of May 1, 1941 (as a percentage of the regular number):

Military regions	Petrol tankers and tank trucks	
Leningrad Military District	30.7	8.8
Baltic OVO	26.8	7.8
Western OVO	18.5	6.0
Kyiv OVO	16.1	13.0
Odessa Military District	14.4	4.5

By the way, does this picture look like Stalin preparing for a preemptive strike in 1941?

And here is a fragment of memorandum No. 03 dated June 28, 1941 by the head of the 3rd (i.e. Special, counterintelligence) department of the North-Western Front, divisional commissar Babich:

"... The commander of the 54th SBAP (high-speed bomber aviation regiment. - **S.K.**), Major Skiba leads combat sorties poorly, does not happen at airfields, gives orders from the dugout, without any data: "Go bomb - you will find the target themselves."

To the remark that without data on the enemy it is possible to bomb our own, Skiba replied: "I don't know anything." On the first day of the war, he gave the order to raise the 3rd squadron and wait for further orders in the air. The squadron, armed with Ar-2 and SB aircraft, was waiting for orders in the air for 1.5 hours, as a result of which they could not complete the combat mission (missing. - **S.K.**) ... <...>

Skiba himself did not fly out on a combat mission, and the plane attached to it handed over to another pilot, his assistant, Major Leontiev, did the same ... "

It was. It was also the way Marshal of the Soviet Union K.S. described those days in his memoirs. Moskalenko, who before the war commanded the 1st artillery anti-tank brigade of the reserve of the High Command (RGK) in the Kiev Special Military District.

But here we need to clarify something in advance ...

Starting work on this very brief book about the beginning of the war, I deliberately decided not to make extensive use of memoirs, limiting myself, as a rule, to documents. And Moskalenko's memoirs "In the South-Western Direction" fell into my hands quite by accident ... However, when I got acquainted with his description of the beginning of the war, it seemed so interesting and even intriguing to me that I considered it my duty to introduce him to the reader ...

Being in the reserve of the RGK, the Moskalenko brigade until June 22, 1941 was operationally subordinate to the commander of the 5th Army, Major General of Tank Forces M.I. Potapov, whose army headquarters was in Lutsk.

The Moskalenko brigade was stationed in the area of the Kivertsy station, about fifteen kilometers north of Lutsk. Early in the morning of June 22, Moskalenko raised the alarm brigade, and then the events unfolded as follows:

"We quickly went to the headquarters. Here I opened the mobilization package and found out that with the start of hostilities, the brigade should be forced to march along the route Lutsk, Radekhov, Rava-Russkaya, Nemirov to the Lviv direction to the deployment area of our 6th Army (General I.N. Muzychenko. - **C.T.O.**). I immediately reported this by telephone to General Potapov. After listening, he said:

- The situation on the front of the 5th Army has sharply escalated: German troops have crossed the Western Bug River ... and are advancing on Vladimir-Volynsky. Therefore, I ask you, finally, I demand to speak to Vladimir-Volynsky and, together with the 22nd mechanized corps of General Kondrusev ... restore the situation ... "

The motorized brigade of the RGK was a powerful force - its commander wore two stars of a major general on his buttonholes and on the eve of his appointment in May 1941 "to the brigade" was certified for the position of commander of a tank division. And Army Commander 5 KOVO Potapov *asked*, rather than ordered, Moskalenko to march on Vladimir-Volynsky, because with the start of the war, the brigade was already subordinate to Commander 6 KOVO Muzychenko. Therefore, the brigade commander answered Potapov: "The brigade is the reserve of the High Command. I cannot fulfill your demand, which is contrary to the mobilization plan."

Potapov asked to wait by the phone while he contacts Moscow or

Kyiv. The brigade was preparing for the march, the brigade commander was waiting ...

"About 15-20 minutes later, the commander of the army," Moskalenko recalled, "called again.

Communication with Moscow and Kiev is interrupted ... The enemy is attacking along the entire front of the army. The 41st Panzer Division was attacked from the air ... and almost all of them were killed. The city of Vladimir-Volynsky will be captured by the enemy any minute. - Potapov's voice became firmer, more demanding. - Considering the current situation, I order: the brigade to follow, as I said ... I take full responsibility for the violation by the brigade of the task provided for by the mobilization plan ...

I considered the decision of General Potapov to be correct in the current situation ... "

In order to fully understand what is described above, one must look at the map of Ukraine.

Here is Kivertsy, here is Vladimir-Volynsky, seventy kilometers from Kivertsy in a direction almost perpendicular to the border.

And here is Radekhov, also about seventy kilometers from Kivertsy, but almost parallel to the border. And from Radekhov you still have to get to Rava-Russkaya, and from it also to Nemirov. Total - one hundred and fifty kilometers, no less ...

And according to the mobilization plan drawn up by someone in Moscow on the eve of an undeniably maneuverable, rapidly changing war situation (which in itself makes the system of strictly sealed packages semi-idiotic, if not completely idiotic), a powerful and highly mobile military unit was supposed to be one hundred and fifty miles of jelly slurrp, spending motor resources, fuel, strength and nerves, under the inevitable bombing attacks of the enemy, only to enter into submission to the new commander, whom the brigade commander does not know and who does not know the brigade commander.

And such forced marches were planned at the General Staff of the Red Army by General Meretskov, and from January 1941 by General Zhukov, not due to forced improvisation, but *in advance* - before the war!

At the same time, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff did not provide reliable coded radio communications in an increasingly heated situation, even the link "army headquarters - front headquarters"! But in advance they tied the hands of both brigade commander Moskalenko and commander Potapov with the mobilization plan.

Wonderful are Your works, Lord! But human deeds are sometimes even more amazing...

But that's not all! When Moskalenko, halfway between Lutsk and Vladimir Volynsky, caught up with the headquarters column of the commander of the 22nd mechanized corps, Major General S.M. Kondrusev, it turned out that two of the three divisions of the corps - the 19th tank and 215th motorized - according to the cover plan, began to advance from the Rovno region to the Kovel region and I could not quickly turn to Vladimir-Volynsky !.

The third division of Kondrusev - the ill-fated 41st was quartered just on the western outskirts of Vladimir-Volynsky. However, according to the cover plan, instead of moving forward to the border - on the enemy rushing to Vladimir-Volynsky, into the zone of fierce battles that ensued, the division was forced to withdraw to the "concentration area" to Kovel - parallel to the border.

"On the way," Moskalenko wrote, "the division got into a swampy area, some of the tanks got stuck there, and the task was not completed."

If such "cover plans" are not sabotage, then what should be considered sabotage? However, I do not suspect either Tymoshenko or Zhukov of treason, but I will only repeat after Talleyrand: "This is worse than a crime. This is mistake"...

And on June 22, 1941, General Halder wrote in his diary:

"The offensive of the German troops took the enemy by surprise ... His troops in the border zone were scattered over a vast territory and tied to their quartering areas ... <...>

A number of enemy command authorities, such as, for example, in Bialystok [headquarters of the 10th Army], were completely unaware of the situation, and therefore, in a number of sectors of the front, leadership of actions from the higher headquarters was almost completely absent.

But even regardless of this, given the state of "tetanus", one can hardly expect that the Russian command, already during the first day of fighting, was able to form such a clear picture of the situation for itself to be able to make a radical decision.

It seems that the Russian command, due to its sluggishness, will not be able to organize operational opposition to our offensive in the near future ... "

Stupidly castrated Soviet military historiography is characterized by the note of the Russian edition in 1971 to this entry by Gaider:

command. It is well known that the frontier troops and fortified areas were the first to take the blow of the enemy, which, in battles with superior enemy forces, showed miracles of heroism and selflessness and largely predetermined the defeat of the Nazi military machine.

So it is! The Soviet border troops really fought heroically, and their training and dedication powerfully influenced the situation. But the border guards are the guards of Beria, not Timoshenko and Zhukov! In addition, it is not the task of the border troops to resist the enemy army, and not individual violators of the state border.

However, many army units and formations also fought heroically from the first day of the war, and although many of the higher headquarters fell - according to Halder - into "tetanus", on the same day, June 22, Halder already wrote this:

"After the initial "tetanus" caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy has moved on to active operations "...

And on June 23, 1941, the chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht made a record that, better than any high words, shows the high sacrifice that the best Soviet people demonstrated from the very first days of the war:

"The general situation is best described in the report of the headquarters of the 4th army: the enemy in the Białyystok sack is fighting not for his life, but for gaining time."

The first time I read this, my throat caught. Can there be a higher assessment of the performance of a soldier's duty and a more convincing evidence of a soldier's steadfastness than this forced recognition of the enemy?

Without thinking about your own salvation, gain time, hold back the pressure ...

Someone managed to do it for an hour.

For someone - for a day ...

Some for a week...

As a result, the Wehrmacht did not reach the approaches to Moscow in the deep autumn of 1941, did not reach, but **crawled**.

On June 24, 1941, Halder admits through gritted teeth:

"In general, it is now clear that the Russians are not thinking about retreating, but, on the contrary, are throwing everything they have at their disposal towards the wedged German troops,"

but stipulates:

"At the same time, the enemy's high command, apparently, does not at all participates in the management of operations ... "

In his delusion, Halder is convinced in a day and on June 25 he writes:

"The assessment of the situation in the morning generally confirms the conclusion that the Russians decided to wage decisive battles in the border zone and retreat only in certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops.

This, for example, is confirmed by the actions of the enemy on the front of *the Army Group "North"* ... <...>

The enemy retreats in an organized manner, covering the retreat with tank formations, and simultaneously transferring large masses of troops from the north to the Western Dvina ...

On the front of *Army Group Center*, the inevitable (yeah! - **S.K.**) difficulties...

On the front of *Army Group South*, the enemy is pulling up fresh forces from the east ... and is moving motorized units along the highway to Rovno ... It seems that the enemy is pulling up fresh forces from the west and south against the 4th Army Corps advancing with heavy fighting to the east and against the body of von Brisen ... "

The entry for the 5th day of the war, June 26, 1941, begins in Halder's diary
So:

"Army Group South is slowly advancing, unfortunately suffering significant losses. The enemy, acting against the Army Group "South", has a firm and energetic (that's even how! - **S.K.**) leadership. The enemy is constantly pulling up new fresh forces from the depths against our tank wedge ... "

Yes, then we only held back the enemy. But the Wehrmacht slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places even ran out of steam, not at the behest of the pike, but due to the courage of the fighters and commanders, whose actions were increasingly not so badly directed by the command.

Here are three destinies...

Already known to the reader, the commander of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, Ivan Nikolayevich Muzychenko, began the war courageously, but during the Kyiv defensive operation in August in the Uman region he was taken prisoner by the wounded. At first he was kept in a Rovno prison, then in camps in Novograd-Volynsky, Hammelsburg, Gogelyitein, Mosburg.

He was released from captivity by the Americans and on April 29, 1945 he was sent to Paris, to the Soviet Commission for Repatriation. From May to December 1945, Muzychenko underwent a special inspection by the NKVD in Moscow. December 31, 1945 was returned to active service in the Red Army.

Approximately the same thing happened with Major General Potapov, who returned from captivity through Paris, the former commander of the 5th Army of the KOVO, also known to the reader.

And on December 30, 1945, the former commander of the 12th Army, General Ponedelin, was brought to Lubyanka from Paris again. Now they write that he was captured in August 1941, shell-shocked, after hand-to-hand combat. However, in a German photo in the book by Francois de Lannoy, published in 2006 by the Eksmo publishing house, German tanks in Ukraine. 1941 Ponedelin does not look shell-shocked or torn to pieces. But he does not have the Order of Lenin and two Orders of the Red Banner on his chest, just as there is no medal "XX Years of the Red Army". Moreover, in a clear photo, the holes from them on the field tunic, which does not bear traces of a "fight", are not visible either. Yes, the Germans would not have taken off the order, especially before propaganda photography. Most likely, Ponedelin himself got rid of them, putting on a new general's tunic before surrendering.

Not the best certification for him.

In captivity, he behaved below average, was moderately anti-Soviet, although he did not cooperate with the Germans. The post-war investigation into the Ponedelin case lasted five years, and only in 1950 was he shot. In 1956, in the general stream of Khrushchev's rehabilitation, he was also rehabilitated.

They were different - the generals of the Red Army of the 1941 model. Someone, being surrounded, left it with all military awards and general regalia... clothes or a Red Army uniform, but he tried to get out of the encirclement ... Someone - shot himself ...

However, the majority of Soviet military leaders commanded the troops entrusted to them, although not all and not always - skillfully.

And not one general of the Red Army in those early days of the war died the death of the brave. Semyon Mikhailovich Kondrusev, whom General Moskalenko met on the military road on June 22, 1941, two days later, on June 24, 1941, died in battle near the village of Aleksandrovka, Vladimir-Volynsky district, Volyn region, Ukrainian SSR. A native of the Smolensk region, he was only forty-four years old in 1941, of which twenty-four were given to army service.

During the civil war, Kondrusev was a platoon commander in the 65th Infantry Regiment 8- and rifle division.

After the Soviet-Polish war - company commander in the 391st rifle regiment 44- and rifle division.

Since May 1931, after the end of the Shooting and tactical courses "Shot", - Commander of the 132nd Donetsk Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division.

In the "Finnish" war - the commander of the 62nd Infantry Division, and since March 1941, the holder of two Orders of Lenin Kondrusev - the commander of the 22nd Mechanized Corps of the KO VO.

Everything is very typical...

The topic of the commanders of the Red Army to this day does not belong to the fully and objectively covered, although it is quite dirty with the dirty fingers of "historians". I already wrote that acquaintance with the official biographies of thousands of Soviet generals during the war completely refutes all sorts of insinuations about them. But here is another illustration of an unscrupulous approach to the topic ...

On page 467 of his book "June 22 ..." Mark Solonin cites an extract from the letter of the commander I.P. Belova People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov dated October 7, 1930, which Belov sent to Moscow from Germany, where he was on a business trip.

Here is a fragment of Solonin:

"... when you look how brutally German officers work on themselves from second lieutenant (lieutenant? - **S.K.**) to general, how they work on preparing units, what results they achieve, it hurts inside from the consciousness of our weakness. I would like to shout with a good obscenity about the need for the most intense study - a decisive alteration of all weak commanders ... [71, p. 272]".

Number 71 in Solonin's bibliography is a collection of documents "The Nazi sword was forged in the USSR" of the 1992 edition (compiled by D.L. Dyakov and T.S. Bushueva). The title of this collection is provocative and deceitful, but it is an interesting source because it contains documents. And, getting acquainted with Belov's letter there, you find that M. Solonin unfairly truncated it when quoting, replacing the end of the fragment of Belov's letter cited in the 1992 collection with an excerpt.

Here he is:

"I want to shout with a good obscenity about the need for the most intense study - decisive reworking of all weak commanders in the shortest possible time. <...>

We have excellent human material in the person of our Red Army soldier; we have good prospects for equipping the army with equipment. We need commanders who are competent in military technical terms, we must make them - this is one of the tasks of today. <...>

There is no non-execution of an order in the German Reichswehr.

As you can see, Belov, while highly appreciating the zeal of the officer corps of the Reichswehr, does not so low assess the potential of the Red Army itself at all its levels - from the Red Army to top commanders.

In addition, we must remember what the Red Army was in 1930 and what the Reichswehr was.

The Reichswehr at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s was a highly professional structure with a number of one hundred thousand people strictly limited by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. It was something like a huge "framed" military unit, the backbone of which is the command staff and which, if necessary, deploys into a full-fledged unit (in the case of the Reichswehr, into a mass army).

The non-commissioned officer of the Reichswehr was trained as a future officer of this mass army, the private - as a non-commissioned officer or also an officer. At the same time, the personnel of the Reichswehr was recruited not due to universal military duty, but due to strict selection.

The officer corps of the Reichswehr in 1930 consisted almost entirely of the best professional, regular, specially and carefully selected combat officers with vast experience of the First World War. Moreover, the officers are relatively young (that is, ambitious), capable of leading a mass army in the future. After all, the Reichswehr from the very beginning was conceived by the Germans as a kind of "concentrate" of the future Wehrmacht, whose task was to be not just the revival of the military power of the Reich, but also the solution of large-scale tasks of decisive revenge for the defeat in the First World War.

Is it any wonder that *such* an officer corps in 1930 snouted with his nose and "brutally" worked on himself, preparing for "great achievements"?

And what was the Red Army of the 1930 model of the year? Semi-militia formations in a country that by that time had not even decided on the immediate tasks of development, where one part of the leadership, like Bukharin, called: "Get rich!", And the other, like Stalin, warned: "We need to run a distance of ten years century, otherwise we will be crushed ... "

The friability, looseness of the then society, the lack of its unity *at that* moment, the presence of serious internal forces hostile to the new government, also determined the friability of the army, which was just beginning to take shape for real and did not yet have a full-fledged professional officer corps. No wonder Belov emphasized that in the Reichswehr it was impossible to disobey an order - in contrast to the then Red Army.

But that was in 1930. And although a real cadre army - according to, for example, Marshal Zhukov - began to be created only in 1939, by 1941 the country had a good command potential both in the troops and in the reserve.

Solonin, cheatingly "quoting" Belov, is trying to give us the impression that even before the war, the brilliant officers of the Wehrmacht who worked on themselves "brutally" were opposed by "soviet" Vakh-laks, "deathly intimidated by Stalin" and incapable of any initiative and competent actions.

There were enough Vakh-laks - we have already seen this from the documents, and we will see it too. But if the Red Army consisted of them alone, then ...

However, is it worth continuing?

And in conclusion of this section, I will once again turn to the topic "Stalin and generals"...

All mediocre failures of the beginning of the war are on the account of marshals and generals. After all, Stalin, himself a high professional in his state "sovereign" business, respected their professionalism so much on the eve of the war, in which he then believed that he was not even present at the December meeting of 1940, as well as at the January staff games of 1941 - so as not to unnecessarily irritate the participants.

Once Stalin was, however, the initiator and actively participated in a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the commanding staff of the Red Army to collect experience in military operations against Finland, which took place on April 14-17, 1940, after the end of the Sov

Finnish war. By the way, the full transcript of this meeting was published in a very limited edition by the Nauka publishing house only in 1999.

At the end of 1939, in the initial period of the "Finnish" war, the Red Army also failed - not catastrophically, as in the summer of 1941, but very shameful. Stalin was naturally concerned about this and, as I understand it, he decided to understand something for himself and give others the opportunity to figure it out. This was how the April meeting of 1940 was decided.

The discussion turned out to be useful and lively. Just for my own pleasure, although also in the interests of the reader, I will digress somewhat from the topic (perhaps, however, not!) And I will give the following fragment of the transcript of the speech of Colonel Mladentsev, commander of the 387th Infantry Regiment of the 136th Infantry Division:

"BABY. It should also be noted that the fighters were not afraid of the Finns and went to bayonet attacks.

What else should be noted? It should be noted that our fighters were afraid of the Finns when they were not seen, the Finns shoot, and the fighters do not see them (Finnish snipers really were able to influence the strongest nerves. - S.K.) . This had a moral effect on the fighters, but when the fighters saw living Finns, they rushed into battle and could not be held back. Fighters always strived forward, not backward. This particular feature must be noted.

A different picture was shown by the fighters who arrived in reinforcements from Gulyai-Polye (*laughter*).
VOICE. Former Makhnovists (Gulyai-Pole is Makhno's birthplace and "capital" - **S.K.**)
INFANTS. This people fights badly, the former Makhnovists, obviously because that they are 37, 38 years old, obviously, the Makhnovshchina was captured.

The Chelyabinsk replenishment was good, the people fought well and fought hard.

STALIN. These guys are serious.

INFANTS. We fought well..."

At the April meeting of 1940 in the Central Committee, the failures were studied in detail and the positive experience of the Finnish war was summarized. The atmosphere of the meeting was businesslike and, at the same time, relaxed and comradely. Almost fifty people took the floor, including Stalin himself, who delivered the closing speech.

And after that, as I understand it, Stalin decided that the military had learned the necessary lessons from the "Finnish" failures and would not repeat their previous mistakes in a possible war with the Germans.

Alas, the beginning of the Great War showed the opposite ...

The attentive reader may, however, ask: "But where is the consistency of the author? Either he praises the generals of the Red Army, or he condemns them ... But did Marshal Timoshenko or General of the Army Zhukov, or Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Fedorenko, head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, fundamentally differ from the same Major General Kondrusev? If things had turned out differently, the same Kondrusev could have been in the GABTU, and Fedorenko could have been lying in the field near Aleksandrovka ... It's not so much specific people that are to blame, but the system ... "

And the reader, oddly enough, will be right in many respects. But the "system" that programmed future failures was by June 1941 not twenty-four incomplete years (counting from November 1917), but a good six hundred plus years, counting from the time of the developed Mongol-Tatar yoke. This is then in the Russian people -

wide and free, like Russian nature - along with the people of Ivanov, who were saving up strength for the Kulikovo field, the people of Vanek and Manek also began to take shape, always ready to kiss then - a foreign, and later - just a master's *boot* .

The people of Ivanov lived according to the rule: "To serve is not to burr, but to burr is not to serve!"

Narodishko Vanek existed according to the rule: "Do not dare to have your own judgment" ...

Moreover, this second, petty and weak-hearted people of Vankov and "Mitkov" has received its development in all segments of the population of Russia. And in the upper strata, his percentage of the people of Ivanov was much greater than in the mass of the people.

In the USSR, Stalin, in Russia, Stalin was valued by Ivanov, but the old "Raseya" left a legacy of the new Russia - among other things - and the mass "vankovo" psychology. The Ivans lived by business, the Vankas lived by their skins. General Ivan Russiyanov prepared the division for war and was always ready for it. And the "vanyok" with the general's buttonholes was preparing mainly for reports, reviews, checks, parades and banquets.

"Vanki" of all levels and failed the war that had to be won
Ivan. And this is not "lyricism", this is the truth of history and the truth of the era.

Of course, the above outlined the scheme, and the scheme can not reflect the fullness of life. In reality, a considerable number of Ivanovs bore the features of "vankovs", and in the soul of a considerable number of "vankovs" a spark of Ivan's soul was glimmering. With the outbreak of the war, the Ivans completely burned out the "vankovs" in themselves, and some of the "vankovs" rose to the level of Ivanovs.

The incorrigible "vanki", both with generals and with Red Army buttonholes, did not accept the battle or after the first bursts of shells retreated, raised their hands, and even, like General Vlasov, served the enemy.

However, even the war did not completely outlive either the "vankovo" psychology in the country, or the carriers of this psychology on all the "floors" of society. Moreover, some of the "vankas" even "grew up" during the war - after all, not all of them were captured. And some even received high awards, and even Golden Stars, while deep down remaining the same "vanko". In addition, in the victorious country, for successfully mimicking dignitaries, including those in uniform, an objectively favorable situation developed - it is always more profitable to share the sweet pie of victory than the bitter cracker of defeat.

And, as I said, after Stalin's death, everything began to be blamed on him. Fortunately, Nikita Khrushchev encouraged this in every possible way, and many of the representatives of the post-war "marshall" and the highest generals were his natural allies here, because they also did not need the truth about how the war began.

After the war, Stalin generously did not make public the fact that not only Paanov criminally missed the war, but almost the entire military leadership. After all, readiness for war is determined not even by whether certain units met it in the trenches, but by how these units are trained, how they are equipped, how army life was organized before the war.

In principle, it was much easier to arrange everything here than in the national economy, because the army does not produce anything, it only consumes. And the generals only had to request, receive, distribute and teach subordinates of all levels to use the distributed.

Some top generals could not even do this properly before the war.
And someone clearly betrayed.

What was left for Stalin? After all, just before June 22, 1941, he found himself in a very difficult situation. He hoped for the generals, and he failed the cause of the war even before it began.

And that's what ... Let's say Stalin would even suspect Pavlov of direct betrayal. After all, even in this case, Stalin could not order the arrest of Pavlov before the start of the war, because the arrest at such a moment of just an **alleged** traitor in such a post is no less dangerous for the general tone of the army than leaving him
in place.

But then the war began. The alleged failure became a fact. What to do? After the failures, it was impossible not to punish anyone at all - it was necessary to show the generals that the patience of Stalin and the Motherland was over. However, it was also impossible to punish many - now it was necessary to fight with someone!

At the same time, even knowing for sure that someone had betrayed, it was again dangerous to openly judge and shoot him as a direct traitor, because official information about the direct betrayal of part of the generals would make any command and control impossible for obvious reasons.

But Stalin also could not poke too much a finger not only at traitors, but even at simply dishonest employees. Such - not such, there were no others. It was necessary to fight with those who are.

Therefore, Stalin did not point his finger at the obvious, and remained silent.

And he explained the military failure by the suddenness and perfidy of the attack.

The fact that he covered up the sins, and even the betrayal of someone from the military leadership, was known to a very limited circle of people, some of whom, moreover, died or were shot.

Then it was necessary to fight again ...

And when the Victory came - was it worth stirring up the past?

Stalin thought so - he did not know that after his death, almost all of his marshals (except Rokossovsky) would behave more or less meanly and allow Khrushchev to slander his supreme leader, and even put dirt on his grave.

And to this day, it was not they who were guilty of the failure of the first days of the war, but the "tyrant Stalin" - together with the "executioner" Beria, of course.

After all, Beria "criminally brushed aside" the mythical warnings of the mythical "secret collaborators" Almaz and Carmen. And the Soviet people, "intimidated" - according to Mark Solonin - by "despot Stalin" to death, at first did not want to fight, and only the atrocities of the Nazis changed the situation for Stalin ...

Well, dear reader! We have now come to an analysis of this myth, which is no longer "oak", but vile and offensive to the Russian people.

Myth seven

**EVERYTHING IN THE USSR BEFORE THE WAR WAS KEEPING ON FEAR OF THE NKVD,
AND THEREFORE THE GERMANS IN RUSSIA WERE THE PEOPLE WITH BREAD AND SALT.
THE RED ARMY AND THEIR COMMANDERS DIDN'T WANT AND DIDN'T BE ABLE
TO FIGHT, THE RKKA WAS ACTUALLY COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND RUN, AND ONLY
THE HUGE SPACES OF RUSSIA AND BAD WEATHER WEAKEN THE GERMAN ADVANCE AND
DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO ENTER MOSCOW**

I must admit that I am not well acquainted with the whole array of sensational "domestic" "research" that in the last fifteen years with masochistic voluptuousness enthusiastically "substantiate" this myth. The reason for my indifference is simple: in order to understand the "aromatic" data of some specific substances, it is not at all necessary to sniff them long and carefully.

However, as I understand it, the same Mark Solonin with his book "June 22, or When the Great Patriotic War began" can be considered the "classic" of this myth ... There are plenty of relevant examples supporting the seventh myth, quite documentary and reliable, and those who want to sniff them carefully, I refer to the book of Corned beef.

I myself will cite only one passage from this book. On page 364 of Solonin, referring to page 367 of the statistical collection "Secrecy stamp removed", published in 1993, edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheeva, reports on our huge irretrievable losses of the main types of weapons in 1941 and ironically:

"The loss of **20.5 thousand tanks and 17.9 thousand combat aircraft** (Solonin's allocation. - **S.K.**) was explained by Soviet historians long and simply: old, unreliable, poorly armored "coffins", worked on explosive gasoline ... What else is there argue?"

Well, there is nothing to argue about here ... Gasoline is really explosive ... But here is something to inform the reader, perhaps it is necessary ...

First, on page 367, the summary losses of the main types of weapons for all five years of the war are given. And the figure of 20.5 thousand pieces of equipment lost in 1941 is given not only for tanks, but for tanks and self-propelled guns (self-propelled artillery mounts). Yes, by June 22, 1941, the Red Army did not have a significant number of self-propelled guns - after 1937, their development, which began in 1931, was curtailed. But, firstly, the very principle of calculation shows that the losses of this type of weapons include all gross losses - including armored vehicles, light tanks, wedges, etc., and in the Red Army of the June 1941 model of this junk - thanks to the technical "policy" there were a lot of two successive chiefs of armaments of the Red Army Uborevich and Tukhachevsky. Sergei Pereslegin, a thorough researcher, once noted in one of his articles that the army before the war was oversaturated with light tanks. I think that even without a war, due to decommissioning and re-equipment, a considerable part of these 20.5 thousand pieces of equipment would have irretrievably "departed" from the Red Army - for remelting. In addition, shortly after June 22, 1941, "hastily - according to the Encyclopedia of Tanks - built" self-propelled guns based on the ZIS-30 gun appeared in the Red Army. These self-propelled guns were created just in a hurry and were quickly knocked out, however, they gave some increase in the total loss figure.

Of course, the losses of 1941 were enormous. But in that war, they were generally huge. Even in the year 1944, which was victorious for the Red Army, the losses of tanks and self-propelled guns amounted to 23.7 thousand units, and these were already formidable modern vehicles, the design of which was "run in" by the war! Rezun and corned beef can, of course, sarcastically remark on this that the Germans had less losses.

Well, this is, firstly, how to say - if we comprehensively analyze both the course of hostilities and the data themselves on the losses and "victories" of the Germans. When analyzing the eighth myth, I will give some interesting data on this matter. The main thing is that the Germans lost the war with less losses. In a serious, "no fools" war, the higher losses of the winner are the price of **victory**.

Further ... Mark Solonin especially unfairly cites the number of losses by aircraft. He presents the case as if all these almost 18 thousand aircraft were shot down in battles. But this is not so! And even very wrong, because on page 367 of the 1993 statistical handbook mentioned above it is said:

"In aviation, a large proportion of losses - **more than half** (the emphasis is mine everywhere. - **S.K.**) - make up **non-combat** losses. They are associated with the training of pilots, with a reduction in the time for their training, especially with the development of new technology, as well as indiscipline of the flight crew, flight managers in the performance of flight training tasks. The number of non-combat losses also depended on the design, production shortcomings of the machines "...

For 1941, the percentage of combat and non-combat losses was most likely less than over fifty percent, although - how to say. The front-line losses of the flight and technical staff of the Air Force, the general nervous situation in the first months of the war could in no way contribute to either maintaining (not to mention improving) the quality of training of young pilots, or the high quality of aircraft production and their rear services.

That is, Solonin gave a number of losses from a reference book edited by General Krivosheev, but kept silent about the estimates of *the structure* of these losses, although he himself was familiar with these estimates. And this is the norm for his "analysis".

By the way, I don't know if Mark Solonin is aware of this, but there is some truth in his ironic statement about "explosive" gasoline in the gas tanks of Soviet "coffins". Gasoline on Soviet aircraft at the beginning of the war was, in some respects, indeed more "explosive" than on German aircraft - both in terms of its octane number and due to the lack of tested (that is, protected, rubberized from the inside) gas tanks, which sharply reduced the fire hazard in the event of a tank damage bullets or shell fragments. The Germans, on the other hand, had such tanks with petrol-resistant rubber by the beginning of the war (German chemistry has always been the most advanced in the world), and in the first battles our pilots could not believe their eyes: they put a burst right into the gas tank, and the German flies himself and does not even smoke.

This is how things stand with the "democratic" anti-Stalinist "analysis" of the losses of military equipment of the Red Army ... As for the "mass surrender", voluptuously described by Solonin, it is simply disgusting for me to cite and then refute this or that - really took place - the facts of betrayal, surrender, confusion, etc., with which M. Solonin is trying to prove that the Red Army from the first days of the war as an organized force fell apart.

But this does not mean that I am done with the analysis and refutation of the seventh myth as such. No, I am just starting my analysis, not closing my eyes both to the fact that in 1941 the Red Army, although it covered itself with glory, did not provide major victories, and to the fact that the arrival of the Germans was far from a tragedy for everyone in the occupied territory, prompting to rebuff the invaders, or at least to their moral rejection.

As you know, it is better to see once than hear a hundred times. With regard to written sources, I would reduce this coefficient by an order of magnitude and say: "It is better to see once than to read ten times." After all, a photographic document often contains and, in the literal sense of the word, *visibly* reveals something that is either very difficult, or even

impossible to describe in words.

So, in the already mentioned book-photo album by Francois de Lannoy "German tanks in Ukraine. 1941" contains, among other things, expressive photographs of Ukrainian villages, decorated with greenery arches; with residents joyfully meeting a column of German armored vehicles. There are also photos of Ukrainian peasant women presenting bouquets of flowers to the soldiers of the Reich and treating a photogenic German motorcyclist from a propaganda company with milk from jars. There is also a photo of our prisoners in de Lannoy's book, with a homemade swastika flag going into captivity without any protection.

All this was, but, I repeat, I will not cite certain memories confirming the veracity of such photographs. Texts of this nature are in abundance in the books of Rezun, Solonin, Solzhenitsyn and other manufacturers of "golden bricks" (Rezun's expression) for laying in the "future genuine, - according to Rezun, - the history of the war." The reader, if desired, can get acquainted with such texts in their falsely "truthful" opuses.

Besides...

In addition, what about the statements of Vladimir-"Viktor" Rezun-"Suvorov", Mark Solonin and others that almost immediately after June 22, 1941, the Red Army turned into a crowd, throwing guns and surrendering in "packs", on background of this quote:

"Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last man. Only in places they surrender in the first place, where there is a large percentage of Mongolian peoples in the troops (in front of the front of the 6th and 9th armies). catches the eye,

that during the capture of artillery batteries, etc. ... only a few are taken prisoner. Part of the Russians fight until they are killed ... "

This was recorded in his personal diary by General Halder on June 29, 1941, and, leaving the words about the "Mongolian peoples" on the conscience of his front-line informants, we will take the general's statement into account.

Yes, then Halder continues: "... others run, throw off their uniforms ..." That is, there was such a thing, and at the same time someone just tried to sit out, but someone - I continue quoting Halder's entry of June 29, 1941 - tried to "get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants."

Get out of the encirclement to *your own*, and not with a gun under your arm or without it, briskly walk to the *German* field kitchens!

That's what was really massive in 1941! Although a lot of former Soviet citizens then went to German kitchens, yes, they walked. Let's say, some of those young "Red Army men" who were called up for active service in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus before the war or immediately after the start of the war. Among them, too, there were heroes or simply reliable fighters, however, quite a few "Westerners", brought up in the traditions of small-scale "individualism", accustomed to wordlessly bend their backs in front of the "pans" masters, quickly raised their hands and then posed picturesquely in front of the photographic lenses of German war correspondents.

Or, if you remember the times a little later - in the autumn of 1941, you can see about 60 thousand young Crimean Tatars, who almost without exception deserted from the ranks of the Red Army, in order to soon voluntarily join the auxiliary troops of the Wehrmacht and in the Crimean prisoner of war camps carve stars on the chest of the prisoners of the Red Navy .

Let us return, however, to those whose heroism was documented by the enemy ... Already in the first days of the war, the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces wrote:

"Inspector General of the Infantry Ott reported on his impressions of the battle in the Grodno region. The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from the principles of the Rules; now it is unacceptable."

Excuse me, but this one phrase immediately torpedoed all the "Icebreakers" and beats all the "concepts" of Corned beef on the spot! This is a volley for cover! After all, these are not memoirs of a "deadly frightened" Stalinist "cattle in stripes", not a dull monograph of the "stagnant" Main Political Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but an internal assessment of the quality of our resistance and the organization of this resistance, given by the highest officers of the Wehrmacht! And the assessment is in real time!

And she shows that from the very beginning the Germans were convinced that here they were confronted not by cocky - however, only in the image of Henryk Sienkiewicz - "arrogant" gentlemen and not brave - in the image of Dumas père - militant chevaliers, but by those same Russian soldiers, about whom the Prussian king Friedrich said that it was not enough to kill them, they also had to be knocked down! That is, from the very first days of the war, the Germans were convinced that it was necessary to fight seriously *here* , because *this* enemy knows how to fight!

In a diary entry on June 22, 1941, on the first day of the war, Halder arrogantly and condescendingly remarked:

"It seems that the Russian command, due to its sluggishness, will not be able to organize operational opposition to our offensive in the near future ..."

And exactly one week later, he states that Russians do not take liberties with themselves. allow. What's it like?

However, such a forcedly high assessment will not look unexpected if we carefully and in detail study the military biographies of those commanders and generals of the Red Army who started the war in certain, but rather high command positions and who successfully advanced to higher positions in the course of the war. Active Army. And I cannot fail to notice once again that in this respect the biographical directories "Komandarmy" and "Komkory", which I mentioned earlier, are excitingly interesting and informative. And as an epigraph to them, one could take the words of General Halder from his diary entry of June 23, 1941. Discussing the danger of a separate offensive by the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian, the general writes:

"This danger should be taken into account, especially since it was the Russians who first put forward the idea of massing mobile units (Budyonny)..."

Remembering the priority of the enemy on the second day of the triumphant war against him is, you know ... This is more than a flattering assessment of the military talent of both Budyonny himself and those Soviet commanders who admired him as boys ... Not academic "studies" reminded Halder of the Russian marshal, and the level of Russian resistance from the first days of the war!

But the "Russian" "democrats" cannot pronounce the name of the "ignorant horseman" Budyonny without a smirk.

N-yes...

On the other hand, for example, Nikita Khrushchev could descend to direct slander against the one with whom he shared bread, salt and a man's cup in Kiev before the war, whom he praised before the war and whom he later, when this commander died a heroic death, wrote off in 1941 and later their own sins and miscalculations during the struggle for Kiev.

I mean Army General Kirponos, about whom in October (1957)

plenum of the Central Committee, where Zhukov was filmed, Khrushchev said this:

"Commander Kirponos was an unadapted person, never a division commanded. He was the head of the schools..."

Forever 49-year-old (he died in 1941), Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos, during the Civil War, commanded a battalion, regiment, after graduating from the Frunze Academy in 1927, he was chief of staff of a division, and in 1934 he was indeed appointed head and military commissar of Tataro -Bashkir Military School, soon renamed the Kazan Infantry School named after the Supreme Council of the Tatar ASSR. But Kirponos still commanded the division - during the Soviet-Finnish war, for which he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. From April 1940, he commanded a corps, from which position he first went to the Leningrad military, and then to the Kiev Special Military District, which was transformed into the Southwestern Front with the outbreak of war.

In the collective collection "The Fatal Decisions" ("Fatal Decisions"), written by a group of German generals in the late forties, commissioned by the Yankees and published for the first time in New York in 1956 (two years later there was already a Russian translation of the Military Publishing House), the former chief of staff 4th Army of the Wehrmacht, General Günther Blumentritt wrote:

"... on the front of the Army Group Center, the Russians were taken by surprise ... But the Army Group South immediately ran into stubborn resistance, and heavy battles unfolded there.

And everything went according to plan..."

Army Group Center is the enemy of Army General Pavlov, shot on July 22, 1941 and rehabilitated by Khrushchev in 1957.

And the Army Group "South" is the enemy of Colonel General Kirponos, who died while leaving the encirclement in battle on September 20, 1941 and slandered by Khrushchev in the same 1957.

But General Halder, as the reader knows, at the end of June 1941, highly appreciated the actions of the Russian command against Army Group South, that is, the actions of Kirponos. The German general von Butlar also praised them after the war, writing:

"...Waging heavy bloody battles, the troops of the Army Group South could only inflict frontal blows on the enemy and push him to the east. Motorized German formations never managed to enter the operational space or bypass the enemy, not to mention the encirclement of any significant Russian forces ... "

Nevertheless, the war began hard, and the most obvious and obvious proof of this was the long columns of prisoners stretching to the German rear.
It was?

Yes!

But how many of our prisoners were there?

The "democrats" keep talking about four, sometimes even about seven million ... Domestic military history now recognizes the figure of more than two million Soviet prisoners of war in 1941. However, even this figure seems to me seriously overestimated. And although I am writing short essays on the beginning of the war, and the topic of Soviet prisoners of war deserves a thorough study, we will also have to stop a little on this side of the initial period of the war.

The figure of 2.4 million was published in October 1941 by Hitler. The official documents of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht record about 1.8 million captured Soviet soldiers as of October 10, 1941 (see VIZH, 1992, No. 2, p. 51).

In the statistical reference book "Secrecy stamp removed ...", on page 336, with reference to the reports of the German high command, the figure is 2,561 thousand prisoners of war (of which, according to German data, in the Kiev region - 665 thousand people).

In the reference book mentioned above, the total German figure is delicately called "not entirely accurate", but the data of this reference book already makes it possible to determine it as *not at all a ton!*

And that's why...

1. The Germans included in the number of prisoners of war all the men who departed with the troops, including employees of party and Soviet bodies, as well as civilian workers employed before the war in the construction of defense facilities.

2. As reported in the same reference book "Secrecy stamp removed...", often the number of prisoners in a particular operation - according to German data - exceeded the total number of Soviet troops involved in this operation. So, near Kiev, the Germans allegedly "captured" 665 (six hundred and sixty-five) thousand people (and this figure is readily reproduced by "democrats" of the Rezunov type). Meanwhile, the entire number of troops of the South-Western Front by the beginning of the Kyiv defensive operation amounted to 627 (six hundred and twenty-seven) thousand people.

In Sevastopol, 100 (one hundred) thousand prisoners were counted, although by the end of the defense of Sevastopol, there were hardly such a number of all residents in the city, including children.

I can give you a documentary example. In the "Description of the course of hostilities of the 4th Panzer Group from October 14 to December 5, 1941" (see "Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. Vol. 15 (4 - 1), M.: TERRA, 1997, document No. 19) it is boastfully stated that in the "Vyazemsky cauldron" the troops of Colonel General Goepner allegedly "captured hundreds of thousands of prisoners and colossal trophies. "Hundreds of thousands" cannot mean figures of less than two hundred thousand prisoners. And this is supposedly one tank group, allegedly on only one sector of the front near Moscow. But in the same volume of the "Russian Archive" data are given on the consolidated losses of the missing and captured in October - November 1941 of the three fronts opposing the entire Army Group Center - Western, Kalinin and Bryansk. And this figure, which the prisoners cannot possibly include by more than half, is approximately 110,000 people. Moreover, in the report of the command of the 4th German Army, to which the 4th Panzer Group was subordinate, about prisoners and trophies for the period from October 9 to October 21, 1941, the number of prisoners is indicated - 40,360 people. However, this figure is also very high, which I report without arguments, so as not to tire the reader with intermediate calculations. Such examples

you can multiply and multiply...

3. In his not always objective, but written in a hot, one can consider traces (in 1948) strategic and tactical review "The Second World War. 1939 - 1945" English military historian John Frederick Charles Fuller remarked (p. 164 of the Soviet edition of 1956): "It is still impossible to verify German statements, because in German, as well as in Russian, communiqués about victories often cited astronomical figures."

However, it should be clarified that Fuller in this case is referring to the astronomical figures in the German communiqués regarding Russian losses. In assessing their own losses, the Germans were much more modest. I will give an example of such "modesty" when analyzing the following myth with reference to the well-known reference book by B. Müller Hillebrand "The Land Army of Germany 1933-1945".

4. The reference book "Secrecy has been lifted..." on page 337 gives the total number of missing and captured Soviet military personnel at 4,559,000 people. This is for the entire war. At the same time, about 500 thousand people actually died in battles, although they are reported missing. That is, the official number of directly captured is 4059 thousand people. Died (died) in captivity, according to German data, 673 thousand people, and according to our updated data - about 1.3 million people. Almost 940 thousand people from among the previously missing and remaining in the occupied territory were called up again after the liberation of the occupied territories. 1836 thousand people returned from captivity.

For comparison, I will inform you that (see VIZH, 1992, No. 2, p. 51), according to official German data from the war, a total of 5.27 million military personnel were captured, as well as civilians from the Baltic regions, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, passed over to the Germans in the first hours of the war. The American commission of General Wood, who had documents from the Reich Prisoner of War Administration, came to the conclusion that 4 million of our soldiers and officers were captured, of which more than 2 million people died in captivity. According to the Americans, 800-900 thousand people remained alive in captivity at the end of the war. But we know that a million more former prisoners returned to the USSR alone (1 million 836 thousand people).

As you can see, even seemingly serious assessments give a big "discrepancy". But the figure of 4 million Soviet prisoners of war for the entire war can be considered relatively reliable, given that it is given in an official reference book. Nevertheless, personally, it seems to me that the total figure in

approximately 3 million people were taken prisoner from among the direct military personnel of the Active Army, that is, from among **the fighting** Soviet soldiers. I cite this figure again as an integral figure, without intermediate calculations.

For comparison, in the forty months of the First World War, which was permanently unsuccessful for it, the Russian army lost 3,638,271 prisoners and missing. Human.

If the total figure of about 3 million is close to the true one, then in 1941 there may be up to one and a half and less than a million prisoners. At the same time, somewhere between 200-300 thousand of them actually did not fight and were ready to surrender immediately after June 22, 1941. I mean the above-mentioned conscripts from Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian regions, Crimean Tatars, anti-Soviet citizens, and so on.

It is worth considering some qualitative assessments, such as the post-war recognition of General von Butlar that the troops of the Army Group "South" never managed to encircle "any significant Russian forces ...". This careless confession alone can reduce the mythical figure of 665 thousand prisoners allegedly taken near Kiev by almost an order of magnitude - to a value of, say, about 100 thousand. And this last figure looks quite close to the true, considering that General Guderian, obviously exaggerating, writes in his Memoirs of a Soldier about the number of prisoners "captured in the Kiev region", "over 290,000 people."

General Halder on the 38th day of the war, July 29, 1941, that is, when the Wehrmacht has already won almost all of its most crushing successes, he noted:

"d. The labor force for agriculture: foreign workers - 210 thousand, prisoners of war - 1500 thousand, Russian prisoners of war - 300 thousand people. Total - over 2 million people".

In July 1941, the war was still quite dynamic and successful for the Germans, and therefore the Germans did not plan the mass use of Russian prisoners of war in the construction of military facilities on the territory of the USSR. And it can be assumed that the figure of three hundred thousand prisoners indicated by Halder **is close to the total as of the end of July 1941!**

True, on July 27, 1941, Halder noted that "Ukrainians and natives of the Baltic states will be released from captivity," but this increases the total number of thousands by two hundred or three hundred - as of the end of July 1941.

Finally, according to my own, of course, very rough estimate, we can talk about the 1941 figure of a million, **or even less**, really **prisoners of war**, that is, Soviet citizens who were in active military service, honestly fought, until they had there was an opportunity, and they were captured in 1941 not of their own free will, but by the force of circumstances.

I hope that the above "arithmetic", if it does not convince the reader, then - at least - will make him think when he gets acquainted with such, for example, statements:

"Napoleon could not ... impose on us a general battle near the border ...

Why? Yes, because the Russian commanders of that time knew the enemy ... and, accordingly, could foresee the development of events ... And on the same, in fact, territory in the early days of the Great Patriotic War, about four million people were surrounded and taken prisoner (my emphasis - **S.K.**), organized people united in regiments, divisions, Corps ... Why were they unable to provide effective resistance ...? What is the reason for what happened in 1941?"

I will not torment the reader - this quote was taken by me from the book "Viktor" "Suvorov" "I take my words back", where the above words precede chapter 18-
yu, and Suvorov himself took it from ... the issue of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper for June 16, 2001.

What does it mean? To be honest, when I read this, I was taken aback. Hitler himself fell short of such an astronomically false figure as four million Soviet prisoners of war in 1941, and even "in the first days of the war!" Therefore, I will not comment in any way on this statement, amazing in its historical blindness and in terms of the level of fabrications, but simply acquaint the reader with it - for completeness of information, so to speak. Or rather, for information about how high the level of disinformation can be in the current "Rossiyaniya".

I, finishing here with the topic of prisoners, I want to at least point out one more point related to the phenomenon of capturing troops during hostilities. The combat stability of troops is a multifactorial concept, and one of the most important factors is the combat readiness and, as the military says, the "cohesion" of the unit.

So, with reference to Marshal Zhukov, I have already said that the Red Army began to transform into a strong regular army only in 1939. And this is well confirmed by objective data, cited, for example, in M. Meltyukhov's book "Stalin's Lost Chance" of the 2002 edition, where on pages 495 - 510 a list of divisions of the Red Army in 1939 - 1941 is given. And from this list it follows that the vast majority of even the rifle divisions of the Red Army were formed in the period from September 1939 to September 1940, and the rifle divisions from the 188th to the 238th were formed even in March 1941.

As for the motorized divisions, out of the thirty-one divisions that were in the Red Army on June 22, 1941, only one was formed in December 1939, and three - in August 1940. The time of the beginning of the formation of all the rest is March 1941 of the year.

Of the sixty-one panzer divisions, eighteen were formed in July 1940, two in October 1940, and the remaining forty-one in March 1941.

Is this evidence of readiness for a preventive strike by the Red Army against the Wehrmacht in 1941?

And what kind of serious "clumping" of divisions, what kind of combat coherence by June 1941 can we talk about with such terms for the formation of units? So one of the reasons for the really indecently huge number of prisoners in 1941 lies in the fact that many soldiers of the Red Army by June 22 simply had not yet learned how to fight! And one courage and selflessness in modern warfare is not enough to win.

However, already in the time of Suvorov, victories were often ensured not by numbers, but by skill.

For us, with the formally numerous Red Army, military skills in 1941 were just not enough. Although the mass base for the rapid acquisition of such skills in a motorized war, the Soviet government laid. When analyzing the tenth myth, I will cite such unexpected data related to Soviet pilots, which struck me myself - after I collected them.

In the meantime, I will cite one of the unexpected testimonies from the time of the war, concerning the mass appearance of not Soviet military personnel, but Soviet prisoners of war. On the 110th day of the war, October 9, 1941, General Halder noted in his diary:

"...and. The question of the protection of prisoners of war. Based on experience in the Kyiv area, a whole division is required to protect and evacuate 20,000 prisoners ... "

What!

Here - if you think about it - is a true collective portrait of Soviet people who were taken prisoner. To protect twenty thousand **unarmed** Russian prisoners of war, the Wehrmacht was forced to allocate **an armed** division of about twenty thousand! Well, let

we are talking about a security division of smaller numbers, but still a **division!** Whoever does not believe, let him open the page of the 27th book of the 2nd volume of the 3rd "Military Diary" of General Halder, published in 1971 by the Military Publishing House, and see for himself the accuracy of the quote.

That is, the Soviet people, by the very nature of their behavior in captivity, delayed significant enemy forces from the front.

At the same time, it would be time to throw into the dustbin of history and the tales that in the USSR, Stalin, a prisoner automatically became an outcast. The fact of captivity was indeed regarded as shameful, and many former prisoners and their families had a hard time. However, already almost a million former prisoners of war and missing after the liberation of the occupied territory, re-conscripted to the Red Army, speaks for itself. And what about the prisoners who escaped from captivity and joined partisan detachments or crossed the front line and returned to the front after filtering? After all, their account must also be kept for at least more than one tens of thousands of people.

The behavior of the main part of the Soviet people during the war was officially defined as a period of mass heroism. But that's how it was - and not only in 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945. So it was in 1941! And in this first year of the war, millions of Russians and Soviet people in general behaved like heroes, and many of them remained unknown heroes and knew about it in advance.

Yes, 1941 was also marked by bouquets from Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian girls for Wehrmacht soldiers, and treason, and betrayal, and just selfishness. It was. But in the end, everything was determined by what prevailed!

Heroism prevailed.

Today, this statement will only cause a skeptical smile among a considerable part of my fellow citizens, and therefore I will turn to German sources, including the official records of General Halder, to confirm my thesis. But first, let me remind you that more than 4 million applications were submitted to the people's militia in the first months of the war.

Not a single military registration and enlistment office could officially call up or mobilize any of the potential fighters of the people's militia - it was not an assigned contingent, not liable for military service. Nevertheless, almost three million people fought in the ranks of the militias alone. Three, not four because not all applications were satisfied.

Four million only non-combatant volunteers - this is also a national statistics for 1941.

And how did the combatant Active Army fight in 1941?.. I will give an assessment of Major General von Butlar, given in his essay "War in Russia", placed in the collective work of a group of German generals "The World War of 1939 - 1945". This work, commissioned by the US Military Historical Service after the war, was published by the Foreign Literature Publishing House in 1957. Von Butlar writes:

"... After some initial successes, the troops of Army Group Center ran into significant enemy forces defending themselves in positions prepared in advance, which in some places even had concrete firing points. In the struggle for these positions, the enemy brought large tank forces into battle and delivered a series of counterattacks against the advancing German troops.

After fierce battles that lasted several days, the Germans managed to break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses west of the Lvov-Rava-Russian line and, by forcing the Styr River, push back the enemy troops, who were stubbornly resisting and constantly turning into counterattacks, to the east ... "

and further, speaking of the results of the border battles:

"During the fighting, the German officers and soldiers fully justified the hopes that were placed on them (here von Butlar puts a good face on a bad game, because the hopes were placed on the blitzkrieg, but it failed. - S.K.) ...

However, as a result of the stubborn resistance of the Russians, already in the first days of the fighting, the German troops suffered such losses in people and equipment that were significantly higher than the losses known to them from the experience of campaigns in Poland and in the West. It became quite obvious that the method of warfare and the fighting spirit of the enemy, as well as the geographical conditions of this country (and what, the German generals with all their education did not know the geography of Russia? - S.K.), were completely different from **those** with which the Germans met in previous "lightning wars", which led to successes that amazed the whole world ... "

Himself refuting his statement that during the hostilities the German officers and soldiers fully justified the hopes that were placed on them, von Butlar states:

"Critically evaluating today the border battles in Russia, we can conclude that only Army Group Center was able to achieve such successes, which even from an operational point of view seem great."

So, the successes of the Wehrmacht in the initial period of the war were nothing more than operational, that is, only a step higher than tactical ones. But hopes were pinned on German officers and *strategic soldiers*. And the collapse of these hopes already in 1941 was indirectly recognized, as we see, by the German generals themselves of the 1941 model.

Above is the German estimate. Moreover, my dear reader, this is actually a military classic, now partially forgotten by us, and strenuously hushed up by the "democrats". So further I will give, without any cuts, the text taken from pages 161 - 162 of the already mentioned by me and also the classic book of the Anglo-Saxon John Fuller, published in 1956 by the Foreign Literature Publishing House. This text is so convincing that it does not need any comments:

"...events in Russia developed differently than in Poland and France. Outwardly, the "blitzkrieg" was successful beyond all expectations, however, oddly enough, there was little or no panic on the Russian front and behind it. Already on June 29, an article appeared in the Völkischer Beobachter (German official - **S.K.**), which stated: "The Russian soldier surpasses our enemy in the West with his contempt for death. Endurance and fatalism (well, well. - **S.K.**) make him hold on until he is killed in a trench or falls dead in hand-to-hand combat. On July 6, a similar article in the Frankfurter Zeitung pointed out that "the psychological paralysis that usually followed lightning German breakthroughs in the West is not observed to such an extent in the East that in most cases the enemy not only does not lose the ability to act, but , in turn, is trying to capture the German pincers "..."

Citing these real-time German public estimates, Fuller continued:

"This was to some extent new in the tactics of war, and for the Germans - an unexpected surprise. "Völkischer Beobachter" wrote in this regard in early September: "During the forcing of the Bug by the German troops, the first waves of attackers in some places could move forward completely unhindered, then unexpectedly deadly fire was opened on the next waves of the attackers, and the first waves were fired from the rear. It is impossible not to respond with praise for

excellent discipline of the defenders, which makes it possible to hold an already almost lost position.

In short, Fuller concludes, according to Arvid Fredborg, "the German soldier met an enemy who, with fanatical tenacity, held on to *his* political creed and countered the German *blitz offensive* with total resistance" ... "

The following statement by Fuller (p. 162) is also important for us:

"... Before the start of the war with Russia, the German intelligence service relied heavily on the "fifth column". But in Russia, although there were dissatisfied, there was no "fifth column" ... "

Fuller was not entirely accurate here - elements of the "fifth column" were also in Russia. But, unlike the European countries, these were only disunited elements, unable to influence the situation in any decisive way, even in a tactical sense, not to mention a strategic one. Moreover, even in the occupied territory of Russia, an influential "fifth column" was never formed - Vlasov's ROA was perceived as an organization of renegades even by many Vlasovites, although they carefully concealed this even from themselves.

Starting with the issue of the 2nd "Military History Journal" for 1992, German protocols of interrogations of a number of Soviet generals who were captured in 1941 were published on the pages of the magazine. In No. 2 itself, 1992, on pages 53-58, data of the interrogation dated September 28, 1941 of the captured commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov (the reader should remember him from my previous story).

Born in 1902, a native of the village of Mochalovo, Yukhnovsky district, Smolensk region, Potapov, during interrogation, pretended to be a native of the Moscow region, which is quite understandable - the Smolensk region was already occupied by the Germans at that time. Potapov's biography was quite typical for a young Soviet general of the 1941 model: in the Red Army since 1920, then - study, service, study again, growth in positions and ranks up to the commander of the 4th mechanized corps from July 1940 and from January 1941 - Commander of the 5th K

Until the liberation by Soviet troops on April 29, 1945, Potapov was held in the camps of Hammelsburg, Godelitein, Weissenburg and Moozbur. In his behavior in German captivity, the general was also quite typical. Without going to any cooperation with the Germans in captivity and behaving all the time of captivity, let's say, tolerably, he nevertheless did not spit in the enemy's face and answered in September 1941 even to such questions that should have been answered.

But that is precisely why the protocol of Potapov's interrogation, with the accuracy of a document, recorded a number of facts that are deadly for the current "democratic" concept of Russian history. For example, the fact that the attitude of officers and Red Army men towards commissars is "quite good and comradely", that "a commissar is a friend of a soldier who shares his worries with him", that the proportion of Jewish commissars in the army hardly exceeds one percent of the total number of commissars.

Asked whether the Russian people are deep down ready to wage war even if they find that the army has retreated to the Urals, Potapov replied: "Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense."

Potapov said so in captivity, in a state of undoubted depression from *his own* unsuccessful defensive actions. However, the most active part of the Soviet people, formed by the Soviet government, already in 1941 was in a state of moral **offensive!**

Only one example of a multitude capable of compiling a strictly documentary, without a single line of fiction, a thick book, or rather - multi-volume edition. In 1968, with a circulation of 25,000 copies (for those times, the circulation was almost limited), an excellent book by paratrooper-political worker General Ivan Ivanovich Lisov "Paratroopers (airborne assault)" was published.

General Ivan Lisov was an associate of the famous General Ivan Margelov, one of the creators of the post-war Soviet Airborne Forces (VDV) and the long-term commander of these "Uncle Vanya's troops", as they themselves called the Airborne Forces paratroopers.

In the book of General Lisov, among the descriptions of the military operations of Soviet paratroopers in the first days of the war, there are diaries of the senior political instructor A.F. Polyakov about the actions of the 214th airborne brigade of the 4th airborne corps, which was behind enemy lines, under the command of Colonel Levashov.

Alexey Fedorovich Levashov - he turned 41 in 1941 - was a prominent representative of the young generation of new Russian people brought up by the new Russia. A native of the village of Bolshoi Dvor in the Babushkinsky district of the Vologda province, he was drafted into the Red Army in September 1919 on mobilization, fought with Kolchak, beat the Tyutyunik and Struk gangs in Ukraine ... In August 1921 he was sent to study at an infantry school, served, studied again, served again, since 1936 he became one of the first Soviet landing commanders. And then all his life - until his death on February 23, 1942 during the fighting of the 4th airborne corps led by him -

was a paratrooper.

Both Levashov himself and his subordinates did not experience any confusion with the outbreak of the war. Were you behind enemy lines? Well, this is a "regular" situation for paratroopers. And for three months, Levashov's fighters smashed the German garrisons, headquarters, rear communications, and in August 1941 they went to their own.

In December 1941, the corps of Colonel Levashov, who soon became a major general, took part in the Vyazemsky airborne operation, during which Levashov died.

I look at his photographs - on one, pre-war, he is with two Major "sleepers" and a parachutist badge with a pendant on which the number of jumps is indicated. The second photo was taken after leaving the German rear: four colonel's "sleepers", the medal "XX Years of the Red Army" and the brand new Order of Lenin ... Large, strong-willed, with a chin "fossa", Russian face.

Alexei, the son of Fedor, a soldier in Stalin's army... And now about the stamina of people like General Levashov, through the mouth of General Halder.

June 23, 2nd day of the war:

"... the enemy in the Bialystok sack is fighting not for his life, but for winning time."

June 24, 3rd day of the war:

"There are no signs of an operational withdrawal of the enemy ... It should be noted the stubbornness of individual Russian formations in battle. There were cases when the garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.

June 25, 4th day of the war:

"... the Russians decided to wage decisive battles in the border zone and retreat only in certain sectors of the front, where they are forced to do so by the strong onslaught of our advancing troops ..."

June 28, 7th day of the war:

"It seems that the enemy undertook only a partial withdrawal with stubborn battles for each line, and not a major withdrawal of an operational or strategic scale ... <...>

General Brand: ...the resistance...of the fanatically fighting enemy troops was very strong, which caused heavy losses in the 31st Infantry Division...
<...>

In the rear of Army Group North, numerous remnants of the defeated enemy units, some of which even have tanks, cause serious concern ...

In all sectors of the front, a small number of prisoners is characteristic, along with a very a large amount of trophy property (including fuel) ... "

June 29, 8th day of the war:

"In the rear of the 1st Panzer Group, separate enemy groups are also operating with tanks that even advance considerable distances... <....>

Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last man. Only in some places they surrender ... It is striking that when artillery batteries were captured, etc. only a few are captured ... <...>

In the Lvov area, the enemy is slowly retreating to the east, waging stubborn battles. Here, for the first time, mass destruction of bridges by the enemy is observed.

In the center of Army Group Center, our completely mixed divisions are making every effort not to let the enemy out of the inner ring of encirclement, desperately breaking through in all directions ... "

My friend reader! After all, our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers are desperately making their way to **theirs** in order to defend the future for their descendants ... That, alas, the future that we have today, when we don't have to sacrifice our lives at all in order to win time and the country, mediocre, inglorious, without we lose the fight...

And they are fighting, and the German general writes:

July 1, 10th day of the war:

"... The enemy breaks tanks into the ground and thus leads the defense ...

The enemy retreats with exceptionally stubborn battles, clinging to every line ...

Serious concern is given to the problem of pacifying the rear area ... Security divisions alone are absolutely not enough ... We will have to allocate several divisions from the army for this.

July 4, 13th day of the war:

"Fights with the Russians are exceptionally stubborn. Captured only

a small number of prisoners ... "

July 5, 14th day of the war:

"During the battles with the "hordes of the Mongols" (obviously, Stalin's personal guard) (no comment. - **S.K.**), wedged into the rear of the 6th Army, the 168th Infantry Division showed complete failure ..."

July 6, 15th day of the war:

"... From the units they report that in some areas the crews of enemy tanks leave their vehicles, but in most cases they lock themselves in tanks and prefer to burn themselves along with the vehicles ..."

Finally, on July 11, on the 20th day of the war, a significant entry appears in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht:

"The enemy command is acting energetically and skillfully. The enemy fights fiercely and fanatically...

Tank formations suffered significant losses in personnel and materiel. The troops are tired ... "

They don't get tired of victories - victories inspire. And already on the twentieth day of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders, these

the invaders were tired of the first defeats and of the increasingly obsessive gnawing thought: "What will happen next?"

I will return to the notes of General Halder, who involuntarily recorded the steadfastness and valor of Soviet soldiers in 1941. I will return to the topic of "bad weather" and "Hitler's mistakes". But even from what the reader has already read, one can understand - whether Russian distances and bad weather in the middle of the Russian summer frustrated the plans for a blitzkrieg and all hopes - even tactical ones - that the Germans had pinned on a "blitzkrieg" war with Russia.

Myth eight

THE GERMANS GAVE THE RED ARMY "TANK" AND "AIR" POGROM. SOVIET TANK TROOPS AND AIR FORCE TURNED OUT OF EFFECTIVE, FIGHTED INSANELY AND DIE IN vain

In 1988, in the September issue of the magazine of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs "International Affairs", an article by V. Shlykov "And our tanks are fast" was published, which was soon followed by his second article "Armor is strong ...".

The MID magazine was then on the rise, had a circulation of more than 60 thousand copies, and the publication of articles became, in a certain sense, an event - well, the author published stunning data that in 1941 the Wehrmacht had no advantage over the Red Army in tanks, nor a qualitative, let alone quantitative. On the contrary, the Soviet tank troops had an overwhelming advantage, and only the "soviet" mediocrity caused the defeat of these troops in 1941.

Over time, the even harsher term "Tank pogrom of 1941" appeared. That is how V. Beshanov called his famous book. At the same time, he argued that the collapse of "the system of totalitarian unanimity, the liberation of historians from the cruel party dictates," etc. allowed de "to rethink the political events that took place in Russia after 1917, to eliminate many" white

spots "...".

I note that many "historians" who have replaced the "cruel" party dictate with a fat dollar dictate would do well to begin by comprehending the events that took place in Russia after 1991. As for the "white spots", such "historians" really "eliminate" them in a very peculiar way - covering them with black paint, or even just dirt.

I will not analyze V. Beshanov's book here ... Andrey Morozov did it for me, in my opinion - excellently, in his, unfortunately, short but convincing article "Tank pogrom and a lot of yellow pants", published in the collective military history collection "Tragedy of 1941" (M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008).

On the very topic of "tank", and at the same time "aircraft" "pogroms", I need to speak out ... And as a kind of "epigraph" for the analysis of this myth, I will quote from the "Complete Encyclopedia of Tanks of the World 1915 - 2000." (compiled by G.L. Kholyavsky):

"Created in 1935, the BT-7 wheeled-tracked tank, without a doubt, was an outstanding vehicle for its time, which had no equal in the world in terms of maneuverability. However, in the domestic press, when covering the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, it has long become a tradition to rank the BT-7 among the obsolete, limited combat-ready tanks. It is this reason that justifies their high losses in June-August 1941 ... "

The authors of the "Encyclopedia ..." believe that such a justification is incorrect already because a car is attributed to obsolete, the production of which ceased only in 1940. But this is not so paradoxical - let's say, the Tupolev "mastodon" TB-3, hopelessly outdated four years before the war, was produced with M 34FRN engines until 1937, and the second, also outdated by the beginning of the war, the Tupolev SB bomber was mass-produced even before 1940.

On the other hand, the statement of the "Encyclopedia ..." is valuable that the large losses of BT-7 are explained by the wrong tactics of their combat use. Insufficient tank armor determined the rationality of its use from ambushes, using natural and artificial shelters, and the BT-7 was thrown into open attacks, and even without artillery and air cover, because, as the Encyclopedia ... notes, "our combat regulations provided for for tank units, there is only one type of battle - an attack. Shooting from a place in the defense was allowed in extremely rare cases. Therefore, "we switched to the tactics of tank ambushes only in the autumn of 1941 - after more than 90% of our tanks were knocked out" ...

An important note ... The tactics of tank ambushes in the initial period of the war could and really was - when it was skillfully used - very successful and effective specifically for Soviet tankers. The future marshal of the armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, in the fall of 1941, colonel, commander of the 4th tank brigade, which soon became the 1st guards tank brigade, brilliantly used ambush tactics (using pre-prepared reserve positions) against Guderian in Moscow direction. Katukov did not have even a hundred tanks, and the Germans thought that there were five times more of them. And so it was with minimal losses at Katukov! And although Katukov had more T-34 medium tanks in the brigade, he also successfully used light tanks in ambushes.

M.E. Katukov at the beginning of the war commanded the 20th tank division in the 9th mechanized corps K.K. Rokossovsky and came to his tactics, presumably, as a result of comprehending the very bitter experience of border battles.

Returning to the BT-7 and its assessment in the "Encyclopedia of Tanks", I can report that these tanks, which were knocked out in battles, could not be restored due to the lack of spare parts, and they were out of action forever. Their fighting qualities were also reduced by the lack of the required number of trained crews. For example, only a well-trained driver could shift gears on the move. This was also explained by the fact that, as Encyclopedia writes ..., "meeting the requirements of the manufacturer, ABTU (Automotive Armored Directorate of the Red Army. - **S.K.**) agreed to changes that made life easier for production workers, without thinking at all about tankers."

Nevertheless, the BT-7 was quite well developed over the five years of mass production and, from the point of view of reliability theory, as a type of serial equipment had quite satisfactory technical reliability. From 1935 to 1940, 4881 BT-7 and BT-7A tanks were manufactured.

That's why I started with the BT-7 - by 1941, these light tanks made up a large part of those formally huge Soviet tank forces, which today some people try to present as overwhelmingly superior to the German tank forces. In fact, the excess of light BT-7 did not strengthen us very much and rather played a negative role.

The most massive pre-war tank of direct infantry support T 26 was produced in more than ten modifications. And as of January 1, 1941, there were 9,665 of them in the Red Army, and in total, 11,218 tanks had been produced by industry since 1931. At the same time, a modification of the T-26RT with a cylindrical turret and a radio station was produced in 1933 - 1940 in the amount of 2127 units, and the T-26-1 with a conical turret - in the amount of 1975 vehicles in 1939 - 1940. Alas, since the time of Tukhachevsky in

The Red Army was carried away by the number of tanks, sacrificing quality and not having time to train experienced tankers. At the same time, the most obsolete tanks in the Red Army turned out to be the most reliable by the beginning of the war.

With the theme of the reliability of armored vehicles, which we have already touched upon, I will begin the analysis of the eighth myth. And since, according to "Viktor" "Suvorov", it was Mark Solonin who "performed a scientific feat" and laid "a golden brick in the foundation of the history of the war that will someday be written", I will touch on some of Solonin's "discoveries", having previously recalled to the reader that all that glitters is not gold.

On pages 292 - 296 of the book "June 22 ..." Solonin pays attention to this side of the matter and states that "the stories about the extreme wear and tear of our military equipment on the verge of war ..." are not confirmed in original documents.

But here's how and with what he refutes these "tales" ... Referring to the "report on the combat activities of the 10th Panzer Division on the front of the fight against German fascism", Solonin quotes: "... the KB and T-34 tanks, without exception, were new vehicles and by the time of the hostilities, they had worked up to 10 hours (they had mostly been run-in) ...".

What does it mean?

In Solonin's view, a completely new car is a very reliable car. But from the point of view of reliability theory, this is just a very unreliable machine. A reliable machine is **a run-in** machine in which all hidden defects have already been identified and eliminated. And in order for defects to be revealed, not only a certain period of operation is required. We also need well-defined operating conditions - as close as possible to combat. And here - just a run-in!

Until June 22, the new tanks only had time to run in - not over the mountains and valleys, but along relatively calm tracks. And after June 22, this, not yet run-in equipment, was thrown into a real battle. This is where she began to refuse!

Yes, there was no wear problem for new Soviet tanks in 1941, Solonin is right here. But for them there was another problem - short service life, insufficient for reliable **running-in** of equipment, and not just its running. The result was the same as in the case of wear and tear - the failure of equipment not as a result of combat losses, but due to technical malfunctions.

By the way ... Solonin, citing the report of the 10th Panzer Division, did not seem to understand that he had already flogged himself insofar as he himself cited data that the personnel of the division with the new KB and T-34 tanks were practically unfamiliar and to On June 22, 1941, I could not master them well - what can be done in 10 hours of running-in?

For numerous T-26, BT-7 and their modifications (not to mention the very old BT-5 and so on), the problem of wear was critical - no matter what and whoever claimed the opposite.

Solonin refers to the "Statement of the availability and technical condition of combat vehicles as of June 1, 1941" for the Kiev Special Military District, from which it follows that out of 5465 tanks of the district, 1124 units were completely new, not yet in operation (we already know that this is not an advantage of a combat vehicle, but a disadvantage); 3664 units (67%) were considered "quite serviceable and fit for use", and only 677 units (12%) needed medium and major repairs.

But would it not be reasonable to assume that this statement, to put it mildly, embellished the real state of affairs or, to put it more simply, was designed to *rub points* to higher authorities? Moreover, in the Kiev district, these traditions were old - since the time of Yakir ... It is interesting - did Mark Solonin come up with this consideration?

In any case, if I admit this, respecting the Red Army of the 1941 model of the year, then such an assumption would be all the more natural for Mark

Corned beef, which the Red Army model of 1941 does not appreciate a penny. After all, he declares every now and then that everyone was "afraid" then. So the question is: what, "afraid" of pomp and so will report on massive breakdowns, on the threatening situation with the resource? Personally, I don't think they were "afraid". But I cannot rule out the desire of these pompous people to look *decent*. And few people were going to fight in 1941 - contrary to later memoirs.

Therefore, it cannot be categorically stated that the statement cited by Solonin is not an example of embellishing the situation. Alas, the desire to look "prettier", as well as complacency, have let down Russian people more than once since the time of Kievan Rus.

But this is half the trouble ...

In reality, according to my deep conviction, which was formed in the course of working on this book, the tankers **of the Red Army** immediately after June 22, 1941, that is, with the start of real hostilities, found themselves in extremely unfavorable conditions, being ***absolutely not to blame***.

No, the failures of our tank troops were influenced by a number of completely subjective (that is, those that should be blamed on the tankers and the command) negative factors ...

Criminal blunders, mediocrity, inactivity, incompetence or confusion of a considerable part of the command at all levels ...

Poor development of the strategy and tactics of mobile formations - although, as we know, there is authoritative evidence to the contrary, coming from such a serious expert as General Halder. I mean his recognition of Budyonny's priority in developing operational methods for using mobile connections.

Insufficient combat training, poor training of personnel and the lack of technical skills associated with this (General Halder noted in his diary on July 12, 1941: "The degree of training of Russian tank drivers is apparently low") ...

Violation of communications for the supply of fuel and lubricants and ammunition...

The suboptimal pre-war deployment of units, forcing them, after the start of hostilities, not to immediately engage in battle, but first to make marches of hundreds of kilometers ...

This and many other things really took place and played their fatal role to a large extent.

But - as I now understand - the main reason was that the failures of our tank forces were programmed by ***objective*** circumstances, which become understandable, visible and obvious only when the concepts of reliability theory are involved in a systematic analysis of the situation. Actually, I already wrote about this at the beginning.

books...

Specialists are well aware of the concepts of "product life cycle" and "reliability plateau"... The life cycle is the whole set of product existence stages from its production to decommissioning. At the same time, there is an "iron" dependence of the number of failures (breakdowns) of equipment on the operating time for various stages of the life cycle. Graphically, this is expressed by a curve, where at first there is a branch descending along the vertical axis of ordinates - over the course of operation, the number of failures progressively decreases; then comes this same "reliability plateau", parallel to the horizontal abscissa axis, when mining and running-in are over and for most of the resource there are no or minimal failures. And then there is a branch ascending along the y-axis, when, due to the increasing depletion of the resource, the number of failures progressively increases over the time of operation.

The Germans started the war in the middle of the resource, on the "reliability plateau". And we are on the left and right branches of the failure curve. At the beginning of the left branch - for new tanks and at the end of the right branch - for old ones. Not only specialists in the theory of reliability, but also experienced amateur motorists can understand what this means without much explanation. After all, most often just either completely new or very old cars break down. New ones - because they have not yet been run in, and old ones - because they are worn out. But in both cases, the vehicles **break down**, which happened to Soviet armored vehicles at the beginning of the war. Again, I will refer to the diary of General Halder, where in the notes for July 12, 1941 there is such a line regarding Russian tanks: "There are frequent gusts of caterpillars."

And the Germans tanks failed, but - fundamentally less often! Less often, not because of their qualitatively better maintenance, but because they are at the optimal, in terms of technical reliability, stage of the life cycle. German memoirists sometimes note that up to 800 German tanks needed repairs after the Balkan campaign. However, it must be remembered that the campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece were fleeting, and in the period from late April to early June 1941, all defects were, of course, eliminated. In some respects, the participation of German tanks in operations in the Balkans only increased the level of their current technical reliability!

Of course, among the many thousands of our tanks there was that significant part of them, which, from the point of view of the theory of reliability, was also in the zone of the "plateau of stability". I think that their number was smaller than that of the Germans, but quite comparable, if we take into account, first of all, the T-26 and BT-7 produced in 1939-1940.

It was these tanks of ours that first of all gave the first rebuff to the tanks of Hoth, Guderian and Kleist. But, let's say, "run-in" KB and T-34, by the beginning of the war, we simply few.

So, on January 1, 1941, there were 196 units in the Red Army, and on April 1, 1941 years - 504 units. T-34, respectively - 97 and 441 units.

However, I want to make a reservation that I myself have little faith in the complete reliability of these and other digital data given in various sources with an accuracy of up to units. It is unlikely that after many years, even when using archival data, such accuracy of accounting is possible. However, the discrepancy between the data by 3...5 and even by 8...10% cannot be of decisive importance for the purposes of our analysis. The "order of appearance" is preserved in any case.

BT-7 for 1939 and 1940 was delivered to the troops a little more than two thousand units (1341 + 706), and T-26 of the last two modifications - more than two and a half thousand (1293 + 1324) units. Moreover, these are data on deliveries to the Red Army as a whole, including the inner districts and the Far East. Deliveries to the border districts accounted for approximately 50% of the total deliveries.

Well, in addition to all this - failures of command, insufficient training, loss of fuel bases, and so on and so forth ... But all this was observed, I repeat, on an *objectively* unfavorable military-technical base.

Therefore, all statements about the overwhelming tank superiority of the USSR over Germany before the war are nothing more than ignorant, refuted not by statistics or memoirs, but by the theory of reliability, a myth.

Formally, having up to fifteen thousand or more tanks in service by the beginning of the war, including five hundred KB and one and a half thousand T-34s, we started the war in the conditions of the actual sharp - albeit temporary - superiority of the Germans in the number of really reliable and combat-ready tanks.

I singled out this thesis because it is quite non-trivial and in itself completely changes all established ideas about the nature of the confrontation between the tank forces of the USSR and Germany in the initial period of the war!

By the way, experts note that of all the KB that were lost in the summer of 1941, only about a quarter were destroyed during the hostilities, and about 60 percent were abandoned due to breakdowns of the undercarriage.

Moreover, in the fact that it happened so, there was neither the special wisdom of the Germans, nor the special stupidity of the Russians. Just a confluence of historical realities, the realities of the development of tank design ideas and tank building in both countries and the realities of the supply of equipment to the troops turned out to be what they turned out to be for the two sides.

In the initial period of the war, the Germans fought on equipment, although not better than ours, and often in terms of performance characteristics and obviously worse, but at the beginning of the war they fought on equipment that was fundamentally more reliable due to its "run-in".

In the first period of the war, our equipment revealed all its shortcomings, and after their elimination and the stabilization of mass production, a gradual increase in our tank superiority began, which became one of the important factors in our final victory.

Mark Solonin mentions a successful 3000-kilometer test run of two experimental T-34 tanks along the route Kharkov - Moscow - Minsk - Kyiv - Kharkov in March 1940. But does he not understand what it is? They prepare for such runs in advance, they are provided by the most experienced specialists, including the creators of the tank themselves, who know it like the back of their hand, like their own child! And technical support, including a mobile workshop!

It is impossible, right, to hold readers for - using Stirlitz's expression - boobies in Polish preference!

Solonin talks about the high merits of the T-34 medium tank, referring to the assessments of the US Aberdeen Proving Ground specialists who studied these tanks at the end of 1942! Still would! Despite the shortage of high-quality steels (hence the bad steel of track pins, etc.), the shortage of equipment (hence the poor heat treatment of gears and other things), the low qualification of part of the workforce at tank factories, in general, the military "thirty-fours" were more reliable than the pre-war ones! Their "childhood illnesses" of 1941, inevitable for any complex design, were left behind by the end of 1942, and mass production was now working to increase reliability in full accordance with the theory of reliability, the scientific development of which was yet to come.

That is why, as Solonin writes, in the January cold of 1943, during the offensive operation Don, Soviet tank brigades marched more than 300 kilometers through the snow-covered steppe, and in May 1945 they covered 400 kilometers from Berlin to Prague along the mountainous terrain in five days. wooded area without significant technical losses.

Still - in the forty-fifth year!

But if there had been no heroic 1941, there would have been no victorious 1945 either. And how did Soviet tankers fight on partly worn out, partly not run-in equipment in 1941? Below I will give the testimonies of General Halder, but for now I will once again return to the "discoveries" of Mark Solonin in his book "June 22 ...".

On page 286, he writes about the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army:

"Like a dream, like a morning fog, the most powerful 4th MK (mechanized corps. — **S.K.**) **did not enter into battle** (my emphasis. - **S.K.**) **with the main enemy forces**. When by July 12 the remnants of the corps had reached the eastern bank of the **Dnieper**, it turned out that out of 101 KB tanks, only 6 out of 313 "thirty-fours" remained 39, out of 565 light tanks, 23 BT tanks arrived in Priluki.

This is how the allegedly Russian M. Solonin writes about Russian soldiers. But if we open the pages of the 19th and 21st book of the Frenchman de Lannoy "German tanks in Ukraine", we can read:

"The 4th mechanized corps was a terrible striking force, which brought a lot of trouble to the German troops from the very first days of offensive operations. <...>

The 4th mechanized corps was heading (after the start of hostilities. - **S.K.**) to Sokal and Radekhov. To the north-west of the latter, his powerful clash with the 11th Panzer Division of the 48th Motorized Corps (Wehrmacht. - **S.K.**) **took place**.

As you can see, even a foreign author of a book about German tanks does not deny military merit to Soviet tankmen. As for Mark Solonin, he vilely over them mocks.

N-yes...

The Soviet 4th mechanized corps was indeed a *potentially* terrible force. It included the 8th and 32nd Panzer Divisions, the 81st Motorized Division and a motorcycle regiment.

The 8th Panzer Division had 50 KB, 140 T-34s; 68 old three-turreted T-28s, 31 BT-7s and 36 T-26s.

32nd Panzer Division - 49 KB, 173 T-34s and some T-26 and BT-2 light tanks.

The 81st motorized division had 65 T-26 tanks.

I don't know, by the way, where M. Solonin got 565 light tanks in the 4th mechanized corps (de Lannoy lists 892 tanks for the 4th mechanized corps, that is, no more than 412 light tanks), but so be it. However, M. Solonin forgot to mention some circumstances that the same de Lannoy did not forget to note, rightly pointing out that the 8th TD was formed in July 1940, and the 32nd TD even in March - April 1941. De Lannoy reports that the last division, due to the tight deadlines for formation, experienced a shortage of personnel before the war, it lacked tractors, communications equipment, etc. In addition, the regiments of the 32nd division received new equipment only in April-May 1941, and the division did not have time to train its personnel.

It is significant that already during the war, on July 8, 1941, General Halder, reflecting on the difficulties for us in the formation of new formations, emphasized that "this is especially true for tank formations, in which even in peacetime there was a significant shortage of commanders, drivers and radio operators, as well as communication property "...

I can add on my own that the presence of different types of equipment did not at all simplify its maintenance.

Let us return once again to the 4th mechanized corps, slandered by M. Solonin. In reality, he fought hard from the first days of the war, participated in the front counterattack near Dubno. The history of the war recorded the following:

"... Intense hostilities unfolded in the southwestern direction. For counterattacks, the Southwestern Front allocated the 5th and 6th armies and troops of its second echelon - a total of six mechanized (4, 8, 9, 15, 19 and 22) and three rifle ... corps. <...>

Since June 22, the 22nd and 4th mechanized corps of the 5th and 6th armies, as well as the 15th mechanized corps, have been fighting intense battles in the bands of their armies.

From June 23 to 29, in the area of Lutsk, Radekhiv, Brody, Rivne, an oncoming tank battle...

And in the combat biography of the then corps commander, published in the biographical guide "Commanders", it is said, in particular:

"In the Great Patriotic War, the corps ... as part of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, participated in a border battle with superior enemy forces in the area of Przemyśl. The formations of the corps participated in the oncoming tank battle near Dubno, Rovno, in the Kyiv defensive operation.

I can add that the then commander of the corps (and not bad, I must say) was Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov - the same one who later forever stained himself with betrayal.

How the tankmen really had to fight can be imagined from the memoirs of Marshal Moskalev, who cites data on the unsuccessful counterattack on Vladimir-Volynsky of the 22nd mechanized corps and the 135th rifle division of the 27th rifle corps. The 19th Panzer Division then lost almost all of its 45 T-26 tanks and 12 BA-10 armored vehicles, 14 guns remained in its artillery regiment. Division Commander Major General K.A. Semchenko was wounded, both commanders of tank regiments were killed, the head of artillery of the division went missing, and the commander of a motorized rifle regiment died of his wounds.

This is how people melted and military equipment melted in the summer of 1941. But Solonin has his own explanation for its loss - on pages 296 - 298 he compares the percentage of weapons losses with the losses of wheeled vehicles and makes a "sensational" conclusion:

"... for a demoralized, panic-stricken crowd, tanks and cannons, machine guns, mortars are a burden. Not only do tanks crawl slowly, they are forced to fight by the very fact of their presence. That's why they rushed to get rid of them. And the truck - even the weakest one - was saved. It is better suited to "relocate" to the deep rear on it, and even take a fig with you ... "

M. Solonin draws his conclusion on the basis of the following total figures for the loss of equipment for the second half of 1941: only 33.3% of lost vehicles against the background of the loss of 73% of tanks, 70% of anti-tank guns, 60% of howitzers, 65% of light machine guns; 61% of mortars ... Regarding the latter, he illiterately remarks: "Although, it would seem, what can break in a mortar? The pipe - it is the pipe ... "

Yes! There is nothing special about rolls either - they grow on trees!
Rip off and chew...

What can be said here?

Regarding the loss of tanks, for example, we can give data on the loss of tanks from the Germans by the autumn of 1941. A little later, the reader will get to know them and then he will be able to see for himself that in the 2nd Panzer Group, the percentage of losses reached 75%. But Solonin's main cheating trick is that he puts the loss of military and **non-** combat equipment on the same level. Yes, cars, just like tanks, participate in the war. However, cars - unlike tanks - do not go into battle. In addition, the Soviet "one and a half" by 1941 were also quite reliable due to their mass production for a long time.

With such "statistics" - "balancing" corned beef and Beshanova divert the reader's attention from the essence of the matter. And to refute their fabrications, I will turn again to the authority of General Halder. September 12, 1941, on the 83rd day of the war, he wrote in diary:

"The Russian T-34 tank (25 tons) is very good and fast. Unfortunately **not not a single usable sample of this tank was captured** (emphasis mine. - **S.K.**)."

According to Solonin, Soviet tankers, intimidated by Stalin, not wanting to fight for him, abandoned their tanks intact and rushed on passing cars - some to their rear, some - to surrender to the Germans ...

And the Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder, after the report of the Inspector General of the Motorized Forces Breit on the 83rd (eighty-third) day of the war, complains that the Germans do not have at their disposal a single "thirty-four"!

No, these words of Halder should, perhaps, be written on all kinds of corned beef directly *on the forehead* - as well as the information given by Halder in his diary on October 9, 1941 about the use of captured tanks at the front as of 9/10/1941:

"... in Russia: Army Group South - 16 tanks (another 5 tanks will be transferred there in October); Army Group Center - 42 tanks (another 20 tanks will be sent to the front in October and November); Army Group North - 23 tanks (another 5 tanks will be sent to the front in October). When the rearmament of the 100th and 101st brigades is completed, another 548 tanks will be allocated for use in the rear areas.

In total, it turns out that by October 1941, the Wehrmacht was able to use only 81 (eighty-one) captured Soviet tanks at the front with the prospect of using another 30 (thirty) tanks by November. In addition, it was possible to adapt a little more than half a thousand frankly outdated Soviet tanks for rear punitive units against partisans.

Not much...

According to German data, during the first two months of the war, German troops knocked out and captured over 14,000 tanks. This figure is, of course, exaggerated, but hardly astronomically exaggerated. And, of course, those experts who say that the main reason that the Germans could not massively use our captured tanks are right are those experts who call fatal damage to the undercarriage and engine. Perhaps, we should only add to this: "... often - due to the exhaustion of the resource."

I will now touch a little on the issue of the accuracy of data on losses in Soviet German front, citing an example of "discord" in assessing the loss of not equipment, but people.

You can see how the total assessments of the "thing in itself" can be seen by comparing some of the figures taken in B. Müller-Hillebrand's "Land Army of Germany 1933-1945", which is considered almost normative, and the figures of General Halder.

In the reference book, in the edition of 2002 (M.: Izgrafus, Eksmo), on page 714, data are given on the losses of ground forces by years of war in the period up to 11/30/1944

of the year.

According to Müller-Gillebrand, these losses for 1940-1941 amounted to: 140,378 people killed; missing - 8769 people; demobilized (?) - 38,894 people; deserters - 3 (three) people.

Total - 188,044 people for the whole of 1941, the entire second half of which Germany was already at war with the USSR.

This is according to Müller-Hillebrand.

But how to understand then the entry I cited at the beginning of this book dated January 5, 1942 in the "Military Diary" of General Halder: "Losses from June 22 to December 31, 1941: Wounded - 19,016 officers, 602,292 non-commissioned officers and privates; killed - 7120 officers, 166,602 non-commissioned officers and privates; missing - 619 officers, 35,254 non-commissioned officers and privates. Total lost 26,755 officers and 804,148 non-commissioned officers and

privates. The total losses of ground forces on the Eastern Front are 830,903 human..."

So how much did the Wehrmacht lose - 188,044 people for the whole of 1941 or still 830,903 people only from June 22, 1941 and only on the Eastern Front?

Of course, Halder's data are correct, but the strange statistics of the *seemingly* thorough Muller-Gillebrand on human losses suggests that his data on equipment losses are somewhat underestimated. At the same time, the data cited by Müller-Hillebrand - by no means, in any case, not overestimated - on the losses of tanks by the Germans in 1941 does not at all indicate a certain victorious and unrestrained movement of a German tank avalanche across the expanses of the USSR.

Here is what Müller-Hillebrand writes (on page 285):

"After the completion of major encirclement operations in the summer campaign, by the beginning of September 1941, tank groups had the following number of combat-ready tanks (in percent): 1st tank group - 53, 2nd - 25, 3rd - 41, 4th — 70".

And then he reports that on June 22, 1941, in the East, including the OKW reserve (2nd and 5th tank divisions), there were about 3680 tanks, and irretrievable losses on all fronts for the period from June to November 1941 amounted to 2251 tanks.

Considering that, according to the same source, there were only 350 tanks in North Africa - less than 10% of the presence in the East, then the losses - at least not exaggerated, or even underestimated - by the Germans of tanks on the Soviet-German front by the end of autumn 1941 amounted to at least 2000 units, that is, at least 54% of the number on June 22, 1941.

This is also confirmed - in real time - by the diary of General Halder, in which it was already recorded on July 13, 1941 (emphasis mine. - S.K.):

"Losses in tanks average 50%."

By 28 August 1941 the situation had not improved and Halder wrote:

"3. Tank position. Parts of the 1st Panzer Group lost an average of 50% of their tanks. The worst situation in the 16th motorized division. Parts of the 2nd Panzer Group have: 10th Panzer Division - 83 % of tanks; 18th Panzer Division - 57% of tanks. The remaining divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group have an average of 45% of tanks. In the 3rd tank group: 7th tank division - 24% of tanks, in the remaining two tank divisions 45% of tanks each ... "

After all, this can also be regarded as a tank *pogrom*! Especially when you consider that even before the start of hostilities, the German tank units were in a state of maximum combat readiness and did not experience, unlike the Soviet tank formations, the difficulties of the organizational period.

And now, I think, it's time to acquaint the reader with some of those entries in 1941 in the official diary of General Halder, which relate to the combat operations of Soviet tanks in the first months of the war.

Already on **June 24, 1941**, Halder, referring to Army Group South, noted: the enemy has a new type of heavy tank, "and later on the same day he wrote:

"At the front of Army Groups South and North, a Russian heavy tank of a new type appeared, which has an 80 mm caliber gun (according to a report from the headquarters of Army Group North, even 150 mm, which, however, is unlikely)."

I note that the KB actually had a 76-mm ZIS-5 gun at that time, but some copies were indeed armed with a 152-mm gun.

On June 25, 1941, Halder wrote down updated data on the new tank - meaning the same KB, and also entered into his diary the first messages from the front about the appearance of "another new tank", that is, the T-34.

And on June 25, 1941, he noted: "The enemy is retreating in an organized manner, covering the retreat with tank formations.

But then our tank formations played the role of fire brigades, often used disorganized or without taking into account the situation. Halder's entry of **June 28, 1941** is characteristic :

"In the zone of Army Group South, the 8th Russian tank corps (actually the 8th mechanized corps, we didn't have tank corps then. - S.K.) is **advancing** from Brody to Dubno in the rear of our 11th and 16th th tank divisions. It is to be hoped that by doing so he will be led to his death."

The tank battle near Dubno was really very unsuccessful for us, but even these battles slowed down the pace of the German offensive. On the morning of **June 27, 1941**, Halder scornfully wrote: "The Russian formations that attacked the southern flank of Army Group South were apparently assembled hastily" ... And by the middle of the day on June 27, he was worried: "The 11th, 13th and 14th tank divisions are fighting with enemy tanks between the river Styr and Rovno " ...

In reality, Kleist's tanks were opposed by personnel, and not "hastily" formed formations of Soviet mechanized troops, but the same 8th mechanized corps, before attacking the Kleist tank strike group, made a 400-kilometer march and entered the battle on the move, in parts. Such a forced way of bringing the corps into battle prompted Halder to guess about Russian improvisation.

On June 29, 1941, he was simply alarmed in the morning:

"Strong fighting is still going on at the front of Army Group South. On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Group, the 8th Russian Panzer Corps wedged deep into our position and entered the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. This penetration of the enemy obviously caused great confusion in our rear between Brody and Dubno. The enemy threatens Dubno from the southwest...

Separate enemy groups with tanks also operate in the rear of the 1st Panzer Group, which even advance over considerable distances ... "

As you can see, even an unsuccessful counterattack by the Soviet mechanized corps, hastily organized at the direction of the Headquarters, had its own significance. And although Halder wrote **on June 30, 1941** that the tense situation in the Dubno region had been defused, he immediately added:

"The penetration of the enemy seriously interfered with the advance of the 16th Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions, and also **delayed for several days** (emphasis mine. - **S.K.**) 44th, 111th and 229th infantry divisions, following in the second echelon behind the 3rd tank corps.

Then, decades after the war, looking at the maps with the now accurately known alignment of forces of the parties, the newly-minted "strategists" will be able to argue that our de Headquarters should not have given our mechanized corps impossible counterattack orders, but should have used them more rationally and prudently. "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side," it was not me who said it, but Shota Rustaveli. However, in **the general** wartime countdown, those few days for which Kleist was detained in June 1941 by the 8th mechanized corps on the territory of Ukraine, by the spring of 1945, turned into attacks by Soviet tank armies on the territory of the Reich.

And then you had to retreat, introducing - as Halder noted **on July 2, 1941**

- "a large force of tanks as a cover" ...

On July 8, 1941, the general proudly stated that out of the 29 identified tank divisions, 20 were completely or mostly destroyed, and only 9 divisions were still fully combat-ready. But how would the Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces react if he was then told that by June 22, 1941, sixty-one tank divisions had been formed in the Red Army?

Yes, few of these divisions were fully combat-ready by the beginning of the war, but they existed, they not only suffered losses, but also fought, gaining combat experience. And already on **July 11, 1941**, Halder made a significant, already familiar to the reader, entry:

"Tank formations suffered significant losses in personnel and materiel. The troops are tired ... "

The last entry for July 11, 1941 was the following:

"On the front of Army Group North, strong enemy rearguards, ***supported by tanks and aircraft*** (my emphasis. - **S.K.**), are stubbornly resisting Gepner's tank group."

And that was just the beginning!

July 16, 1941:

"...To the north of Uman, a cluster of 38 echelons was discovered. From the echelons tanks are unloaded, which immediately move east ..."

Lieutenant Colonel Burkner made a report on his trip to the front in the 10th Panzer Division. Difficulties arising in the course of operations ... and the stubborn resistance of individual enemy groups lead in a number of cases to a critical aggravation of the situation ... Despite this, the troops feel confident and imbued with a sense of superiority over the enemy. The combat effectiveness of the (specified) tank division, however, is gradually decreasing ... "

However, the combat effectiveness of not only the indicated tank divisions, but also tank formations of the Wehrmacht in general.

On July 21, 1941, Halder, referring to Army Group North, writes: "It may be advisable to send part of the tank formations that

they are getting weaker all the time, in the area of Bologoye..." and so on.

And here is the entry dated **July 22, 1941** about Army Group South:

"... In the Uman region, the 16th and 11th tank divisions are engaged in stubborn battles with large enemy tank forces ... This, of course, can put our tank formations operating in the Uman region in a difficult situation, especially since the nature of the battles with the 26th and the Russian army does not give reason to hope for a quick success.

On July 23, 1941, Halder writes in his theses for a report to Hitler, among other things:

"I. Enemy:

Combat efficiency: Despite the large amount of expended forces, the enemy still has fresh formations. <...>

d. *Operational-tactical methods of warfare.* Attack on the flanks the use of tanks, as we have already emphasized earlier ... "

This is after the supposedly tank pogrom of the Red Army!

And during a report to the Führer **on July 26, 1941**, Halder, according to Paulus, writes: "There has been an increase in the activity of aviation ("destroyed" by the Germans. - **S.K.**) and enemy tanks, especially on the left flank of the Gotha Panzer Group.

On August 5, 1941, Halder, like the fox who claimed that the grapes were green, deceived himself by noting:

"The Commander-in-Chief (Brauchich. - **S.K.**) returned from a meeting with the Fuhrer. The Fuhrer declared (we inspired him, but behind the scenes) that the current development of the situation would lead, as in the last world war, to the stabilization of the fronts "...

Excuse me, but in the early days of the war, the leadership of the Wehrmacht was firmly convinced that the war would soon end. Or is it not Halder wrote on July 3, 1941 (emphasis mine everywhere. - **S.K.**):

"... it would not be an exaggeration to say **that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days**. Of course, it's not finished yet. The vast extent of the territory **and** the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for **many more weeks!**

Exactly a month has passed, and the same Halder rejoices that the Fuhrer agrees with the idea of stabilizing the front and moving - as in the First World War - to a positional war. That is, already at the beginning of August 1941 - long before the Russian autumn thaw - Hitler, Brauchitsch and Halder psychologically buried the hopes for a "blitzkrieg".

And then, on August 4, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, which Hitler held in Borisov, Hitler - according to Guderian - involuntarily escaped the phrase:

*"If I knew that the Russians really have such a number of tanks that was given in your book (in the 1937 book "Attention, Tanks!" Guderian called the figure 10,000 tanks. - **S.K.**), I would probably didn't start this war..."*

These are the words that should also be written with all sorts of beshanov *on the forehead!* Die, but you better not prove the full significance of the actions of Soviet tank formations in 1941 to ensure the future Victory of 1945. In the light of these words of the Fuhrer, it can be argued that **in 1941 the Soviet tank forces completed their strategic task in full** - given their general condition at the beginning of the war!

These words of Hitler can also be regarded as a recognition of the fact that Russia **had a continuous presence** in 1941 of strategically significant tank forces. Yes, their losses were very great. But the Great War was on.

Let us turn to the memoirs of the "first tanker of the Reich" Guderian ... Here a few quotes:

"The 17th Panzer Division near Senno (by July 7, 1941. - **S.K.**) fought fierce battles with a strong enemy, who brought an extremely large number of tanks into battle. Stubborn battles were also waged by the 18th Panzer Division "...

"July 18 (1941. - **S.K.**) I was in the 47th tank corps. The 17th Panzer Division was transferred from the flank, which it covered east of Orsha, to the area south of Smolensk, in order to repel Russian attacks moving towards the city from the south. In the battles that took place here, the brave commander of this division, General Ritter von Weber, was mortally wounded ...

By July 20 (1941. - **S.K.**) ... the Russians continued to attack the 24th tank corps and Smolensk ...

July 21 (1941. - **S.K.**) ... all the forces of the 46th tank corps were stubborn fighting with the enemy...

Then Guderian was still fighting in the Moscow direction and, as we see, he fought in hard labor, often already losing the initiative and pace. And it was only the end of July 1941 ...

On August 28, 1941, Halder, after a conversation with General Paulus on the telephone, left alone with his diary, he was frankly grumbling:

"... I understand the difficulty and tension of the situation. But after all, the whole war consists of difficulties (that's how ?! - **S.K.**). Guderian does not agree with such a situation in which he is forced to obey one or another army commander ... Unfortunately, Paulus fell under his influence. In no way do I agree with this. Guderian himself planned this operation. Let him now see for himself how much she doable"...

As you can see, by the end of August 1941, the Reich generals had reached the point of mutual claims and internal "showdowns". And not far off were the Fuhrer's showdown with them. In connection with the failure of the attack on Moscow and other failures, Hitler during 1942 - from February to October, fired 185 generals, including 66 - from the army. In addition, 8 generals received a warning of dismissal, the Fuhrer was going to replace Paulus with Seidlitz, and Halder himself was removed from the post of chief of the general staff at the end of September 1942.

The English military historian Fuller commented on this fact as follows:
Thus: "Such a defeat of the generals has not been seen since the Battle of the Marne."

And the Beshanovs keep talking to us about the "tank pogrom"! I, concluding "tank" section, I will give another quote from Guderian, who is already fighting in Ukraine:

"Early in the morning of September 15 (1941. - **S.K.**) I visited the vanguard of the 3rd Panzer Division ... and talked with the commander of the 6th Panzer Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Münzel. On that day, Münzel had only one T-IV tank, three T-III tanks and six T-II tanks at his disposal; thus, the regiment had only ten tanks.

Ten tanks, of which six are, in fact, light tankettes, inferior even to our BT and T-26, and three are light tanks with which the BT and T-26 could compete quite successfully.

Is it a massacre or not?

In October 1941, Guderian again advances on Moscow. But how! That's how:

"October 6 ... south of Mtsensk, the 4th Panzer Division was attacked by Russian tanks, and she had to go through a difficult moment. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks manifested itself in a sharp form. The division suffered significant losses. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed for the time being "...

However, the "first tanker of the Reich" did not take Tula ...

Much more can be said about the "tank" topic in relation to the initial period of the war. Moreover, using only Western sources, for example, such classic books for this topic as "Tanks, forward!" or Guderian's Memoirs of a Soldier cited above. However, it is time for us to move on to the topic of war in the sky, which, however, for the Soviet Air Force began with a war on the ground.

Yes, alas, to determine what happened to our Air Force on June 22, 1941, the word "pogrom" fits perfectly. However, even here, not everything is as obvious as many today assure, starting with the fact that the main personnel of the Red Army Air Force, that is, combatant pilots, from the first days of the war fought not so badly, and often brilliantly!

I will start, however, with the "negative", using, in particular, archival documentary data reported by M. Meltyukhov in his article,

published in the collective military-historical collection "The Tragedy of 1941. Causes of the disaster" (M: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008).

Even a superficial study of the objective reports of the first days of the combat operations of our aviation shows that with regard to a certain part of it, it is more accurate to speak of **inaction**.

So, on the North-Western Front, the main losses in the 7th air division fell on the 46th high-speed bomber aviation regiment and, as was said in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. the side of the regiment commander, Major Senko, and the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Kanunov, who brought all the personnel during the first enemy raid

into a state of panic.

On June 22, 1941, the 46th SBAP lost 20 aircraft, of which only half were shot down in the air, and the rest were destroyed on the ground at the Siauliai airfield during a German air raid.

The planes went out of action without taking off - due to the indiscipline, nervousness of the command, due to the crowding of equipment at airfields, due to the unmasking of airfields ... If the reader remembers the orders of People's Commissars Voroshilov and Timoshenko that I quoted about the need for masking, dispersal, etc. ., then it can be understood that the blame for the destruction of a significant part of our aviation lies to a large extent on its command, including the highest. Not without reason, of all the "specific" military leaders, only the top aviation generals were arrested after the start of the war, like Smushkevich and Rychagov, and were shot in the fall of 1941. I think they deserve it.

Reading the reports of the Special Departments of the Fronts, marked at the end of June 1941, is difficult and nervous. The commander of the 124th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Major Polunin, arrived at the regiment from vacation on June 22 after the enemy had made two raids on the airfield. After the third raid, the regimental commander flew off on a training UTI-4 in an unknown direction.

The commander of the 41st Fighter Regiment of the Western Front, Major Ershov, sent to intercept not combat-ready groups, but 1-2 aircraft, which became easy prey for Luftwaffe pilots.

In the Kiev Special Military District, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO noted in a special message dated July 1, 1941, "despite the signals about the real possibility of an enemy attack, individual commanders of the units of the Southwestern Front were unable to quickly repel the enemy attack ...". In Chernivtsi, on June 21, 1941, the flight crew was released to the city, in the restaurant of the city of Buchach all night on June 22, the commander of the 87th IAP, the commander of the 16th air division, Major Slygin and his deputy political officer, the battalion commissar Cherny, were drunk ...

There are many such examples, but I think this is enough.
But!!!

But within the limits not only of the same front (district), but of the same air division, the situation from the very first hours of the war could differ fundamentally. So, the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 10th Aviation Division of the Western OVO, stationed in the city of Pruzhany, did not even have ammunition on the planes. And the 123rd IAP of the same division, although it was largely destroyed on the ground, spent the first day of the war simply heroically. Soon only 6 planes remained in the 123rd regiment, however, as it was said in the report of the authorized 3rd (Special) department of the 10th mixed air division Leonov, "our pilots of 2-3 planes of the 123rd air regiment flew towards, took a frontal battle, shooting down 3-4 aircraft, put the enemy to flight ...".

The veracity of this document could be doubted if it were a political report, but it was a special report of a special officer, generally reflecting negative facts, so you can trust him.

Moreover, this was not a single example recorded in the history of that war. The pilot of the 127th IAP Andrei Danilov shot down 4 aircraft on the very first day of the war. On July 9, 1941, he was shot down, already having 9 victories, but survived, although then he was considered dead. His comrades in the SU regiment. Zhukovsky and Nikolai Boyarshinov on June 22, 1941 also shot down 4 aircraft each, making 9 and 6 sorties per day, respectively.

Pilot of the 123rd IAP Air Defense Fighter Aviation Ivan Kalabushkin on the first day of the war, piloting an I-153 biplane, even shot down 5 German aircraft - one Messerschmitt-109, two Yu-88 and 2 Heinkel-111. In 1942, Kalabushkin became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Also the future Hero of the Soviet Union (since 1943), junior lieutenant Dmitry Kovtyulev from the 91st IAP, also flying on the I-153, shot down 4 aircraft in the first two weeks of the war.

Commander of the 55th IAP Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Popov, having received a message in time about the approach of 20 German bombers, accompanied by 18 fighters, took off the MiG-3 squadron on duty and ordered to attack the group, while the regiment, alerted, took off to finish off the enemy.

The commander of the 67th IAP, Major B.A., acted in the same way. Rudakov.

Pilots I.I. Ivanov, L.G. Butelin, S.M. Gudimov, A.S. Danilov (the same one), D.V. Kokorev, A.I. Moklyak, E.M. Panfilov, P.S. Ryabtsev on the very first day of the war made rams, and for the most part remained alive.

That is, the pilots fought well ... Yes, and the command in some places was on top. So, in the Odessa military district, a few days before the war, the combat readiness of the troops of the district, including aviation, was checked. Aviation units were relocated to field airfields, where the aircraft were dispersed and camouflaged. Headquarters of the Air Force of the district by its chief A.Z. Ustinov was transferred from Odessa to Tiraspol. As a result, during the first day of the war, the aviation of the district lost six aircraft, incapacitating 30 enemy aircraft.

And in the Baltic, for example, OVO of 880 aircraft by the end of the first day of the war less than 500 left.

In total, the Soviet Air Force on the first day of the war lost about 1,200 aircraft, of which 800 were at airfields. These were huge losses, but can they be called catastrophic? Already on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Air Force made about 6 thousand combat sorties and destroyed more than 200 German aircraft.

That is, for two of our downed aircraft on the first day of the war, there was one German downed aircraft! Not so bad, given all the circumstances that preceded June 22, and how this day began for many of our pilots.

However, the previous circumstances were different. So, in April 1941, a commission headed by the head of the Air Force Formation and Manning Directorate, General A.V. Nikitin checked the 12th bomber aviation division of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District. The division seriously lagged behind the standard terms for the development of SB aircraft. I note that if in April 1941 the unit received such "new" aircraft as the rapidly aging Tupolev SB, then before that it could not have been armed with anything other than the Tupolev TB-3, which was simply depressingly outdated by 1941.

When checking, it turned out that 104 crew of the division were still in the stage of retraining - because of the fear of the command of the unit to have flight accidents. Energetic Nikitin quickly achieved a turning point, and the result of his inspection finally manifested itself after the start of the war, when the 12th division immediately distinguished itself in battles and for high

flight skill and courage of the personnel was noted in the order of the Military Council of the Western Front.

But in general, the Soviet Air Force did not meet the war in the best shape in all its links - from the command and staff to the airfield service link. Plus, the same problem of switching to new equipment, retraining, small plaque ...

And the problems are not only quality, but also - oddly enough - quantity aviation technology.

First, about quality. I already wrote that thanks to such military "geniuses" as Tukhachevsky and Uborevich - but by no means only to them - by 1939 the Soviet aircraft industry did not produce truly modern aircraft. Qualitatively, things were also bad with aircraft equipment, starting with radio communications (it often simply did not exist) and ending with air navigation equipment, which was far from perfect. "Geniuses" like the aircraft designer Tupolev also made their negative contribution, which I also wrote about.

And, despite the world's highest (!) pre-war figures for the production of combat aircraft, good aircraft capable of winning the war began to appear in our country almost before the war itself.

Here are some figures for world aircraft production. These are total data, including civilian aircraft, but, first of all, for the USSR and Germany, as well as for the USA in 1941, they were close to a purely "air force" figure ...

	1939	1940	1941
USA	5856	12 813	26 289
Germany	8295	9869	10 940
USSR	10 362	10 565	15 735

Let us analyze these data taking into account the fact that by June 22, 1941, Arabic numerals common to modern civilization concealed very different national figures reflecting the structure and state of the national air forces of Russia and Germany.

Germany, as we see, only in the last two pre-war years (if you have view of the Great Patriotic War) produced 18,164 aircraft (not counting gliders).

During these two years, the USSR produced 20,927 aircraft, that is, only 15% more.

That is, about the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army Air Force over the Luftwaffe do not have to speak.

At the same time, on June 1, 1940, the Red Army Air Force had a total (including serviceable and defective aircraft) of 15,693 units of combat aircraft.

But of them...

I ask and warn the reader: one must be careful here! The total number of 15,693 units includes, for example, 3334 reconnaissance and spotter R-5, R-6, R-Zet, R 10, SSS ... I think that soon after June 22, 1941 for a dozen, or even a hundred of these "spotters" The Soviet ground command would agree to receive from the Luftwaffe **one** real spotter "Focke-Wulf-189" - the famous twin-fuselage powerfully armed "frame", which during the war was considered a special honor in the Soviet Air Force to shoot down.

So, from 15,693 units, we can objectively subtract 3,343 units of obvious junk. Result: 12,350 aircraft.

More... 1285 obsolete attack aircraft that could not compete with those Yu-87 dive bombers (the famous "things" of the Polish war), which by 1941 were still formidable weapons of the battlefield.

$12\,350 - 1285 = 11\,065$ combat aircraft.

Further... Subtract from this number 5826 units of the I-15bis, I-153 biplanes and the aging I-16 monoplanes, which were a formidable force only when such dashing guys as Andrey Danilov (I-153) were sitting in their cockpits, or such powerful aces as the legend of the Northern Fleet, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Boris Safonov and the future three times Hero Pokryshkin (I-16), but not an ordinary combatant pilot.

$11\,065 - 5826 = 6239$ units of combat aircraft.

Subtract 527 "monsters" TB-3 and get 5712 combat aircraft, including which a year before the war included 3703 obsolete SB bombers.

Only two thousand relatively modern and really modern aircraft - bombers, fighters, attack aircraft ... That's what we had "thanks" to Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Tupolev, etc. **a year** before the war.

By June 22, 1941, thanks to the aircraft designers Yakovlev, Mikoyan, Gurevich, Lavochkin, Gorbunov, Gudkov, Petlyakov and Ilyushin, who led the army of Soviet aircraft builders, we had:

- 399 Yak-1 fighters;

- 1309 MiG-3 fighters;

- 322 LaGG-3 fighters;

- 460 Pe-2 dive bombers;

- 249 Il-2 attack aircraft (so far, "thanks" to the nerds from the Air Force Directorate Red Army, single, without stern gunner-radio operator).

Total: 2739 really modern and capable of developing combat Soviet aircraft by June 22, 1941.

However, I forgot another outstanding figure, through whose efforts the Soviet Air Force rapidly transformed before the war, and in the second half of the war won air superiority - Joseph Stalin himself.

2739 modern aircraft... This is what we had at the beginning of the war against 4980 aircraft of the anti-Soviet bloc (Germany + Italy + Finland + Romania + + Hungary), 4000 of which were accounted for by the Reich.

I do not take into account the aircraft of Germany's allies - most often they were weaker than the I-153 or SB. But by June 22, 1941, the planes of Germany itself were at least as good as the best Soviet planes.

Actually, for aviation specialists and historians it has long been clear that the Germans started the war with the already massive modern Air Force, and we acquired such an Air Force only by the end of 1942.

I will not give here comparative data of combat aircraft of the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe by the beginning of the war - they are well known - and I will not soar to the heights of a generalized quantitative analysis, but will go down to the specific autumn of 1968, when I first found myself in the Kharkov Design Hall (not yet of the order Lenin and not named after N.E. Zhukovsky) Aviation Institute. Then for me, a freshman of KhAI, as well as for my comrades, it was a complete surprise to get acquainted with the design of our La-5 and the German Me-109 with the skin removed.

"Lavochkin-5" without sheathing looked either as a horizontally laid lattice fence, or as a bed ... And "Messerschmitt-109" looked like an airplane, because its fuselage belonged to the solid "monocoque" type, that is, all-metal, and the fuselage of La-5 was truss, welded from tubes.

The "German" looked clearly more solid, although in general the performance characteristics (performance characteristics) of the La-5 provided him with superiority over the Me-109 and equality in battle with the latest German fighter Focke-Wulf-190.

But this is in 1943 (third) year!

And in 1941 (first) year, the total superiority of the Luftwaffe over the Red Army Air Force undeniable both qualitatively and quantitatively.

I repeat - and quantitatively!

The qualitative superiority of the Luftwaffe by 1941 is not disputed even by the "note" "democrats". They are excitedly talking about the huge (more than triple or quadruple!) Our quantitative aviation superiority in 1941, operating with a figure of one and a half ten thousand aircraft of the Red Army Air Force.

However, in reality, as we see, we did not even have a special quantitative superiority in 1941, because our less than three thousand modern aircraft had to withstand from June 22, 1941, four thousand German aircraft, which were all modern and surpassed in 1941 in **terms** of Performance characteristics of new Soviet aircraft, with the possible exception of the Il-2, which were few at the beginning of the war.

I understand that such a conclusion can in no way be regarded as sensational - it fits perfectly into the basic scheme that was established in Soviet military historiography somewhere in the 70s. But here the author cannot help the reader with anything - two times two equals four in any historical epoch, and the figure of four thousand aircraft will always be greater in terms of combat effectiveness than the figure of three thousand aircraft, if all these aircraft are approximately equal in their combat characteristics.

But even the loss of thousands of combat aircraft - both obsolete and new, in the first days of the war, did not write off the Soviet Air Force of the 1941 model of the year "in circulation" ... Yes, the German dive "Shtuka" Ju-87 with impunity "ironed" the retreating or counter-attacking columns of our troops. Nevertheless, our aviation regiments and divisions carried out important, including not only tactical, but also operational, tasks as early as 1941.

Thousands of aircraft were quickly destroyed. But there are thousands left.
And they fought.

I can cite quite a few figures showing that the Soviet Air Force, even in 1941, by no means disappeared from the theaters of operations on the German Eastern Front. For example, in a 1985 monograph by M.N. Kozhevnikov "Command and Headquarters of the Air Force of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" on page 62 provides information about the air operation to destroy German aircraft at airfields from November 5 to November 8, 1941. Then, on November 5, 13 enemy airfields were hit, on November 6 and 7, on November 15, and on November 12 and 15, strikes were repeated on 19 airfields. As a result, more than 100 aircraft were destroyed and damaged and 61 aircraft were shot down in air battles.

Or here is the story given in the 1975 monograph "Aviation in the Battle of Moscow" (author - A.G. Fedorov) with the pilot of the 11th IAP, Lieutenant S.S. Goshko ... At least insert it into an action adventure! On July 2, 1941, Goshko, on a Yak-1 aircraft, attacked a He-111 reconnaissance aircraft, on board of which was a subordinate of General Halder, a colonel of the general staff. The colonel was so confident in the air supremacy of the Luftwaffe and in the pogrom of Soviet aviation that he took important documents with him on the flight - operational maps, ciphers, etc. During the attack, the fighter's armament failed, and then Goshko went to ram. He-111 made an emergency landing on Soviet territory, and Goshko, with a damaged propeller, also landed safely.

It was the first ram in the Moscow air defense system.

But the air defense of the capital was strong not only by the readiness of its pilots for such extreme measures. Say, at the very beginning of the war, the air defense Moscow received - to replace *the already existing* domestic radar detection stations of the type RUS-1 ("Rhubarb") - quite advanced stations RUS 2 ("Redut"), capable of fixing group air targets within a radius of 120 km, as well as

determine the azimuth, range, heading, speed, and even the approximate number of aircraft in the group.

And already from the second half of July 1941, the forces of the Moscow air defense had to join the battles. **On July 13, 1941**, General Halder, after another report at the Fuhrer's headquarters, noted:

"...G. It is necessary to organize a terrorizing air attack on Moscow in order to disrupt the organized evacuation of enterprises and refute the propaganda of the enemy, which speaks of the depletion of the offensive power of Germany ... "

And in Directive No. 33 of July 19, 1941, Hitler directly demanded an immediate air attack on Moscow. On July 22, 1941, the first raid on Moscow was made, and the fact that this raid was at night proves that Soviet aviation, as a powerful combat force, was not defeated. By the time of the first raid in the Moscow air defense zone, there were 585 aircraft: 170 MiG-3, 75 LaGG-3, 95 Yak-1, 200 I-16, 45 I-153 ... The last two figures show that the air defense of the capital was by no means assembled all the remaining newest aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. On the contrary, as we can see, there were even almost fifty I-153 biplanes in it!

By the way, Moscow's air defense also included 1044 anti-aircraft guns, almost all of which were new 85-mm guns equipped with modern fire control devices. For comparison: London was covered by 452 guns of large, medium *and small* caliber, Berlin - 724.

All this is said in the monograph by A. G. Fedorov "Aviation in the Battle of Moscow". However, the "democratically" advanced part of society now ignores "soviet" information, and therefore, further in this brief essay, I will turn to the same service diary of General Halder, citing below some of *his* 1941 entries regarding the Soviet Air Force ...

June 22, 1941, 1st day of the war:

"The command reported that 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed to date, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken off from the air without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed."

June 26, 1941, 5th day of the war:

"The number of enemy aircraft: in front of Army Group South - 1200 aircraft, in front of Army Group Center - 400 aircraft, in front of Army Group North - 300 aircraft."

June 30, 1941, 9th day of the war:

"An increase in the activity of enemy aviation in front of the front of the group was noted armies "South" and in front of the Romanian front.

July 1, 1941, 10th day of the war:

"Our command seriously underestimated the strength of enemy aviation in terms of numbers. The Russians obviously had at their disposal well over 8,000 aircraft. True, now of this number, apparently, almost half have been shot down and destroyed, as a result of which our forces are now approximately equal to the Russians in numerical terms. But the combat effectiveness of Russian aviation is significantly inferior to ours (this assessment is imbued with excessive euphoria from the successes of the first week of the war. - **S.K.**) due to poor training of their flight personnel ...

At present, the command of Army Group South believes that the enemy has 800 - 1000 first-class aircraft in front of the front of Army Group South, 400 - 500 first-class enemy aircraft are operating in front of the front of Army Group "Center", in front of the front of Army Group North also 400-500 first-class aircraft."

As you can see, on the fifth day of the war, the German General Staff estimated the strength of the Soviet Air Force at 1900 units of all aircraft, and on the tenth day of the war - at 2000 units maximum and 1600 minimum only "first-class" aircraft. And this does not at all confirm the "democratic" thesis about the alleged "aviation pogrom" of the Soviet Air Force in 1941.

On July 10, 1941, on the 19th day of the war, an entry appears in Halder's diary, which will subsequently vary quantitatively more than once, while maintaining the essence:

"... Long-range reconnaissance squadrons ... are extremely weakened, only one squadron has three combat-ready aircraft, the rest of the squadrons have none."

On the same day Halder added:

"The number of enemy aircraft: in total, it operates at the front, presumably about 1,500 aircraft..."

That's how! The war is on, brands of corned beef have long defeated the Soviet Air Force and surrendered their pilots, and the estimates of their strength by the German General Staff practically do not change. Moreover, **on July 12, 1941**, on the 21st day of the war, Halder is concerned:

"Enemy aviation is more active than before in the bands of army groups "South" and "North" ... "

At the same time, as of July 12, 1941, he estimates the quantitative composition of the Soviet Air Force at 1743 aircraft only against Army Groups Center and South, since air reconnaissance was not carried out in front of the front of Army Group North "due to adverse weather conditions ".

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that the weather conditions that prevented the Germans from conducting reconnaissance in front of the front of Army Group North did not prevent the increased activity of Soviet aviation in the zone of this group of forces.

At the same time, the irretrievable losses of military reconnaissance aviation on **July 13, 1941** amounted to: for Henschel-126 - 24%, for Focke-Wulf-189 - 15%, for Junkers-88 - 33.3%. for Messerschmitt-110 - 39%.

Night reconnaissance squadrons lost Dornier-17 - 20%, Fieseler-156 - 13 %.

A lot...

And someone knocked them down!

But the number of our aviation, operating against the three German army groups, Halder, as of July 13, 1941, determines already at "approximately 2500 aircraft."

Does this look like a "pogrom"?

July 15, 1941 Halder counts:

"Today it operated on the fronts: Army Group North - 208 enemy aircraft, Army Group Center - 855 and Army Group South - 626 enemy aircraft. These numbers fluctuate wildly all the time. They do not reflect the transfer of the main direction of aviation actions ... "

Total, according to Halder, - 1689 aircraft only directly on front by the 24th day of the war.

On July 17, 1941, Halder, after a conversation with Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch, who returned from the headquarters of Army Group North, writes:

"Superiority in aviation is on the side of the enemy. The combat composition of our formations operating at the front has been sharply reduced.

For comparison, here are Guderian's memoirs:

"On July 23, I ... went to the SS Reich division, located north of Yelnya ... Strong Russian bombing strikes from the air delayed the further advance of the division ..."

Not even a month had passed since the beginning of the war...
And off we go!

On July 26, 1941, Halder writes:

"There has been an increase in the activity of aviation and tanks (and tanks! - **S.K.**) enemy, especially on the left flank of the Gotha Panzer Group.

July 27, 1941:

"At the front of *the Army Group Center* ... enemy aviation activity increases, which in a number of areas causes serious difficulties.

July 30, 1941:

"The number of combat-ready aircraft in reconnaissance squadrons is sharply decreased."

July 31, 1941:

"... tactical intelligence suffers from a decrease in fighter cover ..."

August 5, 1941 Halder admits through gritted teeth:

"... it is impossible to achieve everything and everywhere at the same time, and not so much because ground forces, how many because of aviation.

This is recorded almost on the same day that Hitler confessed to Guderian that if he knew how many Russian tanks he had, he would not start a war.

Sobering up began, although it was still far from a hangover.

On August 26, 1941, Halder notes that on August 21, according to intelligence data, "the enemy ... has 750 fighters, 650 bombers, 300 aircraft of other types and 700 aircraft (from the Far Eastern aviation)". "In total, the enemy, therefore," the general sums up, "has 2,400 aircraft ... Of this number, 225 fighters and 195 bombers should be considered combat-ready."

By the way, according to the last two figures, the reader can judge how wide the possibilities can be to "juggle" this or that statistical data, if they are used in bad faith. Indeed, out of the formal fifteen thousand Soviet aircraft referred to by corned beef and rezun, not so much of it was combat-ready - such was the specific specifics of the state of the Soviet Air Force on June 22, 1941. While in the Luftwaffe on June 22, 1941, almost all aircraft were combat-ready - otherwise they simply would not have been sent to the emerging Eastern Front!

However, at the front, many, not even downed aircraft, quickly cease to be combat-ready in the air forces of all countries of the world. After all, the resource of a combat vehicle is small, since its average combat life is much shorter than its resource, and the vehicles must be repaired often.

On September 6, 1941, Halder gives the balance of aviation forces - according to intelligence data - with a layout for all types of aircraft and the result: 1919 German aircraft against 1175 Soviet ones.

The superiority is great, especially if you know that we have up to 400 transport aircraft declared by the Germans against zero for the Germans. But this is very inaccurate data, and **on September 12, 1941**, Halder counts 2940 aircraft to us, of which 670 fighters and 600 bombers, and on **October 8, 1941** - approximately 1300 fighters and bombers in total.

Moreover, it must be taken into account that during this period many of our aircraft factories were already evacuated to the east and the production of aircraft and aircraft engines was temporarily sharply decreased.

However, the German pressure also fell sharply ... **November 19, 1941** Halder, preparing for a report to Hitler, writes:

"Situation in the air. Aviation, apparently, will be able to carry out only operations with limited goals and not immediately, but sequentially. Hence the request

(To Hitler from the OKH. - **S.K.**) - where possible, to foresee when and what kind of air connections will be required.

The German post-war publisher of Halder's diary accompanied this entry with a revealing note: "Aviation, due to its weakness, could not simultaneously participate in several major operations. It could only be used consistently."

Actually, here we actually have a recognition: 1) the fact of the pogrom of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front by the end of autumn 1941; 2) the fact of the loss of air superiority by the Germans by the same time.

Unbelievable, but true! Witnessed not by some Sergei Kremlev, but by Franz Halder himself and his German colleagues. Actually, the "first tanker of the Reich" Heinz Guderian after the war recalled, for example, that on September 18, 1941, near Romny, a critical situation developed for his 24th tank corps, and the air reconnaissance of the tank group "was in a difficult condition ... due to enemy aircraft superiority.

On November 28, 1941, Halder notes the activity of our aviation near Moscow and Rostov, on **December 7, 1941** he again writes about "active operations of enemy aviation", which, however, is not surprising - from December 5, 1941, our powerful counteroffensive near Moscow began.

And aviation also took part in it, which by the beginning of the counteroffensive even had numerical superiority in the air in the Moscow direction: 762 of our aircraft (including 590 new ones) against 615 German ones. Three quarters of the fighters were Yak-1, MiG-3 and LaGG-3, a third of the bombers were Pe-2.

So Soviet aviation, having started fighting on June 22, 1941, fought not without success and, in general, the whole of 1941.

I will not insist on the version below, but today I think that the idea of 1941 as the time of the undivided rule of the Luftwaffe has developed over many post-war years, not without the influence of books by various front-line writers, starting with Konstantin Simonov, as well as filmmakers. Artistic word - and the same Simonov was quite talented - he has great power of suggestion, and the most memorable air collision of 1941 for many Soviet people was the tragedy of several obsolete Tupolev TB-3 bombers, which were shot with impunity in the air by Messerschmitts, described by Simonov as an eyewitness. At the same time, writers most often hinted at "Stalin's miscalculations," although it would not hurt to attribute a considerable share of responsibility for such tragedies to, for example, aircraft designer Tupolev, who did not provide Soviet aviation thought with the proper level of dynamism even by 1938.

On this, a brief analysis of the myths about the tank and aviation "pogroms" of the Red Army in 1941 could be completed, but as a kind of postscript, I will give some interesting - I hope - information about the Luftwaffe, its aces, their victories and something else.

So, in the book of the experienced aviation general of the Luftwaffe Walter Schwabedissen "Stalin's Falcons: Analysis of the actions of Soviet aviation in 1941 - 1945", not free from overexposure, of course - it was written when the bitterness of the defeat of the Reich was still fresh - about the Soviet Air Force of the sample 1941 is by no means meant disparagingly. Schwabedissen rightly notes that at the beginning of the war, the Soviet Air Force was significantly inferior to the Luftwaffe in terms of tactics, technical condition, combat practice and training of flight personnel, but he also writes:

"In air battles, Soviet pilots showed themselves to be aggressive, brave, but they often acted recklessly and straightforwardly, they lacked flexibility. As an individual fighter, the average Soviet pilot (in 1941. - **S.K.**) experienced

lack of personal initiative; however, in group battles, his high discipline was most welcome ... "

Not only a generally flattering, but also a thoughtful assessment, although in some ways it can be argue.

And here is the capital encyclopedia "Aces of Stalin", created by the Anglo-Saxons Thomas Pollack and Christopher Shores in 1999 and published in Russian in 2003. The very fact of this publication is a reproach to the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in general, which did not create anything of the kind. Two English-speaking authors are also not always accurate, but quite objective. Further in my reasoning, I will rely on their data first of all.

Pollack and Shores report that the Soviet Air Force lost 46,800 aircraft during the war, including 20,700 during combat operations. At the same time, Soviet pilots won about 40,000 victories, including 4,900 naval aviation pilots and 3,900 air defense pilots. These statistics do not include the victories of attack and bomber pilots, and their score - I will already note - also goes into the thousands. Some attack aircraft, whose combat merit was determined by the number of sorties, also fulfilled the "fighter" norm for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, personally shooting down 15 or more enemy aircraft.

According to modern official data, the loss of officers (not only flight) personnel during the war years in the Soviet Air Force amounted to 18,420 people dead and dead and 20,684 people missing and captured. These figures are in good agreement with the number of combat losses of aircraft at Pollack and Shores. At the same time, it must be remembered that not every downed fighter meant the death of a pilot, but a downed bomber could mean the death of two or three or even more officers at once. And one more thing: some of the dead pilots, especially in the first two years of the war, had not officer, but sergeant ranks (as, indeed, in the Luftwaffe, where there were holders of the Knight's Cross - non-commissioned officers).

So, modern foreign authors recognize up to forty thousand victories for Soviet pilots, which is clearly not exaggerated, but rather underestimated. A simple calculation: only in the fighter units of our Air Force fought 895 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 27 twice Heroes of the Soviet Union and two three times Hero of the Soviet Union. The minimum "heroic" win count is ten or more (15 or more on average). That is, only fighters - Heroes of the Soviet Union shot down up to 10 thousand German aircraft.

But there were a lot of order-bearing pilots who shot down 5 - 7 or more aircraft. At least fifteen, or even more than a thousand victories must be recorded on their account.

Finally, the mass average fighter pilot had one or two personally shot down aircraft, and they certainly add to the total score of victories to at least 40 (forty) thousand, recognized in the West.

As a documentary illustration, I will additionally inform you that in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin No. 0298 dated 19.08.41 on the procedure for rewarding personnel of the Red Army Air Force for good combat work, a pilot who shot down 3 enemy aircraft was presented for a government award, more 3 - to the second award. A fighter that shot down 10 aircraft was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and an attack aircraft could, by this order, receive a Hero for 8 downed aircraft. However, in reality, the "average" Hero Fighter had, as I already said, 15 or more downed aircraft, moreover, during the war, the official "hero" norm was increased.

But here in front of me is a book by Mikhail Zefirov "Aces of the Luftwaffe. Day Fighter Aviation (N. Novgorod: Pokrovka, 2000).

The author, who published a number of compilation books about Reich aviation, belongs to the same vicious "cohort" of anti-Soviet people as Rezun, Solonin, Beshanov, Bunich, Solzhenitsyn and

etc. And he claims that during the entire period of hostilities on the Eastern Front, the Germans lost about 4 (four) thousand aircraft, but the losses on the Western Front amounted to 13 thousand; that the ratio of victories in air battles in 1941 on the Soviet-German front was 5,000 to 600 in favor of the Germans, that in 1944 the Germans shot down 7,000 of our aircraft, and we - only 1,100 German ones, etc.

Zefirov "debunks" six "common", as he defines, myths about the Luftwaffe (oh, these "myths" to me!) And stands up for the honor of the German aces, who are allegedly defamed by insinuations such as that these aces were engaged in mass postscripts of air victories.

And on page 6 of his capitially published book, M. Zefirov assures the reader that the official de victory system adopted in the Luftwaffe, with its unsurpassed German punctuality, took into account everything down to the last aircraft and excluded any additions.

It's on page 6...

But on page 212, in an article about the most productive German ace on the Western Front, Hanse-Joachim Marcell, in a note to the chronicle of his victories, it is serenely reported that post-war studies confirmed only 120 of his victories, or ... 76 (seventy-six) percent. And further it is said that this is also a very high percentage of "reality" of victories ...

What does it mean? It turns out that with the vaunted German system of counting victories, supposedly taking into account everything down to the last aircraft, at least every fourth "victory" Marseille was not won in the air, but was literally created out of thin air!

Or maybe every second? After all, Zefirov mentions as one of the specific figures 46 percent of the "reality" of "victories".

It gets weird...

The famous Gunther Rall with his alleged 275 "victories" (273 - in the Eastern front) our pilots shot down eight times.

Gerhard Barkhorn - the second after Hartmann as Reich - won his first victory on the alleged 120th sortie, and then allegedly shot down 301 aircraft on the Eastern Front. At the same time, even his official biography admits that he was hit eight times - like Harman himself with his alleged 352 victories.

And Alexander Pokryshkin, who shot down "only" 59 (officially) German aircraft, was shot down only four times (he jumped out with a parachute three times), but he fought from the first day of the war and started on the old I-16.

But **the absolute leader in the number of victories among the Allied pilots**, Ivan Kozhedub, with his "only" 62 victories, was not shot down even once in his more than three hundred sorties, starting from the summer of 1943.

How so?

Not a single brilliant English or American pilot, fighting on excellent planes (Pokryshkin himself flew the American Airacobra for the second half of the war!), Not a single brilliant Russian pilot could overcome the bar of official victories above the number 62, and in the Luftwaffe more than a dozen famously "jumped" for a hundred or more "victories", and some - for two hundred, and Hartman with Barkhorn - even for three!

According to Mikhail Zefirov, the aces of the Luftwaffe were easier to knock down Russian pilots than Tsar Nicholas II - the crows of Tsarskoye Selo. But here the ace Herman-Friedrich Joppin, with his 42 victories on the Western Front, begins to fight against the Russians and dies in the Bryansk region on August 25, 1941, having managed to record 28 more "victories" behind him.

And the most experienced (born in 1914) ace Major Gerhard Homut, while fighting on the Western Front, scored 61 "victories", but already on the second sortie on the Eastern Front - August 2, 1943 - was shot down and died.

At the same time, the example of ace Hafner can be an explanation typical for official biographies of the death of German aces on the Eastern Front. On October 14, 1944, he entered the battle with a single Yak-9, but, according to Western sources, "on one of the turns, he was probably blinded by the sun, lost control and crashed into the ground" ...

So, if on the ground the German generals were prevented from fighting in Russia by bad, cloudy weather, then the aces of the Luftwaffe, on the contrary, were prevented from successfully fighting Russian pilots by good, sunny weather.

Moreover, such explanations were in use not only for 1944, but also for 1941! For example, Heinz Guderian wrote that on the afternoon of September 10, 1941, on the outskirts of the city of Romny, he came across a group of senior officers, and further on in the text: "The group suffered heavy losses during an enemy air raid, against which it was impossible to organize the necessary cover, since the Russian aviation operated from airfields located in the zone of good weather, and our airfields were in the zone of unfavorable weather and on this rainy day they were not able to take to the air ... "

Read and marvel! Well, let's say it was like that, although for the first third of the golden Ukrainian September, a special, and even more protracted, bad weather is not typical. Let's say, on the eve, on the evening of September 9, Guderian returned to his command post in Krolevets by plane, and on the evening of September 10 he requested by radio for Model, who had gone to the Romny, "strong fighter cover." If the German airfields had become hopelessly muddy on September 10, then they would hardly have dried out overnight, especially since, according to Guderian, on the night of September 10-11, "it was pouring with torrential rain." So where would the next day's air cover come from?

Further, I do not ask myself the question of how Guderian or his informants knew about the state of the weather at least tens of kilometers from the front line in the Soviet rear - after all, German aviation, according to Guderian, was chained to the ground, and air reconnaissance became impossible. At the same time, Guderian recalled that allegedly until September 14, "the weather continued to be bad" and aviation reconnaissance "did not work at all" ...

And this despite the fact that on the same day, September 14, Guderian, driving through Romny, saw walking "holiday-dressed crowds of local residents" - under a downpour, or what? On the day of September 14, he made a move along the route Krolevets - Baturin - Konotop - Romny - Lohvitsa. Not a bad voyage for one day at the front... Of course, Guderian would have covered those one and a half hundred kilometers in an hour along the imperial autobahn, but it was a war, and besides, the commander of the 2nd tank troupe was not just driving along the route, but inspecting the troops...

However, let's leave such questions aside and pay attention to the fact that a group of senior officers of the Wehrmacht, like Guderian himself (he also came under attack while crossing the bridge over the Seim), Russian aircraft bombed on September 10, 1941 in Romny in rainy weather ! And if the weather was flying for Soviet bombers with supposedly "inept" pilots, then for German fighters, led by knights of the Knight's Cross, it should have been all the more flying.

And is the reason for the unpunished Soviet bombing attacks on Guderian's tank group not hidden in the "good" weather for the Russians and the "bad" weather for the Germans, but in something else? Recall that the German publishers of Halder's diary, referring, however, to November 1941, noted that by that time German aviation "could not simultaneously participate in several major operations" and could "be used only sequentially" ... So wasn't it fair to assess the capabilities of German aviation by September 1941?

And didn't Guderian, referring to the favor of the Russian weather only to Russian pilots, like that "*pad-paruchchik*" from the film "White Sun of the Desert",

who, being thrown out the window by customs officer Vereshchagin, declared that the latter had "a grenade of the wrong system"?

Here, in fact, on this I will finish with the topic of "tank" and "aviation" "pogroms" in order to proceed to the analysis of the penultimate, ninth myth - just about "bad weather" and "Hitler's mistakes" ...

Myth nine

IF NOT FOR HITLER'S MISTAKE AND, AGAIN, BAD WEATHER AND BAD ROADS, THEN BY THE AUTUMN OF 1941 GERMANY COULD WIN THE WAR, AND HITLER COULD ACCEPT THE WEHRMACHT PARADE ON RED SQUARE

Finishing the analysis of the seventh myth, where, among other things, there were German references to bad weather and bad roads, I promised to return to this topic again when it comes to justifying the failure of the "blitzkrieg" by the Fuhrer's mistakes. And these three factors - "mistakes", "weather", "roads" - coexist so closely in Western literature on the war that I will continue to talk about them without separating the analysis and passing from time to time from "mistakes" to "weather and roads" and vice versa.

The myth about the alleged mistakes of Hitler, who did not listen to his highly wise generals and chose the wrong directions of attacks on Russia, as well as the myths about "bad roads" and "bad weather", which allegedly slowed down the pace of the German invasion, and then completely brought them to nothing, began to appear literally with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Moreover, at first, the "weather-road" myth began to be created not even in the depths of the department of the Minister of Propaganda Goebbels, but in the minds of the German generals - as a kind of justification to themselves for the unpleasant fact that everything in Russia immediately went wrong as planned and desired.

And already **on June 27, 1941**, on the 6th day of the war, General Halder wrote in diary:

"At the front, under the influence of changes in the situation, the condition of the roads (that's when "bad roads" first appear. - **S.K.**) and other (?! - **S.K.**) circumstances, events develop completely differently than planned in the higher headquarters, which creates the impression that the orders issued by the OKH (High Command of the Ground Forces. - **S.K.**) are not being carried out "...

About these lamentations, the classic is recalled: "It was smooth on paper, Yes, they forgot about the ravines ... And on them - walk!

Well, actually! Less than two years ago, in Poland, where the roads were, as a rule, no better, if not worse, than in Russia, everything went without a hitch, without a hitch, like clockwork. But then hostilities began two months later, and the autumn bad weather immediately made it difficult for the Germans to fight. Nevertheless, there were no problems with the Poles, and the orders given by the OKH were carried out in full.

However, things soon seemed to get better for the Wehrmacht, the topic of "bad roads" was temporarily closed. But the topic of "bad weather" quickly arose. For example, **on July 21, 1941**, the 30th day of the war, Halder wrote:

"Only parts of the 16th and 11th tank divisions are advancing on Uman (from the 1st tank group of the South group of troops. - **S.K.**). The remaining troops of the army group are moving forward extremely slowly due to bad weather ... "

However, immediately before this is the entry:

Army Group South: The main forces of the 1st Panzer Group are still pinned down by the counterattacks of the enemy's 26th Army, which, however, was to be expected. To Uman..." and etc.

That is, the advance of von Rundstedt's infantry and von Kleist's tanks was not so hindered by the Ukrainian slush (and what a slush can be in fertile Ukrainian July?!), as the Soviet 26th Army held them back! In addition, immediately after writing about the "bad weather" Halder was forced to note:

"Army Group Center": On the northern flank of the army group, our troops, to Unfortunately, I had to leave Velikiye Luki.

This is very disadvantageous. Significant enemy forces will be able (in front of the 16th Army) to get out of the threat of encirclement ... "

So, Russian threats, not Russian thunderstorms, create a disadvantage for the Wehrmacht ... And only on **July 27, 1941**, Halder writes:

"Severe thunderstorms broke out at the front of Army Group South. All movement stopped. One can only try to advance the tank wedge directed at Uman further south in order to intercept the railway and **highway** (emphasis mine. - **S.K.**), going through Uman to the east ... "

However, July thunderstorms on the famous "sparrow nights" are characterized not only by powerful downpours, but also by transience. Immediately after them, as a rule, excellent weather sets in. And let's pay attention to the fact that it does not always turn out that the roads in Russia were bad if it was necessary to intercept **the highway in the Uman region**.

Not so many years will pass, and in 1956, on the pages of the collective German (but written for dollars) collection of works by Hitler's generals "Fatal Decisions", General Günther Blumentritt sighs:

"In the vast expanses of the East, one could not count on easy victories ...

Some of our military leaders throughout the First World War were on the Western Front and never fought in the East, so they did not have not the slightest idea of the geographical conditions of Russia ... "

But, firstly, many German commanders in the First World War still fought on the Eastern Front or fought against Soviet Russia in the Civil War. Secondly, did the German General Staff not know about the relief and climate of Russia and that its road network, despite all the efforts of the Bolsheviks over more than two five-year plans, was more bad than good? And thirdly, Blumentritt admitted after the war:

"Many of our leaders have grossly underestimated the new adversary. This happened partly (well, well. - **S.K.**) because they did not know either the Russian people, let alone the Russian soldier "...

So, in addition to the state of Russian roads, they also did not take into account the Russian soldier ... Indeed, a considerable miss!

But what about the roads? They really were often bad! That's right, however, the Soviet troops also had to use them during maneuvers,

the transfer of troops, etc. This consideration may seem banal, but it does not cease to be true from this. **And this still needs to be looked at - who at the beginning of the war "bad" Russian roads interfered with more - the Wehrmacht or the Red Army? After all, it was on these roads that the incompletely worked out chassis of our new tanks and the chassis of our old tanks, which had already been worked out for a long time, quickly broke down!**

And the dust? Yes, **on August 2, 1941**, Halder noted: "*The condition of the roads*. Dust ruins motors. But dust spoils any motors, and the quality of German technology was higher, which means that dust should have harmed it less than Soviet. Moreover, in North Africa, dust did not prevent Rommel from advancing even in the desert. For the time being, for the time being, of course, or rather, to El Alamein.

The English military historian Fuller, while paying tribute to the thesis of bad roads, nevertheless makes a valuable admission: "The vast plains of Russia facilitated the carrying out of enveloping operations." That is, the "endless expanses of the East" were for the Wehrmacht at first rather a boon. After all, both Hitler and his generals agreed that the main current goal of the war was "to defeat the Russian manpower," as Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch noted on July 25, 1941 (see "Diary" of General Halder, vol. 3, book. 1, p. 189). And it was easiest to destroy the Red Army in a series of "cauldrons" formed by a series of flanking, enveloping operations!

And then I'll say this...

I don't know why, but it seems that the preliminary notes of Colonel-General Halder at the meeting of the chiefs of staff of the army group on July 25, 1941 escaped the attention of Western historians of that war (they are given in the Military Diary of the 1971 edition on pages 182 - 193 of book 1 -th volume of the 3rd).

The conversation at the meeting was exclusively businesslike, there was no need to promote each other, but it was also necessary to assess the situation comprehensively. Nevertheless, Halder's notes do not say anything about the need to take into account the factor of bad roads and bad weather. But there you can read this:

"Freeways!

It is not good when we are told that the terrain is impassable for us, but the enemy constantly conducts counterattacks from there.

In fact, Halder flogged himself and his colleagues with this one entry, after the war they referred, like Halder himself, to "bad roads." But on a real scale of wartime, Halder's constant talk of "bad roads" turned out to be annoying. Still would! For the Red Army, off-road becomes a suitable theater of war, and the Wehrmacht cannot fight without imperial highways!

Yes, it was not important with freeways in Russia at that time ... And in "Memoirs soldier" Guderian wrote:

"The poor condition of the roads made it impossible to move at high speed ... Only those who themselves drove along these swampy and dirty roads to the advanced positions could imagine the tension experienced by the troops and materiel ..."

But have mercy! The mud did not contribute to the high morale of the troops and the material safety of military equipment among the Russians either. However, this is not even the point is important. It is significant that Guderian traveled 165 kilometers in 10 hours **on September 10**, and 130 kilometers in 10.5 hours **on September 11, 1941**. That is, in that period of 1941, when, according to the calculations of the "blitzkrieg" in Russia, everything should have been completed, and the issue of the pace of movement in Russia was removed from the agenda! Why did it turn out differently?

But because the primary factor in the disruption of the "blitzkrieg" was the stubborn Russian resistance, and even it caused over time, by the autumn of 1941, the appearance of a secondary factor - the poor condition of Russian roads. At the same time, even in the supposedly Russian mudslide, the Germans - when the Russians allowed them to do so - advanced more than quickly. Describing the German offensive on Sevsk on **October 1**, 1941, Guderian reports:

"... I went to the advanced units of our tank units and expressed gratitude to the personnel of the unit commanded by Major Jungenfeldt. On the way back, I informed the corps commander of my order to continue the offensive. The advanced parts of the corps advanced 130 km that day!

Comments required?

Speaking about the state of the troops on September 9, 1941, Guderian writes:

"The small composition of all units and formations strongly showed that the troops {...} needed rest and resupply..."

But what is the reason? In bad roads and weather? Or in Hitler's mistakes? No, the text I released in curly brackets is as follows: "... after intense and bloody battles that lasted continuously for 2.5 months ...".

Why, Halder himself in the notes mentioned above at a meeting on July 25, 1941
year notes this:

"The surprise factor has passed - new factors have appeared ...

Experience: A completely different enemy, therefore, a completely different experience ... <...>

General assessment of the enemy:

The number of tank troops of the enemy turned out to be greater than expected. The stubborn resistance of the enemy is especially noted. In front of the Army Group "South", the enemy turned out to be on top in matters of general leadership (this is about Marshal Budyonny and General Kirponos. - **S.K.**) and conducting offensive operations of an operational scale. Before the army groups "Center" and "North" the enemy showed himself on the bad side (first of all, the catastrophic consequences of Pavlov's failure. - **S.K.**) ... "

Immediately after this, Halder, it is true, writes: "The command and control of the troops at the tactical level and the level of combat training of the troops are mediocre," but these - albeit not the best prepared - troops are especially stubborn. It is they who, with their stubbornness, frustrate all the plans of the Germans, and Halder, unable to control his feelings, writes on July 25, 1941:

"Psychological issues: The ongoing war gets on people's nerves (yep! This is not a "strange war" in the West. - **S.K.**). Therefore, the increased sensitivity is understandable. But it must have its limits! The common cause is higher than the personal. If this does not work out, then no matter what the honored boss is, he must go on vacation (in the autumn of 1942 this will happen to Halder himself. - **S.K.**). After the current battles, the question will arise: what kind of commanders are required to carry out new tasks? Not everyone is capable of everything. Therefore, choose and replace ... "

Well, this is not yet a crisis of leadership, but this is its harbinger ... Already on August 5, 1941, Halder, according to the words of a communications officer, Major Pistorius, writes about the fighting in the sectors of the 251st and 253rd divisions:

"Apparently, tactical mistakes were made here. In addition, there were also panic moods. Oddly enough, these sentiments were much stronger among the command of the 50th Army Corps than among the troops.

However, we will talk more about these topics later, and now I will once again turn to the topic of the stubbornness of our resistance through the prism of General Halder's "Service Diary".

Here are a few more entries from it...

July 15, 1941, 24th day of the war:

"Army Group" South "... The enemy is undertaking fierce counterattacks ...

<...>

Army Group Center: Numerous small enemy groups remained on the territory traversed by the 2nd and 3rd tank groups, which continue to resist ...<...>

Army Group North: Russian troops are fighting, as before, with the greatest bitterness..."

July 18, 1941 , 27th day of the war:

"Operation *Army Group South* is losing its shape more and more. front section against Korosten still requires significant forces to hold him. <...>

Army Group "Center": Infantry divisions ... are constantly forced to hide behind part of their forces from small enemy groups left in our rear. Because of that, the troops are always in a tense state ... <...>

Army Group "North": ... In the Opochka area, the enemy is trying to break through the Araks the way to their isolated parts and take them out of the environment ... "

July 20, 1941 (Sunday), 29th day of the war:

"... Separate enemy groups that continue to remain in our rear are a real disaster for us (I remind you that this is an entry in the diary of one of the top Wehrmacht commanders, and not a tactical or at least operational commander. - S.K.) . We do not have any troops in the rear to eliminate these groups ... "

July 20, 1941:

"The fierceness of the battles waged by our mobile formations ... not to mention the great fatigue of the troops, from the very beginning of the war, continuously making long marches and waging stubborn bloody battles - all this caused a certain decline in spirit among our leading authorities. This was especially clearly expressed in the completely depressed state of the commander-in-chief (Brauchich. - **S.K.**)."

Halder then added: "Meanwhile, there are no grounds for such pessimism in reality. To draw any conclusions, you must first wait for the end of major operations ... Only then will it be possible to give this battle a correct assessment.

The final assessment of "this battle" was given in May 1945, however, as we know, five days later, on July 25, 1941, the first irritated and almost pessimistic notes appear in Halder's notes. One should not be surprised - in his diary constantly, as, for example, immediately after July 20, - on the day of July 21, 1941, there are the words: "heavy battles" and "fierce resistance" ...

Halder, it seems, is already so psychologically exhausted that he sometimes does not notice the absurdity of his notes. So, he begins his notes **on July 24, 1941** with the following words:

"Situation at the front:

Army Group South: The situation on the front of the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions is aggravated. These divisions are too weak to hold back **the onslaught** of large forces.

the enemy *retreating* (allocation is mine everywhere. - **S.K.**) in front of the front of the Schwedler group and the 17th army ... "

"Onslaught" is something directed forward. "Retreat" is, on the contrary, something directed backwards. However, at Halder, *the departing* Soviet troops *are crowding* the advancing German ones ... I don't know about the grammar, but the logic is clearly not all right here!

And it is no longer surprising that on **July 28, 1941**, Halder notes that German troops are fighting *defensive* battles in the Luga area ... At the end of July 1941!

Yes, we still had the hardest August and September ahead of us, with their good weather and lanes, graders and highways quite suitable for the advancement of German columns ... We had a hardest October ahead of us with the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow.

But in the same difficult August 1941, the Yelnin operation of 1941 was first conceived and then carried out by the 24th Army of the Reserve Front - one of the first offensive operations of the Red Army in this war, during which it was possible to break through the enemy's strong defenses and defeat his grouping and liberate a large area.

In the second half of July 1941, the Germans broke through the front south of Smolensk and captured the city of Yelnya on July 19, hoping to resume the attack on Moscow from this bridgehead. 24th Army of General K.I. Rakutina received an order to eliminate the "Yelninsky ledge" and during August went on the offensive several times, but could not complete the task.

On August 5, 1941, Halder wrote:

"*The situation at Yelnya.* Troops laugh at how tank and infantry units are advancing. The fire of enemy artillery is unbearable, since our artillery, due to a lack of ammunition, does not offer any resistance.

On August 6, 1941, he added another "Yelnin" entry to his diary:

"... Enemy artillery uses the fire shaft method. There's a big attack ahead. The enemy apparently believes that the Regiment "Grossdeutschland" and the SS division "Reich" are the Fuhrer's elite troops (but that's how it was! - **S.K.**). If these troops are defeated, there will be a great political resonance. Such a catastrophe cannot be averted with a guarantee by the forces of a tank group alone."

So, the troops of the Reich at the front are still "laughing", and one of their top commanders, sitting in the Reich, is already fearing a catastrophe. However, it was not so close to her in August ... **On August 16, 1941**, Halder wrote that "despite the losses suffered, the troops are filled with a sense of superiority over the enemy." Nevertheless, in the second half of August, the Germans were forced to withdraw from the "Yelnin ledge" two heavily battered tank divisions, one motorized division and the same motorized regiment "Grossdeutschland", replacing them with five infantry divisions.

On August 28, Generals Halder and von Bock were already discussing the question of a general withdrawal of troops. However, a decisive turning point was ensured only by our offensive on September 5, 1941.

Yelnya was liberated by the morning of September 6, and only the lack of tanks and aviation (what it was, it was) saved the Germans from complete defeat in this front line - having reached the line of the rivers Ustrom and Stryan, our troops stopped in front of the fortified line of German defense. Then, in the battles for Yelnya, the Soviet guard was born. The 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st Rifle Divisions were reorganized into the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Rifle Divisions.

The last three divisions were commanded by army colonels A.Z. Akimenko, N.A. Hagen and P.F. Moskvitin ... The 100th division was commanded by the army general Russiyanov known to us. The army commander himself, General Rakutin, was a border guard.

On September 5, 1941, Halder noted dryly in his diary: "Our units surrendered to the enemy the arc of the front near Yelnya ...".

And by September 8, the Elninsky ledge was finally eliminated. However, the plans for the offensive of the Wehrmacht on Moscow were not buried. On September 5, 1941, Hitler, at a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Brauchitsch, gave directive instructions on the preparation and conduct of the "decisive operation against the Timoshenko Army Group", that is, on the offensive in the Moscow direction ...

This decision of Hitler was later defined by his generals as "fatal", but the only fatal decision of the Fuhrer, which **none of his generals condemned** in the first days of the Russian campaign, was the decision to start a war with Russia. After this decision, any development of events inevitably programmed for Germany only one end result - defeat.

One of the standard explanations for Hitler's failure in Russia is the "Yugoslav" delay in the invasion, due to the need to eliminate the threat of Romanian oil and the southern flank of the Reich from pro-British Yugoslavia and Greece.

I think that in this very short book I can confine myself to the post-war testimony on this subject of the former Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, General Blumentritt, who wrote the following in 1956:

"The start of Operation Barbarossa was tentatively scheduled for May 15th. This was the earliest date, since we had to wait until the roads were dry after the spring thaw (that is, the German generals were still aware of the Russian thaw. - **S.K.**). Mechanized units would get stuck in April, when rivers and streams swell and the vast expanses of western Russia are covered with spring waters. The Balkan campaign delayed the start of the war with Russia by five to five and a half weeks.

But (sic! - **S.K.**) even if there had been no Balkan campaign, the start of the war with Russia, obviously, would have had to be postponed, since in 1941 the thaw came late and the Bug River entered the sector of the 4th Army to their shores only at the beginning of June ... "

It is strange that none of the "historians" paid attention to the last fact! But besides, neither Hitler, nor the same Halder, in any case, expected to get on with Russia until the autumn thaw. Hitler stated that the Balkans had delayed his campaign against Russia "for five minutes", and on **June 30, 1941**, on the 9th day of the war, Halder wrote in his diary:

"The Führer believes that if Smolensk is reached in mid-July, the infantry formations will be able to occupy Moscow only in August.

The Wehrmacht reached the line of Smolensk in July, but could not occupy Moscow even by December 1941. At the same time, already in the middle of the summer of 1941, Hitler faced a dilemma that could not have arisen in general: "Moscow or Kyiv?" That is how General Guderian called one of the sections of chapter five of his Memoirs of a Soldier.

Guderian blames Hitler for turning his tanks south into the Ukraine instead of continuing the advance on Moscow. But Guderian thought like a general, and Hitler like a strategist.

Yes, in July 1941 Smolensk was taken, but the Russian resistance turned out to be such that large masses of Soviet troops were not defeated, the Smolensk battle continued. And from the southern flank of the German troops advancing on Moscow, the troops of Budyonny and Kirponos hung. Now Hitler began to understand that the "blitzkrieg" did not work and will not work. And something needs to be done with Ukraine.

Already at the end of July 1941, there was a directive from Keitel to Brauchitsch to seize the industrial region of Kharkov, but what was then for Brauchitsch and Halder to little

significant Keitel! Nevertheless, threatening orders from Hitler himself soon followed. On August 4, 1941, Halder wrote that the Führer "attaches special importance to Leningrad, as well as to the capture of the southern regions - coal, iron, the destruction of the enemy air base in the Crimea (against Romanian oil - S.K.)" .

Halder further stated:

"The Führer does not attach any importance to the capture of Moscow."

So, the simultaneous offensive in divergent directions on Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine proved to be further impossible for the Germans, and Hitler quite reasonably decided to turn Guderian's tank "wedge" on Ukraine.

In fact, August 1941 turned out to be for the top leadership of the war in Germany a month of bickering between Hitler, the OKW led by Keitel, the OKH led by Brauchitsch and Halder, as well as the army group commanders who got involved in this squabble and even lower-level generals (I have in mind, first of all, Guderian, who was rushing towards Moscow).

Characteristic in this regard are the August entries in Halder's diary...

On August 11, 1941, on the 51st day of the war, the general writes:

"... Our last forces are thrown into the battle. Each new regrouping within army groups requires us to exert extreme strain and unproductive expenditure of human strength and technical resources (and the Russians are forcing regroupings. —

S.K.). All this causes nervousness and dissatisfaction among the command (commander-in-chief) and an ever-increasing tendency to interfere in all details ... "

August 15, 1941:

"... The divisions have lost their materiel. They are only partially capable of marching. Until now, von Bock had played all-in against superior enemy forces and could play this game only because he was about to go on the offensive. Now the army group must go on the defensive ... "

August 28, 1941:

"10.30. — Phone call from von Bock: he excitedly informed me that the possibilities of resistance of the troops of the group were coming to an end. If the Russians continue offensive operations, then it will not be possible to hold the eastern sector of the front of the army group ... "

August 30, 1941:

"Meeting with the Commander-in-Chief. He had a long private conversation with the Führer... The Führer expressed a number of thoughts, the seriousness and consistency of which I doubt. In essence, he renounces his former words. He said: "I didn't think so" ...

Only a business instruction was given ... "

And then Halder sighs:

"... units that have already been brought into battle somewhere are certainly pinned down by the enemy. And therefore, the question of when and how it will be possible to withdraw these troops for use in another sector of the front will also depend on the enemy.

This, I remind you, is August 30, 1941, the 70th day of the war ...

However, by August 23 and 24, the bickering was almost over. At the headquarters of Army Group Center, a meeting was held between Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch and generals, including Guderian. Brauchitsch announced Hitler's decision to attack first of all not on Leningrad and Moscow, but on Ukraine and Crimea. At the same time, Brauchitsch told Guderian:

"I forbid you to raise the question of an attack on Moscow with the Führer. There is an order to advance in a southerly direction, and it can only be a question of how to carry it out. Further discussion of the issue is useless...

Guderian - all of the above and below direct speech is taken, of course, directly from his memoirs - turned out to be stubborn, and during the ensuing conversation with Hitler, to the question:

Do you consider your troops capable of making another major effort at their real combat capability? - answered:

-If the troops have a real goal in front of them, which will be clear to every soldier, then yes!

Hitler elaborated:

- You, of course, mean Moscow?

"Yes," Guderian confirmed, and asked permission to explain why he thinks so.

Further, Guderian recounts his conversation with the Fuhrer in detail, exposing the latter to have little understanding of strategy and military leadership. This purely general arrogance of Guderian makes a generally amusing impression, but one can only be surprised at the patience of Hitler, who let Guderian speak without interrupting him even once, and then began to explain to Guderian the basics of the Great Strategy, without which it is impossible to lead a modern war.

Guderian was stubborn, and then Hitler, lamenting that his generals "understand nothing in the war economy", ended with a stern order to immediately go on the offensive on Kiev, "which is his closest strategic purpose."

Hitler was right, just as Guderian was, by the way, right from a purely military point of view. Only the *devil* who pulled Hitler to start a war with the Soviet Union was wrong .

The insoluble dilemma that faced the Reich, who dared to go to war with Russia, was well described by the same General Blumentritt:

"Hitler approached the war from purely economic positions. He wanted to seize grain-rich Ukraine, the industrial Donetsk basin (it is significant that even after the war the general, unlike Hitler, did not understand the economic significance of the regions of Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye. - S.K.), and then Caucasian *oil* .

Brauchitsch and Halder (like Guderian. - **S.K.**) looked at the war from a completely different point of view (narrow generals. - **S.K.**). They wanted to first destroy the Red Army, and then fight for the achievement of economic goals ... "

But the generals did not understand that in modern warfare, motors cannot be destroyed. manpower, if it is not deprived of sources of its equipment with motors.

Hitler understood. On March 17, 1941, at a meeting with the highest generals on the Barbarossa plan, he expressed a number of considerations that Halder entered in his diary. Hitler believed that Army Group North "should advance to the river. Dnieper, and then, under the cover of the Dnieper, deploy their forces to the north. Capture of Moscow it does not matter...".

To this entry, the Soviet edition gave the following note:

"After the advance of the advancing German troops to the Dnieper, Hitler intended to turn the main forces of Army Group Center to the north in order to quickly capture Petersburg. According to his other version, it was supposed to turn forces from the Dnieper to the south to capture Ukraine, Donbass and the Caucasus. OKH (Oberkommandos der Heeres, that is, Brauchitsch and Halder. - **S.K.**), however, believed that all goals, including those that Hitler spoke about, could be achieved if Moscow was captured. Therefore, the OKH insisted that after reaching the Dnieper (near Smolensk. - **S.K.**) continue the attack on Moscow.

But this is how it turned out...

If you try to take Moscow, you will not be able to deprive the USSR of its most important share defense potential in Ukraine and soon you will get a blow in the side from the south.

If you try to capture Ukraine before taking Moscow, you will not be able to knock out the striking force of Russia in the Moscow direction and soon you will receive a blow in the forehead, as it actually happened!

That is, in any case, it turned out: "Though twist - twist, even twist - twist, and the "blitzkrieg" of the Reich is death."

Two paths led to the conquest of Russia by armed force - through Smolensk to Moscow or through Ukraine to Moscow. And both were ultimately losing for any aggressor.

What is Belarus and Western Russia? On the one hand, this is the shortest way to Moscow, but the way through swamps and forests. On the other hand, for Belarus and Western Russia of the 1941 model, this is a path through regions with relatively underdeveloped industry, except for Tula, already on the outskirts of Moscow.

And what is Ukraine of the 1941 model?

This, from the point of view of the military economy, is, first of all, a powerful industry, powerful since tsarist times and grown immeasurably over the years of five-year plans, Ukraine is also a rich raw material base! And this base in the second half of the summer of 1941 was still working for the defense of Russia, and not for the aggression of the Reich. Could Hitler, with his complex understanding of the problems of modern warfare, tolerate this state of affairs any longer?

The meeting with Hitler took place on August 24, 1941, and Guderian soon turned south. The defense of Kyiv itself began earlier - from July 11, but as a result of the transfer of the main hostilities to Ukraine on September 19, 1941, the capital of Ukraine fell. Nevertheless, only on October 20 did our troops leave Kharkov. Fighting in the Zaporizhia region took place in August and September, as did the fighting in the Dnepropetrovsk region.

If not for Hitler's August decision, these battles would not have happened, and most of the Ukrainian industrial region would have worked for the defense of the Motherland.

Kyiv, Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk - these are special steels and manganese, tanks and guns, aircraft and aircraft engines, instruments and electric motors...

And Donbass!

And the Crimea, which Hitler in a conversation with Guderian called "the aircraft carrier of the Soviet Union in its struggle against Romanian oil"!

Hitler understood this, but his generals did not.

By the way, here, perhaps, it would be appropriate to dwell a little on that pre-war concentration of Soviet troops in the area of the "Bialystok" ledge, which the "Suvorov" Rezuns present as evidence of the offensive nature of the deployment of the Red Army formations. In fact, this deployment is, on the contrary, proof of the defensive nature of Stalin's intentions!

And that's why...

Hitler reproached his generals for not understanding war economics, which Hitler himself certainly understood. But after all, Stalin also understood the war economy and rational strategy of a major modern war is at least as good as Hitler. And therefore, thinking for Hitler, he naturally assumed that Hitler would inflict his main blow on Ukraine. This was not Stalin's miscalculation, as we have been told about since Khrushchev's time, but Stalin's reasonable predictive assessment of Germany's possible actions.

And within the framework of such an assessment, the presence of the "Bialystok" ledge, which was formed, by the way, not as a result of military operations, but as a result of the delimitation of the state border according to the Soviet-German friendship treaty and the border of 1939, was very convenient. This ledge hung from the west over a possible "Ukrainian" attack by the Wehrmacht and provided the possibility of a Soviet deep flank attack against the German troops that broke into Ukraine.

Expecting Hitler's strike through Ukraine, Stalin thought correctly, because, being himself a major political thinker, he thought for Hitler, whom he highly appreciated, that's right. True, if we keep in mind what the Anglo-Saxons call the "Grand Strategy".

In reality, Hitler - succumbing to the insistence of the generals who thought like generals - delivered the main strategic blow from the first days of the war in the direction as short as possible to Moscow. But then the Great War Strategy and our stubborn resistance forced him to turn to the Ukraine.

Having solved the "Ukrainian" problems in a rough outline, Hitler returned to attacking Moscow. But all this throwing from Moscow to Ukraine and vice versa was just throwing. And by the end of November 1941, they already acquired a convulsive character. Kipling aptly remarked: "The issue is considered resolved when it is correctly resolved ..." However, the "Russian question" of Germany could not be solved by armed force on any path - even through the Pinsk swamps and Smolensk to Moscow, even through the grain-growing and industrial Ukraine to the Crimea, Rostov-on-Don and beyond.

However, once this war was started, Hitler was forced to continue it. And he continued like this...

Kyiv fell on September 19, 1941... And on September 30, the Germans launched a "general" offensive, as they called it, against Moscow with a blow from the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian. returned to the Moscow direction from Ukraine. On October 5, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Group was deployed into the 2nd Panzer Army.

1st Panzer Group Kleist, moving from Eastern Ukraine to the Crimea and beyond to Rostov-on-Don, was deployed to the 1st Panzer Army on the same day, October 5th.

As for the rest of the tank groups, the 3rd TG under the command of Hermann Goth and the 4th TG under the command of Erich Goepner were advancing in the Moscow direction. At the same time, active operations near Leningrad were curtailed by mid-September, and Göpner's tanks from Army Group North were now also rushing towards Moscow.

For the Red Army and the USSR, the time of the most difficult trials again came - the Germans, having picked up materially, physically and psychologically, dealt a powerful blow. And it was a strong, skillful opponent, which he, in fact, remained almost until the very last days of the war. At the beginning of October 1941, Halder was quite pleased, as can be seen from his diary entries ...

October 3, 1941, 104th day of the war:

"At the front, where Operation Typhoon is being carried out, there are very significant successes. Guderian's tank group reached Orel. On the remaining sectors of the front, enemy resistance has been broken almost everywhere (with the exception of the front of the 2nd Army). Tank divisions advanced 50 km, and infantry divisions - up to 40 km (as you can see, the "bad roads" did not interfere with rapid advance. - S.K.) ... "

October 4, 1941, 105th day of the war:

"Operation Typhoon is developing almost classically. The tank group of Guderian, advancing through Orel, reached Mtsensk without encountering any resistance. Göpner's tank group quickly broke through the enemy's defenses and went to Mozhaisk. The Goth tank group reached the Hill, thus approaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper ... "

October 6, 1941, 107th day of the war:

"... In general, we can say that the operation conducted by Army Group Center, is approaching its apogee - the complete completion of the encirclement of the enemy ... "

October 1941 was successful for the Reich and other sectors of the Eastern Front. On October 16, the Romanians, with the help of the Germans, took Odessa. Manstein's 11th Army broke through Perekop to the Crimea. The 1st Panzer Army of Kleist with its right flank reached the northwestern approaches to Rostov, in the Mius region, and with its left flank - to the Donbas Gorlovka. The 16th Army occupied Kharkov and Belgorod. 48th Motorized

Corps of the Army Group "Center" entered Kursk. On October 16, Army Group North struck in the direction of Tikhvin, advancing 120 kilometers in three weeks and occupying Tikhvin on November 8.

In the Moscow direction, Army Group Center advanced 230 - 250 kilometers, reaching the approaches to Moscow.

On October 19, 1941, a state of siege was declared in Moscow.

Halder is still satisfied ... **On October 8, 1941**, he lists those air forces that "after the end of operations it is planned to leave in the East", but already on **October 9, 1941**, in his diary there appears - no, not even a cloud, but just a small cloud of worries: "Enemy pressure on the western flank of Guderian's tank group is increasing all the time ..."

A month passes - what a month! - and on **November 11, 1941**, on the 143rd day of the war, Halder writes:

"The enemy is making powerful attacks against Guderian's tank army. The situation is not quite clear ... Apparently, a slight frost.

As a commentary on the previous story, I will take a quote from Guderian about the October battles:

"... in the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the 24th tank corps near Mtsensk ... fierce battles of local (not quite, as it turned out, so. - S.K.) unfolded , into which the 4th tank division was drawn, however, due to for the mudslides, she could not get enough support. A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into the battle, causing heavy losses to our tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which has taken place so far, has now been lost and has now passed to the enemy ... "

I note that the mudslide did not prevent, as we see, our offensive actions, but fettered - according to Guderian - his troops. Well, an army that expects to fight only in greenhouse conditions is, sooner or later, objectively doomed to failure and has no right to justify itself with "bad weather"!

In Moscow in mid-October 1941, the townsfolk fell into a panic, and the Soviet soldiers at that time near Orel gradually created the conditions for a decisive turning point in the course of the war. And on **November 15, 1941** , on the 147th day of the war, another entry, previously impossible for the owner of the diary, appears in Halder's diary:

"... A report has been received: "The enemy is retreating!" This is something new! Meanwhile, the enemy is conducting energetic counterattacks on the front of the 4th Army (where the chief of staff was, by the way, General Blumentrit. - S.K.) ... "

So, on the 147th day of the "blitzkrieg", the Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces is already surprised (!) by reports from the front about the withdrawal of Soviet troops ... But further - more!

November 17, 1941, 149th day of the war:

"... The command of the 4th Army reports that due to the great successes achieved by the enemy on its right flank, it is forced to bring into battle the reserves intended for the offensive scheduled for tomorrow. In general, they cannot go on the offensive in the area between Moscow and the Oka ... "

November 18, 1941, 150th day of the war:

"Meeting with the commander-in-chief. He is very unhappy with the fact that more and more disappear chances of a quick approach to Moscow. It does not depend on his desire! <...>

... Field Marshal von Bock, like us, believes that at the moment both sides are straining their last strength and that the one who will show more perseverance will prevail ... "

Here the Germans were right, but Halder was mistaken that we, like the Germans, by the end of November no longer had reserves.

We had them!

And they were already advancing - so far, however, near Rostov.

On November 21, 1941, Halder began recording just from Rostov:

"Our troops captured Rostov. To the north of Rostov, heavy battles are going on with a numerically superior enemy, who, apparently acting under skillful leadership (this, for the information of Mark Solonin, about Marshal Timoshenko. - S.K.), is attacking in dense battle formations in several **groups**, 2 - 3 divisions in each. There is no particular danger for our troops yet (but soon it will arise, and Rostov will be recaptured! - **S.K.**).

And the Wehrmacht was still advancing in the Moscow direction, but what did it cost him, says the recording of a conversation between Halder and Colonel Zeitzler **on December 1, 1941**:

"On the state and position of individual divisions. The number of these divisions is very small. The commander of the 13th Panzer Division and one of the most capable regimental commanders suffers from a complete breakdown of the nervous system ... "

On December 2, 1941, Halder sighs with relief:

"The offensive near Tula is developing successfully ... The general conclusion is that the enemy's resistance has reached its climax. He has no more
no new powers...

Dear reader! This was written three days before the start of our counteroffensive!

For three days!!!

At the same time, already on November 23, 1941, at a meeting of chief quartermasters of the armies of the Eastern Front at Hitler's headquarters, it was stated that "Russia's military power no longer poses a threat to Europe."

The Germans did not immediately understand what had happened! **On December 6, 1941**, Halder wrote down at a meeting with Hitler: "Enemy artillery at zero level." And in the evening of the same day, summarizing the situation at the front in his diary, he writes about the battles near Tikhvin: "The enemy is carrying out massive artillery raids on the city."

And on December 9, 1941, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts liberated Tikhvin, and the troops of the Southwestern Front liberated Yelets on the same day.

And on December 1941, the troops of the Western Front liberated Istra, on December 15 - Wedge.

On December 16, 1941, the troops of the Kalinin Front liberated Kalinin, on December 20, the troops of the Western Front entered Volokolamsk and Naro-Fominsk, and on December 30 - to Kaluga.

On December 16, 1941, the commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, issued top secret order No. 3147, which began like this:

"For several weeks now, the thinned units of the army group have been fighting stubborn battles with a numerically superior enemy. Enduring frost and hardships, the troops courageously fulfill their duty... It is currently impossible to replace formations that are tired in battles. Everyone must stand in his place ... "

This order ended, which Field Marshal von Bock could not have dreamed of even in a nightmare back in October 1941, like this:

"Written transmission of this order is prohibited. After his content will be communicated to all division commanders, it must be burned."

On December 18, 1941, the directive of the OKH was issued with the stamp "top secret, state importance". Here is its beginning:

"1. *The Fuhrer ordered:*

Large-scale retreat is unacceptable. It can lead to the complete loss of heavy weapons and equipment. By personal example, commanders, commanders and officers should encourage troops to fanatical resistance in their positions, even if the enemy has broken through from the flanks and from the rear ... "

In June 1941, the Germans in their reports wrote about "Bolshevik fanatics" with a certain amount of condescending contempt - they say, what can you take from these savages ... In December 1941, the Germans grabbed the word "fanatic" in their orders as some kind of password to salvation ... This the word was present in the Fuhrer's directive, in the report of the headquarters of the 4th Army to the headquarters of Army Group Center, in the telegram of the headquarters of Army Group Center to the commands of the 2nd, 2nd Panzer, 4th Armies, 4th Panzer Group, 9th Army...

The last telegram, dated December 21, 1941, stated:

"... The fanatical will to defend the territory on which the troops are stationed must be instilled in every soldier by all, even the most cruel means ... <...>

The story of Napoleon's retreat threatens to repeat itself again ... "

It is unlikely that comments are required here.

On December 19, 1941, Field Marshal Brauchitsch left his post - allegedly due to illness. Von Bock was replaced as commander of Army Group Center by Field Marshal von Kluge. Half a month earlier, on December 3, the Fuhrer resigned the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Rundstedt, and on January 16, 1942, it was the turn of the commander of Army Group North, Leeb.

On December 20, 1941, Hitler said at a meeting at headquarters: "We must learn how to eliminate breakthroughs." But the Russians have somehow already learned how to create them! On December 26, 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet began, Kerch and Feodosia were liberated.

On January 2, 1942, the troops of the Western Front liberated Maloyaroslavets, on January 20, Mozhaisk, and on March 5, 1942, Yukhnov.

By the way, about the weather... On the eve of our December counter-offensive, the frosts near Moscow were really great - up to 36 degrees. But at the same time, Hitler ordered to get rid of the expression "Russian winter", calling it "psychologically dangerous." Of course, he did not suspect that over time, after the war, this expression would turn out to be psychologically *beneficial* for his generals and that all Western analysts would pick it up - from the academic Englishman Fuller to the half-yellow English journalist Len Dayton ...

By the end of 1941, everything became clear to the Germans.

Entries for **December 29, 1941**, Halder began with the words:

"Very hard day!"

December 30, 1941:

"Tough day again!"

On December 31, 1941, on the 193rd day of the war, the first line of Halder's notes did not

changed:

"Another hard day!"

January 2, 1942:

"Heavy fighting all day... <...>

The current situation prompted Field Marshal von Kluge to request permission to withdraw troops ... I had a stormy explanation with the Fuhrer.

<...>

Repeated negotiations with von Kluge, who is in some kind of trance and says that he is not trusted "...

January 3, 1942, 196th day of the war:

"... A dramatic scene broke out at the Führer's headquarters. He expressed doubts about courage and determination of the generals ... "

Further, Halder added: "In reality, the whole point is that the troops simply cannot withstand frosts exceeding 30 degrees." However, in reality, the point was that the Russian resistance, which began on June 22, 1941 and did not stop day after day for the rest of 1941, resulted in the creation of a state of affairs when the German troops were forced to freeze at the very gates of Moscow.

Isn't that right, gentlemen?

On January 9, 1942, Halder is concerned that "it was not possible to localize the enemy's breakthrough to the west of Rzhev," and the next day he rejoices, but why: "Due to the very unfavorable weather, the day passed relatively calmly."

So, on the 203rd day of the war, the bad Russian weather turned out to be not an enemy for the troops. Reich, but their ally. What to do - times have gradually changed ...

On January 11, 1942, Hitler held a meeting at headquarters with Field Marshal von Kluge. Halder wrote that day:

"The Führer insists on his order to firmly hold every inch earth."

At the same time, Hitler responded to requests from the front in a standard way: "Do not think that yours is harder than the others'...

December 12, 1941, when the Soviet counter-offensive was just unfolding for real, Halder confessed to his diary:

"V. The situation with the production of tanks. It is currently such that we will no longer be able to wage war at all ... "

But where did the tanks with which the Germans began their "blitzkrieg" go, counting on the same tanks to complete the "blitzkrieg" in 1941?

Where were they?

Drowned in Russian mud?

Or did they burn out in battles with the Red Army?

Friedrich von Mellenthin, Lieutenant General of the Reich Tank Forces, wrote much later than the end of the war:

"It will always remain an open question for us whether we could have achieved victory in the critical year 1941 if Hitler's strategy had been different. The attack on Moscow, of which Guderian was a supporter, and which we temporarily abandoned in August by deciding first to seize the Ukraine, would perhaps have brought decisive success if it had always been regarded as the main blow that determined the outcome of the whole war. Russia would be struck to the very heart ... "

And then Mellenthin quotes the famous English military theorist Liddell Hart, who in 1948 stated that if during the years of Soviet power in Russia the same road network was created as the Western powers have, then "this country might have been quickly conquered. Bad roads delayed the advance of the German mechanized troops "...

Oh, those bad Russian roads, somehow laid across the vast Russian expanses! How convenient to explain everything by their dirt and length. In the general's German collection Fatal Decisions, General Günther Blumentritt lamented (p. 74 of the 1958 Soviet edition):

"In 1941, the German army still consisted mainly of purely infantry divisions, which moved on foot, and horses were used in the wagon train.

Only a small part of the army consisted of armored and motorized divisions. Therefore, we faced the problem: how to cover huge distances ... "

Distances in Russia are really more than in the same Germany. Often, thousands of kilometers lie between the start and end points of the route, or maybe - and a whole tens of thousands. Task!

However, in 1941, in real time, the Wehrmacht solved this problem quite successfully and at the level of a century, moving across the vast Russian expanses on that half a million (!) Units of only wheeled vehicles that were available to three million three hundred thousand people of the ground forces Reich, involved since June 22, 1941 in the East.

Information about 500 thousand wheeled vehicles is given on page 286 of the Müller-Gillebrand reference book of the 2002 edition. And if, following the example of Mark Solonin, the reader picks up a simple calculator, he will be convinced that as of June 22, 1941, General Blumentritt's subordinates had one car for 6.6 people at their disposal.

Wouldn't this be enough to get to Moscow - if you had to go under the "welcome" raised two hands of millions of Soviet "Stalin's slaves"? But the transport of the Wehrmacht "sank" in the same place as its tank units - in the "quagmire" of the war with Russia. Not a "geographical" quagmire created by climatic factors, but in that fundamentally impenetrable systemic "quagmire" from which, since June 22, 1941, there was not a single possible way out for the Reich, except ...

Except for unconditional surrender - as happened on May 9, 1945 in Berlin.

In 2002, the collective collection "Third Reich Victorious: The Alternate History of How the Germans Won the War" was published in London. In 2004, it was published in Russian in Moscow under the title "Victory of the Third Reich: An Alternative History of the Second World War" (M.: ACT, Astrel).

And it has a dozen masters, doctors, colonels and lieutenant colonels from England and the US described how the Germans *did win* that war.

Hitler could have won the Second World War only by maintaining peace with the USSR and strengthening the economic union with it - as the basis of a strong political, and then military alliance. Any other options are absolutely ahistorical even within the framework of a virtual analysis!

Moreover, the "analysis" of the "military historians" of the United States that appeared at the beginning of the new century turned out to be sometimes elementary illiterate. So, these unfortunate "analysts" made Georgy Zhukov, who allegedly replaced Stalin, the General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, although until 1952 the ruling party in the USSR was the CPSU (b).

And this illiterate "analysis" is thoroughly saturated with Russophobia. Accordingly, in the "version of history" of the authors of the "virtual" collection of Soviet Russia, a miserable fate is assigned, but Field Marshal Manstein arranges for the Soviet tank forces in February 1945 a new "Tannenberg" "on the plains of Central Poland."

On the Western Front, in Normandy, at the same time, of course, a separate truce was signed, which allowed the Germans "to transfer thousands of guns from the western borders of the Reich to the Eastern Front."

Oh, how *they* want to win that war so that the Russians do not win it ... How they want, at least on paper, at least in the 21st century, to deprive "these Russians" of the victory of 1945!

It turns out that the victory over Russia in 1991 and 1993 is not enough for the Anglo-Saxons!

One of the learned colonels, the authors of the collection, the American Gilberto Villahermosa, worked in 1990 as a senior researcher at the Institute of Military History with such an odious figure as General Volkogonov. Picking up from

this "general from provocation" of anti-Soviet experience, Villahermosa then became an adviser on Russia and Eurasia to the High Command of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe. "Multi-station" for the atmosphere and essence of the current "Russian" is quite logical.

However, despite the metamorphoses of these villahermoses, scientifically and historically sound, I repeat, there is only one alternative version of the Fuhrer's victory - with us!

The Germans could not defeat the Russians in 1941 with an armed hand under any variant of their actions after June 22, 1941 - even if Russia of the 1941 model were all covered with a network of autobahns, and its climate at the latitude of Moscow would suddenly become milder by the fall of 1941, than in southern Germany.

After all, those who want to attribute everything to "bad roads" and "bad weather" should not forget, for example, that if the Soviet tank and mechanized corps in the very first days of the war had made their marches hundreds of kilometers along the highways, they would have arrived at the place of battles and in a good technical condition, and with personnel not exhausted by marches, and - which is very important - **much faster** than it happened in reality! And the great tank battle, unsuccessful for us in the Lutsk triangle -

Dubno - Brody, perhaps, would be successful for us in, for example, the triangle Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk - Berestechko, closer to the border ...

And then, you see, with all our miscalculations and overlays, the Soviet tank forces, even with worn-out and unprocessed equipment, but indeed numerically superior at the first moment, the German tank forces would decide everything in their own, Russian, favor! We would have decided already in the first week of the war!

So - paradoxical as it may seem at first glance - perhaps it was the lack of a developed network of good roads in the western regions of the USSR that saved the Germans in 1941 from a quick defeat by Soviet tank and mechanized corps!

Well, if you think "virtually" on the topic "If only...", then this option cannot be ruled out!

And frosts at thirty-six degrees? But after all, the Wehrmacht was ready for the heat of thirty-six degrees in North Africa? Why, then, were his chief quartermasters and other generals - staff, drill and scientists - not preparing for Russian frosts? Did they overestimate the British and underestimate the Russians?

Well, that's how they got it in the teeth from the Russians! And there is no point in blaming your intellectual and organizational miscalculations on Russian spaces, Russian roads, Russian dirt, Russian frosts and the Fuhrer's German mistakes.

And here, after all, General Halder did not let me down! None other than Halder of the August 1941 model exposes the post-war lies of his colleagues that the Wehrmacht, undressed and undressed, turned out to be "unprepared for the Russian winter" and etc.

In fact, in the Wehrmacht, already in July 1941, they thought about winter uniforms for troops in Russia, although at the beginning and in a slightly different way than it actually turned out, they were going to dress warmly the occupying troops, settling in winter quarters in Russia after the victory over her, and not combat units waging a winter war.

But they were going to outfit them in sheepskin coats in advance.

Here are Halder's notes that prove this and with which I will end the analysis.

the ninth myth (highlighting in bold type in quotes is mine. - **S.K.**).

July 9, 1941, 18th day of the war:

"17.00. - *Heusinger*: about current affairs ...

V. Exchange of views on the issue of the future organization and distribution of forces in the occupied regions of Russia **after the defeat of the Russian armed forces** (as it turned out, did not take place. - **S.K.**). We should start preparing for winter right away."

July 25, 1941, 34th day of the war:

"Conference of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army Groups on July 25, 1941... <...>

V. Already now to think over the issue of preparing for the winter (winter uniforms).

August 2, 1941, 42nd day of the war:

"... The question of the supply of winter uniforms. The supply of winter uniforms, for which applications were sent in May, made it possible to meet only a small part of the total requirement. The West must make do with its own resources. ***At the disposal of the chief of the armaments department of the land army there is a sufficient supply of uniforms intended for the active troops in the East.*** This stock will last until October of this year.

As you can see, the Wehrmacht - in full accordance with the Russian proverb - began to prepare "sledges" for the Russian winter in the summer. Another thing is that the situation for the winter turned out to be "uncalculated" - and the troops from the west had to be transferred, and the enemy destroyed the warehouses with uniforms, and the irreversible loss of uniforms that had not been removed from the corpses of German soldiers turned out to be much greater than expected.

Guderian, however, later stated that in a conversation with Hitler in mid-December 1941, he allegedly accused the commissaries of being unable to "push" winter uniforms to the front for several weeks and trains with them were stationed in Warsaw. But where were, firstly, the vaunted German punctuality and German organization? And that it was Guderian who "combed it" only in mid-December? After all, he could "trace the path" of winter sheepskin coats not in December, as he really did, but several weeks earlier! However, I didn't follow it - near Moscow everything was going so that the Germans were already losing their heads and the ability to act soberly. They were morally broken even before it happened on the battlefield.

So why complain about the "Russian winter"?

And was it, our Russian winter, always so severe at the end of 1941? I will remind the reader of only one phrase from the recording of negotiations on the direct wire of I.V. Stalin with the commander of the Kalinin Front I.S. Konev on December 12, 1941.

"KONEV. <...> The matter was complicated by the thaw, across the river. The Volga of heavy tanks cannot be transported ... "

This is a very important phrase!

Firstly, it is asked: "Who, since things were like this, was prevented by the Russian winter from successfully fighting near Moscow - the Germans or the Russians?" After all, the Germans by that time were losing their heavy weapons in battles, and the Russians, it turns out, were not able to fully use their heavy weapons due to bad Russian weather.

Secondly, something else is even more important! Here we have documentary evidence that in mid-December 1941, there were even thaws near Moscow! But there is no mention of this in German memoir sources. And, perhaps, it is clear why ...

I had to read that in the rear of the German units advancing on Moscow, there seemed to be a huge service, which was intended for a gala dinner for the winners after the capture of Moscow. We took this service as a trophy. A parade of German troops on Red Square was also planned. To accept it, as I understand it, was going to the Fuhrer himself.

However, in 1941, only one military parade was possible on Red Square. The one that really took place on it and took place on November 7, 1941 in honor of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and which was hosted by Stalin.

In any case, Stalin would have hosted this parade on November 7, 1941. As for Hitler, he, in any variant of his actions, in any, completely

decisions that suited him, the generals did not have a single chance for *his* parade on Red Square.

The Germans in 1941 did not have the opportunity to win in advance, because they swung at something then unrealistic, then beyond anyone's reach - to destroy Soviet Russia by armed force. And the same diary of General Halder shows and proves how the top leadership of the Reich, and not just Hitler, not only underestimated the complex potential of resistance of the Soviet Union, but simply blindly, point-blank, did not recognize the very fact that the USSR had such a potential.

What, they, the elite of the Reich, understood everything and only Hitler was blind and rejected all warnings and objective information? Let me not believe! After all, if all these Halders and Brauchits, Goths and Boks, Leebs and Guderians, Mansteins and Blumentrits were really perspicacious *in real time*, that is, if they saw the unequivocal disastrous for Germany of a campaign against Russia, then they could simply collectively resign.

Until this trip!

Not plotting, which at that moment could only weaken Germany, but refusing to support Hitler by action - as did the imperial commissioner for employment Günter Terek long before the war. He, an old imperial official of the highest level, at the personal insistence of the Reich President Hindenburg, was introduced into the first cabinet of ministers of the Reich Chancellor Hitler, but soon left it on his own initiative. Once and for all...

Of course, this step did not provide Terek with pies and donuts. But Hitler did not instruct him in any special cones. Terek, however, more than once during the years of the existence of the Third Reich was temporarily arrested, infringed, he was officially listed as an "enemy of the state", but ... On "no", as they say, there is no trial.

However, the highest generals of the Reich, the highest officials - the basis of the state apparatus, already knowing about the Barbarossa plan, did not say "No!" to their Führer. On the contrary, they told him not just "Yes", but even "Oh, yes!!!". And what of the fact that many of them - as they later "remembered" - supposedly hesitated, feared and doubted inside themselves. In reality, they developed the Barbarossa plan, and supported it, and enthusiastically - at first - carried it out.

And only then, when the situation reached its logical conclusion, they all blamed on "bad weather" and "bad strategist Hitler" ...

N-yes!

By the way, once again about the Terek. If a person is honest and principled, then he is always honest. And after the war, Günter Terek, a prominent figure in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the ruling party of Chancellor Adenauer, did not get along in bourgeois Germany. And he ended up moving to the German Democratic Republic, becoming president of the Central Office for Horse Breeding there and dying in the GDR at the age of 77 in 1970, two years before the death of the 88-year-old Halder.

Two chronologically close destinies. And how different morally and psychologically! Halder, like Terek, was convinced all his life that he loved Germany and served her. At the same time, Halder became one of those who led Germany to collapse, and Terek, with his life, gave a real example of genuine high citizenship and spiritual stamina. However, the former royal Prussian adviser Terek in his memoirs does not talk much - unlike Halder and his colleagues - about "Hitler's mistakes". And, very likely, because he - unlike Halder and his

colleagues - never had anything to do with them.

After the war, the German field marshals and generals unanimously asserted that they allegedly feared and did not want war with the USSR, that they allegedly warned Hitler, and he allegedly stubbornly did not want to listen to anything when he was told, for example, that the Red Army had not less than ten thousand tanks.

But even so, did these generals themselves believe in their data? And if they believed in them, then why, I repeat, did they not resign in protest against the lost war? Didn't they know that already in 1937 the rapidly developing Soviet Union ranked first in Europe in terms of total industrial output, second in the production of electricity, second in the production of iron, steel and rolled products, first in the production of electric steel and steam locomotives, and by 1942 did you plan to take the first place in Europe in terms of all gross indicators of industrial production (except for the production of cars), and in the extraction of peat, the production of electric steel, steam locomotives, tractors, combines and beet sugar - to the first place in the world?

In order to find out all this, it was not necessary to steal secret information from fireproof safes - it was enough to pick up a reference calendar for 1941, released at the end of 1940 in the USSR by the State Social and Economic Publishing House in mass circulation!

And was it necessary to think and analyze for a long time in order to understand whether the industrial potential of the new Russia is great and what is its structure, if from the same reference calendar it followed that in 1913 the old Russia produced 1.9 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, and The USSR in 1942 (in 1941 it was already close by) planned to produce 75 billion kilowatt-hours, which in 1913 old Russia produced 0 (zero) thousand metal-cutting machine tools, and in 1937 the USSR - 36 thousand with a plan for 1942 year at 70 thousand, which in 1913 produced 0 (zero) thousand cars, and in 1937 - 200 thousand, steam locomotives - 418 and 1580, freight cars - 14.8 thousand and 66.1 thousand, with a plan for 1942 of 120 thousand, leather shoes - 8.3 million pairs and 182.9 million pairs ...

In the 1913/14 academic year, 112,000 people studied in higher educational institutions in Russia (moreover, in engineering institutions - with a gulkin nose!), And in the 1937/38 academic year in higher educational institutions of the USSR - 550,000 people; in primary and secondary schools, respectively, 7896.2 thousand people and 29 446 thousand people. This already proved that Russia has changed beyond recognition in a quarter of a century!

Hitler, unlike his generals, understood the war economy. And he wanted to seize Ukraine not only because of its bread, but also because of its powerful industrial potential. Therefore, it was enough for the generals of the General Staff to give the Fuhrer general statistics on the pace and volume of the economic development of the USSR, while pointing out that if 115,595 tractors were produced in the USSR in 1936, then the Russians could produce ten thousand tanks in a few years.

Yes, Hitler was provoked by supposedly underestimated intelligence data and pushed to war with Russia by a formally English, but in fact - cosmopolitan agent of influence, the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris ... But the rest of the top generals - according to his post-war assurances, were against the war with Russia.

And what about the "immense Russian spaces"? Referring to them, the Nazi generals force us to assume that, when planning a war against Russia, they represented Russia as something like Luxembourg, which the Germans in the spring of 1940 slipped through, plain
and without noticing it.

So there is nothing for the generals to blame Hitler, if their snout was "down" ...

Myth tenth, in this book - the last "regular"
ONLY WITH THE BLOOD OF MILLIONS AND THE TERROR OF THE CHK, STALIN MANAGED
AVOID THE COLLAPSE OF YOUR REGIME IN 1941. AT THE SAME TIME, IF THE
GERMANS COME TO RUSSIA AS ALLIES OF THE RUSSIAN
OF THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIST FORCES AND IN 1941 WOULD START IMPLEMENTING
A POLICY LIKE THE

**TO VLASOV AND ROA THREE YEARS LATER, THEN THE PEOPLE WOULD OVERTHROW STALIN,
THE PRISONERS OF THE RED ARMY - IF HITLER HANDED THEM
HAND AND RETURNED THE WEAPON...**

This book is gradually coming to an end, and I can confess to the reader that the form of analysis of "myths" turned out to be a convenient way of organizing reflections on what the year 1941 was in reality for our country and our people and how enemies are trying to present it in the minds of living generations. our country and our people...

Speaking of the country, I mean all of it — from the multinational but Slavic Carpathians to the multinational but Slavic Far East and from the Russian North to the Tajik Pamirs. It is these lands that have been rallied for a thousand years by that Great Rus', the concept of which the spiritually marasmic former author of the anthem of the Soviet Union removed from the "new edition" of the anthem of the Russian Federation, and the enemies of Great Russia are trying to remove it from the souls of the peoples inhabiting the Russian geopolitical space.

For the first time, Russia in its modern historical incarnation of the Soviet Union was seriously attacked in 1941 by Hitler and his generals. However, already on August 11, 1941, on the 51st day of the war, one of the military leaders of this war, now well known to the reader, Colonel General Halder, made the following entry in his diary:

"The general situation more and more clearly shows that the colossus-Russia, which was consciously preparing for war (before the war, all the world powers were preparing for it in one way or another, but only the USSR was preparing for defense. - S.K.), despite all *the* difficulties characteristic of countries with a totalitarian regime, was underestimated by us. This statement can be extended to all economic and organizational aspects, to means of communication and, in particular, to the purely military capabilities of the Russians ... "

I would not argue that Halder came to this conclusion on his own. He was forced into it! Forced by their behavior from the very first day of the war, our fathers and mothers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers. And in this book, in my opinion, enough has already been said in order to assess the "merit" of the tales of terror and fear, without which the "Stalin regime" would have collapsed overnight. At some point, Hitler had to intimidate his own people during that war. Yes, actually, what is there - "from some point"! If we had to introduce penal battalions only in the summer of 1942, then the Germans created them almost immediately after the start of the war, and already on July 9, 1941, Halder noted: "The organization of "penal battalions" turned out to be a good idea" ... And in the spring of 1945, the SS men hung deserters right on city lights.

But it did not help. Fear breeds either inaction or despair. And only conviction breeds resilience. The Germans also showed mass heroism and stamina in that war - in Stalingrad and Koenigsberg, on land, on water, under water and in the air, in 1941 and 1945, but they showed them only as long as they remained convinced of their right to resist and the conviction of Hitler's right to demand steadfastness from them.

When they realized that they had lost this right, they also deprived Hitler of the right to trust ...

And they collapsed.

And we - even after the catastrophic losses of 1941 - no. And this is a fact. And we didn't collapse, among other things, because not only were we always aware of our right to defend our native land, but we were also aware of Stalin's right to demand any sacrifice from the people in the name of expelling the invaders from this land and ensuring the coming Victory.

Indicative in this sense is Guderian's conversation with Hitler, which took place on December 20, 1941 at the Fuhrer's headquarters near Rastenburg and lasted for five hours. Part of this conversation Guderian cited in his memoirs, and there is the following passage:

"Hitler:" Do you think that the grenadiers of Frederick the Great died willingly? They also wanted to live, nevertheless the king had the right to demand his life from every German soldier. I also consider myself entitled to demand from every German soldier that he sacrifice his life.

I (Guderian. - **S.K.**): "Every German soldier knows that during the war he is obliged to sacrifice his life for his homeland, and our soldiers have proven in practice that they are ready for this. However, such sacrifices should be demanded from the soldiers only when it is justified by necessity
"...

Psychologically, this place of conversation between the Fuhrer and his general is very interesting! As long as the Germans believed in the need for war with the Russians, they were able to show amazing resilience even by Russian standards - Stalingrad alone is worth something! When the Germans lost the sense of resistance, they almost immediately proved incapable of it.

And this is also a fact.

It is also a fact that with the advent of the Germans, life - real, living life - in the occupied cities and villages froze and acquired a ghostly character, although in September 1941 a handful of "wide Ukrainians" in Romny could walk in front of Guderian in "vishyvanka shirts".

The "department" of General Halder, that is, the Reich ground forces, did not deal with civil administrative issues throughout the occupied territory, but a considerable part of this territory was under the responsibility of the military command. And so in the diary of General Halder there are, although not often, "civilian" entries. And among them there is not a single one that expresses joy from the sincere mass loyalty of the population to the "liberators".

But there are records that testify otherwise.

August 1, 1941, 41st day of the war:

"3. *Ukraine*. The population living in Western Ukraine is striving for self-determination. In the Russian part (Ukraine), stupid indifference reigns among the population. Only in big cities do activist committees work."

As for the "stupid indifference" Halder went too far - rather, it was necessary to talk about deaf resistance and psychological rejection. And the epithet "stupid" is, of course, from irritation.

As for the "activists", their level - not moral (it simply did not exist), but purely intellectual - can be judged from, for example, the materials of the collaborationist newspaper "Voice of Crimea", published in Simferopol from December 12, 1941 to April 9 1944 (a total of 338 issues were issued).

In 1996, the Crimean publishing house "Tavria" tragically published a brochure with a selection of materials from this newspaper. "Tragicomic" because, within the framework of the "independence" acquired thanks to the already pro-Western neo-collaborationists, the publishers diligently translated this brochure from Russian originals into "sovereign language" and published it under the title "Occupation regime in Crimea: 1941 - 1944 pp. Behind the materials of the presi of the occupying authorities "...

These "materials" make a sad impression... And not even with their servility, but with frank wretchedness.

However, in some places the inhabitants of the occupied territory pleased the occupiers, and on **August 2, 1941**, Halder wrote:

"German railway personnel are not flexible enough and too slow. Both in France and in Latvia we meet with a situation where the local civilian railway personnel work better and faster than ours..."

However, this was the case in Latvia, where a blow to the face most often evoked not hatred, but an obsequious lackey smile. But in December 1941, the Germans had to carry out a grain threshing campaign in the occupied regions of Ukraine and Russia with their own troops (see "Diary ..." Halder, vol. 3rd, book 2nd, pp. 35-36).

Here is another, rather amusing, entry by Halder dated **November 14, 1941:**

"In Vilnius, the field commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Tsenpfennig appeared with a report. Discouraging pictures of greed in the civil administration. Lithuanians are of little use for administrative tasks.

In Kaunas, Oberfeldkommandant Colonel Just came to report. He confirmed a disappointing picture of self-interest and selfishness in the civil administration ... "

However, Halder was wrong here too! It was not the Lithuanians as such who were of little use *for* performing administrative tasks, but *the Lithuanians-traitors!* And here the situation was similar in Vilnius and Kaunas, in Kyiv and Kharkov, in Orel and Bryansk, in Smolensk and Riga, in Elista and Simferopol ...

General Vlasov, in a conversation with his confidant Sergei Frelich shortly before an audience with the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, boasted after another glass that his de, Vlasov, in Russia knew that he was familiar with a large number of Soviet generals and was on friendly terms with them, that he -does he know how they feel about the Soviet government, and that he - if Himmler gives consent to the creation of the Russian Liberation Army led by Vlasov, will quickly come to an agreement with them and they will understand each other, "even if only by phone" ...

But Vlasov could not agree with a more or less significant number of even captured Soviet generals. Not everyone behaved in captivity as heroically as, say, General Karbyshev, but even General Ponedelin, who was shot after returning from captivity and a preliminary investigation, did not cooperate with Vlasov.

Here is a list of all the "companions" of Vlasov of the general level ...

1. Former Major General of the Coastal Service, former Chief of the Military Naval Air Defense School in Libau, Blagoveshchensky, born in 1893.
2. Former commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, former Major General Zakutny, born in 1897.
3. The former chief of staff of the 19th Army, former Major General Malyshkin, born in 1896, was arrested in 1938, rehabilitated in 1940, as it turned out -

in vain.

4. Former Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, former Major General Trukhin, born in 1896, from the nobility, his father and brother were shot in 1919 for anti-Soviet activities.

In addition, Vlasov labored:

- who went over to the Germans on December 17, 1942, the former commander of the 389th Infantry Division, former Colonel Bunyachenko, in 1942 sentenced to death by a tribunal of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front for creating a threat of encirclement for the 9th Army and the entire group with a replacement of 10 years in prison and the possibility serve a sentence in the army;

- former thirty-year-old member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army, former brigade commissar Zhilenkov, former secretary of the Rostokinsk district party committee in Moscow, from homeless children;

- former commander of the 350th Infantry Division, former Colonel Zverev;

- Former Assistant Chief of Communications of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, former Lieutenant Colonel Korbukov;

- Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, former Colonel Meandrov;

- Former Colonel of the Air Force, former Knight of the Order of Lenin Maltsev, who was arrested in March 1938 and rehabilitated in 1940, as it turned out -

in vain.

That's the whole general "staff" of the ROA as of 1944 - exactly a dozen Human. All of them, together with Vlasov, were hanged at the end of August 1946.

I hope that the above brief information about the extent of the "cooperation" of the Russian military with the Germans will be enough for the reader to laugh at the allegations that if the Germans had come to Russia as allies of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, they would have risen to fight Stalin millions.

The situation is more accurately conveyed by an entry in Halder's diary dated **November 27, 1941**.

of the year:

"Local population. Our troops spare the locals too much. It is necessary to move to enforcement measures in relation to local population".

I do not think that this entry needs a detailed comment, as well as the entry in the same diary, made on **July 20, 1941**, on the 29th day of the war:

"Separate enemy groups that continue to remain in our rear are a real disaster for us. We don't have any troops in the rear to liquidate these groups."

All this is reminiscent of a joke: "I caught a bear! "Then bring him here!" "Yes, he won't let me." The Red Army seems to have been defeated, but its fighters are still a real disaster for the victorious Wehrmacht, and the "victorious" Germans have no troops against them. But this is only an incomplete month after the start of the war.

Who forced to fight these remaining in the German rear, our troops - the NKVD? Beria? Fear of Stalin? And after all, all these groups fought their way to the front line, where they knew that they were waiting for the front-line special departments, the NKVD, the harsh orders of the same Stalin ...

The myth of mass anti-Soviet, anti-communist and anti-Stalinist sentiments among the people, in the Red Army and in its leadership does not stand the test of a single question, namely: "If everything were as the German special propagandists claimed in 1941 and as Suvorov claims today - Rezun, Mark Solonin and other anti-Soviet, then why in 1939, in 1940 or in 1941 - before June 22, the armed people did not turn their bayonets against the authorities?

Well, okay, let after June 22, 1941, everyone was united by the need to repel external aggression. But after all, since 1939 the Red Army was truly mass. And at the same time, internally, according to Mark Solonin, it was anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet. And according to Vlasov, her generals were more than cool towards Stalin and the Soviet government.

So what, as they say, was the matter?

But the fact of the matter is that in reality everything was the opposite - Hitler's calculations for a blitzkrieg, as the hostilities developed, sank not so much in the non-existent mud of summer Russian roads, but in a sea of really popular hatred for the invaders.

Why?

In answering this question, one can cite many facts, figures, names, dates and memories, but I will limit myself to two quotes from the "Memories of a Soldier" written by General Heinz Guderian:

"On the mood that prevailed among the Russian population, by the way, one could judge from the statements of one old tsarist general, with whom I had a conversation in those days in Orel. He said: "If you had come 20 years ago, we would have welcomed you with great enthusiasm. Now it's too late. We're just now starting to come alive again, and you came in and set us back 20 years, so we have to start all over again. Now we are fighting for Russia, and in this we are all united ... "

These words do not need special comments, but I still note that the old general meant not just the unity of the people in the struggle for a sovereign national state, but he had in mind a very definite social structure of **this** state.

And the essence of this device, it seems that he did not understand it, was again witnessed by Guderian. In mid-September 1941, he was still moving through the territory of Ukraine and spent the night with his officers Bu-sing and Kalden in the school building in Lokhvitsa (this is in the north-west of the Poltava region).

"The school," Guderian wrote, "was in a solid building and was well equipped, **like all schools in Soviet Russia** (the emphasis, of course, is mine. — **S.K.**), which were almost everywhere in good condition. A lot has been done for **schools, hospitals, orphanages and sports grounds** in Russia. These establishments were kept clean and in perfect order..."

And now I will not comment on these words!

However, once again I will say about the "fear", which, according to Mark Solonin, was allegedly the core of Stalin's life in the USSR ...

Let the reader try to guess about what era and about life in which country the following words are said: *"We educated the people incorrectly. All these are traces and results of excessive democracy. Everyone dared to criticize the head of an institution or enterprise ... "*

However, I will immediately reassure the reader that trying to guess the correct answer - wasted labor. These words of Zaslavsky, executive secretary of radio broadcasting of the Stalingrad Front, were said in August 1942 regarding the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin No. by order of the NPO No. 227 "of August 8, 1942!

What amazing tricks history does sometimes! Wow! In the internal document of the Soviet **repressive** organs of the Stalin era, an unbiased assessment of pre-war life in the USSR by a creative (!) intellectual worker (!!)

And this everyday assessment on the spot beats all the tales of the "democrats" about mass repressions and the regime of mass fear in Stalin's Russia. But this assessment testifies to the opposite - about **excessive democracy** in Stalin's Russia!

At the same time, Zaslavsky said: *"This is the result of the entire system of education and social organization, when the leader had to be afraid of everyone, if wanted to live..."*

I note that the last words have nothing to do with the notorious "fear of denunciations", because before that Zaslavsky complained about too open criticism of leaders.

I will not argue that the state of affairs, when **the leader** had to be afraid of everyone, is an ideal. But this is still better than the current, "Russian" situation, when everyone is afraid of **the leader**.

And they were afraid of the occupiers - because this fear was planned in advance by the occupiers themselves as the psychological core of the occupation regime. And this is my statement is not unfounded. So, on March 17, 1941, after a meeting with Hitler, Halder wrote in his diary:

"...2. [Hitler's comments on] Operation Barbarossa:

A. We must be successful from the very beginning. No failures are allowed...

<...>

...5. [Hitler's remarks] about rear areas: There are no difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be handed over to Finland. The Baltic states will go to us with their local self-government. Rusyns (Hitler meant Western Ukrainians. - **S.K.**) will welcome us (Frank); Ukraine - unknown; Don Cossacks - unknown; Kuban Cossacks - unknown. We must create republics free from communism. The intelligentsia planted by Stalin must be destroyed. The governing apparatus of the Russian state must be broken.

In Great Russia it is necessary to apply the most severe terror. Ideologists consider the Russian people not strong enough. After the liquidation of the activists, it will stratify..."

And the "regime", as the "democrats" attest it, Stalin, more precisely - The socialist system relied precisely on the development of genuine democracy, that is, translated from Greek, the power of the people. And so he practically developed the people's forces, drawing strength from the very thick of the people. A little later I will give a very - in my opinion - unexpected, but concrete confirmation of this general thesis. In the meantime, another little-known detail of that war... On August 23, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin signed NPO Order No. 281 on the procedure for submitting military orderlies and porters to government awards. In accordance with it, for the removal of 15 wounded from the battlefield with their rifle or light machine gun, the orderly was presented for awarding the medal "For Military Merit" or the medal "For Courage"; for the removal of 26 wounded - to the Order of the Red Star; for the removal of 40 wounded - to the Order of the Red Banner ... For the removal of 80 wounded, the Order of Lenin was supposed - the highest award of the Motherland.

That is, behind all the worries of the war, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not forget the most modest and inconspicuous warriors on the battlefield - not those who go on the attack (although the orderlies sometimes had to do this), but those who went "for his friends" under bullets in order to save the life of a wounded comrade, who was killed in the attack. And this was also the essence of the era of Stalin and Stalin's Russia ...

Now a little - about the barrage detachments ... I already had to write that once "advanced" "intellectuals" sang in the kitchens: "This company was machine-gunned by its own barrage detachment."

Today, these false infamy are presented to "Russian" boys and girls by high school and "Russian" television. However, in the history of the war there is not a single case when a *company* was shot by a barrage detachment. After all, if a certain detachment shot a company standing (in reality, of course, lying) in front of it, then the detachment itself would be in the position of the company - someone needs to hold the front. Therefore, in the case when there were army barriers in the front line area, if they fired, then over their heads - to intimidate and clear their brains.

At the same time, the restoration of the combat stability of an unstable unit located on the front line belonged to the prerogatives of the barrage detachments of the Army in the field, and the barrage detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) ***never ensured the combat stability of the troops!***

The first barrage detachments of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) were created in accordance with the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5, 1941. The commander of the Bryansk Front, Eremenko, was allowed (not ordered! - **S.K.**) to create detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. The detachments were supposed to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units from their positions, and in case of flight, "stop, using weapons if necessary."

More widely, the NPO barrage detachments became known after the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin No. 227 of July 28, 1942, which, in particular, stated: "... Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot. From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command ... "

The Supreme High Command of the Red Army ordered "to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and to help the honest fighters of the divisions fulfill their duty to the Motherland ... "

I draw the reader's attention - there were up to a thousand minelayers in an army of about a hundred thousand people. Is one armed man capable of detaining a hundred armed men? I don't think... He can contain and delay a few units. But after all, detachments were created for unstable units!

The same order No. 227 ordered to form from one to three penal battalions (800 people each) within the front, where to send the guilty middle and senior commanders and political workers (and not the "brave" criminals).

Within the army, it was ordered to form from five to ten penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each) for guilty ordinary soldiers and junior commanders.

After the stabilization of the situation at the front at the end of 1942, the NPO barrage detachments were used as part of the NKVD units to protect the rear of the Army in the field, and in accordance with NPO order No. 349 of October 29, 1944, they were disbanded.

As for the NKVD barrage detachments, about which I wrote in more detail in my book about L.P. Beria, an adequate idea of these detachments is given by the certificate of the deputy head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank S. Milstein addressed to Beria, which reported that from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941, operational barriers of the Special Departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who lagged behind their units and fled from the front, of which 25,878 people were arrested by the Special Departments. The remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.

At the same time, according to the decisions of the Special Departments and according to the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line.

What does it mean to provide barrage measures ***in the frontline zone*** at the cost of only ten thousand executions in the first four months of the worst confusion? This means acting professionally, judiciously, and not poking everyone in the teeth with a revolver unnecessarily. That's the whole truth about the "bloody" blocking detachments of the "Cheka", allegedly shooting their own companies.

At the same time, the NKVD barrage detachments, if necessary, fought themselves - after all, their main activity fell on the first period of the war, when the rear area in the morning could become a front in the evening. I must say that the topic is directly front-line

the heroism of the Chekists, primarily the border guards, is hushed up to this day, because the truth about him indirectly refutes many of the vile things that are being spread today about the NKVD of Beria. But the same hero of the Yelninskaya offensive operation of 1941, the commander of the 24th Army, 39-year-old General Rakutin, was a recent subordinate of Beria. A native of the Nizhny Novgorod region, the son of a peasant from the village of Novinki, Konstantin Ivanovich Rakutin commanded the Baltic border district before the war, and after it began, he became one of those border commanders who, under the leadership of Beria, first formed formations of the Reserve Front covering Moscow, and then they were in command.

Coming into the ranks of the Red Army in 1919, at the age of 17, NKVD General Rakutin died a heroic death on October 7, 1941 in a battle near the village of Semaevo, Vyazemsky district, Smolensk region. Officially, he became a Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, but he was one throughout his short but bright life, in which he managed to make war with Kolchak, with the White Poles, storm Volochaevka, make a trip to the "pole of cold" in the 20s in order to eliminate the gang adventurers who intended to seize Yakutia from the Soviet Union ... Marshal Zhukov spoke well of Rakutin in his memoirs, and the chief of staff of the 24th Army, Army Major General A.K. Kondratiev, having met the commander, soon wrote in his diary: "Energetic, agile, intelligent. Able to find the most important in the mass of material and focus his attention and the attention of people on it. A characteristic typical of Beria's experienced cadres.

In the Smolensk battle of 1941, of which the Yelnin operation was a part, other border guard generals also took part, but I will highlight one in particular - 35-year-old commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front, Ukrainian peasant son Dmitry Platonovich Onuprienko. Onuprienko's name is not very well known even today, and he, a career Chekist-border guard, was also a bright personality, he also went through the school of People's Commissar Beria. From March 1939 - Deputy Head of the Directorate of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR (in "democratic" terminology - "Vertukhaev"), from March 1941 - Deputy Head of the Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, from June 1941 - Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District, and from July 1941 of the year - commander of the 33rd army. He fought bravely, was not convenient for everyone, but in 1943, commanding a corps, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper. Since 1957, at the age of 51, he was dismissed - the Khrushchevites did not need Beria's cadres.

I dwelled on the figures of generals Rakutin and Onuprienko separately because the brilliant military activities of the border generals of the NKVD were hushed up in the USSR after the assassination of Stanin and Beria.

Here is an example... On December 8, 1941, Halder wrote in his diary: "According to radio intelligence data, the NKVD institutions were reorganized into field divisional headquarters," to which the Soviet edition of "Voenizdat" gave the following note: "Several rifle divisions of the NKVD operated at the front from the first days of the war. They were staffed mainly by border troops and neither they nor their headquarters were subjected to any reorganization at that time.

Almost everything is deliberately distorted here! From the first days of the war, not NKVD divisions fought at the front, but border regiments of the NKVD, and only on June 29, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command instructed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria to form not "a few", but 10 rifle and 5 motorized divisions with the backbone of the personnel of the border and internal troops of the NKVD. On July 14, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command issued an order to create a front of six reserve armies, four of which were commanded by Beria's subordinates, including the 24th - Major General Rakutin.

The 30th Army was commanded by the head of the troops of the Ukrainian border district, Major General V.A. Khomenko, who later died a heroic death; 31st Army - Chief of the troops of the Karelian-Finnish border district, Major General V.N. Dalmatov.

After the completion of the formation of the armies of the Reserve Front, the 29th Army was received by Beria's deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Maslennikov, the hero of the battle for Moscow, a completely legendary and naturally heroic personality.

These people themselves did not know fear, and did not sow it in people. Just as Stalin himself did not sow it in them. I think it would not be out of place today to give an assessment of the atmosphere established by Stalin in the circle of the top leadership of the war. This is the testimony of Stalin's military deputy in that war, Marshal Zhukov. In the first, lifetime edition of his memoirs, for which he himself is responsible, and not the editors of the posthumous "additions" to these memoirs, the marshal about the work of the State Defense Committee, which concentrated all power in the country during the war, wrote like this:

"At the meetings of the GKO, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or at the dacha of I.V. Stalin, all the most important issues of that time were discussed and resolved. The plans for military operations were considered by the State Defense Committee together with the Central Committee of the Party (here, of course, we mean not the entire composition of the Central Committee, but its secretariat and apparatus. - **S.K.**), people's commissars, whose rights were significantly expanded. This made it possible to ensure, when the need arose, the concentration of enormous material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a single line in the field of strategic leadership and, backing it up with an organized rear, to link the combat activity of the troops with the efforts of the whole country.

Very often at the meetings of the State Committee of Defense sharp disputes broke out, while opinions were expressed definitely and sharply. I.V. Stalin used to pace around the table, attentively listening to the arguing. He himself was laconic and did not like the verbosity of others, often stopping those who spoke with remarks "shorter", "clearer". Sessions opened without introductory, introductory words. He spoke quietly, freely, only to the point. He was concise and expressed his ideas clearly.

If a consensus was not reached at a GKO meeting, a commission was immediately created from representatives of the extreme parties, which was instructed to report the agreed proposals. It happened so if I.V. Stalin did not yet have his own firm opinion. If I.V. Stalin came to the meeting with a ready decision, then disputes either did not arise, or quickly faded when he joined one of the parties ... "

As you can see, not fear, but a businesslike atmosphere emanated from the highest level of power in the USSR of Stalin. And these powerful waves of Stalinist restraint and calm reached the very "bottom". Of course, along the way, they more than once encountered the "pitfalls" of incompetence, meanness, arrogance and cruelty of some of the lower leaders. And then many of those conflicts, dramas, and even tragedies arose that today "democrats" and "advanced" "historians" are trying to pass off as the essence of era.

But the essence of the era was the measured directive of Stalin, and not his cry. By the way, Zhukov testifies:

"In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and resolutions of a military and economic nature. These resolutions and orders were strictly and energetically implemented, around them the work began to boil, ensuring the implementation of a single ... line in the leadership of the country at that difficult and difficult time.

I.V. Stalin was a strong-willed man and, as they say, not from a cowardly dozen. Somewhat depressed, I saw him only once. It was at dawn on June 22, 1941: his conviction that war could be avoided collapsed.

After June 22, 1941, throughout the war, I.V. Stalin ... firmly led the country, the armed struggle and our international affairs."

Ten thousand resolutions and decisions of the State Defense Committee alone! And Stalin considered and weighed each of these decisions. This is in addition to the daily work of the head of state and a world-class politician. We know how Stalin spent the day of June 22, 1941. And what, by the way, were the days of June 22 for him in the subsequent war years? Opening the journal of visits to the Kremlin office, we learn the following ...

June 22, 1942:		
1. t.	Shcherbakov	20.00 – 0.40
2. t.	Bodin (head of the front headquarters. - S. TO.)	20.05 – 23.55
3. t.	Molotov 4. t.	20.10 – 1h.00
	Voroshilov 5. t.	20.20 – 1 h. 00
	Malenkov 20.30 - 1 h. 00	
6. t.	Ivanov (deputy head of the General Staff - S. K.)	23.00 - 23.35
7. t.	Beria 0.45 - 1 h. 00	

June 22, 1943:		
1. t.	Zhukov t.	22.55. — 3.10
2.	Vasilevsky	0.30 - 3.10
3.	Comrade Antonov	0.30 - 3.10
4.	t. Mekhlis	0.30 - 2.45
5.	Comrade Molotov	0.45 - 3.15
6.	Comrade Malenkov	0.50 - 3.15
7.	Comrade Mikoyan	1.10 - 3.15
8.	comrade Khrulev (head of the rear of the spacecraft. - S.K.)	1.10 - 2.55
9.	Comrade Novikov (VVS. - S.K.)	2.15 - 2.35
10. T.	Nikitin (VVS. - S. K.)	2.15 - 2.35

June 22, 1944:		
1. com.	Molotov	entrance at 21.00 — 1.45
2. tov.	Wanda Vasilevskaya (writer. - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
3. tov.	Manuilsky (secretary of the ECCI. - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
4.	Moravian (Polish political activist - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
5.	Tursky (Polish political activity - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
6.	Ganetsky (Polish political activity - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
7.	Hardy (Polish political activity - S.K.)	entrance at 21.00 — 23.35
8.	Comrade Beria	entry at 23.50 — 1.45
9. tov.	Malenkov	entry at 23.50 — 1.45

10. Item Konev	entry at 23.50 — 1.45
11. tov. Antonov (General Staff - S.K.)	entry at 23.50 — 1.45
12. tov. Gryzlov (General Staff - S.K.)	entry at 23.50 — 1.45
13. tov. Krainyukov (member of the Supreme Court 1 Ukr. fr. - S.K.)	entry at 23.50 — 1.45
14. tov. Vorozheikin (Air Force - S.K.)	entry at 1.15 — 1.45
15. tov. Nikitin (Air Force - S.K.)	entry at 1.15 — 1.45

Three days out of more than one and a half thousand military days - if you count the war with Japan. Three ordinary, "offhand" taken days. But what a volume of work, what scope!

And against such a leader - according to the corned beef - the people would turn their weapons if they received it from the Germans? And this is affirmed in relation to the people for whose armament and military skills Stalin worked day and night? To the people, millions of whose representatives from Stalin received the best military weapons in the world?

What nonsense!

The stupidity of such "discoveries" is especially clearly visible against the background of forced assessments of the enemy - for example, Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin. Mellenthin was an enemy of Russia during the war and remained so after the war. However, he has always been an intelligent enemy of ours, and, moreover, has long been an experienced enemy.

He fought in Poland, in France, in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Eastern Front, and then again in France, in the Ardennes and in Germany itself ... He ended the war as chief of staff of the 5th Panzer Army in the Ruhr pocket. In 1956, his book "Panzer battles 1939 - 1945", published in our country in 1957 ("Tank battles 1939 - 1945"), was published in London. 1945). Chapter XIX of his memoirs is called "Red Army", and below I will give excerpts from it.

So, a hereditary German officer, Wehrmacht General F.V. von Mellenthin:

"The Russian soldier loves his "mother Russia", and therefore he fights for the communist regime, although, generally speaking, he is not a political fanatic. However, it should be borne in mind that the Party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissars are urban dwellers and come from working class backgrounds. Their courage borders on recklessness; These people are very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline. <...> Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in the achievement of Stalin's enormous political and military successes. <...>

The industrialization of the Soviet Union, carried out persistently and ruthlessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number of highly qualified specialists. <....>

... during the war, the Russians were constantly improving, and their top commanders and headquarters received a lot of useful things by studying the experience of combat operations of their troops and the German army. They learned to react quickly to any changes in the situation, to act energetically and decisively.<...>

... the Russian, on the whole, is certainly an excellent soldier and, with skillful leadership, is a dangerous adversary. <...> The skillful and persistent work of the communists led

to the fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way. There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level of his education is constantly growing. <...>

Russian divisions <...> attacked, as a rule, on a narrow front <...> They appeared as if from under the ground, and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche. <...> Only soldiers hardened in battles were able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone. <...> After 1941, masses of tanks were added to the human masses of Russians. It was, of course, much more difficult to repulse such attacks, and it cost much more nervous tension.<...>

My remarks <...> concerned <...> the actions of the Russian infantry, which during the Second World War fully preserved the great traditions of Suvorov and Skobelev. <...> Russian artillery, like infantry, is also used massively. <...> During the war, the Russians improved and developed artillery tactics in the offensive. Their artillery preparation turned into a genuine flurry of destructive fire. <...> Russian artillery is a very formidable branch of the armed forces and fully deserves the high appraisal that Stalin gave it. <...>

The extraordinary development of the Russian armored forces deserves the closest attention from those who study the experience of the war. No one doubts that Russia can have its own Seidlitz, Murat or Rommel - in 1941-1945, the Russians, of course, had such great commanders. <...> The tankers of the Red Army have hardened in the crucible of war, their skill has increased immeasurably. Such a transformation must have required exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and leadership."

A military man himself, General Mellenthin praised the purely military leadership of the USSR, writing: "The Russian high command knows its business better than the command of any other army."

But something can be added to these words: "He knows, thanks to the political leadership, which formed the competent potential of such a command during the war **and in front of it !**"

Moreover, both Mellenthin's assessment and my addition to it imply, as the first the figure of the Russian high command, of course, Stalin!

To once again confirm the retrospective German assessment, I will give - perhaps the last time in this book is a series of recordings of General Halder made in real time. It is interesting to compare how these estimates changed throughout 1941.

June 23, 1941, 2nd day of the war:

"... I doubt that the enemy command really retains in its hands a unified and systematic leadership of the actions of the troops."

June 24, 1941, 3rd day of the war:

"... the enemy's high command, apparently, does not participate at all in directing the operations of the troops."

June 27, 1941, 6th day of the war:

"... the Russian command in Ukraine (to give it its due, it acts well and energetically ...)"

July 3, 1941, 12th day of the war:

"... the nature of the enemy's attacks shows that the enemy's command completely disorganized. The organization of the attacks is exceptionally bad..."

July 11, 1941, 20th day of the war:

"The enemy command is acting energetically and skillfully. The enemy fights fiercely and fanatically..."

The troops are tired ... "

July 26, 1941, 35th day of the war:

"... The enemy again found a way to withdraw his troops from the threat of the emerging encirclement. This, on the one hand, is fierce counterattacks ... and on the other, great skill with which he withdraws his troops from threatened areas and quickly transfers them by rail and by car ... "

August 8, 1941, 48th day of the war:

"... You should pay attention to the courage of the enemy during the operation to break through. The resulting breakthrough speaks not only of the courage and audacity of the enemy, it creates a number of inconveniences for our troops.

August 15, 1941, 55th day of the war:

"Again we repeat the old mistake, allowing one boldly acting Russian division to forge 3-4 of our divisions ..."

At the same time, on **July 28, 1941**, on the 37th day of the war, Halder wrote:

"The Mogilev area has been finally cleared of enemy troops. Judging by the number of captured prisoners and guns, we can assume that here, as expected, there were originally six enemy divisions.

However, only the 172nd Infantry Division directly defended Mogilev. Counting the two divisions adjacent to it, there were only three Soviet divisions in the Mogilev area and a few small battered our units that retreated to this area. And Halder counted twice as many of our troops here. And this is on the 37th day of the war!

An entry dated **July 19, 1941** is also interesting :

"... *Artillery units*. We will have to defend more than once the need to create a sufficient amount of artillery of the RGK (reserve of the High Command. —

S.K.) as a powerful means of warfare. We need both divisions of the AIR (artillery instrumental reconnaissance. - **S.K.)**, and headquarters of artillery commanders. Winged phrases that the modern war is being waged, they say, not with artillery, but with tanks, are erroneous and do harm.

Halder did not know, of course, that Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, thought this way. He was aware of the role of a powerful and well-organized artillery strike from the time of his leadership of the defense of Tsaritsyn in the Civil War. And therefore, in the Red Army of the 1941 model -

In 1945, the artillery was raised to such a height that Stalin from some period called it the "god of war"! Already on July 18, 1941, by GKO Decree No. 200, the post of Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was restored, and by order of NPO No. 0234, the Main Directorate of the Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was formed, headed by the future Chief Marshal of Artillery, and then General Voronov.

The Germans did not know much about us... On July 8, 1941, on the 17th day of the war, Halder was sure that "the formation of new formations by the enemy... would certainly fail due to the lack of officers, specialists and artillery materiel" , but by the time of our counter-offensive, he was convinced in practice of this mistake of his, as later the Germans could make sure that Halder also hit the sky with his finger, doubting our ability to form new large tank

connections.

At the beginning of July 1941, Halder believed that the Red Army was finished as a serious enemy. And less than two months later, on August 30, 1941, on the 70th day of the war, Halder sighed about the fact that the possibility of transferring German troops to one or another sector of the front no longer depended on the will of the German command, but on whether is to make the opponent.

And on December 20, 1941, Hitler himself will demand from the German troops that they learn how to resist breakthroughs, do not panic when "enemy units seep into the German defenses" and do not think about withdrawing "if conditions are not created for this."

However, even then, at the end of 1941, the Germans were often forced to retreat without preparation, or, more simply, "drape," as they said in the Soviet troops. At the same time, they, of course, remained skillful and strong warriors. It's just that more and more often there was a reciprocal Russian force on their strength.

And this strength came from the very thick of the people, but not from the gray, not from the bastards, who instinctively managed to rise to the idea of \u200b\u200brebuffing the enemy - as it was in the Patriotic War of 1812 ... The new Russian force had both a quick mind, and modern knowledge, and open eyes, and well-trained muscles. And now, as promised, I will give impressive - in my opinion - and unexpected illustrations to this thesis ...

The reader, I hope, has not forgotten about the report of the former assistant to the Japanese military attache in Moscow, infantry captain Kootani, "The Internal Situation of the USSR (Analysis of the Tukhachevsky Case)", dated July 1937. The military "historian" Cherushev did not cite in his book about 1937 that fragment of Kootani's report, which I will now cite (according to the collection of documents "Lubyanka: Stalin and the GUGB 1937-1938", p. 453):

"... Our greatest attention (that is, in Japan. - **S.K.**) requires the work to popularize and train aviation, which is carried out by Osoaviakhim (Society for the Promotion of Aviation and Chemical Defense, the predecessor of DOSAAF. - **S.K.**). <...>

... According to data published in June last year, the number of flying clubs in just six months increased by 30 and reached 167 ... If they go at this pace, then the task of training 150,000 people (civilian pilots of initial training. - S.K.) will by no **means** be impossible.

Regarding the growth of flying clubs: there are highways from Moscow towards Kazan and Leningrad. And so, when you drive along these highways by car, for 200-300 km you see airfields every 10-20 km Airfields are small and are simple landing sites with primitive hangars. They have at least 7, sometimes up to 40 - 50 U-2 aircraft ... All this appeared over the past year, and young people are really studying hard ... "

Now, along the highways near Moscow, like mushrooms, the mansions of the nouveaux riches are growing - in the "Russian" of Putin and Medvedev. And in Stalin's Russia, as we see, flying clubs for working and peasant youth grew like mushrooms. I emphasize: for the peasant - too. Yes, and as **"too"!**

When I began to analyze the encyclopedia I mentioned by Thomas Pollak and Christopher Shores "Aces of Stalin" by some factor, and specifically by the place of birth, after some time I was, to be honest, amazed. From the biographical data of the "Stalin's falcons"-aces, it followed that most of them were natives of villages and villages from various regions of the USSR. I simply did not believe my eyes and was not sure that the reader would take my word for it here.

So, in order to believe me, below I will give data **on all** fighter pilots (Pollack and Shores write only about them), Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose names begin with the letter "A" ... On the one hand, this is certainly random "sample". On the other hand, this is certainly a representative "sample".

Here she is:

Vladimir Abramov, born in 1914, Kuznetsk

Nikolai Abramchuk, born in 1912, p. Romanovka, Grodno region

Shamil Abrashitov - was born in a Tatar family near Orenburg

Alexander Avdeev, born in 1917, village of Bolshaya Talenka, Tambov Region

Mikhail Avdeev, born in 1913, village of Gorodets, Mogilev region

Ivan Avekov, born in 1919, village of Osipovka, Vitebsk region

Pyotr Ageev, born in 1913, p. The hype of the Kurgan region

Vasily Adonkin, born in 1913, p. Khokhlovo, Belgorod Region
Evgeny Azarov, born in 1915, Volfino village, Kursk region
Sergey Azarov, born in 1915, village of Sokolovo, Bryansk region
Viktor Aleksandryuk, born in 1921, Kursk
Konstantin Alekseev, born in 1919, the village of Pridantsevo near Moscow
Alexey Alelyukhin, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, born in 1920, p. Kesova Gora

Kalinin region

Nikolai Alifanov, born in 1912, from a peasant family in the Dnipropetrovsk region
Vladimir Alkidov, born in 1912, p. Alkuzhi, Tambov Region
Alexey Amelin, born in 1921, Ostapovo village near Moscow
Sultan Ametkhan, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, born in 1920, Alupka Crimean

ASSR

Vasily Andrianov, born in 1920, Ivanisovo village, Kalinin region
Ilya Andrianov, born in 1918, p. Kanishchevo, Ryazan region
Alexander Aniskin, born in 1918, Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk)
Alexey Antipov, born in 1911, p. Vaskovichi, Mogilev region
Mitrofan Anufriev, born in 1921, Lipetsk
Nikolai Artamonov, Nekhlyudovka village, Penza region
Grigory Artemchenkov, born in 1923, Arkino village, Bryansk region
Fedor Arkhipchenko, born in 1921, Avsimovichi village, Mogilev region
Nikolay Arkhipov, born in 1918, Puchenkovo village, Yaroslavl region
Ivan Astakhov, born in 1921, Belomestnoye village, Tula region
Mikhail Astashkin, born in 1908, village of Nashi, Ryazan region
Boris Afanasiev, born in 1920, Bryansk
Vladimir Afanasiev, born in 1921, p. Nikandrovka, Voronezh region
Sergey Achkasov, a native of the village of Staro-Klemenskoye

Approximately the same picture we see in the biographies of twice Heroes of the Soviet Union - fighters ... For example, Vladimir Lavrinenkov - a native of the village of Ptahino, Smolensk region; Arseny Vorozheykin - the village of Prokofievo, Nizhny Novgorod region; Pavel Golovachev - the village of Koshelevo, Gomel region; Kirill Evstigneev - the village of Khokhly, Kurgan region; Pyotr Pokryshev - the village of Golaya Pristan, Kherson region; Nikolai Skomorokhov - villages Lapot, Saratov region; Stepan Suprun - the villages of Rechki, Sumy region, and so on ...

Actually, only three of the fighters were twice Heroes of the Soviet Union - Sergey Lugansky, Vitaly Popkov and Evgeny Savitsky are city dwellers by birth (Alma Ata, Moscow and Novorossiysk).

And only three times Heroes city and village were given equally: Alexander Pokryshkin - a worker from Novosibirsk, and Ivan Kozhedub from the village of Obrazheevka in Chernigov.

This dry statistics alone shatters both the myth about the anti-people nature of Stalin's policy, and another malicious anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet myth about the alleged destruction of the Russian village by Stalin and the Bolsheviks. As you can see, it was the young village guys who made up the guard of "Stalin's falcons". In the old *Race*, only "white bone" acquired wings. The military flying profession was almost exclusively the prerogative of the nobility; representatives of the unprivileged classes and, in the rarest cases, skilled young workers made their way to it only as an exception. Young peasants could not even dream of heaven.

And they didn't dream.

And Soviet, Stalinist Russia raised the best young representatives of the Russian village not just to the sky - in the literal sense of the word, but also to the highest stellar heights!

And so it was with all the young and active forces of Russia - in the power of Stalin, they received unlimited opportunities for rapid growth and creation, if it was not a desire for a career and for personal well-being.

That was the strength of Stalin and the power of Stalin!

And that is why Stalin and his power did not collapse after all the trials of 1941, but got stronger and went to Victory.

I could talk a lot more on this topic and confirm what was said with documents and factual arguments, but is it worth it?

First, this book cannot grow to the size of capital labor.

And secondly, is it really not clear what is here and why?

However, I will conclude with one more fragment from the report of the Japanese captain Kootani:

"In Japan today, they look at airplanes like this - if you fly, you will fall like that ... It's embarrassing for me to say this in front of older people, but if there are people among today's youth who are afraid of airplanes, then you need to influence them ... It is necessary to resolutely raise a campaign for popularization of aviation, and if ... the Leningrad workers have launched a campaign for the training of 150,000 pilots, then we must at all costs train 50,000 pilots ...

... I bow to the leaders of the Soviet government, who turned their eyes to this problem ... "

And if the leaders of the Soviet government, headed by Stalin, bowed down to the intelligent enemy of Russia, then how could all the active forces of Soviet society not support this government, not believe in such a government?

Three million communists died on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. The French Communist Party, which became the basis of the French Resistance, was called the "party of the executed." In this sense, the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) during the war could be called the "party of the heroically dead", if not for the fact that by the end of the war there were still 3.3 million living, fighting members of the CPSU (b) in the Army in the Field - sixty percent of the Active Army! The place of the dead was occupied by new front-line communists. They wrote applications for admission to the party right on the front line, and there, as you know, the communist had one "privilege" - to be the first to go on the attack.

So what led the front-line comfrey soldiers into the ranks of the CPSU (b)? Only in the second, military, half-year of 1941, 126,625 people were accepted as candidates for party membership in the Red Army against 27,068 people accepted in the first, pre-war, half-year.

What led them to the party?

Is it really fear of Stalin?

Myth "supernumerary", eleventh

TODAY, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY, THE WORLD, THANKS TO THE LONG-TERM WORK OF THE ACADEMIC INSTITUTES OF HISTORICAL PROFILE AND THE INSTITUTE OF MILITARY HISTORY OF THE MOD OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND ALSO THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF A NATIONAL AND FOREIGN RESEARCHERS, HAS A COMPLETE, OBJECTIVE AND RELIABLE HISTORY OF BOTH THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE OF 1941-1945 AGAINST THE GERMAN-FASCIST INVADERS

Having finished the analysis of the last, 10th myth about 1941, I completed the publishing task and at the same time exhausted the "regular" limit of myths to be analyzed. However, I cannot help but say at least a few words on the topic indicated in the formulation of the eleventh myth, which in this book turns out to be "excessive", "excessive" ...

Indeed, even in the Soviet Union we never had a reliable and objective history of the war. Already the very first, "Khrushchev" six-volume edition of 1961 was full of omissions, and in some fundamental provisions he falsified the history of the war. The "Brezhnev" 12-volume "History of the Second World War", published in the 70s, did not correct the situation either.

As for the last fifteen years or so, from the moment the "Icebreaker" of "Suvorov"-Rezun appeared on the mass book market, not only tubs, but tanks of dirty historical falsification began to pour on the heads of contemporaries, and in this muddy stream the truth about the war turned out to be for many are simply recessed. Today, it is enough to get acquainted with the many opinions expressed on the Internet forums to understand what an unimaginable confusion for an informed and thinking person reigns in many young and not very young minds, how monstrously and maliciously the picture of the Great Patriotic War and in general the entire Stalin era is distorted in them.

In 2002, the publishing house "Veche" published a book by Alexander Albertovich Pomogaybo "Pseudo-historian Suvorov and the mysteries of the Second World War." This is almost the only thorough analysis of the "Icebreaker" of "Suvorov", and although it is sometimes naive, on the whole it deserves praise and readership.
attention.

One way or another, I could not avoid mentioning this work in my book, but I remembered it precisely in connection with the eleventh myth, because in the preface to his book Pomogaybo made a very revealing admission that when he, in his time as a journalist, received an assignment to interview about the book "Icebreaker" at the Institute of Military History, this interview did not clarify the issue for him.

How could this happen? It would seem, where else can the question be thoroughly clarified, if not in the concentration of the military historical thought of the Fatherland? But no, it wasn't there. The question was not cleared up.

But why?

I repeat: only one history of the Great Patriotic War itself was written in the USSR - the "Khrushchev" six-volume edition edited by Pospelov, released in the early 60s. Plus - the 12-volume "History of the Second World War", published in the "Brezhnev" 70s, where a lot of true and useful things were said about the Great Patriotic War for its understanding, but far, far from everything, if we keep in mind even purely factual and statistical side of the history of the war.

For comparison, let me tell you that the official English history of the Second World War, prepared by the historical section of the Cabinet of Ministers, has 80 (eighty!) Volumes and, as noted in the preface to the Russian edition of the 4th volume of this history, published by Voenizdat in 1980, "reflects setting views of the British ruling circles on the events of the Second World War.

Eighty volumes! And this despite the fact that the description of events on the Soviet German front in this story - judging by that 4th - no more than 8% of the total.

And where is **our** complete history of the war? And what "setting" views should reflect it?

Lenin's own niece, Olga Dmitrievna Ulyanova, when asked by a television presenter about which version of her uncle's genealogical roots

would arrange more - "German" or "Jewish", answered that she would be satisfied with *the truthful* version. By the way, I will already note that the "Jewish" version is erroneous, as objective studies have shown already in the Yeltsin era ...

So, the true history of that war can be written only by professing "setting" views similar to Olga Dmitrievna's approach, namely: 1) complete, accurate, representative information; 2) an honest, comprehensive analysis of it; 3) comprehensively substantiated and comprehensive conclusions.

But where is she, such a story? And how many approach the study of the history of the war with an open mind, honestly and professionally? Today, in the bibliography of many "research" about the war, you can't find anything, although most of the "sensations" are actually either rehashings of a long-forgotten old one, or rewriting from each other ... But not always in these "lists of used literature" there is a place even for the classics - the same Tippelskirch or the collective collection "Fatal Decisions" ... I'm not talking about such "rarities" as the memoirs of General Vincenz Muller or the work of General Philippi "The Pripyat Problem" ... that it is involved for the appropriate "entourage" and giving "sensations" solidity.

However, these are, so to speak, buffoons and cheaters from history. And how is it with strong professionals, and above all with the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and even earlier - the Ministry of Defense of the USSR?

In England, I remind you, only the open (and, of course, also full of "incompleteness" and omissions) history of that war "pulls" for 80 volumes. In the United States, from 1945 to 1961, in the Department of Military History of the Headquarters of the US Armed Forces in Europe, a huge amount of work was done to collect memories and assessments of a large group of former Nazi generals and officers. As a result, more than two thousand manuscripts were prepared.

Do we have something similar at home? After all, we also had a lot of German generals in captivity ... But did we gather in time not only theirs, but even *our* full experience? I do not know what the full volume of the War Memoirs book series is, but it is unlikely that it will be even a quarter of what the Yankees received from their former opponents. However, many of our memoirs are just a "literary record" and not an accurate soldier's account of events.

However, a professional military historian can only shrug his shoulders about my philippics, because he knows that we also carried out similar work, and our captured German generals received a pack of paper and a pen and pen, and we compiled questionnaires for the Soviet generals and conducted extensive and serious historical research by professional military men, for example, with a comparative analysis of the levels of combat stability of German and Soviet troops in different periods of the war.

But how is all this reflected in the full history of the war?

Where is she?

Why was the journalist Pomogaybo unable to clarify the unclear issues of the history of the war, even after visiting the Institute of Military History, and was forced to deal with these unclear issues himself?

Yes, writing such an honest and complete history of the war today will be especially difficult, given the psychological atmosphere that has been created over the past twenty or so years by domestic falsifiers of the modern history of the Fatherland.

And what is interesting! After all, this story will not contain any super-discoveries. Moreover, its scheme will be close to the traditional one: the USSR did not want a war, and Hitler started it at his own will. The Nazis were cruel and took in the first period of the war often impudently, and our troops fought heavy defensive battles. And because our cause was right, we won!

This is a brief outline... But how much of the content of this scheme is missing to this day!

So, an honest history of the war cannot but give I.V. Stalin - Commander No. 1 of all times and all peoples ... Commander No. 1 because he led the entire complex of Russia's actions in War No. 1 of all times and all peoples and led Russia in this war to Victory.

An honest history of the war cannot but pay tribute to the second after Stalin managerial figure of the war years, Stalin's deputy for the State Defense Committee L.P. Beria...

In this honest history of the war, it will be necessary to admit that even the most famous, and deservedly famous, representatives of our post-war "marshals" and generals did not need the *full* truth about how the war began.

Earlier in this book, I already wrote that Stalin, after the war, generously did not make public the fact that not only Pavlov, but almost the entire military leadership criminally missed the war. "After the Victory has come, is it worth stirring up the past?" — most likely, he decided. Perhaps he did not attach much importance to the study of past military experience, and because such experience in the nuclear missile era should have rapidly become obsolete and indeed would have become obsolete if defense construction in the USSR had proceeded rationally even after the death of Stalin and Beria. After all, we were not going to conquer the world by force of arms - as Napoleon tried to do, as the current oligarchs of the West are trying to do. And therefore, it would be enough for us to protect ourselves with the Nuclear-Missile Shield, which would completely change all the former concepts of war and exclude this war.

Or here is another circumstance, which I also already mentioned ... Stalin did not know that after his death, many, and almost all of his comrades-in-arms, including the military, would not cut off Khrushchev when he began to slander Stalin, obviously for Stalin's inner circle way. Stalin could not imagine that his marshals would allow their supreme leader to be slandered. But we know this today! And knowing this, how can one keep silent about *it* in an honest, objective history of the war?

And it will not be possible to keep silent about what Stalin himself preferred to keep silent about - that he also made many military leadership mistakes, because he did not immediately master the military craft, although he mastered it quickly and brilliantly ...

Yes, the objective history of the war has not yet become a fact. And my work, which in its main part has already been completed, is nothing more than another "brick" in the foundation of that complete history of the war that will someday be written.

Even if it is not so "golden", but I tried to make it a solid "brick" in the collective "building" of the true, real history of the Great Patriotic War, for the construction of which cutters and corned beef

relationship.

However, they must definitely get there - but in *small print*, in the notes to it, because the full history of the war will also have to say about its most malicious falsifiers.

As the saying goes: "To each his own."

AFTERWORD

SOME ASPECTS OF THE WORLD SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION BEFORE THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945

99.

So, dear reader, our conversation about 1941 itself is over. However, a comprehensive discussion on the merits cannot, in my opinion, be completed without

for example, the author's answer to a reasonable reader's question: "So what did happen in 1941? Why did what happened happen?"

Well, I will give my answer to this question, and it is up to the reader to accept it or not to accept...

In the middle of 1941, something similar happened in Russia in the military sphere - in a systemic sense, to what happened in 1933 in Russian agriculture.

And in 1933, and in 1941, we got, what is there to deny, catastrophes. At the same time, both catastrophes had the same systemic cause, but this cause had no connection with the policies of Stalin and the Bolsheviks. Both catastrophes, both in 1933 and 1941, were due to the heavy legacy of the old, tsarist, Russia, which went to the new, Bolshevik, Russia without the slightest desire, but - got it. After all, you can't get away from your country and its history - if you live in your country, and don't run away from it in search of a warm place on the planet.

And the special drama of the situation lay in the fact that in its most essential features this legacy of tsarism did not belong to the sphere of economy, education, science, culture, social development, etc. In its most significant and disgusting features it, this accursed heritage of the accursed past, belonged to the sphere of the national character of the Russian people.

And here's something to explain...

I have already written more than once in my books, including this one, that in the Russian people there are, as it were, two peoples - a great people, the personification of which was Ivan da Marya, and the insignificant people Vanek and Manek. And in order to develop this idea, I will allow myself an extensive autoquotation from my book "Russian America - to discover and sell!", Published by the Yauza publishing house in 2005:

"However, now, when I am at the end of a lot of work, I understand that from some point this book has also become a story about the greatness of the Russian spirit, firstly, and about the significance of the competence of power in the fate of peoples, secondly ...

And above all, in the fate of the Russian people.

The Russian people are a great people, and once again we have proved this with our East Siberian, Far Eastern and Pacific epic.

But these same events, the same periods in our history show and prove that what is especially significant for Russia is what constitutes its supreme power and what it is guided by ... And I also want to say about this at the end of the book

Few words...

If smart patriots are at the head of Russia, it gains strength and perspective. If mediocrity and "Ivans who do not remember kinship" are in power, the country is weakening and decrepit.

Alas, in Russia the second happened more often. And very often her supreme power was unworthy of the people who were subject to her. But even in such periods of confusion and vacillation, Russia was strong in the initiative and vitality of the most glorious part of her popular mass. Let us recall the heroes of the defense of Sevastopol in the Crimean War. It was a handful, but a handful that felt like a part of the State.

And Russian America?

It - if you think about it, did not even begin with Peter ... In fact, it originated in the era of Ivan the Terrible, when it began not just the expansion of the Russian state to its natural borders, but an expansion deliberately initiated at the highest state level, that is, initiated and encouraged by the head of state .

Then it was an autocrat, a man who for the first time called himself "the king of all Rus", - Ivan the Terrible ... As a true Russian patriot, he was slandered both during his lifetime and beyond the grave. But it was he who moved the Russians to the east. However, it was not only Grozny that was the problem, but

first of all - in a truly Russian spirit. That is, in an inquisitive, active, courageous, stubborn and unpretentious spirit.

Somehow the thought occurred to me that there are, as it were, two English peoples, differing from each other even in outward appearance - a squat, clumsy plebs, the common people, and a slender, lean and elegant aristocracy ...

I don't know if this is true, but I'm more and more convinced that in the Russian people - both in the very thickness of its masses and in its upper layers - there are certainly two peoples that are fundamentally different from one another - the people of Ivan and Mary and the people Vanek and Manek ...

The first people beat foreigners, the second licked their heels.

The first created melodious songs that took the soul, the second - obscene ditties.

The first in a difficult time frowned his forehead, tightened his belt and rolled up his sleeves, the second - fooled around.

The second lived anyhow, not very interested even in what is there beyond the distant forest. The second strove to lie down on the stove, and the first ...

And the first went to distant lands - not conquering them, but organically absorbing them into the circle of Russian affairs.

It was precisely the movement of the nation ... The West sent predatory adventurers to overseas possessions, then missionaries, and then administrators, colonists.

And the Russian Ivan, the son of Ivan and Marya, went to the new lands of Western, Central, Eastern Siberia immediately as an exponent of the general Russian will - due to the breadth of character. And even if he seemed to be going for yasak and soft junk, then - in the end - he followed the fate of the Russian land ... "

The tsarist "Raseya" mass-produced exactly manek and vanek, and could only exist until Ivan and Marya gained serious strength in Russia.

This is exactly what happened in 1917. At first, however, the most active sections of the upper bourgeoisie, dissatisfied with the autocracy, prepared and carried out **their** The February revolution, but then they failed to cope with the elements, where the revelry of the Vankas was combined with the emerging - in the figurative expression of Lenin - "the measured tread of the iron battalions of the proletariat." And in October 1917, a new government was born, which began to transform the "Race" of the Vankas into the Russia of Ivan da Marya.

Vanki of all sorts and levels, up to the professorial and academic, resisted as best they could. At the same time, if for vanki with university badges this resistance could somehow be justified by a longing for lost privileges and a desire to return them, then vanki in worn trousers resisted due to that dense ignorance and deep-seated "I don't like it, and that's it!", Which The "race" of crowned vanki has been carefully cultivated in the people's soul for more than one century.

The people, the people for whose future Stalin ruined his health in the frosts of Turukhansk exile, have not yet seen, have not realized what it is - this future - should be.

But Stalin knew!

And in 1933, the surviving "Raseya" vanek and manek paid cruelly - with itself - for the centuries-old debts of the royal "Race" ...

In 1941, too.

What, my dear reader? Uncomfortable? Harsh and harsh? I agree, it's tough and brutal.

But, alas, it's fair.

Today we must understand - what is dearer to us, supposedly "elevating deceit" or "darkness of low truths"? And one of these bitter truths is the following ...

Yes, the famine of 1933 was almost programmed by the collectivization of 1930, but the main cause of the humanitarian catastrophe of 1933 was not Stalin's policy and not even the hidden provocations of the Trotskyists and anti-Soviet people, but the unwillingness, first of all, of the middle peasant masses (and peasant Russia by the beginning of collectivization was predominantly middle peasant) to realize that only large-scale commodity production of food can ensure the future of the country, and under socialism, against which the middle peasant had nothing as a social system, large-scale commodity production of food could be ensured only **through** collective management on

earth.

Should have either:

a) to constantly live from hand to mouth, not to be able to develop large-scale industry and defense, and soon become a victim of external successful aggression by one or another foreign power, or a bloc of these powers;

or:

b) to carry out collectivization, on its basis to create a collective large-scale commodity production of food and provide them with cities in which workers create a large-scale industry and the material base for the defense of Russia ...

There was, however, a third option: to return to capitalism, when not the middle peasant individual farmer, but about five million hired workers (farm laborers) in large capitalist latifundia created the bulk of the commodity mass of grain, which more or less fed Russia and was exported.

The middle peasant did not want capitalism, just as he did not want collectivization either. And the problem had the character of only a dilemma: "either-or". "Let your word be "yes-yes", "no-no", and what is beyond this is from the evil one," Jesus Christ said more than two thousand years ago, but even before him the ancient Romans said: "Tertium non datur" - "There is no third"!

Stalin honestly said the same to the country. In 1929, he said: "We need to run a distance of a hundred years in ten years. Otherwise, we will be crushed."

The Ivans understood him immediately, the Vankas after a while. At first, they did not want to join their efforts, they looked at yesterday's own, but now standing in the collective farm stables, as if they were someone else's **horse** ... —

the number of horses, pigs, cattle and small livestock ... At the end of the first third of the 20th century, they wanted to live as shaky as centuries ago.

And then, unexpectedly - for the vankas - the terrible drought of 1933 struck.

And a catastrophe occurred - as a kind of result of the centuries-old abomination that the old "Raseya" accumulated in itself and which the new Russia simply did not have time to completely clean out of the people's soul.

When the problem of creating a socialist base for large-scale commodity production of grain was basically solved through deprivation and misunderstanding, in the USSR, in the second half of the 1930s, not only industry, but also agriculture began to grow rapidly. And by 1941, the bulk of the former middle peasants had already sincerely become a supporter of collective farming.

Although the people of Vanek, alas, did not completely disappear, still coexisting next to the great people of Ivanov. Moreover, there were vankas not only in the village, but also in the city, and in the army. And they wore not only peasant trousers, but also working blouses, and Red Army tunics. Even more of them - in percentage terms - were among those who wore jackets, uniforms, briefcases and the consciousness of their own leader.

greatness.

And in the defense of Russia in the last two or three years before the catastrophe of 1941, something similar happened to what happened in the agriculture of Russia in the last two or three years before the catastrophe of 1933.

On the one hand, the Ivans and Maries made enormous creative efforts... Some of them were in order to build a mighty industrial power as quickly as possible in the conditions of obvious historical time pressure, capable of reliably defending itself with modern weapons in a modern war... Others, in order to both as soon as possible and better to master the possession of this weapon.

On the other hand, vanka and manka lived neither shaky nor roll. Vankas, having worked their shift or ordered their own on the parade ground, calmly bought "bagels" and sat with their "Mashas" at the body ... sorry, samovar.

In Europe, not only did it smell of gunpowder, it already smelled of gunpowder smoke with might and main, and the vanki still lived according to the laws of serene peacetime.

And then, unexpectedly - for the vankas - a military thunderstorm of 1941 struck.

And a catastrophe occurred - as a kind of result of the centuries-old abomination that the old Russia had accumulated in itself and which the new Russia simply did not have time to clean out of the people's soul.

He was not ready for war, the initial period of the war was lost by the people of Vanek and Manek, the most prominent representative of which was General of the Army Pavlov among the military, and Nikita Khrushchev in the civilian environment.

And the multi-million people of Ivanov and Mari, led by Stalin, from the first day of the war took upon themselves its burden and carried it, carried it ... He immediately matured and became more severe, this people, they immediately increased immeasurably in numbers. And the remaining several million vaneks and maneks also had to - where can you go - carry and carry the burden of war all war years.

Konstantin Vanshenkin, a very uneven and ambiguous poet, has a theme an equally beautiful poem that begins like this:

A coward pretended to be brave in war
Since cowards were not given a descent,
He was shaking, panting, on the armor,
He languidly joked at a halt ...

And this coward "pretended" to be brave for so long that he gradually became really something like a brave man ... Then Vanshenkin writes: "Oh, if one day the scoundrel pretended to be noble forever," and ends like this: "In everything else, appreciating naturalness, I welcome such a pretense!"

The Great Patriotic War became such a great test for the people, it turned the soul upside down and forced so many natural cowards to go into battle, under bullets, it gave such mass examples of sacrifice and heroism that it cleansed and nobly reborn the souls of millions of people. And, despite the death in that war of millions of Ivanovs and Maries, as well as hundreds of thousands - eternal glory to them! - former vankov, the people of Ivanov and Mari during the war received a powerful increase. Although the people of Vanek completely, alas, did not disappear even after all the national disasters and national exploits.

But by 1945, the great people of Ivanov came to Berlin, hoisted the Banner of Victory over it and raised the immortal bronze Ivan the Nameless Great, who took up the sword on June 22, 1941, and lowered it only on May 9, 1945, on a granite pedestal.

And just as by the beginning of the forties of the XX century the great transforming and creative power of socialism in agriculture became clear, so by the very middle of the forties the great vitality of socialism became clear, which allowed Russia to survive the military catastrophe of the summer of 1941 and turn the tide of the war in favor of Russia.

This is how I explain what happened in the summer of 1941 and why the catastrophe of 1941 did not become final for Russia, but turned out to be only a tragic episode in the general history of the Great Patriotic War.

"That's how it is," one of the readers may say to all this. "But how are those long-standing events connected with the present and are they connected with it at all — directly?"

The exact answer here is unequivocal: "Of course, they are connected, and how!" Now I will give a riddle quote, where some words have been released so far, and let the reader try to guess when and where this happened ... So:

"At the beginning {...} the idea was to divide the territory of the Soviet Union into separate states. The Baltic republics, Belarus, Ukraine were to become "free {...}" states with their own governments. N-th {...} observers were supposed to play the role of advisers...

At the final meeting, all these ideas were thrown overboard, in other words, rejected. N declared that these territories would become protectorates ... "

At first glance, this may seem like a frank admission by some expert of some Bilderberg club or something like that, made in some kind of "exclusive" interview at the beginning of the 21st century. However, here is the full, uncut, text (previously released words, replaced by dots in curly brackets, are highlighted by me. - **S.K.**):

"In the beginning, the idea of dividing the territory of the Soviet Union into separate states prevailed **in the General Staff**. The Baltic republics, Belarus, Ukraine were to become "free **from Stalin**" states with their own governments. **German military** observers were to play a role
advisors...

At the final meeting, all these ideas were thrown overboard, in other words, rejected. **Hitler** declared that these territories would become protectorates ... "

The quote is taken from Walter Görlitz's The German General Staff. Its history and structure. 1657 - 1945 ("The German General Staff. Its history and structure. 1657 - 1945"). As you can see, the "hawks" of the German General Staff dreamed about what has become a reality for Russia today, although they dreamed about it not only in Germany. So far, the hands of the "fifth column" on the territory of the Soviet Union have implemented ideas similar to the old ideas of some of the German General Staff. However, the modern "Rossiania" - if it tries to remain as a liberal "Rossiania" - can wait for the implementation of more far-reaching plans, similar to Hitler's plans.

And here we come to one very subtle point... For some of the readers, the position of the author of the book may seem strangely inconsistent. On the one hand, he shows through documentary examples that Hitler quite consciously went to war with Bolshevik Russia, hated her and did not want to live on the same planet with her. On the other hand, he argues that the war between the USSR and the Third Reich was by no means automatically programmed. What does it mean?

It should be understood as follows - if something is still unclear to someone ... In the short period between 1938 and 1941, there were two really possible, but diametrically opposite, versions of the development of the historical situation in the world.

One option - a positive one - was implemented with partnerships between Russia and Germany, based on the idea of continental Europe, united under the auspices of Germany, guaranteed by Russia and opposing the international elite with its headquarters in London and New York.

Another option - the negative one - was implemented when an armed struggle arose between Germany and Russia, was based on the confrontation between Germany and continental Europe, united under the auspices of the international elite with its headquarters in London and New York.

I know that on July 8, 1941, Halder (here, I had to turn to him again for information) wrote in his diary:

"Unshakable is the Fuhrer's decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. Tanks should not be used for this. It will be "a national disaster that will deprive the centers not only of Bolshevism, nor of the Muscovites (Russians) in general" ... "

But this was said by Hitler in the heat of the moment and in a state of dizziness from outwardly phenomenal military successes in the very Russia on which Napoleon himself broke his teeth. And this was said after the Western Bug, the Rubicon of that war, had been crossed.

I did not immediately come to the conclusions that I cited above. And today I see our past much more voluminously compared to how I saw it, say, fifteen years ago.

Between my old, largely naive, "understanding" of history and this book, not only years have passed, but also four published books of mine on the topic - a kind of "trilogy" (in quotation marks because I strived for sufficient independence of each of my books) about the relations between Russia and Germany: "Russia and Germany: play off!", "Russia and Germany: together or apart?", "Russia and Germany : the path to the Pact", as well as its virtual (however, only at the end) continuation of the "Kremlin visit of the Fuhrer".

And in each of these books, I carried out the main idea that Russia in the outside world could not have any other main constructive partner except Germany - whether the Kaiser, whether Weimar, or nationalist ...

It was the strategic union of these two powers, which developed at the expense of their own talents, that determined peace in Europe and, accordingly, ruled out war there. If the situation had developed in this way, then the United States would never have been able to think about the role of the master of Europe and the world.

That is why the forces of the World Evil did everything to play off two potentially friendly and complementary countries both in 1914 and in 1941. But by saying this, I do not fall into some kind of Germanophilism, which some active participants in Internet forums sometimes suspect me of ... I -

a consistent Russian Soviet patriot and I love not Germany, but Russia. Germany - as one of the three most distinctive phenomena in the history of the XIX-XX centuries (the other two are Russia and Japan) - I just respect.

The unwise Slavophiles cannot forgive Bismarck for not defending the interests of Russia at the Berlin Congress, which did a lot for Germany ... However, not everyone can be so simpletons as to neglect their own national interests for the sake of some "uncle" .. Especially to Uncle Sam, as today's liberal Rossiyanians do. It's the racist "elite" vankas who don't give a damn about Russia, and Bismarck respected many countries and peoples, but loved one country -

his, as he loved only one people - his own, German.

I don't have a claim on him for this ... I myself, I repeat, love only my people - Russian, Soviet. But I love him with open eyes... After all, the heart should be hot, and the hands should be clean... The mind should be cold, clear - for some reason

this third term of Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky's famous formula is often forgotten. But the mind should be such not only among the Chekists, but also among patriots, among researchers of the past ...

And cold reason leads to the conclusion, which has already been mentioned above more than once: it was not the intransigence of ideologies (really very different in a number of fundamental provisions), not an objective conflict that led us to the second war of the Russians with the Germans, but the provocations of the enemies of Russia and Germany, as well as unsurmounted mutual distrust, the grounds for which were given to each other by both sides.

Both!

And both did not do everything that could and should have been done ...

In 1985, the Military Publishing House published the memoirs of Marshal Chuikov "From Stalingrad to Berlin". And there, on page 529, an indicative opinion was given of a lieutenant colonel of the German General Staff, who was taken prisoner in January 1945. In a conversation then with General Chuikov, a German, a completely convinced Nazi, said:

"Peace is needed not only by the Germans, but also by the Russians. Your allies are unreliable. We Germans can come to terms with you and be reliable neighbors, and maybe even allies against your current allies.

Why, then, in 1941 did the Germans, violating the non-aggression pact, attack our peaceful country, which did not threaten anyone? asked Vasily Ivanovich.

And the general staff responded:

The rapid growth of the Land of Soviets inspired us with fear, we were afraid that you would be the first to attack us. Hitler decided to get ahead of you, which made the biggest mistake. We didn't expect the Soviets to be so strong. Our general staff and Hitler miscalculated ...

But then we also miscalculated, dear reader! They miscalculated, allowing Hitler to go to war with us... And as a result, the Planet lost that quite possible development of the world situation, which would exclude the dictate of the world stock exchange by the beginning of the 21st century.

Today, the Germans and Europe once again look down on Russia, believing that it has already been dropped from the scales of history. Well, the liberal *two-headed* "Russian" vankov on the coat of arms and in the Kremlin can really be ignored.

But aren't the federal Germans at the beginning of the 21st century making the same fatal mistake that the German nationalist Hitler made in 1941?

I am sure that today there is something to think about here for Russians, Germans, and everyone Europeans. As, however, and not Europeans - too.

One more thing...

One of my longtime comrades and colleagues, an experienced weapons engineer, who can perfectly analyze not only engineering problems, told me:

"You know, with all your obvious rightness, won't it turn out that you will pour water on the mill of that bastard who is trying to put a sign of identity between Stalin and Hitler and convince us that all the victims of that Great War were allegedly meaningless?

And continued:

"Will it turn out that a young guy, on the one hand, an intellectual, and on the other, an unwitting victim of the current "PR", information forgery and total filthiness of the brain, will see in your reasoning the opposite of what you would like to prove? After all, they don't teach him to think, on the contrary, they zombie him from television screens, from the pages of books and newspapers, at school and on the student bench ...

Literally on the eve of this conversation, I leafed through Lyudmila Chernaya's book "Brown Dictators", where in the section on Ribbentrop this "publicist", on the one hand, contemptuously assesses Stalin's policy after August 23, 1939, the day the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed, and contemptuously talks about the essence visit

Molotov to Berlin in November 1940. On the other hand, she quotes the great muddler Andrei Sakharov, who in his "Memoirs..." reported that in Gorky he managed to read Yevgeny Gnedin's notes "on the prehistory of the Soviet-German pact...". According to Sakharov: "Gnedin, citing many documents published in the West and supplementing them with his memoirs, convincingly shows that the Soviet-German pact of 1939, his secret articles, rapprochement up to negotiations on joining the axis (meaning the Tripartite Pact of Berlin , *Rome and Tokyo* . - **S.K.**) - all this is not just a necessary maneuver, the only way out of the situation that has developed for the USSR as a result of the Munich "appeasement" of the aggressor ("historians" like Chernaya call the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, inhabited almost exclusively by three millions of Germans, but unfairly included after the First World War in the "Czechoslovakia" - S.K.), but a turn long desired by Stalin - Molotov, corresponding to their deep orientation and prepared by many of their long-term actions.

Here he is, they say, the true appearance of the "tyrant" of Stalin, Chernaya hints to the reader ... Like, he had long dreamed of an alliance with another "tyrant" - Hitler ... At the same time, Chernaya, of course, keeps quiet about the fact that enmity for the USSR with Germany (of any state structure) was absolutely unnecessary from the point of view of national interests. She also keeps quiet about the fact that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR "Litvinov"-Vallah and the nits subordinate to him ... oh, sorry, the gnins tried a lot to encourage such enmity, despite the obvious harm from this for the USSR.

Our "publicist" is maliciously silent about many other things that can give a picture of the era and an explanation of Stalin's motives, completely different from those given by various kinds of blacks ...

At three o'clock in the morning I finished getting acquainted with the "black" passages, and the next morning I listened to my friend. And, remembering Lyudmila Chernaya, he decided that there was a reason in his there are doubts. And if so, then I, dear reader, realized that my afterword is not yet finished and something else needs to be said - about the "kings" of finance, about green "cabbage", about Uncle Sam's shoes and top hat and about "black" dirt poured out by a host of pseudo-historians on the history of people.

No, in the situation in which it was shaped by the dark forces of human society, the Russian Bolshevik Stalin and the German nationalist Hitler had almost no chance not to turn out to be antagonists to such an extent that the words became fair: "We are fighting for peace and light, they are for the kingdom darkness..."

However, neither Stalin nor Hitler led and led their countries and peoples to such a deadly confrontation. No... Bankers Rothschilds and arms dealer Basil Zakharov, Du Ponts and Rockefellers, Churchill and Roosevelts, "Soviet" Ballach and anti-Soviet Baruch, Pole Beck, Czech Benesh and many other "black" and "dirty" did everything to ensure that a peaceful version of the European and world history of the XX century

became impossible.

Someone inside the USSR was taunting Stalin in his desire to pursue a foreign policy that was rational from the point of view of the national interests of the Soviet people. And as a result, this policy turned out to be inconsistent, and "just nothing" was enough for Stalin in order to get rid of both the Trotskyist and the leftist Comintern ballast in the politics of the USSR.

Someone in Germany was pissing off Hitler. And as a result, he came to Barbarossa ...

Someone in England, France, Poland, Norway, Holland and Belgium, in Greece and Yugoslavia also blocked their reasonable policy, determined by the interests of the peoples of these countries, and not by the interests of world financiers.

And, of course, in the United States - the headquarters of all world work to undermine the world and incite all past and future world wars - a lot of effort was made to pit Hitler against Russia.

In his book, far from being truthful in everything, but interesting in everything, the former personal assistant to the chief of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, Oscar Raile, writes about the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Beck, as follows:

"Beck rejected both the political ideas of Dmowski, who advocated a common path between Poland and the Soviet Union, and the ideas of Studnicki, who advocated mutual understanding with Germany. On the other hand, Beck was inclined to the theses of the historian Adolf Bozhensky, who considered the policy of war to be the only true one for Poland. Beck intended with the help of the West ("democratic." - **S.K.**) to plunge Europe into a big war again. The First World War made Poland independent...

Beck thought would give Poland even more..."

It is interesting, by the way, that Beck's calculations were in a sense justified, because the Polish "arrogant" meanness finally provided Poland with huge and unfair increments of its territory at the expense of defeated Germany. Here Stalin was pleased for the Poles, whom they today pour slops over and curse.

Reile, of course, greatly overestimates the role in the preparation and unleashing of the Second World War of such a small fry as the drunkard Beck (Reile himself reports that the "eagles" of Canaris, examining the abandoned official residence of Beck, the Brühl Palace, found there a huge box of empty bottles from under champagne and a letter from Pani Beck to her husband with the line: *"Nights in which you were not drunk, I can count on the fingers"*).

But Reile's testimony is very important because it correctly points to the role of Western countries as puppeteers of Beck's type of puppets.

So what does Hitler and even more so Stalin have to do with it?

Yes, the war between the Russians and the Germans, if you look at its objective background, can be regarded by us, the descendants of the heroes of that War, as a misunderstanding. But this does not mean that the sacrifices, efforts and exploits of these heroes were senseless in that real subjective situation into which the peoples of the world, Europe and, in particular, the German and Soviet peoples, were driven by the Golden Elite of the world and its shameless, cynical and corrupt lackeys from politicians, as well as left-wing fanatics of the "global fire", who ultimately served the same forces of World Evil.

After these forces were able to push Hitler onto a path that was disastrous for him and for his Germany, we Russians had no choice but to take up arms and defend the freedom and independence of our Soviet Motherland in fierce battles with the German fascist invaders...

However, the world, the guarantors of whose stability would be jointly, first of all, Russia and Germany, could well become a reality. And not Stalin, and not Hitler, in the first place, are to blame for the fact that in reality it turned out differently.

How often in all the decades that have passed since the Second World War, Western historians, publicists, writers and politicians lamented - not with those, they say, they fought in an alliance ... It was necessary, they say, to fight not against Hitler along with the Soviets, but against Soviets with Hitler. And it was not necessary, they say, to enter into an alliance with these Russians - albeit forced, temporary, unnatural ...

And we, the simple-minded Russians, proved to them that no, that's right, an alliance between the West and Hitler would not have benefited the West. And not once did we ask ourselves the question: "Did we fight in alliance with the one with whom it was necessary?" Was it not profitable and reasonable for us to fight together with the Fuhrer, with the Duce, with the Land of the Rising Sun against the stock exchange West, against England and the USA?

To some, such a question of mine - despite everything said above - may still seem blasphemous. And I understand this... It is not easy, it is very difficult to look at the past era from such a position.

But I remind you: with such an unrealized, but possible turn of events on the parade ground of the Brest Fortress, Soviet soldiers would not die under German bullets, but would continue to hold parades together with the Germans ... The Dneproges and Kharkov Turbine Plants, Zaporizhstal "and Stalingrad tractor, Kiev Khreshchatyk and Sevastopol Panorama ...

Tens of thousands of large and small plants and factories would remain intact and produce products for the peoples of the USSR ... Tens of thousands of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Great Russian villages and villages would drown in the gardens ...

And millions of young builders of the new world would live, work and create - Commissar Rudnev and his son Radik, engineer Konstantin Zaslونov and writer Arkady Gaidar, Muscovites Zoya and Shura Kosmodemyansky and Oleg Koshevoy from Krasnodon with Sergei Tyulenin and Ulya Gromova ...

On the other hand, neither the English Isle nor the North American Continent would ever emanate that threat to the world, which today is more and more personified by the United Blackening States.

No, I do not desecrate the memory of the fallen with my analysis of history - it is desecrated in the castrated "Rossiyanin" by those who, since 1991, have served the black forces of the stock exchange West, and today they are deliberately puffing out their cheeks against the West - at the promptings of all the same dark forces of the West ...

And do not defile the deeds and memory of fallen friends by those who, ringing with military awards of that war, defile at sham "parades" in front of suppliers of Russian national wealth to the West? They desecrate the past, the present and the future of our great Motherland.

On November 7, 2008, an alleged military parade took place on Red Square - allegedly in honor of the military parade on November 7, 1941. But *that* parade was held in honor of a very specific event - the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917! And from the Mausoleum of Lenin, not draped with Christmas trees and sticks, he was received by the great successor of Lenin's cause - Stalin, and the battalions left Red Square to fight for our Soviet Motherland, overshadowed by the banner of the great Lenin.

What does the organizers of this alleged parade have to do with *that* parade? The only thing is that they dismantled socialism and the Soviet Union, slandered Stalin, tore Lenin's banner from the Kremlin, replaced it with the Vlasov "tricolor" and betrayed the Soviet Motherland, which was officially sworn in.

They have a chance - like any traitor before them. But this only chance - like that of any traitor before them - lies in the opportunity to repent before it's too late, and if not by blood, then by deed, to atone for their guilt before the Motherland.

And we must understand that even the catastrophe of 1941, overcome nevertheless Russia, pales before the catastrophe of 1991, which we still have not overcome.

We must understand this. And therefore, not only for the entertainment of the reader and not only for his information, I have undertaken and continue to undertake my work, but also so that our future does not repeat the mistakes of the past ...

**November 13, 2008,
18 hours 50 minutes Moscow time**

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"On the European situation in 1940-1941"

Myth first and foremost

The war between the USSR and the Third Reich was inevitable from any point of view: civilizational, geopolitical, political and economic

Myth two

The reason for the defeats of 1941 was Stalin ... Everyone saw the proximity of the war, except for this "fool" and "paranoid", who held back the generals, ignored intelligence data and believed the "provocateur" Beria. Therefore, in 1941, everyone in the country and in the army was preparing for war, except Stalin. At the same time, thanks to the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, who announced "Readiness No. 1", the Red Fleet especially distinguished itself, which started the war successfully

Myth three

Stalin himself planned a preemptive strike against Germany in 1941, and Hitler only preempted him (option: Stalin and Hitler agreed on a joint strike against England, but Hitler deceived Stalin and hit Russia)

Myth four

If in 1941 at the head of the Red Army were not "talentless" like marshals Timoshenko, Voroshilov, Budyonny, but Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich executed by Stalin and commanders repressed in 1937-1938, then the course of the war would have been immediately successful for the USSR

Myth five

Stalin was wise and far-sighted in everything, built a war plan in advance, created a situation that was obviously losing for Hitler in advance, and calmly led the war

Myth six

From the first day of the war, the whole country stood up to the German invasion as one person, and the Red Army from the very beginning fought skillfully and courageously under the leadership of experienced commanders, and only the suddenness of the attack did not make it possible to adequately repel aggression

Myth seven

Everything in the USSR before the war was based on fear of the NKVD, and therefore the people in Russia met the Germans with bread and salt. The Red Army soldiers and their commanders did not want and did not know how to fight, the Red Army was actually completely defeated and fled, and only the vast expanses of Russia and bad weather weakened the advance of the Germans and prevented them from entering Moscow

Myth eight

The Germans staged a "tank" and "air" pogrom against the Red Army. Soviet tank troops and the Air Force turned out to be ineffective, fought ineptly and died in vain

Myth nine

If it weren't for Hitler's mistakes and, again, bad weather and bad roads, then by the fall of 1941 Germany could have won the war, and Hitler could have received the Wehrmacht parade on Red Square

Myth tenth, in this book - the last "regular"

It was only through the blood of millions and the terror of the Cheka that Stalin managed to avoid the collapse of his regime in 1941. Moreover, if the Germans came to Russia as allies of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces and in 1941 would begin to pursue a policy similar to that

which they adopted in relation to Vlasov and the ROA three years later, then Stalin would have been overthrown by the people themselves, the captured Red Army soldiers themselves - if Hitler had extended his hand to them and returned the weapons ...

Myth "supernumerary", eleventh

Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, the world, thanks to the many years of work of academic institutions of historical profile and the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as thanks to the efforts of a number of domestic and foreign researchers, has a complete, objective and reliable history of both World War II and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people 1941 - 1945 against the German fascist invaders

Afterword

Some aspects of the world situation at the beginning of the XXI century in the light of the situation before Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945

Sergei Kremlev 10 MYTHS ABOUT 1941

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10 мифов о 1941 году

- В трагедии 1941 года виноват Сталин, вовремя не отдавший приказ о приведении Красной Армии в боевую готовность.
- Летом 41-го Сталин собирался нанести превентивный удар по Германии (вариант: Сталин и Гитлер планировали общий удар по Англии, но Гитлер обманул Сталина).
- Красная Армия была полностью деморализована в первые же дни войны и попросту «разбежалась», а кровавый сталинский режим удержался у власти лишь благодаря массовому террору и всеобщему страху.
- Если бы в 41-м командовал Тухачевский, катастрофы бы не случилось.
- Если бы не ошибки Гитлера, осенняя распутица и русские морозы, фюрер уже в ноябре мог принимать парад Вермахта на Красной площади...
- Эти грязные антисоветские мифы пришли на смену парадным советским. Это «либеральное» промывание мозгов калечит умы и души. Эта «демократическая» ложь вытесняет из памяти подлинную историю Великой Отечественной войны. Трагедия 1941 года стала главным козырем ревизионистов, которые ради очернения советского прошлого не брезгают ничем — ни подтасовками, ни передергиванием фактов, ни прямой ложью: в их «сенсационных» сочинениях события сознательно искажаются, потери завышаются многократно, слухи и сплетни выдаются за истину в последней инстанции, антисоветские мифы плодятся, как навозные мухи в выгребной яме...
- Эта книга — лучшее противоядие от «либеральной» лжи. Ведущий отечественный историк, автор бестселлеров «Берия — лучший менеджер XX века» и «Зачем убили Сталина?», не только опровергает самые злобные и бесстыжие антисоветские мифы, не только выводит на чистую воду клевету и клеветников, но и предлагает собственную убедительную версию причин и обстоятельств трагедии 1941 года.

